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Abstract 
THE STRATEGIC SYMBIOSIS 
BETWEEN US ASIAN POLICY AND TAIWANESE NATIONALISM 
by Wen-lung Laurence Lin 
This thesis explores the influence of US Asian policy on the evolution of Taiwanese 
nationalism and the role of Taiwanese nationalism in America's Asian policy. The study 
consists of five parts. The first part (1895-1950) introduces the source of Taiwanese 
nationalism and America's strategic scheme on Taiwan before 1945, and explores 
American options after the gennination of Taiwanese nationalism. America's intention 
to separate Taiwan from the mainland so as to deny the island to Chinese Communists 
· from late 1948 helped preserve inchoate Taiwanese nationalism. 
The second part (1950-1970) examines how America simultaneously exploited the 
Chinese Nationalist regime's anti-communism and facilitated the growth of Taiwanese 
nationalism in the bipolarized Cold-War em. The Truman administration's separatist 
intention after the Korean War, US aid and American scholars' Taiwan independence 
theories had significant implications for the evolution of Taiwanese nationalism. 
The third part (1970-1989) examines how America reconciled US-PRC mpprochement 
with its promotion of Taiwanese nationalism. Taiwan's democmtisation evolved in the 
context of US political, economic and military intervention. During the tmnsition to 
democratisation, secessionists turned political opposition movement into nation-building 
revolution. 
The fourth part (1989-2000) examines how US conservatives and Taiwanese nationalists 
jointly promoted Taiwanization. The dynamics of democratisation, native president Lee 
Teng-hui's domination of political agenda, the ambience of US-Taiwan strategic 
c realignment and the maturity of political nationalism together-facilitated Taiwanization.- - --~- c- o· 
The fifth part (2000-present) explores how America and Taiwan establish a stmtegic 
ii 
symbiosis for US-China strategic competition. The 9/11 Incident has little influence on 
the course of strategic symbiosis. The consolidation of Taiwan identity obliged the 
pan-blue camp to identify with Taiwan, promote political nationalism and deviate from 
their pro-unification ideology. The increased antagonism between Taiwanese 
nationalism and Chinese nationalism ossifies the symbiotic partnership between US 
Asian policy and Taiwanese nationalism and hinders China's rise to regional hegemony 
and global superpower. 
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Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION 
Objectives and Rationale 
Although China spares no efforts to advocate "one country, two systems" as a formula 
for unification across the Strait, the Taiwanese national government is determined to 
construct a new constitution and become a "normal country."1 In mid-March 2005, the 
National People's Congress of the PRC passed an anti-secession law that would 
effectively pre-authorize military action if Taiwan took concrete steps toward formal 
independence. 2 The antagonism between Taiwanese and Chinese nationalisms is 
intensifying. Contemporary Taiwan has become a military and cultural bastion of the 
US,3 and also the westernmost point on America's Western Pacific frontier.4 Before 
1895, the Chinese living in Taiwan shared a history and culture with their mainland 
counterparts; however, after the Chinese Nationalist government's misrule and 
suppression following 1945, they diverged from cognate Chinese nationalism in favour 
of cultivating a Taiwanese nationalism of their own. Central to this remarkable 
transformation is the influence of the US on Taiwan since 1945. 
All researchers agree that Taiwan would not be what it is today without the influence of 
the United States. In fact, the American connection is the sine qua non of Taiwan's 
quasi-independent existence.5 However, there are many riddles in terms of the link 
between American influence and the evolution of Taiwanese nationalism. Before 
1 Former Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui called on August 23, 2003 for the rectification of the nation's 
name from "ROC'' to "Taiwan" so that Taiwan can become a "normal country." He also advocated 
major changes to the Constitution to bring it into line with the reality of Taiwan's situation; see Chang 
Yun-ping, "Change of Name Must Happen: Lee," IT, Aug 24 2003. President Chen Shui-bian declared 
on September 28, 2003 to enact a new constitution for Taiwan in 2006; see Chang Yun-ping and Huang 
Tai-lin, "President Makes DPP Birthday Pledge," IT, Sep 29 2003. It is believed by many secessionists 
that a new constitution is necessary to build Taiwan into a normal country. In this context, drafting a new 
constitution inevitably indicates an intention to alter the status quo. See Hsu Yung-ming *-*l!f.J, 
"Drafting a Constitution Would Alter Status Quo," IT, Oct 3 2003. 
2 Joseph Kahn, "Beijing Leaders Speak of Force to Keep Taiwan 'Chinese'," NIT, Mar 8 2005; UDN, 
"Fan fenlie fa quanwen (The Full Text of the Anti-Secession Law)," Mar 15 2005. 
3 John King Fairbank, "Formosa Through China's Eyes," The New Republic, Vol. 139, No. 15 (1958): 10. 
Hong Kong scholar Shill-~ ~aaDoterms Fairbank's argument as "cultural interventionism;"-,~see Paaii 
~Siiiri-lai:li if!!~-. 't(udu' muhou: Meiguoren de changyi yu zhengce (Behind the Scene of Taiwan 
Independence': American Propositions and Policies) (Hong Kong: Zhonghua shuju, 1992), 48. 
4 George H. Kerr, Formosa Betrayed (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1966), 22. 
5 Thomas W. Robinson, "America in Taiwan's Post Cold-War Foreign Relations," The China Quarterly, 
No. 148, Special Issue: Contemporary Taiwan (1996): 1340. 
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exploring the essence of bilateral interactions, it is necessary to recapitulate the history of 
US-Taiwan relations. 
Taiwan used to be a settlers' society. Austronesian indigenous peoples, who arrived in 
Taiwan during the Palaeolithic age, 6 were the original inhabitants of the island. 7 
Following Dutch colonial development of Taiwan, ethnic Han people from Mainland 
China began substantial migration to the island around 1624. Han migration peaked in 
the middle of the seventeenth century and the Han became the dominant ethnic group on 
Taiwan.8 As a frontier territory of China, Taiwan was gradually incorporated into 
China in late seventeenth century and became a Chinese province in 1886. After China 
was defeated by Japan in the first Sino-Japan War (1894-95), Taiwan was ceded to Japan 
under the terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895. The Roosevelt administration 
decided on the return of Taiwan to the Republic of China (ROC) in the Cairo Declaration 
of 1943. The Declaration was reaffirmed by the Truman administration at the Potsdam 
Conference in July1945. Accordingly, Taiwan reverted to China after World War II. 
After the Chinese Nationalist government (Kuomintang, KMT) killed thousands of 
Taiwanese in the February 28 Incident in 1947, the US recognized Taiwanese 
secessionism and has been promoting Taiwanese nationalism ever since. 
Next, the KMT's successive failures against the Communists in the Chinese Civil War 
prompted the US government to implement separatism on Taiwan in late 1948. 
Nevertheless, when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) defeated the KMT on the 
mainland in late 1949, the Truman administration lost interest in defending Taiwan; the 
US changed its policy toward Taiwan from separatism to "hands off." In response to 
6 Michael Stainton, "The Politics of Taiwan Aboriginal Origins," in Taiwan: A New History, ed. Murray A. 
Rubinstein (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), 28-29. 
7 Shih Cheng-feng ~ "Tai-Zhong guanxi yu guojia anquan - Meiguo de yinsu, guojia rentong, yiji 
minzu rentong (Taiwan-China Relations and National Security- The American Factor, State Identity, and 
National Identity)" (paper presented at the Liang'anjiaoliu yu guojia anquan guoji yantaohui (International 
Conference on Cross-Strait Exchanges and National Security), Taipei; Nov-1- 2003). AVailable from--~ ~-
-http://mail.tku.edu.tw/cfshih/ [accessed Apr 30 2004]. 
8 Ronald G. Knapp, "The Shaping of Taiwan's Landscapes," in Taiwan: A New History, ed. Murray A 
Rubinstein (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), 9-10. See also Shih Cheng-feng, "Tai-Zhong guanxi yu guojia 
anquan- Meiguo de yinsu, guojia rentong, yiji minzu rentong (Taiwan-China Relations and National 
Security- The American Factor, State Identity, and National Identity)". 
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the Communists' charge that the US was going to occupy Taiwan,9 Truman declared on 
January 5, 1950 that the US had no interest in obtaining special rights or privileges or in 
establishing military bases on the island.10 When the Korean War erupted on June 25, 
1950, however, Truman abruptly reversed his position on Taiwan. Two days later, he 
announced that Taiwan's legal status was undetermined. In the next twenty years of 
Cold War bipolarisation, Washington exploited the KMT's anti-communism and 
accepted Taiwanese nationalism. America's refusal to recognize the ROC's sovereignty 
over Taiwan enabled some elements in the US, notably academics and Congress, and 
sometimes the administration, to promote an indigenous democratic movement in 
Taiwan. Taiwan independence becomes an option that all administrations have had to 
consider in order to advance US national interests. 
In the late 1960s, the Nixon administration began to seek rapprochement with China for 
a strategic alliance against the Soviet Union. However, America's "Three Joint 
Communiques" with the PRC and the "one China" policy only "acknowledges" that 
Taiwan is a part of China. The US has never recognized the PRC's sovereignty over 
Taiwan. As the Cold War drew to a close, China's strong economic development and 
expanding military build-up worried American, Japanese and Taiwanese governments. 
Taiwan thus became an integral part of American containment policy against China. 
The pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate Chen Shui-bian 
(~7.1<$) unexpectedly won the presidency in 2000. The Taiwanese nationalist DPP 
government shares with its US counterpart the belief in the threat posed by China. 
Since 2000, the US and Taiwan have been committed to consolidating a bilateral defence 
relationship focused on wartime cooperation against China. Taipei also endeavours to 
extend the US-Japan security alliance and promote regional comprehensive security 
against Beijing to justify the continued spread of American values and influence in the 
Asia Pacific region. Contemporary Taiwan has become a bona fide westernmost 
military and cultural bastion of the US on America's Western Pacific frontier. This 
marks a unique US-Taiwan symbiotic partnership in the international arena. This 
- --.·-_ .. .,: __ ---_- --:=-:::--, ------=-~..:::.---~:-..= -------
9
-bean Acheson, Pr~se~t;, the Cre:mon: My Years in ~he State Department (London: Hamish Hamilton, 
1970), 350-51. 
10 USDOS, "Memorandum. 5 January 1950," in Papers of Dean Acheson. Confidential, declassified 1976, 
Harry S. Truman Library, 1. See also June M. Grasso, Truman's Two-China Policy (New York: M. E. 
Sharpe, 1987), 137. 
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partnership is disconcerting to Beijing, as China heads for global and regional hegemony. 
Chen Shui-bian's re-election in 2004 may consolidate the strategic symbiosis between 
the US and Taiwan . 
. In the bipolarised Cold War era (1950-1970), the US maintained an anti-Communist 
alliance with the KMT government. In US-PRC rapprochement era (1970-1989), the 
US-Taiwan relationship was characterized by American help for Taiwan's survival under 
a "one China., structure. In the post-Cold War era, the Taiwanese government has been 
eager to participate in the American containment policy against China. This transition 
epitomises the rise of Taiwanese nationalism. The broad outlines of this history are 
well known; however, several key issues remain unresolved. What is America's ultimate 
Taiwan policy? Why has the US failed to recognise either the PRC's or the ROC's 
sovereignty over Taiwan? How do America's ''Three Joint Communiques;• "one 
China., policy and the Taiwan Relations Act fit in this picture? How has the gap 
between theory and practice of America's ''Three Joint Communiques., and "one China .. 
policy nurtured the US-oriented Taiwanese nationalism? An active and self-assertive 
Taiwanese nationalism has created both linkages and tensions among regional nations 
and civilizations. How will current US-Taiwan relations influence the peace and 
stability of East Asia? These questions can easily lead to more questions on 
US-PRC-Taiwan trilateral relations. 
This thesis seeks to answer these questions. It is necessary to understand the linkage 
between the US and Taiwanese nationalism, and the role of Taiwanese nationalism in 
America's Asian policy. There have been many studies of contemporary US-Taiwan 
relations, but the topic has been far from exhausted. American scholars and politicians 
typically stress American values of democracy, self-determination and the constitutional 
democratisation of Taiwan to justify American support of Taiwan, while calling attention 
to the stubbornness of China's claim of sovereignty over Taiwan. 11 Americans 
frequently argue that: "If the cross-Strait rivalry is ever to be resolved, China must 
u The autbors·ofthe·Heritage Foundation exemplify this approacb;-'-Johfi Tkacik;-W1Wse'Otte~china?- ----
[internet] (National Review, 2004 [cited Jun 5 2004]), available from 
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/tkacik200406030908.asp; John J. Tkacik, The Heritage 
Foundation Backgrounder No. 1717: Time for Washington to Take a Realistic Look at China Policy (The 
Heritage Foundation, 2003 [cited Dec 17 2003]), available from 
http://www.heritage.org/Researchl AsiaandthePacific/BG 1717 .cfm. 
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change. Any discussion of reunification without democratic reform in China is 
premature."12 However, they devote little attention to America's repeated attempts to 
separate Taiwan from China since the late 1940s and the American policy of containment 
against China. In contrast, most Chinese arguments concentrate on America's 
self-interest in Taiwan, 13 but overlook the threat that reactionary, irredentist and 
chauvinistic Chinese nationalism poses to regional peace and stability. 14 This 
dichotomy represents a traditional split between the American principle of national 
independence and a Chinese nationalism that emphasises unification.15 In other words, 
Taiwan is the battleground of a conflict between American and Chinese national values. 
Both sides do share one thing: a focus upon the Taiwan problem in the US-PRC relations 
to the exclusion of Taiwanese nationalism. 
Immediately after the inception of the Taiwan independence movement, Taiwanese 
nationalism has been a subject of scholarly concern. However, the nature of Taiwanese 
nationalism has been in constant change in the past decades. Works on transitional 
Taiwanese nationalism provide valuable but fragmented literature of its evolution in duly 
defined context in a framed period of time. Not until the late 1990s, when Taiwanese 
nationalism approached its maturation, could scholars make a more comprehensive 
review about the evolution of Taiwanese nationalism, the aim of which is to unite all 
residents on the island to construct a Taiwanese nation and establish a modem 
nation-state of the Republic of Taiwan.16 Recently there has been more research on 
Taiwanese nationalism. The research on this subject is characterised by two distinct 
12 USDOS, Taiwan Relations Act Helps Democracy Thrive, Senator Says (2004 [cited May 18 2004]), 
available from http://lists.state.gov/archi ves/us-china.html. 
13 These arguments are abundant among Chinese official figures and news agency. See Xinhuanet, 
Curbing Taiwan Independence' Most Urgent Task [internet] (Xinhuanet, 2004 [cited May 21 2004]), 
available from http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2004-05/17/content_1472607 .htm; Zhongyang 
dang'anguan rp~fflt~«Ef, ed.,l'eds., Zhongguo gongchandang bashinian zhengui dangan (Valuable 
Documents of Chinese Communists in the Past Eighty Years), 2 vols., vol. ll (Beijing: Zhongguo dang'an, 
2001), 1769-71,73,74. 
14 For the criticisms of Chinese nationalism, see Maria Hsia Chang, Return of the Dragon: Chinas 
Wounded Nationalism (Boulder: Westview Press, 2001), 6, 221. 
15 John King Fairbank, "China: Time For a Policy," Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 199, No.4 (1957): 35. See 
also Michel Oksenberg, "Taiwan, Tibet ~d_Hqn~ng in Sino,AmericanRelations,'1in-Eiving-with,China: 
--U.S./China Relationi irithe Twentj7-F{rst Century, ed. Ezra F. Vogel (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), 59. 
16 Shih Cheng-feng :MilE~. Taiwan minzu zhuyi (Taiwanese Nationalism) (Taipei: Qianwei, 2003), 
38-39, 85-86, 117-19,23, 229. See also Chang Mau-kuei ~t:E. "Shengji wenti yu mizu zhuyi 
(Provincialism and Nationalism)," in Zuqun guanxi yu guojia rentong (The Relations among Ethnic 
Groups and National Identity) (Hong Kong: Yeqiang, 1993), 237. 
5 
approaches, the endogenous and the exogenous. 
The endogenous approach stresses the intrinsic variables and internal development of 
Taiwanese nationalism. For early Taiwanese nationalists, the history of Taiwan has 
been a history of four centuries of struggle against colonial oppression.17 Yet Maurice 
Meisner wonders whether the Taiwanese tradition of revolts preceding the Japanese 
occupation in 1895 had anything to do with modem, western-type nationalism.18 This 
tradition of rebellions may have more to do with the struggle against local officials' 
corruption and exploitation. Indeed, nationalism is an ideology that emerged in Europe 
at the end of the late eighteenth century and only acquired its present meanings in the 
course of the nineteenth century.19 
Huang Chun-chieh outlines Taiwanese struggle against Japanese colonial suppression, 
KMT authoritarian rule and the PRC's policy of intimidation to make the argument that 
Taiwanese consciousness is the islanders' resistance to foreign rule.20 Chang Mau-kuei 
argues that Taiwan's domestic problems - including clashes over provincialism, 
inter-ethnic conflicts and definitions of national identity- reflect the Taiwanese step-up 
struggles for democracy, self -determination and sovereignty. This process also represents 
the division of a homogenous Chinese nationalism into a mutually antagonistic 
Taiwanese nationalism. 21 Robert Edmondson believed the coercive silencing of 
Chinese nationalism reinforced Taiwanese collective memory of the February 28 
17 Joshua Liao g3t~. Formosa Speaks (Hong Kong: Graphic Press, 1950), 3-21. See also Niu 
Ciong-hau, "The Formation of the Formosan Nation- A Short History of Formosa," Formosan Quarterly, 
Vol. 1, No.2 (1962): 45-55. Shih Ming ~1!13. Taiwans 400 Year History, Japanese ed (K.asugachO: 
Otoba ShobO, 1962), 438. 
18 Maurice Meisner, "The Development of Formosan Nationalism," The China Quarterly, No. 15 (1963): 
92-94. Meisner uses the establishment of "Formosan Democratic Republic," a temporary device for 
Taiwan's eventual reunification with China, to demonstrate that there did not exist a Formosan sense of 
nationalism at the moment of Taiwan's cession to Japan. 
19 Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 5. 
20 Huang Chun-chieh jii~~. "Lun Taiwan yishi' de fazhanji qi tezhi (The Development and 
Characteristics of Taiwanese Consciousness)," in Zhongguo yishi yu Taiwan yishi: 1999 Aomen xueshu 
yantaohui, ed. Xiachao jijinhui (Taipei: Haixia xueshu, 1999), 2,8-32. 
21 Chang Mau-kuei ~jl;f!, ''Taiwan de zhengzhi zhuanxing yu zhengzhi de 'zuqunhua' guocheng 
(Political Transformation and Ethnizationof Politics in Taiwan)". (paper presented aUhecJiaoyu yu ·~.., 
·· Zliongguo guojia in.inzu.tentong (Edrication and Chinese National Identity), Hong Kong, Jun 1 1996). 
Available from http://taup.yam.org.tw/PEOPLEJ961117-5.htm [accessed Aug 16 2002]. Provincialism, 
in the context of Taiwan, refers to "lack of cooperation, division, and even prejudice" between native 
Taiwanese and mainlanders; see Mau-Kuei Michael Chang ~ft. "Provincialism and Nationalism," 
Taiwan Studies, Vol. 1, No.2 (1995): 67, 91 note 1. 
6 
Incident and Taiwanese nationalist narratives from the late 1940s. 22 After the 
pro-independence DPP took power in 2000, the official records associated Taiwanese 
nationalism with democratisation. Chang Yen-hsien, Head of Academia Historica, 
argues that Taiwan's democratisation results from dissidents' persistent struggle against 
the authoritarian system of the KMT. 23 Indeed, democratisation played an integral role 
in the evolution of Taiwanese nationalism; however, the sources of democratisation 
remain controversial. 
There are four theories of democratisation. The first theory holds that democratisation 
is a consequence of rapid economic growth and social change in a capitalist economy. 
According to the second theory, it is the result of KMT elites' long-term commitment to 
the ideal of democracy; third, for counter-elites, it is the result of the compelling power 
of democratic forces.24 Finally, some argue that since 1977 a series of calculated moves 
by both the KMT and the opposition, or "a continuous process of bargaining," resulted in 
democratic breakthrough. 25 No scholars have investigated the link between these 
sources and external forces, such as the influence of the US. In other words, these 
works concentrate on the domestic conflicts and reconciliation between social structures 
and political systems on Taiwan. They fail to explain why the nationalism is 
US-oriented. 
The exogenous approach, in contrast, stresses American promotion and Chinese 
22 Robert Edmondson, "The February 28 Incident and National Identity," in Memories oft he Future: 
National Identity Issues and the Search for a New Taiwan, ed. Stepbane Corcuff (Armonk: ME Sharpe, 
2002), 30-31. 
23 Hsueh Yueh-shun, Tseng Pin-tsang, and Hsu Jui-bao a¥ .F..I J®t, tf £7,g, ~:fifitra, ed., "eds., Cong jieyan 
dao jieyan (The Martial Law Era), 8 vols., vol. 1, Zhanhou Taiwan minzhu yundong shiliao huibian 
(Documentary Collection on Democratization Movement of Postwar Taiwan) (Taipei: Academia Historica, 
2000), v-x. 
24 Chen Ming-tong ~!IJ3~. Paixi zhengzhi yu Taiwan zhengzhi bianqian (Faction Politics and the 
Political Transition of Taiwan) (Taipei: Xin ziran zhuyi, 2001), U7; Cheng Tun-jen ~JJ(f=, 
"Democmtizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan," World Politics, Vol. 41, No.4 (1989): 471, 90; 
Chou Yangsun and Andrew J. Nathan, "Democratic Transition in Taiwan," Asian Survey, Vol. 27, No.3 
(1987): 283; Peng De-fu ~;I. "Taiwan difang xuargu yu minzhu zhuanxing zbi yanjiu (A Study on 
Taiwan's Local Election and Democratic Transition)" (PhD thesis, National Taiwan Normal University, 
__ ~90 DL~. 12,_J3;"Tien_Hung-mao __ Eflzz~. "Dynamics of-Taiwan's-Democratic-Transition;~"-in In-the~--­
Shadow of China: Political Developments in Taiwan since 1949, ed. Steve Tsang (London: Hurst, 1993), 
103. 
25 Cheng Tun-jen, "Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan," 490; Peng De-fu, "A Study on 
Taiwan's Local Election and Democratic Transition", 11; Tien Hung-mao, "Dynamics of Taiwan's 
Democmtic Transition," 107-08. 
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intimidation in the development of Taiwanese nationalism. The official statements of 
Chinese nationalists, in particular, focus on American proposition for Taiwan 
independence.26 A typical argument is that American traditional values and stmtegic 
interests combined to prompt the US to enforce separatism and interventionism and thus 
gave rise to Taiwanese nationalism.27 Although this argument is valid, it oversimplifies 
the linkage between America and Taiwan. It also ignores the awareness of the 
Taiwanese people of the cultural differences between China and the US and the 
Taiwanese final selection of American values. This oversimplification and ignorance 
block the extraction of any constructive lessons from the evolution of Taiwanese 
nationalism. 
In fact, no single approach can satisfactorily explain the development of Taiwanese 
nationalism, which is the result of both reconciliation among intrinsic variables and 
interaction with changing external contexts. Wong Ka-ying argues that Taiwanese 
nationalism results from a desire to "form coherence between a cultural identity and a 
specific political boundary" with the appreciation that decades-long confrontation and 
separation across the Strait have forged an identification of a common destiny. 28 This 
argument ignores the influence of the US. Shih Cheng-feng believes that Taiwanese 
state identity and national identity have a lot to do with the system of the ROC and the 
war threat from the PRC. 29 He believed the deliberate ambiguity of the American "one 
China policy" since the 1970s has given the proponents of the Taiwan independence 
movement the leeway to pursue the establishment of an independent Republic of 
Taiwan;30 in fact, because of the protection of the Taiwan Relations Act (fRA) of the 
26 See, for example, Zhongyang dang'anguan, ed.,"eds., Zhongguo gongchandang bashinian zhengui 
dangan (Valuable Documents of Chinese Communists in the Past Eighty Years), 1769-71,73,74. See also 
CNN, Zhu: China Will Never Allow Taiwan to Declare Independence (2000 [cited Mar 11 2003]), 
available from http://www.cnn.com/2000/ASIANOW/east/03/15/cbina.zhul. 
27 Paau Shiu-lam, Taidu' muhou (Behind the Scene of Taiwan Independence'), 42-45. 
28 Timothy Ka-ying Wong, The Rise and Changing Nature of Taiwanese Nationalism (Hong Kong: Hong 
Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, 2001), 3, 16. 
29 Shih Cheng-feng, "Tai-Zhong guanxi yu guojia anquan - Meiguo de yinsu, guojia rentong, yiji minzu 
rentong (Tai wan-Cllin!_!~,~!ations ll!ld_ ~ational Security - J'he_ American Factor,. State Identity ,-and-_- -~ 
National IdentitY)".· · · -· ~-- · 
30 Shih Cheng-feng tiffiE .. "American Policy toward Taiwan- A Taiwanese Nationalist Review" (paper 
presented at the 2nd Annual Symposium on Taiwan's National Security- 20th Anniversary of the Taiwan 
Relations Act, Taipei, Nov 7 1998). Available from http://mail.tku.edu.tw/cfshih/lntroduction.htm 
[accessed Apr 25 2004]. 
8 
US, Taiwan is able to exist as a quasi-state.31 Christopher Hughes argues that the 
PRC-US rapprochement of the 1970s resulted in Taiwan's intermediate state and the 
Taiwanese questioning the links between national identity, regime legitimacy and 
international status; under the umbrella of the Taiwan Relations Act, the international 
isolation "has provided the context for a deconstruction of Chinese nationalism to take 
place" and resulted in a "post-nationalist identity in Taiwan."32 Yuan Ho-ling believes 
that since the 1970s America's "one China" policy has facilitated a division in domestic 
collective identity on Taiwan and China's policy of intimidation prompted the islanders 
to strengthen their collective consciousness.33 James Wang argues that international 
and domestic pressures since the early 1970s fuelled Taiwanization; America's 
de-recognition of the ROC and the Taiwanese opposition's challenge to the KMT pushed 
for democratisation and led to Taiwanization; the Taiwanized ROC finally abandoned the 
idea of unification with China. 34 These works acknowledge the Chinese and American 
role in the evolution of Taiwanese nationalism. In their study of democratisation, Chu 
and Lin argue that Taiwan's democratic transition was ''triggered by a protracted process 
of diplomatic derecognition and facilitated by the cumulative social and political 
mobilization produced by rapid industrialization and strong economic growth." 35 
However, these arguments refer only in passing to American influence since the 1970s. 
None of them explores the origin of America's separatist design for Taiwan and 
American influence on the rise of domestic Taiwanese nationalism. 
Although the US is an exogenous variable, it has a deep influence on Taiwan in terms of 
the evolution of national identity, and on the tension between Chinese and Taiwanese 
nationalisms. If national identity can be studied in ethnic, cultural and systematic terms, 
the rise of Taiwanese nationalism is most clearly manifested in terms of culture and 
system. Cultural identity stresses the shared history and memory, and systematic 
31 Shih Cheng-feng, Taiwan minzu zhuyi (Taiwanese Nationalism), 120 note 40. 
32 Christopher Hughes, Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism: National Identity and Status in International 
Society (London: Routledge, 1997), 30, 32, 35, 154. 55. 
33 Yuan Ho-ling ~fiQ&ti, "Chutan guojia rentong de waibu yinsu- Meiguo yinsu, Zbongguo yinsu yu 
Taiwan de guojia rentong (An Introductory Study of the External Factors of National Identity - The 
American Factor, Chinese Factor and Taiwanese National Identity)," .in ZhongglU!:yi~/:!i_ y~'{_aiwan yishi: . ~ 
1999 Aomen xueshu yantaohui, ed. Xiachao jijinhui (Taipei: Haixia xueshu, 1999), 506, 11. 
34 James Wang :E.lt:a;, "KMT's Localization Claim Is Empty," IT, Jan 14 2003. 
35 Chu Yun-han and Lin Tse-min, "The Process of Democratic Consolidation in Taiwan: Social Cleavage, 
Electoral Competition, and the Emerging Party System," in Taiwan's Electoral Politics and Democratic 
Transition: Riding the Third Wave, ed. Tien Hung-mao (London: M. E. Sharpe, 1996), 82. 
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identity refers to the acceptance of specific political, economic and social systems. 36 
However, scant research has been dedicated to the relations between the US and 
Taiwanese nationalism, or to the extent of America's dynamic Asian policies in guiding 
the evolution of Taiwanese nationalism. Mei-ling T. Wang's The Dust That Never 
Settles explores the interaction between the US and the Taiwan independence movement 
between 1949 and 1997. The first half of her analysis describes the international events 
that moulded US policy toward China, which in tum has influenced US policy toward 
Taiwan. The second half of her work discusses the growing strength of then 
pro-independence opposition DPP on Taiwan and the success of China's domestic 
reforms. 37 Absent from her analysis is examination of the continuous contribution of 
the US to the evolution of Taiwanese nationalism. 
One more variable complicates scholars' investigation of the relations between the US 
and Taiwanese nationalism in the 1990s: Lee Teng-hui. As ROC President and KMT 
Chairman he constantly reaffirmed his faith in unification. He did not reveal himself as 
a secessionism fundamentalist until his retirement in March 2000. His vacillation 
between independence and unification in the 1990s obfuscated Taiwanese nationalism. 
Most scholars attribute the KMT's political indigenisation to Chiang Ching-kuo, 
successor of Chiang Kai-shek, and the accomplishment of Taiwanization to Lee 
Teng-hui.38 However, few realize that American scholars had been the ones to coin the 
term ''Taiwanization" in the 1950s as a reference to separating Taiwan from Mainland 
China. These riddles underscore the need for a more comprehensive, revisionist and 
updated review on the link between American influence and the evolution of Taiwanese 
nationalism. 
Taiwan's interest in joining the American alliance against China proves that American 
influence has westernised Taiwan's cultural values and national identity. Shih believes 
that US-Taiwan relationship is very close to quasi-"security community;"39 within such 
36 The three major aspects of national identity include ethnic identity, cultural identity and systematic 
identity; ses Chiang 1-hua. tc1i:f1ti. Ziyo.u zhuyi, minzu zhuyicyu guojia,rentong (libercilisrn,~ Nationidism 
-i.iiicfNiitionalideritiiy}(ja.ip~i: Yangzhi, i998), 15. 
37 Mei-ling T. Wang, The Dust That Never Settles: The Taiwan Independence Campaign and U.S.-China 
Relations (Lanham: University Press of America, 1999), 4-5. 
38 See, for example, Wang, "KMT's Localization Claim Is Empty." 
39 Shih Cheng-feng, Taiwan minzu zhuyi (Taiwanese Nationalism), 157. 
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a security community, common values are "the wellspring for close security 
cooperation" and that "security cooperation will deepen those shared values and 
transnational linkages." States within a security community will defend their shared 
values, jointly deal with an external threat and attract new allies that are seeking national 
security and material progress.40 Indeed, the concept of a (quasi-) security community 
can be used to explain current US-Taiwan relations, where shared democratic values bind 
Washington and Taipei against the perceived threat from Beijing. However, when the 
Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), the most important American law governing the 
relationship between the US and Taiwan, was enacted in 1979, Taiwan was still 
administered by the authoritarian KMT regime and there was no mention of democratic 
values or democracy in the text of the TRA.41 Instead, the TRA makes Taiwan a 
protectorate of the US. 42 That is, the concept of "security community" fails to faithfully 
reflect the development of bilateral relationship in the past decades. By contrast, the 
concept of "strategic symbiosis" effectively depicts American efforts to promote 
Taiwanese nationalism in the past and, in retum, the willingness of the nationalist Taiwan 
government to play the role of a vassal state of ·the US to serve the interest of American 
hegemony. Nevertheless, the literature fails to consider the emergent concept of 
strategic symbiosis in the study of international politics.43 
As Taiwanese nationalism grows more active and assertive, Taiwan can no longer be a 
mere variable subject to US-China relations. Secessionist Taipei is committed to 
expanding the US-Japan security alliance and promoting regional comprehensive 
40 Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, "Security Communities in Theoretical Perspective," in Security 
Communities, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 4. 
See also Philip E. Jacob and Henry Teune, "The Integrative Process: Guidelines for Analysis of the Bases 
of Political Community," in The Integration of Political Communities, ed. Philip E. Jacob and James V. 
Toscano (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1964). 
41 For the complete text of the TRA. see Taiwan Relations Act, 96-8, 96th Congress (Apr 10 1979). 
Available from http://ait.org.tw/enlabout_aitltra/ [accessed Feb 28 2005]. 
42 Harvey Feldman, "A New Kind of Relationship," in A Unique Relationship: The United States and the 
Republic of China Under the Taiwan Relations Act, ed. Roman H. Myers (Stanford: Hoover Institution 
Press, 1989), 29. 
43 The term "strategic symbiosis" has previously appeared in international relations discourse. Thomas 
=Neumann, director. of the Jewishlpstitute for national Security Affairs;- forexample,·uses the term-to-.· 
describe US-Israeli relations (see Mark H. Milstein, Strategic Ties or Tentacles? [internet] (Institute for 
National Security Affairs, 1991 [cited Feb 28 2005]), available from 
http://www.washington-report.org/backissues/1091/9110027.htm.) However, no specific definition is 
provided and, indeed, no coherent theory has developed around the concept of "strategic symbiosis." For 
a detailed definition of "strategic symbiosis" as conceptualised in this thesis, see page 213 of this thesis. 
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security against Beijing to justify the continued domination and expansion of American 
values and influence in East Asia. Boasting its democratisation and economic 
accomplishments, Taiwan has in fact become a major player in the Asia Pacific region. 
Research on US-Taiwan relations can hardly be complete without an exploration of the 
development of Taiwanese nationalism. Likewise, research on Taiwanese nationalism 
cannot be complete without an understanding of the American role in promoting 
Taiwanese nationalism. If the role of Taiwan in America's Asian policies is to be fully 
appreciated, these two research approaches must be integrated. Accordingly, this thesis 
will explore the essence of America's Taiwan policy; the influence of America's Asia 
policies upon the development of Taiwanese nationalism since World War ll; the impact 
of the US-Taiwan strategic symbiosis upon the peace and stability of Asia Pacific in the 
twenty-first century; and the implications of US-Taiwan strategic symbiosis on Mainland 
China. 
Research Methodology and Structure 
This study uses historical and archival research to explore the dynamics of American 
strategic schemes on Taiwan in order to highlight the American role in the evolution of 
Taiwanese nationalism. 
This thesis consists of seven chapters. Following an examination of research objectives, 
the presentation of the rationale, and a discussion of previous research, the thesis will 
take a chronological approach to explore and analyse the interaction between US Asian 
policy and Taiwanese nationalism. The periodisation is as follows: 1) 1945-1950: the 
period between the end of World War ll and the outbreak of the Korean War; 2) 
1950-1970, the height of the Cold War; 3) 1970-1989, from the beginning of US 
rapprochement with the PRC to the Tiananmen Incident; 4) 1989-2000, from the collapse 
of the Communist bloc to the end of Lee Teng-hui's rule in Taiwan; and 5), 2000 to the 
present. While any imposition of periodisation is, arbitrary, the periods identified above 
.. offerc ,a" framework for understanding-, the -progression·-of--us:Tafwan -reifttions --an.J= ih~ 
development of Taiwanese nationalism. Each period is characterised by crucial changes 
in the strategic symbiosis between the US and Taiwan. 
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Chapter 2: 1945-1950 
ENCOUNTER AND 
THE GERMINATION OF TAIWANESE NATIONALISM 
Introduction 
The Han had become the dominant race on Taiwan by the mid-seventeenth century. 
The Ming-dynasty loyalist Cheng Cheng-kung (~ffltJ;JJ. Koxinga) swept away the Dutch 
occupiers in 1662 and launched Sinicization efforts on the frontier island.44 In 1683, 
Admiral Shi Lang C:MI!JJ!n, a defector from the Cheng Cheng-k:ung camp to the 
Qing-dynasty, defeated Cheng Ko-shuang ~52::1;10, grandson of Cheng Cheng-kung; 
Taiwan was then incoiporated into China as an island affiliated to Fujian Cfi9!), a 
southern coastal province of China. In response to the Japanese Empire's intention to 
occupy Taiwan, China made the island a province of China in 1886.45 
The major language, Taiwanese, is derived from the dialect spoken in southern Fujian, as 
are many Taiwanese customs and religious beliefs. The written language is Chinese. 
Therefore, at least until the beginning of the twentieth century, Taiwanese and Chinese 
people belonged to the same ethnic group and used the same script. After China's 
defeat in the first Sino-Japan War (1894-95), Taiwan was ceded to Japan in accordance 
with the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Chinese nationalism initiated Taiwanese armed 
resistance against Japanese colonial rule. This nationalism would turn into separatism 
within two years of Taiwan's reunification with China in 1945. 
This chapter describes the initial encounter between Taiwanese secessionism and 
American government's separatist intention on Taiwan. The first part of this chapter 
shows how the Chinese nationalism of island Taiwanese crystallized into Taiwanese 
consciousness, the seed of Taiwanese nationalism. ~is_~~pt~r-~aJ.~o~ex,~es the_nature 
- - _.,_. ·~ -- .-::--· --- ::-- ::-;· ;_ - ~- -- ---- --
44 Weng Chia-in ~ftlf, Taiwanese Armed Resistances under the Early Japanese Rule ( 1895-1902) 
(Taipei: National Taiwan University, 1986), 17. 
45 Ibid., 16-17. 
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of Taiwan in American foreign policy before 1945. The second part of this chapter 
explores how the Taiwanese consciousness germinated into secessionism under the rule 
of the Chinese KMT government, the US' involvement in this process, and the 
underlying options and constraints of America's Taiwan policy after US recognition of 
Taiwanese nationalism. 
Pre 1945: Planting of the Seed of Taiwanese Nationalism 
1895-1915: Taiwanese Armed Resistance and Japanese Despotism 
The cession of Taiwan to Japan in 1895 was followed by two decades of anti-Japanese 
armed resistance. In the first stage (1895-1902), the Taiwanese people's strong Chinese 
nationalism compelled them to defend their land and protest the cession.46 The Taiwan 
Republic was established on May 25, 1895. Although it lasted for only thirteen days, it 
reflected widespread popular resistance to the Japanese takeover. 47 Since early June 
1895, the Black Flag force headed by Liu Yung-fu (itl.ikt~D fought valiantly along with 
local rebels against Japanese military until forced to withdraw from Taiwan in late 
October 1895.48 
In 1896, Law No. 63 was enacted, authorizing the Taiwan Governor Geneml the 
exclusive authority to enforce all regulations on the island for the next three years. This 
extraordinary power, however, was regularly extended. This law justified the colonial 
government's long-term discriminative despotism employed to suppress the Taiwanese 
hostility and resistance.49 Furthermore, Taiwanese were excluded from the government 
and representative bodies, had no voting rights, were vulnerable to police abuse, and had 
46 Huang Hsiu-cheng fi*i81:· Taiwanshi yanjiu (A Study of Taiwan History), 2nd ed. (Taipei: Taiwan 
xuesheng shuju, 1992), 176-78,207. See also Weng Chia-in, Taiwanese Armed Resistances 
(1895-1902), 1-2, 136-44,48. 
_ ~ For the details. of thecestablishmentcofl'ormosan Democratic Republic,see-WangcHsiao-po -£~7J1l,­
ed.,"eds., Yiwei Kang-Ri shiliao huibian (Documentary Collection of 1895 Resistance against Japan) 
(Taipei: Haixia xueshu, 1999), 69-74. See also Meisner, "The Development of Formosan Nationalism," 94. 
48 Huang Hsiu-cheng, Taiwanshi yanjiu (A Study ofTaiwan History), 176-77. 
49 Edward 1-te Chen ~.A~. "Formosan Political Movements under Japanese Colonial Rule, 1914-1937," 
Asian Studies, Vol. 31, No.3 (1972): 482. 
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no obligation to serve in the military. 50 In snuffing out local resistance, the Japanese 
colonial government imposed draconian penalties for even minor crimes. In short, Law 
No. 63 excluded the Taiwanese from the protection of the Japanese Constitution. 51 
The carnage committed by the Japanese military and the corruption and incompetence of 
its civil officials only made the Taiwanese opposition increasingly militant. 52 After the 
Black Flag force withdrew, organized and networked rebellions ensued and persisted 
until the colonial government forces attacked Lin Shao-mao (#:}'~) and eliminated 
local rebels in southern Taiwan in 1902, concluding the first stage of anti-Japanese armed 
resistance. 53 
The second stage of armed resistance, from 1902 to 1915, was characterised by 
revolutionary nationalism. Inspired by Chinese revolutions and by their own 
awakening national consciousness, rival elites mobilized mass rebellions against 
Japanese rule. Among the many uprisings, the "Miao-li CEB~) Incident" in 1913 and 
the "Hsi-lai-an @§'*.Rtf) Incident" in 1915 were the best examples.54 
1915-1945: The Modem Taiwanese Nationalist Movement 
The Taiwan Government-General shifted to a patronage or assimilationist policy from 
1915 to early 1920s.55 The purpose of Japanese assimilation policy was to promote 
racial harmony in the interest of Japanese expansionism in Asia. Governor General 
Akashi Motijiro (E!i3::0"7c=E!~) vigorously pursued an assimilation policy in order to 
tighten Japan's political and ideological control over Taiwan. His policy had little to do 
with Taiwanese aspirations for political equality and shared responsibility. 56 
so Yun-ban Cbu and Jib-wen Lin, "Political Development in 20th-Century Taiwan: State-Building, 
Regime Transformation and the Construction of National Identity," The China Quarterly, Vol. 165 (2001): 
106. 
51 Weng Chia-in, Taiwanese Armed Resistances (1895-1902), 48. 
Sl Ibid., 136. 
53 Huang Hsiu-cheng, Taiwanshi yanjiu (A Study ofTaiwan History), 177. See also Meisner, "The 
Development of Formosan Nationalism," 94. 
54 Huang Hsiu-cheng, '[aiwanshi yanjiu (A Study ofTaiwanHistoryh117~7s:---see8.1io Weng Chia-in, 
TaiwaneseA~d Resistimces (1895-1902), 145-46. 
ss Huang Hsiu-cheng, Taiwanshi yanjiu (A Study of Taiwan History), 207. See also Mark R. Peattie, 
"Japanese Attitudes toward Colonialism," in The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945, ed. Ramon H. 
Myers and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 102-04. 
56 Peattie, "Japanese Attitudes toward Colonialism," 103-04. 
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Accordingly, Taiwanese elites began to join resistance or anti-government movements. 
This was the birth of the modem nationalist movement in Taiwan. 57 
After the First World War, inspired by President Woodrow Wilson's doctrine of political 
self-determination for minorities, young Taiwanese fervently anticipated the end of 
colonial rule.58 Taiwanese students in Tokyo established a variety of organizations to 
promote racial enlightenment, racial self-determination, and assertion of civil rights.59 
Among these, the most prominent was Tokyo Taiwan Seinenkai (*3?:-El'tl~W~-tf, The 
Society of Taiwan Youth in Tokyo). With the financial support of members of the 
Taiwanese gently such as Lin Hsien-tang Cif'*it~) and Tsai Hui-ru ~1!\t£0) and the 
support of prominent Japanese intellectuals such as Yoshino Sakuzo and Izumi Tetsu, 
Tokyo Taiwan Seinenkai was in the vanguard of the racial enlightenment and 
emancipation movements in Taiwan. 60 In July 1920, Tokyo Taiwan Seinenkai 
published the Taiwan seinen (Taiwan Youth, 1920-1922), the first journal dedicated to 
awakening the national consciousness, and to fighting for the speech and press 
freedom. 61 Later on, it became a bona fide journal for the Taiwanese nationalist 
movement. On the one hand, it castigated the administration of Taiwan Governor 
General and called for self-government; on the other hand, it introduced its readers to the 
culture and society of the motherland, and joined forces with several racial movement 
organizations. 62 
Law No. 63 became the first target in a volley of political movements launched by the 
anti-government elite. In November 1920, when the law was again due to be extended, 
Tokyo Taiwan Seinenkai recruited more than two hundred Taiwanese students to join the 
Movement for the Repeal of Law No. 63 and demand self-government.63 Finally, in 
March 1921, Law No. 63 was replaced by Law No. 3, "Law regarding the Ordinances to 
be enforced in Taiwan," which stipulated that the laws of the Japanese homeland were, in 
57 Huang Hsiu-cheng, Taiwanshi yanjiu (A Study of Taiwan History), 207. 
58 Liao, Formosa Speaks, 13. 
59 Lao Po-chou lf!Wmi. Riju shiqi Taiwan xuesheng yundong (Taiwanese Student Movement during 
Japanese Occupation Period) ~(Taipei: Shibao~wenhua,~1993), 86~87.--"-
600 Huang Hsiu-chetig: Tiiiwanshi yan}iu (A Study of Taiwan History), 209. 
61 Ibid., 212. 
62 Ibid., 227. 
63 Lao Po-chou, Riju shiqi Taiwan xuesheng yundong (Taiwanese Student Movement during Japanese 
Occupation Period), 93. 
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principle, to be enforced in Taiwan.64 This assimilationist law was the culmination of 
"homeland extensionism." Although this symbolized the shift of Japanese colonial 
policy from discriminative despotism to assimilation, the Taiwanese elites were no 
longer satisfied and had decided in late 1920 to drop the Movement for the Nullification 
of Law No. 63. This decision rendered moot the homeland extensionism adopted by 
Den Kenjiro (EBfmm~~). the first civilian Taiwan Governor General (serving from 
1919-1923). Instead, the elites made an argument on behalf of Taiwanese particularism. 
Each year, from 1921 to 1927, Tokyo Taiwan Seinenkai launched its Campaign for the 
Establishment of a Taiwanese Parliament.65 Another important anti-government society, 
the Taiwan Cultural Association (Taiwan bunka kyoka1), was formed in 1921; it 
cooperated with Tokyo Taiwan Seinenkai until 1934. 66 This petition movement 
explicitly emphasized the particularism of Taiwanese society. Implicitly, it made a 
social and an ethnic distinction between Taiwanese and Japanese. 67 In effect, it 
"demanded Japanese recognition of a distinct Taiwanese identity within the Japanese 
empire."68 The Taiwanese finally forced the colonial government to agree to hold 
partial and limited elections in April 1935. Taiwanese could now elect half the 
members of the city, street, and village councils, who would then elect half the members 
of the p~vincial councils.69 
Inchoate Taiwanese Consciousness 
Japan's invasion of China in July 1937 interrupted the development of political 
resistance in Taiwan. The goal of self-determination could not be realized under 
wartime conditions. Yet, from the nationalist perspective, a Taiwanese consciousness 
was born. National consciousness, the key prerequisite of nationalism, is mainly 
ethnocentric; that is, it is defined by "favourable feelings and actions regarding one's 
own nation and unfavourable feelings and actions concerning other nations." 70 
64 Chu and Lin, "Political Development in 20th-Century Taiwan," 107. 
65 Lan Po-chou, Riju shiqi Taiwan xuesheng yundong (Taiwanese Student Movement during Japanese 
Occupation Period), 93-94. 
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National consciousness recognizes ''the specificity of one's own nation and its difference 
from other nations," and is constituted by a person's perception of his own nationality.71 
Clearly, national consciousness does not have to imply a desire for statehood; it is a 
perceptive reaction of a group of people to external threat or oppression. Although 
there was a mosaic of ethnic groupings on the island,72 including aboriginal tribes, 
Hakkas (Ke-chia jen, ~~A) and Hokkiens (Min-nan jen, !Mli¥JA.), Japanese colonial 
despotism prompted an oppressed consciousness that united people of various ethnic and 
linguistic groups living in the same area.73 This "cohesion and distinctiveness" of the 
oppressed group of people gave rise to national consciousness?4 Clearly, when Taiwan 
was under Japanese rule, the racial and social contradictions nurtured a consciousness of 
local islanders; this consciousness may be termed ''Taiwanese consciousness." 75 
Promoted by the counter-elite, or "intellectual awakeners,"76 the notion of guaranteeing 
civil rights for Taiwanese and the pursuit of a distinctive Taiwan identity had been 
widely disseminated. Nourished by modem ideologies such as democracy and 
self-determination, this consciousness intensified and evolved into a nascent, nebulous, 
inchoate Taiwanese consciousness, which was identity-minded, equality-minded, and 
71 Otto Bauer, The Question of Nationalities and Social Denwcracy (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2000), 119, 21, 23. 
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self-detennination-minded.77 
There are two incompatible characteristics of Taiwanese consciousness in its initial stage. 
One is that the root of Taiwanese consciousness is Han national consciousness.78 The 
Taiwanese were eager to reunite with the Chinese after 1895. Therefore, it was a fonn 
of Chinese irredentism, and nothing more than a pre-national Taiwanese identity.79 
Secondly, during the fifty years of colonial rule, the Japanese government integrated 
Japanese and Taiwanese systems and institutions.80 Japan raised Taiwan's standard of 
living, education and industrialization well above mainland China's levels. 81 The 
modem administrative techniques used by the Japanese colonial government imposed on 
Taiwan an infrastructure for a new "imagined community," or a new independent 
nation.82 
The Evolution of American Hegemonys3 
The US Values and National Interests: "Self-Determination" and Hegemony 
n Hans Rogger argues that national consciousness is manifested by a striving for a common identity, 
character, and culture by the articulate members of a given community; see Hans Rogger, National 
Consciousness in Eighteenth-Century Russia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), 3. 
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The origins of the American hegemony can be traced to the values of self-determination 
on which the US was founded in 1776 in revolt against the European monarchy. After 
the fall of the Spanish empire as a result of the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815, the 
US extended recognition to many new Latin American republics in 1822 in response to 
their quest for independence from the Spanish empire. When France and Spain 
attempted to re-establish their colonies in the New World, President Monroe warned the 
European powers in 1823 that any interference in American affairs would be considered 
by the US "as dangerous to our peace and safety."84 This was the "Monroe Doctrine." 
Thus, recognising the new republics in the New World accelerated the disintegration of 
the old empires, and ensured the rise of the US. Within the space of a century, the US 
used subtle "acquisition" measures - including the Monroe Doctrine, diplomacy, the 
Spanish-American War and economic penetration - to expand its territory. As Lens 
stated, ''the decimation of the Spanish empire resulted in the enlargement of the 
American empire . . . from less than 900,000 square miles in 1790 to more than 10 
million square miles - including spheres of influence - today."85 
The US abandoned its values of self -determination while it expanded. Instead, such 
ideas as "white man's burden," "[duty of the] superior [race] of civilizing the inferior 
races," aggressive altruism, self-protection and "divine commission" were used as 
pretexts to amass domestic support for Western, self-interest imperialism.86 In 1890, 
Rear Admiral Alfred T. Mahan used "moral obligations" in his work, The Influence of 
Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783, to justify American imperial expansionism.87 He 
advocated the government to take the Caribbean Islands, Hawaii, and the Philippine 
Islands for bases to protect its commerce and for free access of fleets to consolidate 
84 USDOS, The Monroe Doctrine (1823) [internet] ([cited Aug 9 2002]), available from 
http://usinfo.state.gov/usalinfousalfacts/democrac/50.htm. 
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American national interests. 88 In 1898, the US defeated Spain, seized the Philippine 
Islands and developed its ambition to become a world power. In response to the 
Philippine Insurrection of 1899 and 1902, America used force to quell the indigenous 
population's desire for self-determination. When the war ended in July 1902, 20,000 
Filipino soldiers and 200,000 Filipino civilians were killed. 89 Evidently, old imperial 
expansionism could not accept self-determination by other peoples. 
American Hegemonic "Open Door" Policy in China 
The 1898 Spanish-American War also facilitated American intervention in China. In 
the late nineteenth century, European imperial powers scrambled for spheres of influence, 
claimed extraterritorial rights in China and even partitioned Chinese territory. Taiwan 
had already been ceded to Japan. Like the European powers, America also required 
new markets to absorb its sutplus products and goods. To protect the prospect of 
American business and investment, the McKinley administration declared the "Open 
Door" policy in 1899 to prevent the further partition of China and assure America's 
access to markets in China. Hence, this Open Door policy embodied American 
hegemonism, which since 1898 was market-centred rather than colonial.90 
The Fusion of Self-Determination and Hegemony 
America's extension of self-determination to many new Latin American republics in 
1822 served to disintegrate the dominance on the American continent of the Spanish 
empire. The US further used the "Monroe doctrine" to deny the resurgence of 
European imperialism and expand American hegemony. After succeeding Great Britain 
as a sea power and occupying the Philippine Islands, the US responded to the Filipino 
request for "self-determination" with a brutal massacre between 1899 and 1902. 
However, during World War I the US faced the likely victory of Germany and the 
ensuing dominance of German imperialism in Europe; this could have put an end to 
American hegemonic ambitions. Woodrow Wilson skilfully innovated American 
hegemony by incorporating the values of self-determination, which provided "a moral 
88 The ~World o]189B: The Spanish-American War, [internet] (Library of Congress, [cited Sep 10 2004]), 
available from http:/ /www.loc.gov/rr/hispanic/1898/chronology .html. 
89 Ibid., ([cited). 
90 Neil Smith, American Empire: Roosevelt's Geographer and the Prelude to Globalization (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2003), 116. 
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rationale" for "a liberal war against German imperialism" and enabled him to launch a 
"moral crusade for 'a new world order. '"91 Woodrow Wilson wove together American 
"global ambition and moral renditions" to support an ''unprecedented international 
adventurism in Europe and the Pacific."92 The marriage of self-interest hegemonism 
and liberal "self-determination" led the US to proclaim itself a nation innocent of 
imperial pretensions, and enabled the preservation and advancement of global openness 
to sustain American pre-eminence and guide American foreign policy.93 
After World War II, most of the European empires disintegrated. The doctrine of 
national self-determination became the mainstream of international political thought and 
initiated the era of decolonisation. The global openness policy - free access of the US 
fleets to every part of the oceans in the world and the backbone of the American 
hegemony - finally evolved into an ambition of global domination.94 
Chinese Claims, American Schemes and the Disposition of Taiwan 
Chiang Kai-shek Of:ffr:fi) did not publicly call for the return of Taiwan before the 
outbreak of the Sino-Japan War in 1937. Before the outbreak of the Pacific War in 
1942, advocating national self-determination was useful in mobilizing minority ethnic 
groups against Japan. In January 1934, Mao Zedong (=§~JI~) promised his comrades 
from Taiwan, Korea and Vietnam that the Chinese Communist Party would allow 
minorities to establish independent states.95 Chiang declared in 1938 that although 
Taiwan had been Chinese territory, the purpose of the Resistance War against Japanese 
Aggression from 1937 was to "restore the independence and freedom of the brethren 
in ... Taiwan."96 Likewise, when interviewed by Edgar Snow, an American journalist, 
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in 1938, Mao expressed his willingness to treat Taiwan as he had Korea and to help 
Taiwan to achieve independence.97 Not until1942 did the Chinese government begin to 
argue formally and publicly for the recovery of Taiwan. The earliest known official 
claim that Taiwan must be returned to China was made on October 6, 1942 when Chiang 
met Wendell Wilkie, an envoy of the US President.98 Chiang further asserted in China:r 
Destiny that Taiwan was "a fortress essential for the nation's defence and security."99 
Because of Taiwan's unique goo-strategic value, American strategists proposed in 1942 
to internationalise Taiwan so as to establish a US-UN defence belt across the Pacific. 
This belt would begin at Hawaii in the east and terminate at Taiwan in the west as "the 
logical anchor of the line and the mighty western terminus for the air armadas of the 
United Nations." The Pentagon also suggested the creation of a postwar policing base 
in southern Taiwan.100 However, in 1942 and 1943 the Council on Foreign Relations 
found that the disposition of Taiwan presented a dilemma: 
On the one band, Taiwan was such a key spot for sea control in the western Pacific that it should 
not be confidently delegated to a weak and disoriented China. On the other band, denial [ ofJ 
Taiwan to China would damage that country's relations with the Western Allies, and "suspicion of 
all Occidental schemes and motives [in China] may be so great [as] to frustrate, or at least, seriously 
limit, postwar Chinese collaboration in security matters with the other United Nations.101 
Evidently, American original interest in Taiwan was based upon hegemonism. In May 
1943, the Territorial Subcommittee proposed four alternative solutions: the continuance 
of Japanese sovereignty, independence of Taiwan, the internationalisation of Taiwan, and 
the restoration of Chinese sovereignty in Taiwan. The subcommittee investigated each 
alternative and finally concluded that the last was the most logical one. Even though 
there were many proponents of Taiwan's self-determination in Congress, Chiang's 
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reactionary nationalism and the historical and ethnic relationship between Taiwan and 
China, led the US to rule out self-government of Taiwan.102 Between 1942 and 1943, 
Roosevelt indicated that he favoured ''both returning Taiwan to China and having 
American bases on the island."103 By the end of 1943, the US had made no formal 
public commitments concerning Formosa. The US Navy proposed to place Taiwan under 
an American naval administration before Japan's surrender.104 However, considering 
the internal and external situation before the Cairo Conference on December 1, 1943, the 
Roosevelt administration decided upon the return of Taiwan to China. 
Accordingly, the Cairo Declaration stipulated the return of Taiwan to China: "All 
territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the 
Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China."105 At about the same time, the 
Chinese Communist Party changed its position of helping Taiwan achieve independence 
to identifying Taiwan as part of the Chinese nation.106 In 1945, President Harry Truman 
told General George Marshall who was about to embark on the Marshall Mission to 
China that a "strong, united, and democratic China is in the most vital interest of the 
United States and all the United Nations."107 Therefore, the Potsdam Proclamation 
signed by China, the US and Great Britain on July 26, 1945 (and subsequently by the 
Soviet Union) reiterated: ''The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out."108 
On September 2, 1945, Japanese Surrender Documents reaffirmed the Potsdam 
Proclamation.109 Thus, Taiwan reverted to China after World War n However, to 
George Kerr, Vice Consul of American Consulate at Taipei, the Cairo Declaration was a 
fatal blunder, "some of the damage to American interests will never be repaired."no 
102 Ibid., 76. 
103 Ibid., 74. 
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The Germination of Taiwan Secessionism in 1947 
Toward the end of the WWII, when Germany surrendered, the US and the USSR had 
unfolded their struggle in East Europe in order to expand their respective spheres of 
influence, which marked the prelude to the Cold War. In August 1945, although Japan 
was on the way to defeat in the Pacific War and despite the availability of other means of 
ending the war, the US dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Gar 
Alperovitz argues in his classic Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam that these 
new instruments of war were deliberately used by the US as the first blow in the 
emerging Cold War confrontation with the USSR.lll This argument illustrated the 
struggle between the two world powers as World War II drew to its close. Therefore, at 
the moment of the Emperor Hirohito's radio announcement of Japan's willingness to 
"bear the unbearable," Taiwan was to be engulfed in Nationalist-Communist civil war, 
behind which the US and the USSR struggled to dominate China. 
Taiwan under Chinese Nationalist Rule since the 1945 Takeover 
Despite the so-called cooperation between the Communists and the Nationalists against 
Japanese aggression, the Communists dealt with the Nationalists perfunctorily but 
conducted clandestine campaigns to expand its territory. Military conflicts persisted 
throughout the years.112 When Japan surrendered in August 1945, Communists and 
Nationalists immediately clashed again over who had the right to accept Japanese 
capitulation and to scramble for control of the northeast part of China. Hostilities soon 
spread to the mainland.113 
The Chinese Nationalist government was preoccupied with the civil war and ignored 
Taiwanese political and economic demands. The KMT takeover started in September 
1945 when Chiang appointed General Chen Yi (~{I) Governor General of Taiwan. He 
arrived in Taiwan on October 23, 1945. Chen Yi dismissed almost half of the 
governmental staff. More that 37,000 Taiwanese public servants lost their jobs and 
m Gar-AlperoVitz:Atomic Diplo~: Hiroshima ;,d Potsdam: The Use of the Atomic Bomb and the 
American Confrontation with Soviet Power (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965), 58-60. 
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almost all department heads were mainlanders.114 This crushed native aspirations for 
political autonomy. Understaffing of governmental positions also caused 
inefficiency.115 Corruption and nepotism were rampant.116 The poor discipline of the 
military posed another serious problem. 117 The officials and soldiers from the mainland 
openly despised the Taiwanese as a vanquished people.118 Worst of all, Chen Yi used 
capital from mainland syndicates and the bureaucracy to exploit Taiwan's economy and 
industries, creating a drastic commodity shortage, inflation and unemployment by early 
1946.119 
By January 1946, the American Army's Formosa Advisory Group had already predicted 
serious uprising against Chen Yi.120 The Taiwanese were so embittered that hostility 
against mainland Chinese replaced their high hopes for the new KMT government. 
Taiwanese consciousness - characterized by the hostility between mainlanders and 
Taiwanese, invaders and natives, and conquerors and vanquished - prevailed.121 An 
ethnic division between Taiwanese and mainlanders was bom.122 Because Japanese 
colonial rule brought some modernisation for the islanders, many Taiwanese believed 
they were superior to the Nationalists from the mainland; they despised and resented 
Nationalist Chinese. 123 On January 10, 1947, Taiwanese were infuriated by Chen Yi's 
114 Before the takeover in 1945, the total governmental staff amounted to 84559; Taiwanese accounted for 
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announcement that he would postpone the introduction of China's new constitution on 
Taiwan because he believed that the Taiwanese were politically lagging behind the 
mainland and required at least two more years of Nationalist tutelage before they would 
be mature enough to enjoy the rights of full citizenship.124 
The February 28 Incident 
On February 27, 1947, investigators of the Taipei City Monopoly Bureau, accompanied 
by uniformed policemen arrested a forty-year-old Taiwanese widow for peddling illegal 
tobacco in Taipei, confiscating her cash and untaxed cigarettes and then beating her. 
Outraged onlookers surrounded the investigators and one investigator, attempting to 
escape, accidentally shot a bystander.125 Around noon the following day, to vent their 
anger, a Taiwanese mob attacked a branch office of the Tobacco Monopoly Bureau in 
the name of demanding redress and assaulted five or six officials, killing two of them. 
The rest were spared after surrendering their money and belongings.126 In the afternoon, 
a mob occupied the Taiwan radio station and took over the airwaves to urge other 
Taiwanese to march on the Taiwan Provincial Administrative Executive Office to protest 
the government. Two people were killed and others injured by the guards as the crowd 
gathered and petitioned in front of Chen Yi's Executive Office.127 As the news and 
violence spread, greater numbers of Taiwanese gathered in places throughout the island, 
attacking and killing mainlander Chinese, and even seizing military ordnance to arm 
themselves. 128 
The Taipei Settlement Committee, established on March 1 and composed of Taiwanese 
aiming to reform the government and settling the incident, failed to stop the violence 
from escalating into island-wide clashes.129 Although Hsieh Hsueh-hung (~~fJ), a 
leading Communist in Taiwan, had played a role in instigating the March 2 riots in 
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Taichung (-EJ't:j:t)/30 the Taiwan Communist Party actually had little official involvement 
in starting the uprising. 131 On March 4, the Settlement Committee established 
seventeen subdivisions, or local Settlement Committees, throughout the island. Some 
controversy stemmed from some local Settlement Committees' attempts to take over the 
ordnance of local police departments, military police units or even troops.132 
In the week following February 28, eyewitness reports were sent to the American 
Consulate at Taipei and the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration 
(UNRRA).133 On March 5, a Taiwanese delegation petitioned the American Consul to 
forward an enclosed letter and a ''Manifesto" that restated the request for reform to 
Ambassador Dr. Leighton Stuart for transmission to the Chinese Nationalist 
government. 134 On March 7, inquiries about the American attitude to this uprising and 
the international legal status of Taiwan were put to George Kerr, Vice Consul and 
Foreign Service Staff Office at Taipei (from April 1946 to March 1947).135 During 
World War II, he had been a staff officer in charge of "Island X" (Taiwan's code name) in 
the Navy's "Operations Causeway," Admiral Nimitz' plan to capture Taiwan from 
Japan.136 At this juncture, Kerr argued that the US should consolidate its interests in the 
region by supporting self-determination of Taiwan. He saw a parallel between the 
islanders and the American colonists in 1776 and wrote secret reports naming the leading 
Taiwanese who had sought the help of the American Consulate before and during the 
February 28 Incident.137 
On March 7, the Taipei Settlement Committee proposed the "32 Demands" to the 
130 Hou Kun-hung and Hsu Chin-fa, ed.,lleds., Ererba shijian dang'an huibian (Archives Materials on the 
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Governor General's Executive Office and the central government. These demands 
called for self-government. 138 However, some items demanded that all military forces 
on Taiwan temporarily disarm, the Garrison Command Headquarters be abolished, and 
Taiwanese take charge of the judicial organizations.139 These demands were construed 
by Taiwan authorities and central government as intention to mount an armed 
rebellion. 140 On March 8, Chang Mu-tao CSi::S~). Commander of the Fourth 
Regiment of military police, advised the Taipei Settlement Committee not to offend the 
central government by acceding to these demands.141 The Taipei Settlement Committee 
took his advice and rescinded many of the demands.142 
However, in the middle of the afternoon of March 8, the streets of Taipei were cleared by 
random machine gun fire. After dark, Nationalist reinforcements consisting of 2,000 
police and about 8,000 lightly armed troops with American jeeps landed in Keelung (£ 
~) and rushed to Taipei. An estimated 3,000 men simultaneously landed at Takao 
(Kaohsiung, ~f.i!). 143 At the same time, radical dissidents were beyond the control of 
the Taipei Settlement Committee. 
After 10:00 that evening, armed Taiwanese insurgents in Taipei attacked the Executive 
Office, the Garrison Command Headquarters, the Taipei City police, military police, 
some officials' residences, and attempted to rob the Taiwan bank and some major 
corporations.144 The situation was so dangerous that the Nationalist military source in 
Taipei warned the central government that the mob had established a command, that the 
Taiwan situation had deteriorated and that troops had to be immediately airlifted to 
138 Lai Tse-ban, Myers, and Wei Wou, A Tragic Beginning, 120, 97-200. See also Kerr, Formosa 
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Taiwan. 145 The KMT reinforcements annihilated the rebels and restored order within a 
few days. Several thousand armed rebels escaped to the mountainous hinterland.146 
Yet, the undisciplined KMT troops engaged in much wanton killing and looting.147 
Many Taiwanese secessionists, including Liao Wen-i (~3(:~, Thomas Liao), escaped to 
Hong Kong. On March 17, General Pai Chung-hsi (B~HI), Minister of National 
Defence, reached Taipei to settle and investigate the crisis. On March 24, he submitted 
a long report to Chiang outlining the causes of the incident.148 
The KMT authorities then launched a household enumeration to facilitate the hunting of 
radicals who had participated in the insurgency; Taiwan was caught in a time of terror 
and many innocent Taiwanese were arrested or summarily killed. 149 An estimated 
10,000 people were killed during and immediately after the February 28 Incident.150 
The February 28 Incident distinguished Taiwanese history from Chinese history. 151 
Taiwanese Consciousness and George Kerr after the February 281ncident 
The February 28 Incident and the ensuing reign of terror germinated the seed of 
Taiwanese nationalism. Many people with strong Taiwanese consciousness saw the 
February 28 Incident as an attempt "to replace misrule with home rule,"152 and as a 
demand for political self -determination. 153 Seeking international intervention and 
stressing cultural differences across the Straits were immediately available measures.154 
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Some survivors were so embittered and desperate that they colluded with Americans to 
promoted secessionism. 
George Kerr was the most important American involved in this process.155 As Vice 
Consul and Foreign Service Staff Officer at Taipei, Kerr was irritated with a Consul who 
"had consistently played down the gravity of events preceding the fatal clash" and with 
diplomats' divergent attitudes toward the February 28 Incident in American Embassy at 
Nanjing.156 After March 17, he spent a week working on a memorandum of the 
February 28 Incident for Dr. Leighton Stuart, US Ambassador to China. Kerr wrote to 
Dr. Stuart that "all Formosan leaders who sought intervention by the United States or 
United Nations were very keenly aware of Formosan's unsettled legal status, and would 
continue to raise the issue at every opportunity." 157 Kerr argued in his original 
memorandum to Dr. Stuart, that: "No area in China is so enthusiastically pro-Americans 
[sic] as this island, which completes the chain we influence, control, or occupy 
strategically from the Hokkaido through the Philippines."158 He listed seven different 
forms or degrees of intervention suggested "by thoughtful Formosans." 159 Kerr 
explained: 
The most extreme proposal called for the creation of a United Nations trusteeship or protectorate. 
This should be set up for a stated period of time, and subject to review at a reasonable interval 
before the proposed terminal date, or until a local plebiscite would afford the Formosans themselves 
an opportunity to determine their permanent status. 1150 
On April18, Dr. Stuart sent to Chiang a Memorandum on the Situation in Taiwan, which 
was essentially Kerr's account of the February 28 Incident. 161 The memorandum 
showed that Kerr did not comprehend the difficulties that resulting from the civil war 
and the resignation of Premier T.V. Soong (Sung Tsu-wen, *r3t).162 Kerr omitted 
ten of the 32 demands that dealt with military and political matters, thus rendering his 
155 Kerr was active in communicating with secessionists in Taiwan. For instance, see Kerr, Formosa 
Betrayed, 326. 
156 Ibid., 321. 
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presentation "very misleading."163 Kerr played down the Taiwanese request to disarm 
the troops and its rebellious elements that left the KMT little choice but to resort to 
military force. Furthermore, he ignored the casualties inflicted upon the KMT troops 
by local rebels, 164 and the disturbances caused by local radicals attempting to take over 
military ordnance. 165 He similarly ignored the insurgents' attacks and killings of 
mainlanders. In particular, he failed to mention the attacks by insurgents on the night of 
March 8. Instead, he stressed the reformism of the Taiwanese. However, his account 
shaped the American understanding of the February 28 Incident.166 
The KMT government appointed Wei Tao-ming Cam:EJ3), former Chinese Ambassador 
to the US, to replace Chen Yi on May 15, 1947. He made an honest effort to rectify the 
errors of Chen Yi's incompetence and inefficiency.167 However, he still had to face 
such realistic structural issues as economic control and reliance on an autonomous 
budget. Hence, the state-entrepreneurship system established by Chen Yi was relaxed 
but not discarded. Meanwhile, the worsening civil war had aggravated central 
requisitioning of local resources.168 Accordingly, Wei was not able to effectively solve 
the economic problems. The terror continued and undisciplined troops remained a 
problem.169 
On May 26, 1947, following his return to Washington, Kerr was keen to sell his account 
of the February 28 Incident, interventionism and his conclusion that "a friendly, 
non-Communist and non-Nationalist Formosan population would serve our interests 
best" to Department of State officials, including Secretary of State General Marshall, 
Senator Joseph Ball, UN Ambassador Warren Austin, the Navy, the War Department and 
163 Ibid., 197. The "32 Demands" presented in Dr. Stuart's memorandum to Chiang Kai-shekin 1947 are 
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the Pentagon.170 
Initial Intentions of America vis-a-vis Taiwanese Nationalism 
The Wedemeyer Report and American Support 
In July 1947, Lt. General Albert C. Wedemeyer was sent to China by Secretary of State 
Marshall to reassess the US' China policy. Before concluding his fact-finding mission, 
he flew to Taiwan. In August, Thomas Liao, who had escaped to Hong Kong and had 
remained in contact with Kerr, 171 sent General Wedemeyer a petition requesting 
American assistance.172 Based on Kerr's research and his account of February 28,173 
Wedemeyer echoed Kerr's most extreme views by asserting in his report to Secretary of 
State Marshall that "Formosans would be receptive toward United States guardianship 
and United Nations trusteeship."174 Within seven months of the report, a series of 
suspicious events took place. 
The US government announced its plan to help the KMT government develop a military 
training program on the island. Kerr believed that this was the Pentagon's effort to 
prevent Taiwan from being "written off."175 A Hong Kong news story alleged on 
October 3, 1947 that a Taiwanese leader had a two-hour conversation at the American 
Consulate with the Director of the USIS, who commented upon Formosa's unsettled 
legal status and pledged American help for the trusteeship issue.176 According to Kerr, 
this story "had alarmed Nanjing and Taipei, for it was too close to the truth." 177 
On December 15, the New Zealander Allen Shackelton, the Industrial Rehabilitation 
Officer of the UNRRA, denounced Wei Tao-ming's "reform government" and provoked 
a furious reaction in Taiwan.178 Wei responded with an announcement in Nanjing on 
170 Ibid., 326-29. Emphasis of non-Nationalist is Kerr's. 
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December 20 stating that "all outside criticism of the policies and conduct of the 
Nationalists on Formosa was promoted by the intrigues of communists and 'ambitious 
elements of a certain nation' who wanted to sever Formosa from China."179 
During the Chinese Lunar New Year in early and mid-January 1948, the American 
Consulate used eight non-American Catholic priests to "pour propaganda into Formosa 
which pictured the United States as the world's foremost champion of liberty and of 
minority rights."180 They spent the long New Year holiday in villages far from Taipei, 
carried with them an American film series made available by the Consulate, showed the 
films seven times and each showing drew large crowds. 181 According to the priests: 
Anywhere the Formosan people is very enthusiastic about anything coming from the U.S., and 
not only that but also some people many times ask me when will the U.S.A take control of this 
Island. They say that [they] hope the day of bein~ free of the "Pigs" (as they call them) of the 
Mainland ... Many people want to learn English ... 1 
This deliberate and delicate exercise of clerical political influence, not long before the 
first anniversary of the February 28 Incident, inflamed secessionist sentiment and 
alienated the Taiwanese from Wei Tao-ming's government. The message delivered by 
these US Consulate-directed Fathers was warmly received by Taiwanese secessionists.183 
From February 20, 1948, Governor Wei combed the island for dissidents. Although the 
atmosphere on the island was tense, the anniversary came and went uneventfully. 
Many dissidents wrote to foreign friends in the American Consulate and in the media to 
vent their rage and reiterate their appeal for separation from China.184 
The promotion of self -determination became a subject of media interest. On February 
179 Ibid. 
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27, 1948, Dr. Sun Fu (~1;1), President of the Legislative Yuan and Premier of the KMT 
government, issued an address in Taipei and denounced inaccurate reporting of 
conditions in Formosa by foreign newsmen who raised the question of Formosa's future 
status.185 At a press conference in Shanghai on March 1, Dr. Sun chastised a press 
officer in the US Consulate in Taiwan for spreading a rumour that Formosa wished to be 
separated from China, and questioned whether the US government "should allow such a 
man undermining the U.S.-China friendship to remain in its government until the present 
moment ... " 186 This amounted to a showdown, in which the US was urged to express 
its positions on Taiwan and against Communism. 
Chiang Kai-Shek and US Partisanship on China 
The civil war between the Nationalists and the Communists and the struggle for China 
between the US and the USSR eclipsed this historic encounter. At this juncture, the US 
had yet to define a single China policy. Secretary of State George Marshall distrusted 
Chiang and favoured a policy of quiet disengagement from China. In fact, Marshall 
believed that the US "should not commit its military and economic resources to the 
saving of Chiang, because no matter how much you poured in, under his leadership you 
couldn't win."187 Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, Executive Secretary of the National 
Security Council, believed there was no solution to the Chinese problem "unless we 
could have assassinated Chiang and gotten a good leader'' to replace him. 188 The 
Republicans, however, with their belief in the greatness of Chiang, their conviction that 
the Chinese Communists were puppets of the Russians, and their reluctance to abandon a 
traditional ally, called for increased aid to the KMT against the Chinese Communists. 
Republicans used their majority in Congress to influence foreign policy, even threatening 
to totpedo the Marshall Plan in order to generate support for Chiang's KMT government. 
In April 1948, the China Aid Act was passed with Republican support.189 With strong 
Republican Congressional support and the strategic need for the KMT cooperation, the 
US government would not set itself at odds with the KMT government on the Taiwan 
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issue. The Nationalist-Communist civil war took clear priority over Taiwan in the US 
master plan to position China in the democratic camp. 
The Overseas Taiwan Independence Movement 
In mid-summer 1948, the Liao brothers, Liao Wen-kuei (~3t~. Joshua Liao) and 
Thomas Liao, together with Hsieh Hsueh-hung founded the Formosan League for 
Re-emancipation (FLR). It was the first organization demanded extreme 
interventionism, US guardianship and UN trusteeship for ultimate self-determination of 
Taiwan. The FLR is considered the flagship of the Taiwan independence movement. 
On August 23, 1948, the exiled FLR members issued in Tokyo a manifesto demanding 
independence and a plebiscite. The manifesto declared the invalidity of the Cairo 
decision by invoking the Atlantic Charter that provided for racial self-determination and 
free choice of government.190 To provide a theoretical basis and doctrinal grounds for 
self-determination, the FLR manifesto demanded that Taiwan be treated in the same way 
as independent Korea and declared that Formosans were not "pure" Chinese but a mixed 
race with no natural political bond with any nearby country.191 
Inconsistencies in US Policy 
Separatism and Extreme Interventionism 
From late 1948, the Nationalists suffered successive defeats at the hands of the 
Communists. Acting Secretary of State Robert A. Lovett requested an appraisal of 
Taiwan's strategic importance. On November 24, 1948, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 
warned that control of Taiwan by Chinese Communists could threaten maritime 
communication between Japan and the Malaysia and cause very serious damage to 
American national interests. Yet the JCS suggested that it would be in the interests of 
American national security if diplomatic and economic measures could be deployed to 
thwart Communist domination of Formosa.192 On December 20, the JCS still suggested 
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refraining from making a military commitment to Taiwan. 193 However, Acting 
Secretary of State Robert A. Lovett reported to President Truman on January 14, 1949 
that Taiwan was planned as a last Nationalist bastion.194 He predicted that it might be 
necessary "for the US to take military action if Formosa is to be denied to the 
communists." He believed that should the Chinese Communist invade Taiwan or 
should the Taiwanese revolt against the Chinese, UN intervention could be justified 
based on the de facto right of Taiwan to arrange a plebiscite.195 He suggested that the 
US base its military intervention on the principle of self-determination instead of upon 
obvious strategic interests to gain international support. In the event that the Nationalists 
proved unable of denying the island to the Communists, the US should cultivate a 
Formosan autonomy movement.196 
A National Security Council (NSC) draft report on January 19, 1949 asserted that the 
legal status of Taiwan and the Pescadores was that they were a part of Japan awaiting 
final disposition by a peace treaty; that the US had recognized Chinese de facto control 
over the islands since V-J Day; that the Taiwanese welcomed independence under the 
protection of the US or UN, and· that the US should maintain discreet contact with 
potential indigenous leaders and "be prepared to make use of a Formosan autonomous 
movement" should it be in the American national interests to do so.197 Its conclusions 
recommended that the US issue the following warnings to the governing KMT authority 
on Taiwan: 
(1) The US does not want to see chaos spread from the of mainland to Taiwan; 
(2) If KMT misrule continues, world opinion might swing in favour of Formosan 
autonomy; 
(3) The US requests that the KMT look after Taiwanese welfare and economic needs 
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194 Before his retirement, Chiang Kai-shek had adopted a series of measures to transform Taiwan into a 
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and encourage active Taiwanese political participation; 
(4) The US is concerned about the influx of refugees from the mainland, which 
aggravates the burden on Taiwan's economy, and is disturbed at the increment of 
KMT troops, which is not an effective barrier to Communist penetration; 
(5) The KMT authorities should draw lessons from past failures on the mainland and 
on the island to deal with the situation in Taiwan.198 
On January 26, Formosan League for Re-emancipation (FLR) leader Joshua Liao 
informed US Consul General at Shanghai, John M. Cabot, that a Taiwanese revolt 
against the KMT authorities on Taiwan could start upon the fall of Nanjing to the 
Communists and requested that US assist the Taiwanese rebels or at least remain neutral 
toward the revolt. 199 The Liao brothers had been maintaining contacts with US 
Consulates since the establishment of the FLR in mid-1948. 
On February 3, the NSC sent to Truman a top-secret report, NSC 37/2, an abstract of the 
NSC draft report of January 19. There were three main points. First, the US should 
maintain contact with potential native Taiwanese leaders to exploit a Formosan 
autonomous movement should it serve US national interest. Second, it outlined the 
conclusions of American warnings to the KMT authority on Taiwan. Third, the US 
"should conduct a vigorous program of economic support for the economy of Formosa, 
designed to assist the Formosans in developing and maintaining a viable, self-supporting 
economy."200 A successful Formosan autonomous movement conceivably presupposes 
a viable Formosa economy, one for which American economic aid was designed. The 
link between economic aid and separatist intention filtered all the way down; as 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson and other key officials later insisted, economic aid was 
intended to deny Taiwan to the Communists; "ECA (Economic Cooperation 
Administration) program only means [to] aid autonomous Formosa."201 With Truman's 
approval and with the direction of coordinated implementation on February 4, NSC 37/2 
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became the guiding policy toward Taiwan in early 1949.202 On the same day, the 
American Consulate reported to State Department that the Formosan League for 
Re-emancipation had small influence and that other secessionist groups were not unified. 
"[I] Suspect all of them hope to force outside action by exaggeration."203 At this point, 
secessionism apparently lacked popular support in Taiwan. 
Dean Acheson was appointed Secretary of State after George C. Marshall resigned on 
January 21, 1949. Acheson played an important role in the Truman administration's 
China and Taiwan policies. On February 14, Acheson instructed Livingston Merchant, 
then Counsellor of US Embassy in Nanjing, to go to Taiwan to pave the way for the 
Formosan autonomy movement. Merchant's responsibilities included establishing a 
personal relationship with Taiwanese independence groups,204 and seeking to enable 
General Sun Li-jen Cf*.Jl.A) to replace Governor Chen Cheng(~~) so as to facilitate 
separation. 205 For the US, Sun was "an American trained officer of integrity, 
competence and liberal philosophy."206 The US government was eager to replace Chen 
Cheng, a henchman of Chiang, with Sun as governor of Taiwan when Chiang's future 
was still unknown after his retirement. 207 American diplomatic officials in Taipei 
maintained very close contacts with Sun. America's earliest exploratory thoughts were 
to manoeuvre for the replacement of Chen Cheng by Wei Tao-ming or Sun Li-jen so that 
the Taiwan regime would agree to declare Formosan autonomy or to be taken under the 
wing of the UN upon Chiang Kai-shek's fall.208 
On February 18, Acheson directed the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) to 
provide economic assistance to Taiwan by developing and maintaining a viable, 
self-supporting economy. 209 Later, Merchant urged that US economic aid be directed at 
improving the welfare of native Taiwanese, by providing fertilizer under the ECA 
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program and implementing revival projects under the Joint Commission on Rural 
Reconstruction. 210 
On March 2, Acheson realized that apparent American efforts to separate Taiwan from 
the mainland would create an irredentist movement and anti-US sentiment. A vigorous 
program and the ambitious mission of American economic aid "would make US position 
more noticeable but general US position [on] Formosa as seen [from] outside should not 
be particularly affected by [the] size [ot] mission." 211 Although the American 
government avoided making any promises to offer military assistance to the KMT 
government, the US planned to extend its aid program to maintain the viability of the 
Formosan economy.212 
On March 3, Acheson informed the NSC that the US was attempting to cultivate 
separatism in Taiwan but had to avoid raising American-created irredentism that the 
Communists could use for their own purposes: "if our present policy is to have any hope 
of success in Formosa, we must carefully conceal our wish to separate the island from 
mainland control."213 He realized that diplomatic and economic measures alone would 
not guarantee a denial of Taiwan to the Communists, even the use of US military power, 
short of complete blockade and occupation, would be ineffective.214 He said, after 
exhausting all political and economic measures, if the US would resort to military 
intervention, America would do so in concert with like-minded powers and with the use 
of UN mechanisms. The proclaimed intention would be to satisfy legitimate Taiwanese 
demands for self-determination, either under a UN trusteeship or through 
independence.215 Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, executive secretary of the NSC, 
noted that the president approved of this policy. 216 The State Department 
acknowledged on March 23 that it was interested in the activities of the Formosan 
League for Re-emancipation and had instructed the appropriate consular offices to keep 
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in touch?17 However, Merchant reported to Acheson that Taiwanese independence 
groups were disunited, politically illitemte, disorganized and unreliable. Merchant 
believed that the US could not advise or encourage an American-backed Governor to 
declare sepamtion unless he possessed sufficient force to defend it.Z18 
The China White Paper and the Rush for Extreme Interventionism 
Following the Democmtic victory in the Senate and House elections in 1948, the KMT's 
debacle in late 1948, Chiang Kai-shek's announcement of retirement on January 21, 
1949, and the ensuing disintegmtion of the Nationalist leadership, the Truman 
administmtion decided in March 1949 to draft the China White Paper. The White Paper 
was intended to "show that we had done as much as we could, that our course had [been] 
basically correct, and that the impending fall of China to the Communists was in no way 
attributable to American policy."219 This decision marked the conclusion of US support 
to the Nationalists on the mainland and the acceptance of the imminent Communist 
victory. If the United States wanted to deny Taiwan to the Communists, more vigorous 
interventionism would be required. 
Merchant affirmed to Acheson on April 12 that the control of Taiwan by Chen Cheng and 
Chiang who were preoccupied with their self-interest in defending the island from the 
Communist invasion would now serve the immediate interests of America. 220 Acheson 
agreed and instructed Merchant to inform T. V. Soong, an important KMT government 
official and brother-in-law of Chiang, that the US would give "primary consideration" to 
the Nationalist economic and self-strengthening projects,221 and to disabuse him of the 
linkage between US economic aid and US imperialistic designs on Taiwan.222 The 
superficiality of American support for the KMT regime worried the secessionists. On 
May 2, P. Huang, a member of the Formosan League for Re-emancipation, visited the 
US Embassy and urged the US to make its sepamtist intentions toward Taiwan clear and, 
in particular, to support Formosan independence to save the island from communism.223 
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The American approach was both sophisticated and opportunistic. On May 5, Merchant 
recommended to Acheson the use of some economic programs on Taiwan to support 
military establishment and raise the average standard of living. In return, the US should 
request Taiwan's permission for the long-tenn leasing of US Navy and US Air Forces 
bases and the placement of Sun Li -:ien in command of all forces and services. 224 On 
May 24, Merchant concluded that efforts to replace Governor Chen Cheng with liberal 
General Sun had proven unsuccessful and that the Formosan population was deeply 
resentful of its Chinese rulers. However, the Formosans did not have the revolutionary 
organization, leadership or the anns to mount a successful uprising. Taiwanese 
independence groups were too weak. He urged a reconsideration of American policy. 225 
Among the three lines of actions he enumerated, he suggested "a policy of calculated 
inaction colored with opportunism" which took advantage of the Nationalist self-interest 
in resistance and continued to direct American economic aid to native Taiwanese. 226 He 
realized that although economic aid and secret diplomatic efforts might contribute to the 
ultimate raising of the Formosa issue in the UN as a result of an appeal by the native 
population and by mainland elements on the island, economic and diplomatic measures 
alone could not guarantee that Taiwan would not fall to the Communists.227 
In the arena of international politics, the US Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, 
Walton Butterworth, consulted UN officials about the Taiwan issue on June 8. The 
following day the US proposed a statement to be delivered to the UN General Assembly 
to revoke the Cairo Declaration, denounce the Nationalist misrule which had forfeited its 
right to sovereignty over the island, and call for a plebiscite or some alternative UN 
trusteeship pending Taiwan's qualification for independence. He believed the right of 
self-determination would render the US position morally unassailable.228 
On Taiwan, the US also required a stabilizing Chinese force apart from American troops 
and unsophisticated secessionist groups. Donald Edgar, US Consul at Taipei, reported 
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to the State Department on June 12 that General Sun Li-jen "brightened considerably" 
after Edgar showed him a letter from Butterworth to Merchant. Sun believed that if 
Governor Chen received replacement orders from ROC Acting President Li Tsung-jen ( * * {.- ), Chen would withdraw and Chiang Kai-shek could not obstruct the 
replacement; Sun believed that a change of governor or regime would serve national 
interests and save Taiwan for China.229 
A draft memorandum prepared by the Policy Planning Staff on June 23 considered all 
possible measures. It indicated that any US plan for the removal of the KMT 
authorities on Taiwan might encounter the military resistance of 300,000 KMT troops on 
the island. Although the document claimed it did not attempt to provide solution to this 
military obstacle, it suggested that an inquiry be instituted to see whether the US 
National Military Establishment was able and willing to "subdue and eject . . . the 
Nationalist troops now on the island" and to "exert effective authority there for an 
interim period."230 It proposed to call the powers that had defeated Japan to petition the 
UN for a plebiscite regarding the ultimate disposition of Taiwan based on 
self-determination within one year.231 It recommended that Chiang be informed that if 
he wished to remain on Taiwan, he would be accorded the status of a political refugee. 232 
On July 6, Director of the Policy Planning Staff George F. Kennan reasserted that the 
only reasonable chance of denying Taiwan and Pescadores to the Communists lay in the 
removal of the present KMT administrators from the islands and in the establishment of 
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a provisional international or US regime that would invoke the principle of 
self -determination and hold a plebiscite to determine the ultimate disposition of the 
islands. He believed that "Formosan separatism is the only concept which has 
sufficient grass-roots appeal to resist Communism" and urged action to change the 
National Military Establishment's view of Taiwan's strategic importance.233 
On August 4, America revealed its deepest fear: the turnover of Taiwan to the 
Communists resulting from widespread mutinies by disaffected KMT troops. The State 
Department requested the JCS to consider two situations incurred by US military 
occupation: (1) occupation in the face of initial opposition from Nationalist forces on the 
island or an attack by Communist forces, and (2) occupation by agreement with the 
existing authorities on Taiwan with implicit responsibility for internal security and 
external defence. 234 
Publication of the "China White Paper" on August 5 precipitated the fiasco of the 
Nationalists on the one hand; on the other hand, it dismissed Soviet and Chinese 
Communists' accusations against American imperialistic designs on Taiwan and to reach 
an accommodation with the Communist government in China once it was officially 
established.235 Yet the Democratic victory in the 1948 Congressional elections and the 
publication of the "China White Paper" intensified partisanship on China issue. Many 
conservative Republican senators, including Styles Bridges, William Knowland, Pat 
McCarran, and Kenneth Wherry, denounced the China White Paper as "a wishful, 
do-nothing policy that has succeeded only in placing Asia in danger of Soviet 
conquest."236 
The State Department received on August 22 the JCS' reply to the planned military 
occupation of Taiwan. The JCS did not regard Taiwan's strategic importance as vital to 
the US under peacetime conditions. Citing the disparity between US military strength, 
budgetary limitations and global commitments, the JCS reaffirmed that Taiwan's 
importance did not justify overt military action. The JCS recommended against 
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occupation. Yet the JCS promised to advise on overt military action in case of war 
from the standpoint of national security. 237 
The Emergence of Acheson's Defeatism on Taiwan 
In September the continuing deterioration of the mainland situation and the influx of 
refugees into Taiwan led many prominent secessionists to appeal to Macdonald, Consul 
General at Taipei, and Rankin, Consul General at Hong Kong, for support of Taiwan 
independence.238 Moreover, the British Foreign Office gave the US State Department 
officials a written statement on September 9 regarding its position on Taiwan. The 
statement stressed that the legal status of Taiwan could not be altered without the 
consensus of the Four Powers (the US, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and China); that 
submitting Taiwan case to the UN was both unlikely and harmful; and that Taiwan would 
eventually fall into Communist hands. 239 
Considering the JCS' view of Taiwan's strategic importance, the allies' refusal to support 
interventionism, and Acheson's assertion that American influence in China "remains one 
of [the] most valuable assets in that country,"240 the State Department decided on 
October 6 not to take "any action contrary to the wishes of the present or future Chinese 
authorities in Formosa."241 The State Department was resigned to accept the .KMT 
control of Taiwan and refrain from extreme interventionism. However, the US was 
determined to make it clear to Chiang that he was responsible for the defence of Taiwan, 
that the US would not commit its armed forces to defend Taiwan, and that American 
support and attitude toward Taiwan depended upon .KMT efforts to establish an efficient 
administration that would see to the political and economic well-being ofTaiwan.242 
On October 28, Acheson instructed John J. Macdonald, the Consul General at Taipei, to 
convey American views on Taiwan forcefully to Chiang. 243 Macdonald did so on 
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November 3. Chiang believed that the US had extended moral support to the KMT and 
was willing to again deal directly with him. 244 In reply, Chiang shared the view that 
"improvement of the political and economic well-being of the Taiwanese people will 
fundamentally strengthen the security ofTaiwan."245 
Abandonment of the most extreme interventionism caused a backlash in the conservative 
camp. Senator H. Alexander Smith sent a letter to Secretary Acheson on November 4 
to urge military occupation on the position that Taiwan was still technically a part of 
Japan and that it might be made a trusteeship area. He also stated that, pending a peace 
treaty with Japan, America should take the view that the US could establish a sort of 
protectorate over Taiwan. 246 Smith's calls were to no avail. On December 1, 
Merchant, now Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, filed a 
memorandum on the expected loss of Taiwan, in which he suggested announcements 
designed to reassure the American people as to the preparedness and competence of US 
government, to minimize the psychological repercussions, and to repair or neutralize the 
resultant shift in the strategic balance of American defences. 247 
After the Nationalist government's formal declaration of the retreat of the ROC to 
Taiwan on December 9, on December 19 Acheson instructed Donald D. Edgar, Consul at 
Taipei, to make an estimate of domestic support for the KMT, the Communists, 
Taiwanese independence leaders, the prospects of a coup, KMT defections to the 
Communists, prospects of economic stability, and official and public receptivity of US 
military occupation and UN trusteeship.248 In response, Edgar concluded on December 
23 that the KMT had no popular support, and that independence leaders were 
unorganised and unreliable. A coup could not succeed without outside support. If US 
aid did not arrive soon, the number of defections from the KMT would increase. 
Taiwan's economy was basically sound but the KMT military drain had to be scaled 
down. The KMT troops would oppose US military occupation without negotiation but 
welcome military control through advisors. Over one million Chinese civilians on 
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Taiwan looked hopefully ahead to a temporary US takeover and most Taiwanese 
welcomed UN trusteeship.249 
While awaiting Edgar's reply, President Truman had already issued a statement to the 
press on December 22. He said: "Formosa is a part of Nationalist China and we still 
recognize the Nationalist Government as the government of China." 250 In late 
December, the US moved its embassy from Nanjing to Taipei. It was evident that at 
this time, the JCS was revising its opinion on the strategic importance of Taiwan. On 
December 23, the JCS recommended stepped-up economic and diplomatic aid and 
military advisers and the gift of military equipment and supplies to the KMT government 
on Taiwan as a part of the overall program to resist the spread of Communist domination 
in East Asia.251 Meanwhile, the American Consulate reported to the State Department 
in late December 1949 "Only Uao brothers can be called independence leaders and their 
reliable following in Taiwan most uncertain .... Other Taiwan 'big names' ... equally 
without solid backing."252 
Senator Smith again urged on December 27 that the administration open a dialogue 
immediately with Mr. Wu Kuo-chen (K.C. Wu, ~~~). the new Governor of Taiwan, 
to arrange an American occupation of Taiwan. On December 30, Senator William 
Knowland called for the dispatch of a military mission to Taiwan. On the same day, 
Senator Robert Taft strongly suggested that Taiwan be kept out of the Communist hands 
even if it were necessary to send the US Navy there.253 Yet, on December 29, despite 
an assertion from General Bradley, Chairman of the JCS, that Taiwan's strategic 
importance justified military assistance, Acheson maintained a defeatist attitude, 
believing that ''there is no Chinese basis of resistance to Communism," that the corrupt 
Nationalist China was doomed to losing Taiwan to the Communists and that the loss of 
Taiwan would not breach American defense.254 Accordingly, he reaffirmed the existing 
policy - the US would continue to use its best diplomatic and economic efforts to keep 
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the island out of Communist hands but would not use force. 255 
The Hidden Reversal Mechanism in Truman's Abandonment Policy 
Citing the proposals of some Congress members, the Communists charged that the US 
was going to occupy Taiwan; in response, Truman issued a statement on January 5, 1950 
to end further speculation.256 A key sentence of Truman's "abandonment" policy 
toward Taiwan initially read, ''The United States has no desire to obtain special rights or 
privileges or to establish military bases on Formosa at this time or to detach Formosa 
from China."251 Chairman of JCS General Bradley suggested deleting the phrase "or to 
detach Formosa from China" because "the situation might arise where [the Communists] 
will march South, in which case we may want to detach Formosa from China." Truman 
agreed. So did Acheson, although he said he would have preferred to leave the phrase 
in the statement. Thus Truman's announcement read ''The United States has no desire 
to obtain special rights or privileges or to establish military bases on Formosa at this 
time."258 On the same day, Acheson told Senators Knowland and Smith: "if one wanted 
to be legalistic it could be argued that in sheer legality Formosa would not be a part and 
parcel of China until a stipulation to that effect had been made in the Japanese Peace 
Treaty."259 
This announcement seemed to announce the abandonment of Taiwan. Secretary of 
State Acheson reinforced this perspective when he excluded Taiwan from the "defence 
perimeter' in his speech to the National Press Club on January 12, 1950.260 Most 
people believed that the eruption of the Korean War reversed the abandonment policy 
and saved Taiwan.261 As Edwin W. Martin, Consul at Taipei recalled to US in January 
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1950, stated: 
Our policy was hands off, let the dust settle, we're not going to defend Formosa. We had no 
military aid program then of any kind there. We had long ago recognized that Formosa was part of 
China and that was it. Now, if China had taken Formosa at that time rather than gone into Korea-
of course they eventually might have gone into Korea and we might have gotten involved then, but 
by that time they would have already had Formosa, at least that wouldn't be an issue today.262 
Summary 
Japan's fifty-year period of colonial rule planted the seed of Taiwanese nationalism, a 
prototypical Taiwanese consciousness. The Taiwanese consciousness was defined by 
the Chinese diaspora's passion for irredentism. However, Japan's modem 
administrative techniques had given Taiwan an infrastructure for a new "imagiiled 
community." America's involvement in Asian affairs evolved from an old-style 
imperialism, through market-centred hegemonism, and finally to modem hegemonism 
that incorporates self-determination, enabling the US to claim innocence of imperial 
pretensions, vitiate old imperialism, and achieve and sustain global domination. Since 
the early 1940s, this modem hegemonism has persisted through American involvement 
in Taiwanese affairs. 
After the Taiwanese reunited with the Chinese in 1945, the KMT's incompetence ruined 
Taiwanese passion for irredentism but fermented an embittered Taiwanese consciousness. 
The February 28 Incident and the ensuing reign of terror then converted the embittered 
Taiwanese consciousness into secessionism. After the Incident, some America 
strategists began fomenting separatism in the name of self -determination. George Kerr, 
American Vice Consul at Taipei, capitalized upon the compatibility between Taiwanese 
secessionism and American strategic scheme to call for extreme interventionism. 
The KMT debacle on the mainland and the projected Communist challenge to American 
hegemony prompted the US government to encourage separatism on Taiwan. 
Politically, the US attempted to revoke the Cairo Declaration and manoeuvre a plebiscite 
or UN--·trusteeship ·oasedon.the un8ettled.legat status of Taiwan and the .principle of 
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self-determination. America's vigorous economic aid to Taiwan was intended to 
maintain a viable, self-supporting economy; the link between economic aid and 
separatist intention did build up as key US officials repeatedly stressed that economic 
measure in the form of aid was an integmted tool to deny Taiwan to the Communists. 
In addition, the US considered manoeuvring General Sun Li-jen into new leader of 
Taiwan authorities independent from mainland control, plotting a coup against Chiang, 
eliminating the Nationalist troops and authorities from Taiwan, and launching a military 
occupation by American troops to achieve its separatism on Taiwan and safeguard the 
integrity of the openness policy. 
However, the cause of independence did not initially receive strong popular support from 
the Taiwanese. Despite the secret and subtle promotion of separatism, the US 
diplomats' first-hand reports in 1949 insisted that the Taiwanese secessionist groups were 
too fragmented, inexperienced, and unreliable, and that despite their minimal influence 
they tended to exaggerate the support behind them by saying what the US wanted to hear. 
Still, the Truman administration was eager to inflame separatism. The American 
Consulate finally admitted in late December 1949 that the Liao brothers were truly 
independence leaders but that they had no assured following in Taiwan. This underlines 
the American use of Taiwan independence to serve its hegemonism. However moral 
the universalism of self-determination is, the literature does not absolve the US of 
hegemonic pretensions. 
Realistically, the weakness of Taiwanese independence groups, the influx of mainland 
refugees into Taiwan, the disparities between US military strength and global obligations, 
the lack of allies' support of interventionism, and Acheson's attempt to seek a 
rapprochement with Communist China after the establishment of the PRC combined to 
lead the Truman administration to defeatism. Consequently, although the US 
government fully recognized the genesis of Taiwanese secessionism and was interested 
in collaborating with secessionist activities, America could not enforce separatism on 
Taiwan. However, the paradox was that the hidden reversing mechanism embedd~ in 
Truman's abandonment policy. ~ould o~y fun;ti~~ withfue ;rup;to~ ;f th~ ~o~an War 
in 1950, when the strategic position of Taiwan assumed new importance. 
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Chapter 3: 1950-1970 
THEORY CONSTRUCTION AND 
THE GROWTH OF TAIWANESE NATIONALISM 
Introduction 
After the Chinese Communists claimed the mainland in 1949, the expansion of the 
Communist bloc worried the US. When the Korean War broke out in 1950, the Truman 
administration had to resort to military intervention in the Korean peninsula and in the 
Taiwan Strait to consolidate its defence belt in the Western Pacific. For the US, 
exploiting the anti-Communist attitude of the Chiang Kai-shek regime became an 
immediate option. This did not mean, however, the US would commit to reviving the 
failed KMT regime that had just lost Mainland China to the Communists. Promoting 
Taiwanese nationalism was another viable, long-tenn option. Parallel use of these two 
options best served American interests. That is, despite America's official position of 
supporting the KMT regime, there was an underlying promotion of Taiwanese 
independence. 
This chapter shows how the US pursued these two options by focusing on four questions: 
What was the essence of Truman's interventionism after the Korean War? How did the 
US government use Taiwanese nationalism to undennine the KMT regime and contribute 
to the evolution of Taiwanese nationalism? How did these two options allow American 
politicians and scholars who supported separatism on Taiwan, and Taiwanese 
secessionists to shape their respective visions of Taiwan independence? How did the 
Taiwan independence movement benefit from American patronage in this era of 
bipolarisation? 
The Resumption--of Separatism-s-ince ·the Korean· War·· 
Truman's Ambiguous Options over the Future of Taiwan 
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Truman's "hands-off' policy toward Taiwan faced many challenges from early 1950. 
On the front of US-PRC relations, America's attempts to secure its national interests on 
the mainland by recognizing the Communist regime had proven impractical. Mao 
Zedong's course of "leaning-to-one-side," most evident in his "On the People's 
Democratic Dictatorship" speech on June 30, 1949, dismissed American efforts for 
improving relationship with Chinese Communist regime.263 From November 1948 to 
December 1949, Chinese Communist authorities arrested and detained American 
consulate staff in Shenyang (71~). The failure of American diplomatic efforts to 
resolve this issue made it impossible for the Truman administration to recognize the 
newly established PRC. The detained American diplomats suffered mistreatment and 
were tried in November 1949 for allegedly beating Chinese employees. On January 13, 
1950, Communist authorities confiscated part of the American consular compound in 
Beijing, a move Ambassador 0. Edmund Clubb assessed as one designed to hasten 
recognition. In response, the State Department withdrew its personnel from China. 264 
On February 14, 1950, the Sino-Soviet Thirty-year Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and 
Mutual Aid was signed after Mao's two-month visit to Moscow. The Soviet Union thus 
increased its influence over China. America closed its consulates in ChiD.a in April. 265 
American hopes of securing the national interests in the mainland and influence on 
Communist China had been frustrated. 
On the front of strategic balance, Stalin was impressed with Acheson's "defence 
perimeter" speech that implied that America was retreating from East Asia. Stalin thus 
supported Kim n Sung's plans to invade South Korea and Mao Zedong was preoccupied 
with plans to invade Taiwan.266 Truman learned from the CIA that North Korean 
Communists were actively preparing to attack the south with the assistance of the USSR 
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and the PRC.267 Truman calculated the possible loss of the entire Korean peninsula and 
Taiwan as a serious threat to the bases included in the so-called security perimeter in 
Japan, Okinawa, Philippines, and Aleutians.268 
When the Korean War erupted on June 25, 1950, the immediate military threat 
outweighed American political consideration that had led to the "hands-off' policy on 
Taiwan.269 Taiwan immediately became "an important anchor in a US defensive chain" 
stretching from the Aleutians to Australia. 270 The hidden reversal mechanism that had 
been embedded in Truman's "abandonment" policy was activated. Truman found it 
expedient to use the war to escape the yoke of the Cairo Declaration and resume the 
separatist intention without any UN resolution. Therefore, in addition to immediately 
committing American soldiers and war material to South Korea as a member of the UN, 
Truman made an emphatic statement regarding Taiwan on behalf of America alone on 
June 27. He arbitrarily asserted that the legal status of Taiwan was undetermined.271 
Truman also dispatched the Seventh Fleet to neutmlize the Taiwan Strait, making Taiwan 
a protectorate of the US.272 All of these measures marked a resumption of separatist 
intention on the island. 
Although the very next day PRC Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai (.m.J}l~''*) accused America 
of imperialism and declared Beijing's determination to liberate Taiwan, the US stuck to 
its new position.273 On July 10, Truman and Acheson denounced the Kremlin's request 
to link the restoration of the status quo ante on the Korean peninsula to the change of 
America's latest position on Taiwan for a peaceful settlement.274 Believing that the 
pronouncement on June 27 may have inspired the Chinese Communists to speed up the 
invasion timetable, Truman dispatched the Seventh Fleet to the Strait to reinforce its 
267 Harry S. Truman, Memoirs (Years of Trial and Hope: 1946-1953), 2 vols., vol. 2 (New York: 
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position in the Far East. ns With respect to the most controversial issue of the legal 
status of Taiwan, Truman explained the American position in his letter of August 27, 
1950 to Ambassador Warren R. Austin, US Representative in the UN. Truman stated: 
The actual status of the island is that it is territory taken from Japan by the victory of the Allied 
forces in the Pacific. Like other such territories, its legal status cannot be fixed until there is 
international action to determine its future. The Chinese Government was asked by the Allies to 
take the surrender of the Japanese forces on the island. That is the reason the Chinese are there 
now.276 
Truman thus brought his position on the legal status of Taiwan in line with the draft 
report of the NSC on January 19, 1949, which asserted that the Taiwanese would 
welcome independence under the protection of the US or UN and recommended that the 
US ''be prepared to make use of a Formosan autonomous movement."n7 Surely 
Truman was being prudent in keeping his options over the future of Taiwan open by 
maintaining legal ambiguity, given the poor state of the KMT regime and the threat from 
the CCP. This ambiguous position would allow Washington to deny any claim to the 
island by the CCP. 
The Emergence of Taiwanese Primordialism 
Although Truman's assertion about the unsettled status of Taiwan never mentioned such 
terms as the Cairo Declaration or self-determination, it nullified the Cairo decision and 
granted the request of the Formosan League for Re-Emancipation (FLR) on August 23 
1948 that the Cairo Declaration be invalidated in accordance with Atlantic Charter's 
national self-detennination.n8 Truman's explanation of Taiwan's legal status in his 
August 27 letter added momentum to the exiled Taiwanese secessionist camp. 
Taiwanese secessionists in Japan founded the Formosan Democratic Independence Party 
in 1950. Although Thomas Liao was imprisoned on charges of illegal entcy in 
MacArthur's Japan for openly attacking Chiang Kai-shek and was waiting for 
deportation, his associates elected him Chairman in absentia.n9 In September 1950 
Joshua Liao submitted his memorandum, Formosa Speaks, to the UN, in support of the 
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petition for Taiwan independence. He stated: 
With [Formosan] group-consciousness growing into Formosan Nationalism, ... the Formosan 
patriots now want complete independence through a plebiscite under neutral supervision in 
accordance with the principle and practice of self-determination and democracy ... 280 
He enumerated six failings of the Cairo Declaration to justify the unsettled political 
status of Taiwan as the legal basis for Taiwan independence.281 To strengthen the 
theoretical and doctrinal basis for "self-determination," he argued: 
[T]hough Chinese blood dominates, constant absorption of Dutch, Spanish, and Manchu 
elements in the remote past and of Japanese immigrants in the recent time through intermarriage is 
indisputable. Thus, in both race-psychology and physical appearance the native Formosans have 
become as different from the Chinese as - if not more than - the Americans are from the English 
and the Brazilians from the Portuguese.282 
In industry and population, cultural advancement and social organization Formosa is comparable 
with the majority of the independent nations in the present world and therefore deserves to become 
independent. 283 
The FLR manifesto of August 1948 argued that the Taiwanese were a mixed race.284 
Joshua Liao's Formosa Speaks asserted the biological heterogeneity between Chinese 
and Taiwanese and the cultural superiority of the Taiwanese over the Chinese to frame a 
cultural argument as the basis of a Taiwanese nation-state. The narrative is typical of 
primordialism, or ethno-nationalism, which argues that the collective identity of an 
ethnic group is founded on physical cultural or biological determinants, 285 such as 
common consanguinity, ethnicity, language or religion. 286 Evidently, America's 
ambiguity over the policy of Taiwan after the outbreak of the Korean War directly 
contributed to this Taiwanese primordialism. 
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America's Separatist Strategies 
"Two Chinas" and "One China, One Taiwan" 
After the eruption of the Korean War, the US resumed its aid to the Nationalists on 
Taiwan and thus strengthened the KMT regime. On May 18, 1951, Dean Rusk, 
Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, reaffirmed in a speech to the China 
Institute that the US recognized the KMT as the government of China.287 There was no 
official repudiation of Rusk's statement from the Truman administration.288 Grasso 
believed that recognizing the KMT as the ROC was the foundation of Truman's "Two 
Chinas" policy. 289 However, behind this ''Two Chinas" solution was a widely held view 
that the KMT, as a corrupt and unpopular dictatorship, would collapse upon the death of 
Chiang or the withdrawal of American support.290 There was also an assumption that in 
the course of time, after power passed to a younger generation of leaders, an independent 
Formosa might be accepted.291 Fred W. Riggs argued that many Taiwanese ''no doubt 
felt the greatest amount of sympathy for those of their leaders" who advocated 
independence and that power transition on the island would blur and ultimately eliminate 
the distinction between mainland Nationalists and Taiwanese. 292 Therefore, "Two 
Chinas" could finally lead to Taiwan independence. 
Meanwhile, Truman's insistence upon the undetermined legal status of Taiwan had 
become a guiding principle of America's China policy. In the US-Japan San Francisco 
Peace Treaty, sponsored by the US government on September 8, 1951, America not only 
deliberately excluded the Communist Chinese and the Nationalist Chinese 
representatives from meetings to discuss the Treaty, but also circumvented the issue of 
Taiwan's sovereignty.293 Under Article 2 of the Peace Treaty, "Japan renounces all right, 
title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores."294 The Treaty of Peace between the 
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Republic of China and Japan was signed on April 28, 1952. Article 2 stipulated: "It is 
recognised that under Article 2 of the [US-Japan San Francisco Peace Treaty] ... Japan 
has renounced all right, title, and claim to Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (~mJ. the 
Pescadores) as well as the Spratley Islands and the Paracel Islands."295 Again the 
sovereignty issue was conspicuously absent. Arguing the superiority of treaties over 
declarations and proclamations, Taiwanese secessionists always based their argument for 
independence on Truman's statements about the undetermined legal status of Taiwan and 
his position on the KMT's control of Taiwan.296 Thus Truman's own words were a 
major factor in the birth of "One China, One Taiwan" policy. 
"Two Chinas" and "One China, One Taiwan" is a reflection of merely two different, 
non-exclusive approaches to separatism. 
The Authoritarian Regime of Chiang Kai-shek 
Before the KMT retreated to Taiwan in 1949, the ROC's First National Assembly had 
appended to the constitution several clauses, collectively called the ''Temporary 
Provisions Effective During the Period of Communist Rebellion" (lb~WG~L~:MI:!fn~'AA€ 
mx) on April 18, 1948.297 These provisions overrode the constitution itself with 
mandatory unification of China. After retreating to Taiwan, citing these temporary 
provisions, the KMT regime set aside the basic principles of constitutional democracy in 
pursuit of unification with the mainland. Chiang Kai-shek resumed the Presidency of 
the ROC on Taiwan in March 1950. The outbreak of the Korean War two months later 
and the signing of the US-ROC Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement in February 1951 
immediately benefited the creation and extension of Chiang's Leninist-style authoritarian 
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regime.z9s 
Politically, the KMT established a two-tier system. The upper tier consisted of Martial 
law.299 To cope with "the subversive danger'' of Communism and comply with the 
Temporary Provisions, the KMT had imposed Martial law on May 20, 1949.300 Martial 
law suspended the planned national elections to the National Assembly and the 
Legislative Yuan, gave all members of these two political bodies unlimited terms of 
office, established a ruling stmtum that was isolated from the population, and deprived 
the Taiwanese of the right to campaign and vote in national elections.301 Because 
martial law was based on the Temporary Provisions, they arguably legalized the KMT 
dictatorship by linking it with the unification of China over the coming decades.302 The 
lower tier was comprised of the Local Autonomy Law and allowed local elections after 
1950.303 The KMT intended to use local elections to impress the US and infiltmte 
Taiwanese society. 304 Although local elections establish a fa~ade of democracy, the 
KMT formed networks of patron-client relations, implemented a de facto vote 
distribution scheme among its candidates, and took advantage of irregularities in 
balloting and vote counting to manipulate local elections?05 The patron-client system 
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was based on the exchange of economic interests and political support between the KMT 
and native local factions. As the patron, the KMT divided, ruled and rewarded native 
heavyweight followers, or its clients, with economic favouritism and political 
ascendance; in return, the native local factions supported the KMT regime. The 
patron-client system was originally designed to make political inroads into the Taiwanese 
community.306 So-called local self-government under martial law actually reinforced 
KMT authoritarian rule by enhancing the KMT's legitimacy and suppressing opposition 
forces.307 The KMT also used the Taiwan Garrison Command to maintain an extensive 
intelligence network to monitor suspicious activities by Communist agents or by 
Taiwanese dissidents.308 In a sense non-supportive of the KMT, the political structure 
and security system were designed for the minority mainlanders to rule over the 
Taiwanese majority.309 Furthermore, between 1949 and 1953, a series of land reforms 
created a large owner-cultivator class to win Taiwanese gratitude and rally support for 
the Chinese Nationalists.310 In the eyes of the landlord class that constituted "the social 
elite in every community'' and that was "known to have been active in the 1947 revolt," 
however, the land reforms removed them from their accustomed position as political 
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leader. 311 The landowner class that had been expropriated by the KMT land reform was 
often compensated with state-owned-enterprise stock.312 
Militarily, because the Chiang Kai-shek regime cited "return to the mainland" as its 
highest national policy, its exorbitant military budget made native Taiwanese bemoan 
their sacrifice for an impossible mission. 313 Economically, because the KMT 
confiscated all Japanese-owned property in 1945, a large part of Taiwan's industry came 
under government control and passed into mainlander hands. After the KMT retreated 
to Taiwan in 1948, mainlanders took industrial and administrative positions en masse. 
The KMT regime imposed a party-state capitalist monopoly upon the economic 
system. 314 In addition to the daunting task of recovering the mainland, the KMT 
seemed more interested in protecting mainlanders' interests, squeezing limited resources 
to support an immense mainlander-dominated military, in addition to an administrative 
and teaching personnel corps that amounted to one quarter of the population?15 Native 
Taiwanese therefore took charge of the private sector.316 Psychologically, the KMT 
made any reference to the February 28 Incident taboo, but this policy only encouraged 
Taiwanese pride in the incident as the latest native rebellion against mainlander 
suppression.317 Culturally, the KMT imposed a Chinese national identity by instituting 
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Mandarin Chinese (guoyu, ~~) education, a manifestation of cultural hegemony, 318 
and enshrining Sunist thought or the Three Principles of the People as official 
ideology319 to justify authoritarian KMT rule.320 
For Taiwanese nationalists and their sympathizers, the KMT instilled in the Taiwanese a 
sense of inferiority to the mainlanders. Virtually all native Taiwanese were marginalized 
by definition; 321 the Taiwanese believed that they were politically dominated, 
economically exploited and socially discriminated against by the KMT regime. 322 
However, it is an exaggeration to argue that because of the structural inequities, "the 
Formosans overwhelmingly favour the establishment of an independent republic."323 
As explored in Chapter 2, the cause of independence had never received strong backing 
from the Taiwanese community.324 Although the KMT regime was very repressive, 
most of its victims were mainlanders who were suspected of anti-Chiang Kai-shek or 
pro-Communist activities. The second group was a small circle of native secessionists. 
British diplomats in Taipei repeatedly reported in the 1950s that the majority of residents 
had little to do with the security apparatus and were hardly affected by the Chiang 
regime. 325 In any case, the Korean War tightened Chiang's authoritarian control in the 
1950s and 1960s and generated resentment of the regime's structural inequities, 
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reinforcing the ethnic and class divisions that had emerged when Chen Yi took over the 
governorship of Taiwan in 1945?26 
American Aid and the Emergence of Taiwanese Structuralism327 
Before the Korean War, American economic aid had been used to promote Formosan 
autonomy and to deny Taiwan to the Communists. Although American recognition of 
the ROC strengthened the KMT regime, the US had used economic assistance 
(1950-1965) first to make the Taiwanese economically powerful, and then to make them 
politically powerful. As Jacoby put it: 
It was wise for the United States to focus upon rapid material progress, based on a vigorous 
private sector. In this way, American aid helped to disperse economic power and to create new 
power sectors in society. Indirectly, pressures were built up for political and social changes that 
are likely to occur in due time. 328 
Here, the private sector refers to the overwhelmingly native-owned small and medium 
businesses. The KMT feared the implications of economic power passing into the 
hands of the Taiwanese.329 However, the defection of the Nationalist Navy's only 
cruiser to the Communists in early 1949 had made Washington worry about a likely 
political conspiracy and deals between the Communists and the higher echelons of the 
KMT.330 The US strongly pressured the KMT to cultivate private businesses, making it 
an important condition for the use of American aid. 331 Chiang initially opposed 
investing in the private sector at the expense of the military; yet he did not want to be 
restrained by US aid and accepted the suggestion of economic policy-makers that Taiwan 
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should use the aid to create economic self-sufficiency.332 To encourage economic 
development in the 1950s and 1960s, the economic policy-makers of the ROC expanded 
private industry through the early privatisation of state-owned enterprises; the transfer 
was accomplished by turning stock in the companies to landlords as part of their 
compensation for lands that had been surrendered to tenants under the land reform 
program?33 With the deliberate channelling of American aid into the private sector, 
native landlords became entrepreneurs; their private small and medium factories 
increased the levels of export trade and accounted for more than two-thirds of industrial 
production since the 1960s.334 Li Kuo-ting C*~lf1{), one of the most influential 
economic policy makers from the late 1950s to late 1980s, asserted that the US was the 
single most important factor in the fast growth of Taiwan's export trade. 335 Accordinly, 
economic power passed into the hands of the Taiwanese. 
The continuing local elections compelled local factions to expand and upgrade their 
political and economic networks. 336 Many of the local factional leaders grew interested 
in advancing their political territory from local level to central level, or were willing to 
struggle against the structural inequalities imposed by the KMT regime. In any case, 
the rising economic power as a result of the channelling of American aid emboldened the 
native local factions to become openly critical of the structural inequities. In 1966, 
more than half of the seventy-four members of the Taiwan Provincial Assembly 
presented a petition urging the resignation of all members elected in 1947 to the National 
Assembly, Legislative Yuan, and Control Yuan to pave the way for new elections in 
accordance with a constitutional amendment that had just been approved. 337 This 
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episode was a preliminary example of the intended purpose of American aid. The 
episode also reflected the rise of structuralism on the island. 338 Consequently, 
American aid was conducive to the emergence of Taiwanese structuralism. Moreover, 
the US government was eager to investigate the KMT regime's fear of the rising 
economic power of Taiwanese, and the relationship between Taiwanese and the KMT; 
this investigation led to protests from the KMT regime. 339 It is understandable that the 
Chiangs drew a clear line between local factional leaders and businessmen, not 
permitting businessmen to play an active role in the political arena. Under the Chiangs' 
regime, the business community was little more than the primacy economic coalition 
partner of the authoritarian state. 340 
In the following decades, increasing numbers of native Taiwm1:ese businessmen joined 
the struggle against the structural inequities imposed by the KMT. Although the US 
ceased its economic aid to Taiwan in 1965, American aid had multi-dimensional, 
far-reaching socio-economic implications in the evolution of Taiwanese nationalism. 
As Chapter 4 will show, rapid economic growth beginning in the late 1950s and the 
ensuing socio-economic changes had created a sizable new middle class and a literate 
urban working class by the 1970s. 341 This new middle class, in conjunction with a 
higher literacy rate, intensified mass communication, greater per capita income and an 
emerging urban sector, was instrumental in natives' struggle against the ruling elites from 
the mainland and in the transformation of the KMT authoritarian party-state system. 
Theories of Taiwan Independence in the Cold War Era 
The KMT's lmmobilism 
As Chiang stepped up his authoritarian rule in Taiwan, liberal mainlanders, Lei Chen (§t 
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fi )'s Free China Fortnightly group in particular, expressed their opposition. 342 
However, the international situation continued to bipolarise after John Foster Dulles 
assumed the post of Secretary of State (1953-1959) and proposed the "domino theory'' 
which ossified bi-polar confrontation and justified deeper American involvement in East 
Asia.343 The domino theory along with the increase in authoritarianism in tum gave 
rise to an immobilism, a new conservatism and resistance to reform, in the KMT. In 
February 1954, the former Governor Wu Kuo-chen issued an article sharply criticising 
Chiang's dictatorship and modelling the KMT on Soviet's political control on the Soviet 
Union.344 To call American attention to conditions in Taiwan, Wu published "Your 
Money is Building a Police State in Taiwan" in the June 29 issue of Look Magazine.345 
However, these accusations against Chiang were overshadowed by McCarthyism. 346 
Until the end of the First Taiwan Strait Crisis (September 1954-early1955), Dulles still 
openly lauded Chiang. 347 When Dulles visited Taiwan in early September 1954, 
Chiang told Dulles that he did not want to drag the US into a war with the Chinese 
Communists, that he intended to recover the mainland with his own forces without 
American military assistance, and that he would attack only when he was certain of 
success. Knowing that the KMT had no chance of repulsing an all-out attack by the 
Chinese Communists without American help, Dulles refused to believe that Chiang was 
preparing to recover the mainland by force. 348 Dulles even asserted that Chiang knew it 
was impossible to recover the mainland or return to the mainland.349 As the First 
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Taiwan Strait Crisis unfolded, to secure a mutual defence pact with the US, Chiang 
pledged that the KMT government would neither invade nor attack the mainland without 
first consulting America.350 When the US and Taiwan signed the Mutual Defence 
Treaty (MDT) on December 2, 1954, Chiang reached a secret understanding with the US 
that he would not use force without American consent. At the same time he remained 
free to continue his Ihetoric of military recovery of the mainland.351 In retrospect, not 
preparing to recover mainland by force and realizing the impossibility of recovering or 
returning to the mainland are separate interpretations based on separate positions. 
Opponents of the Chiang regime were correct to argue in 1978 that the Chiang regime 
had continued to use the Temporary Provisions, martial law and "recovery of the 
mainland" as excuses to deny democratic reform and suppress dissidents.352 Chiang's 
authoritarianism became even more pronounced after the dismissal of liberal General 
Sun Li-jen on May 25, 1955?53 
Continued Practices of American Separatism 
Despite its support of the KMT regime on Taiwan, in practice the US government 
persistently stressed "the unsettled status of Taiwan." ROC Foreign Minister George 
Yeh Kung-chao (~0m) admitted that ''the delicate international situation makes it that 
[Taiwan and Pescadores] do not belong to us." 354 When the MDT was signed, on the 
issue of sovereignty, both parties exchanged notes reiterating the ROC's effective control 
of Taiwan and the Pescadores. 355 Dulles reaffirmed to the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations that the MDT carefully avoided any reference to Taiwan's 
sovereignty. 356 The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations emphasised that "nothing 
in the treaty shall be construed as affecting or modifying the legal status or sovereignty 
(Taipei: Academia Historica, 2000), 302-03. This news was blockaded by the KMT but disclosed by a 
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of the territories to which it applies," though it accepted the KMT government as the 
lawful authority on Formosa.357 On January 24, 1955, in the course of the hearings on 
the Formosa Resolution as a response to the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, Dulles again 
indicated that "sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores was not considered to have 
been transferred to the Republic of China in the Japanese Peace Treaty and that the 
question of sovereignty over these islands was not yet finally detennined."358 
The MDT formalized the American protectorate over Taiwan, yet it never explicitly 
guaranteed the offshore islands such as Quemoy (~f~). Matsu O~WdD or the Tachens (j( 
IIJI.[) against the Communist attack. 359 The Senate attached several understandings that 
"military operations by either party from the territories held by the ROC shall not be 
taken except by joint agreement"; that the application of the MDT to "other territories" 
"shall be construed as requiring the advice and consent of the Senate of the US" to make 
sure that Chiang could not drag the US into war with Communist China.360 To dispel 
the Senate Committee's fear that the passage of the Formosa Resolution would 
automatically draw the US into a war with Communist China, Dulles testified in a secret 
hearing that Chiang knew that it was impossible for the KMT to return to or recover the 
mainland. 361 
From mid-February 1955, President Eisenhower repeatedly attempted to cajole or 
pressure Chiang into withdrawing KMT troops from Quemoy and Matsu in order to 
eliminate the risk of war with Communist China.362 However, the KMT's retreat from 
the offshore islands would weaken or even sever China's offshore link with Taiwan, 
construct a neutral zone across the Strait, consolidate a framework for the territory 
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governed by either side and justify international status for both sides.363 As a tough 
Chinese nationalist, Chiang resolutely declined Eisenhower's proposal in late April 
1955.364 
Realizing the impossibility of taking over Taiwan because of American commitment to 
defending the Nationalists, PRC Premier and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai for the first 
time proposed a negotiation with the US to lessen the conflict on Taiwan at the Bandung 
Conference in April 1955. Between May and July, Zhou repeatedly expressed the 
desire to "seek the liberation of Taiwan by peaceful means."365 In August 1955, the US 
and the Chinese Communists started a series of ambassadorial talks, first at Geneva and 
later at Warsaw?66 The sovereignty of Taiwan became a central issue in bilateral 
relations. Meanwhile, the members of the Western alliance diverged over the 
recognition of Communist China.367 The US considered adopting the ''Two Chinas" 
policy which "redefines, at least implicitly, the Republic of China's sovereignty as being 
limited to Formosa and the Pescadores . . . and which insists on a UN Assembly seat for 
the Republic of China as part of any UN admission for Communist China."368 Yet 
neither the Nationalists nor the Communists were comfortable with the undetermined 
legal status of Taiwan. Each claimed to represent China, had sovereignty over Taiwan, 
and vowed to accomplish unification by the use of force. 369 The KMT claim that the 
ROC on Taiwan represented China drew an increasing amount of criticism in the 
international community. 
American Scholars' Input on Taiwan Issue 
Cultural Assimilation as a Matter of Time 
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After the Korean crisis, Taiwan became a major element in international politics and a 
topic of great scholarly interest. In May 1952, Dr. Fred W. Riggs introduced the 
argument that power transition would blur and ultimately eliminate the distinction 
between mainland Nationalists and Taiwanese. 370 The power transition argument 
suggests the cultural assimilation of Taiwanese and mainlanders in the course of time. 
Independent Taiwan: An Experiment in American Values 
The American government's endorsement of Taiwanese secessionism might have been 
overwhelmingly self-interested; a more positive policy toward China came from the 
academic field. By the mid-1950s, Chinese Communist rule had greatly enhanced the 
militacy power and economic productivity of China?71 Harvard professor Edwin 0. 
Reischauer suggested that the US government drive a wedge between China and Russia, 
for the sake of maintaining a balance of power, and persuade the Chinese to abandon 
totalitarianism, for a US-envisaged democratic world order. 372 He urged the use of 
economic and political tools to develop Taiwan into a successful democracy in order to 
demonstrate that democracy is "a better system than communism for all Chinese."373 
For this goal, the KMT would have to engage in political growth and "integrate the 
native population with the ruling regime until the Formosans themselves have their 
rightfully preponderant place in the govemment." 374 Apparently, he believed a 
democratic Taiwan would serve the interests of both America and China. Still, he 
supported Taiwan independence, "for it is larger and stronger than many nations at 
present in the UN.''375 
Cultural Conflict between American and Chinese 
During World War ll, prominent sinologist John King Fairbank served as Special 
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Assistant to the American Ambassador in Chongqing (]i!Jt) and later as Director of the 
USIS in China. After the war, he returned to the history faculty at Harvard University. 
Most people in the political and academic communities noticed his support of the Nixon 
administration's rapprochement with China in the 1970s but ignored his support of 
Taiwan independence from the 1950s. In fact, Fairbank had been a champion of the 
Taiwan independence movement in the US.376 His most remarkable contribution rests 
on associating American values with the cause of Taiwan independence. Since the 
beginning of 1957, he had warned that the Communists could exploit modem 
nationalism, which "stems from the ingrained tradition of Chinese superiority," to focus 
upon "foreign imperialism" and the US. 377 He saw the Taiwan problem as a 
deep-seated cultural conflict of two antithetical political traditions: American values of 
self-determination and freedom of access among peoples, and the Chinese political 
tradition of unified empire and a political universe under a centralized Chinese despotism 
in the Chinese cultural area. 378 He pointed out that the struggle between Chiang 
Kai-shek and Mao Zedong was typical of reactionary Chinese culture: rivals scrambling 
for the throne of the Son of Heaven. 379 He warned that Taiwan, if it fell into 
Communist hands, could upset the world balance of power and force the US to fight 
against or acquiesce to Communist hegemony. 380 He urged Americans to veto Chiang's 
ambition to recover the mainland and instead to "engineer an independent Republic of 
Taiwan."381 Many Americans would not be prepared to accept an overwhelmingly 
selfish balance of power strategy, but would prefer that American power be used for both 
self-interest and seemingly moral, altruistic purposes.382 
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Alternative SeN-Determination through Democratisation 
Starting on August 23, 1958 Communist China ferociously shelled Quemoy and Matsu 
for forty-four days, creating the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis. With the American 
Seventh Fleet and advanced weapons, the KMT successfully defended these two islands. 
The KMT's success presented a stark contrast to the Taiwan independence movement in 
Japan. Australian scholar Michael Lindsay commented in early October that 
''Excluding Japan, Formosa may quite well be the best administered country in Asia" and 
"an independent Formosa has become less and not more acceptable."383 One week later, 
Fairbank, in response, used this crisis to attest to the traditional political antithesis 
between America and China and warned the US not to allow Chiang to manipulate fears 
of - Communism. 384 Fairbank devised an innovative interpretation of 
"self-determination" in the context of the Chiang regime's tight control of Taiwan. "As 
[Taiwan's] genuine electoral process continues to develop in scope and efficacy, ... it can 
validly claim to be a channel of popular self-determination, without recourse to a 
plebiscite."385 Furthermore, he stated that "a plebiscite on Formosa is not easily 
conceivable. Self-determination through letting an electoral process function is 
probably the most we can hope for, but in time it may be enough to represent genuine 
democracy."386 On the premise that most Taiwanese were sympathetic to the cause of 
independence, because democratisation meant the redistribution of political power 
between the minority mainlanders and the majority Taiwanese, democratisation would 
undermine the legitimacy of the KMT and ultimately invalidate its support for 
unification. Consequently, democratisation became an alternative vehicle of 
"self-determination." Self-determination through democratisation was realistic in the 
minds of decision-makers in Washington. In October 1958, as the Second Taiwan Strait 
Crisis drew to a close, Dulles persuaded Chiang to issue a joint communique that 
amounted to recovering the mainland through politics and diplomacy, not force. 387 That 
is, Chiang had to develop Taiwan as a model Chinese society and initiate democratisation 
if he hoped to put Communism on the defensive. 
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Cultural Differences across the Strait 
In addition, Fairbank supported the use of American aid to raise the standard of living in 
Taiwan and to establish political freedom well ahead of the mainland in order to bring de 
facto independence to the island.388 He believed that many Taiwanese cherished the 
memory of the higher civilization developed under Japanese colonial rule.389 The 
differences in civilization across the Strait would help distinguish the identity of Taiwan 
from Chinese nationalism. 
Taiwanese Nationalism versus Chinese Nationalism 
Fairbank repeatedly hinted at the use of Taiwanese nationalism against Chinese 
nationalism: ''the real argument for an independent Formosa, is in the broadest sense 
cultural .... Formosa is now a cultural bastion as much as it is a military one."390 He 
contended that "we can't do anything else than support an independent Taiwan- we've 
got to do that."391 "[We are given an opportunity] to build up an independent Taiwan, 
to make it a non-Communist place which can go ahead with progress in welfare and in 
education in all sorts of cultural studies which are Chinese and yet not Communist."392 
American Scholars' Unks with Taiwanese Secessionists 
On September 1, 1955, Thomas Liao's Taiwan Democratic Independence Party formed a 
Commission of Exiled Representatives for each of the twenty-four principal cities and 
districts of Formosa to constitute "Provisional National Congress of the Republic of 
Formosa."393 On February 28, 1956, Liao's "Congress" inaugurated a "Provisional 
Government." Thomas Liao was named First President. 394 Although Liao was 
accepted in the US and Canada as the spokesman for the Taiwan independence 
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movement and all Taiwanese, his "Provisional Government" camp was plagued by 
constant internal dissension. 395 Meanwhile, the rising economy enabled more 
Taiwanese to educate their children in the US, where they were exposed to American 
democratic ideas and practices. As a result, America became a meeting place for 
Taiwanese students and a cradle for young reformists, oppositionists or secessionists, 
depending on their attitude to the KMT. Many secessionists credit their American 
mentors on university campus with converting them to secessionism. In 1956, Chen 
1-te (~PJ.tl. Edward Chen) encouraged by his mentor John King Fairbank,396 grouped 
several like-minded associates including Lin Jung-hsun (if*~IJJ) and Lu Chu-i (J1tj:~) 
to set up the first Taiwan independence movement organization in North America- Free 
Formosans' Formosa (3F). 397 In 1959, the Philadelphia-based Free Formosans' 
Formosa was reorganized as the United Formosans for Independence (UFI). 398 George 
Kerr drew an elaborate comparison between Taiwan independence and American 
independence?99 As to be seen below, this UFI later became the main body of the 
World United Formosans for Independence (WUFI), the largest international Taiwanese 
independence organization. 
The Conlon Report 
The need to improve US-Communist China relations in the late 1950s eroded the 
strategic basis for American support of the KMT. To assess the practicability of 
America's Asian policy, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations published the 
Conlon Report on November 1, 1959.400 Professor Robert A. Scalapino of University 
of California- Berkeley wrote the section on northeast Asia, which included Taiwan. 
The part on Taiwan began with a discussion of the historical and cultural differences 
between Taiwanese and mainland Chinese and stressing the ways in which American aid 
was helping to strengthen Taiwan's economy.401 The report then commented on the 
395 Ibid., 465-67. See also Mendel, The Politics of Formosan Nationalism, 148-49. 
396 Paau Shiu-lam, Taidu' muhou (Behind the Scene of Taiwan Independence~. 33. 
397 Chen Ming-cheng and Shih Cheng-feng i!J;J!~:I]JG. H~ ed., "eds., A History of World United Formosans for 
Independence (Taipei: Qianwei, 2000), 34-35. 
398 Ibid., ed.,"eds. --- - -
m- Kerr; -Formosa Tieirayed, 451. 
400 Robert A Scalapino, "United States Foreign Policy - Asia (North East Asia - Communist China and 
Taiwan)," (Washington DC: Conlon Associates, 1959). See also Kerr, Formosa Betrayed, 431-33. 
401 Scalapino, "United States Foreign Policy - Asia (North East Asia - Communist China and Taiwan)," 
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respective situations of Chiang Kai-shek's KMT regime and of the Taiwanese. The 
report rejected the practicability of Chiang's reunification program;402 denied the KMT's 
claim to be the government of China;403 and urged the US government to disengage 
from its commitments to the offshore islands.404 The report went on to defend the 
Formosans' ideal ofindependence;405 proposed a Republic of Taiwan under an American 
guarantee of its defence;406 and proposed a plebiscite allowing the Taiwanese to vote on 
separation from the mainland.407 The report specifically pointed out the KMT regime's 
vulnerability: ~'The increasing democratisation could occur ... [and could] produce new 
political crises. Some of these will almost certainly reflect the unresolved differences 
between the Taiwanese and the mainlanders."408 
Most noticeably, the report explored cultural assimilation in detail: 
... assimilation is beginning, a process whereby the dominant Taiwanese population is starting 
to absorb the refugee minority through intermarriage and a variety of other ways . 
. . . Under present trends, ... gradualism will prevail, with increased pressures for local autonomy 
and expanded social and political rights. One prediction is fairly safe: either Taiwan will be joined 
with mainland China or the process of Taiwanization will continue. In the concrete terms of the 
present, if Taiwan does not go to the Communists, it will go increasingly to the Taiwanese.409 
The Senate's Conlon Report made several salient points. It reflected the political 
reasoning behind discrediting Chiang and promoting Taiwanese nationalism. It equated 
cultural assimilation with Taiwanization. It distinguished democratisation from 
Taiwanization, wherein the former would produce political crisis and the latter political 
reconciliation. Indeed, more than twenty years later, Taiwan's democratisation was 
compounded by the politicisation of ethnic cleavages and the emergence of the national 
identity crisis; both of which were manifestations of political crisis.410 More than thirty 
402 Ibid., 143. 
403 Ibid., 147. 
404 Ibid., 154. 
40S Ibid., 143. 
406 Ibid., 153. Kerr, Fomwsa Betrayed, 433. 
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14-16. 
410 Chu Yun-han and Lin Tse-min, "The Process of Democratic Consolidation in Taiwan," 81. For 
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years later, Taiwanization proved an egoistic political scheme centring upon Taiwan.411 
In this context, Taiwanization can be defined as follows: A process of achieving political 
domination of island Taiwan by ethnic Taiwanese, while including members of the 
mainlander elites in the political process. 412 Despite the differences between 
democratisation and Taiwanization, calls for democratisation or "increased pressures for 
local autonomy and expanded social and political rights'' would invigorate 
Taiwanization. 413 Finally, radical or ultimate Taiwanization would culminate in 
secessionism, splitting Taiwan from the mainland.414 
Lei Chen's Case 
In July 1958, a group of Taiwanese activists and mainlanders critical of Chiang's 
dictatorship applied to the KMT government for the establishment of "The Society for 
the Study of Local Autonomy in the Republic of China."415 To avoid the trouble that 
would arise from any linkage between democracy and national identity in the "White 
Terror" era, the group limited its objectives to demands to put an end to corrupt electoral 
politics.416 The KMT rejected the application in December 1958, fearing that the 
Society might evolve into a Formosan political party that would later oppose the 
KMT.417 As Hill Gates pointed out, "attempts by the Taiwanese to gain an equal share 
411 Chang Mau-kuei, "Shengji wenti yu mizu zhuyi (Provincialism and Nationalism)," 244. See Chapter 
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of political power at the national level can be seen as subversive of the whole system."418 
The constraints associated with the population structure and the supreme goal of "return 
to the mainland" made the KMT reactionary and resistant to reformism. 
The Free China Fortnightly led by Lei Chen had been criticizing the dictatorship of the 
Chiang Kai-shek regime since 1951. His journal urged the KMT to abandon 
"recovering the mainland," called for "a democratic Formosa" to preserve the ROC, and 
proposed to establish a pro-democracy opposition party.419 Since 1957, his group had 
argued that popular will outweighed the hollow "fatong" <Wkl1E, constitutional legitimacy) 
that the KMT used as a pretext to reject the demands for comprehensive re-election of 
the three national elective bodies.420 In particular, Lei "advocated genuine cooperation 
between the continental refugees and the Formosan people."421 This was unacceptable 
to the KMT because since 1949 the demo was limited to the island, expansion of 
democracy in Taiwan would invalidate the idea of constitutional legitimacy.422 On 
November 16, 1959, Free China published an article attacking Chiang Kai-shek's desire 
to revise the constitution in order to extend the presidential term indefinitely for 
himself.423 Lei's criticism of Chiang Kai-shek and his interest in collaborating with the 
democratic opposition in Taiwan drew the attention of American officials and scholars. 
The Asia Foundation subsidised his Free China Fortnightly.424 On May 18, 1960, 
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mainlander liberals centring on Free China brought some Taiwanese activists together to 
establish a new opposition party- the China Democratic Party (CDP).425 Lei's group 
sought to enlist Fairbank's support in securing the American Embassy's protection for 
the opposition party. Fairbank declined and warned Lei of the doomed prospect of the 
CDP.426 Lei was arrested on September 4. On the same day, Dr. Hu Shih (i!i,§~). a 
respected mainlander liberal and President of Academia Sinica, sent a telegram from the 
US to Vice President Chen Cheng, castigating the KMT' s ban on the formation of an 
opposition party.427 Many major foreign news agencies in Taipei gave unflattering 
reports of the "explosive incident."428 On September 7, the Associated Press reported 
Dr. Hu' s defence of Lei Chen and asserted that American officials completely concurred 
with Hu' s point of view. 429 Lei was court martialed on "sedition" charges on October 3. 
Upon Chiang's demand, Lei was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment on October 8.430 
The CDP immediately collapsed. 
Lei's case was a classic example of the Chiang regime's use of an extensive security 
network and trumped-up sedition charges to purge dissidents to consolidate the KMT' s 
authoritarian rule under the pretext of national security.431 Ironically, the KMT's 
immobilism denied itself the opportunity for self-revival. The opposition camp's use of 
reformism was to take its toll on the KMT regime in the 1970s. 
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In a lecture at Connecticut University on November 21, 1960, John King Fairbank used 
Lei's case to reaffirm the cultural conflict between US and China and illustrate the 
obsolete, residual and typical features of the Confucian rulers and the KMT 
dictatorship.432 To deal with the cultural conflict, he argued: 
• The epochal Sino-America antagonism further highlighted Taiwan's strategic importance.433 In 
particular, "based on rough balance of power: we would support islands and peninsulas in the Western 
Pacific ... against the growing power of mainland China.'o434 
• Taiwan can be a window for America to contact and study Chinese so that consequently America will 
not "be less able to deal with them.'o435 
• In American long-term political strategy, the US wants to help Taiwan grow and develop, "not 
necessarily as a military threat, but as a pilot-model competitor.'o436 
• As long as the American Seventh Fleet was able to patrol the Taiwan Straits and use a Taiwan base, 
US should abstain from invoking the misleading "Two Chinas" concept. ''The fact of Taiwan's 
independence is our o~ect, not the name.'o437 
• The two million mainlanders will finally be integrated with the Taiwanese, many of whom cherish the 
memory of the higher civilization developed under fifty years of Japanese colonial rule.438 
• The dream of "Taiwan for the Taiwanese" in one sense is being realized by time .... The 
mainlander-Taiwanese antagonism might die away, and the American good will toward smaller states 
struggling for "independence" might have full opportunity, ... 439 
The last two points reinforced the argument of cultural assimilation by suggesting that 
the mainlanders on Taiwan would ultimately join the Taiwanese to become a culturally 
distinct race from the Chinese. Professor A. Doak Barnett of Columbia University also 
promoted a version of constructuralist cultural assimilation in 1960:440 
... it is both possible and desirable for the Taiwanese to participate in their government and to 
identify their loyalties with it and for the mainlanders to become increasingly "Taiwanized" by 
identifying their interests and sentiments more and more with Taiwan rather than their former 
mainland homes ... 441 
432 Fairbank, China: The People's Middle Kingdom and the U.S.A., 60-61. 
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The argument enhanced the link between democratisation, integration, and Taiwanization. 
In 1960, Chester Bowles, twice US Ambassador to India, also wrote in Foreign Affairs 
that native Taiwanese would determine their own fate in the long run. He urged 
neutralization of the offshore islands, the development of a Sino-Formosan state and 
America's assumption ofTaiwan's protectorate.442 
These American scholars' arguments reaffirmed the concepts of cultural conflict 
between the US and China, cultural differences across the Taiwan Strait, and cultural 
assimilation on Taiwan which equated to a culture-based ''Taiwan Independence 
Roadmap."443 This pattern of American political thought on Taiwan by the end of 1960 
made the following argument. In the realities of segregation of the Taiwan Strait by 
American military intervention, American values of self -determination justified a 
balance of power on Taiwan in the name of cultural conflict, as Fairbank had been 
arguing since 1957. American aid produced substantial improvements in Taiwan 
economy and intensified the already significant cultural differences between the 
Taiwanese and the Chinese. American aid also generated more pressure for local 
autonomy and promoted the social and political rights that were conducive to 
democratisation. Increasing democratisation would expand cultural differences across 
the Strait and promote cultural assimilation orTaiwanization on the island. Put simply, 
American values of self -determination justified cultural conflict and American separatist 
intention on Taiwan; American aid and American values helped expand cultural 
differences across the Taiwan Strait; American aid and values also promoted cultural 
assimilation or Taiwanization, which would break Taiwan away from China. 444 
Consequently, Sino-US cultural conflict, cross-Strait cultural differences and intra-island 
cultural assimilation or Taiwanization would perpetuate an independent Taiwan. There 
is an assumption that once Taiwanization or cultural assimilation were accomplished, the 
US could exploit Taiwanese nationalism in an epochal Sino-US struggle. However, 
Fairbank exhorted the US government to safeguard Taiwan's de facto independence, not 
442 Mendel, The Politics of Formosan Nationalism, 181-82. 
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de jure independence, to avoid a direct confrontation with formidable Chinese 
nationalism.445 
The values of "self-determination" pervade this "Roadmap." In a broad sense, as 
Fairbank argued, democratisation is an alternative vehicle for "self-determination." 
Because democratisation lends dynamism to Taiwanization, which would, as Scalapino 
and Barnett argued, break the island away from China, Taiwanization is also a vehicle 
for "self-determination." Avoiding direct confrontation with China, the ''Taiwan 
Independence Roadmap" would lead to Taiwan's self-determination short of de jure or 
full independence and serve the interests of American security. 
The Feasibility of the Road map 
The "Taiwan Independence Roadmap" is compamble to a US-defined balance of power 
system. Based on the US government's separatist intention on the island, as Fairbank 
stated in 1957 that ''Taiwan's independence has been the chief fruit of our China policy 
for seven years past and there is nothing on the horizon, except disaster, to alter it,"446 
American scholars defined the dimensions of cultural conflict, cultuml differences and 
cultural assimilation. The starting point of the balance of power system is Taiwan's 
original status as China's frontier island. These scholars intended to pull Taiwan away 
from this original point to serve US hegemony without triggering a war with China. 
Their contribution lies not on influencing the immediate policy of the government. The 
concrete policy is subject to realistic restrictions, such as the American need for the 
Chiang Kai-shek regime in the hi-polarized em, and the American need for Communist 
China in the em of US-China rapprochement.447 Instead, their contribution lies in 
inspiring the long-term, metaphysical ethos of America. Although scholars might not 
necessarily have been political decision-makers, many of them were affiliated with 
academic or think tanks, held official positions in the State Department, assumed 
diplomatic positions, and testified in Congressional hearings.448 Because very few 
445 Fairbank, China: The People's Middle Kingdom and the U.S.A., 63. 
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students studied the Far East before the early 1940s, only a handful of experts emerged 
from this generation. 449 Therefore, people such as A. Doak Barnett, John King 
Fairbank and Robert Scalapino who "straddled the cold and post-cold war worlds, come 
to mind" as the academic figures who "significantly shaped American's interaction with 
Beijing."450 Their ideas of Taiwan had essentially been presented in the US foreign 
policy making in the following decades. Rather than serving as independent policy 
analysts providing informed analysis for government policies, these scholars acted more 
like mentors who sought to convince senior policy-makers of their opinions or whose 
students functioned as policy-makers at the highest level of government. According to 
native secessionist scholar Chen Lung-chu, "Despite [American] official support of the 
Nationalist regime and the influence of the 'China lobby,' there are channels and 
predispositions open to the champions of Formosa."451 These champions of Formosa 
strengthened the undercurrent of America's separatist intentions in Taiwan. 
The Roadmap did not encounter resistance from the regime of Chiang Kai-shek. In the 
1950s, Dulles had already convinced Chiang that force would not be the principal means 
of liberating the mainland;452 Chiang had privately admitted that it would be impossible 
to return to the mainland, but that developing Taiwan as a model Chinese society would 
help his political offensive against Beijing.453 The rise of structuralism among the 
Taiwanese in the 1960s and, the KMT's indigenisation in the 1970s and political 
liberalization in the 1980s were closely related to the infusion of American aid 
(1950-1965) and American values, 454 which did expand cross-Strait differences, 
facilitate intra-island assimilation, and prove that self-determination through 
democratisation and Taiwanization was practical and feasible. 
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In terms of Sino-US relations, "the hostility felt for each other's political system helped 
to sustain the Sino-American confrontation throughout the 1950s and 1960s;" 455 there 
was a "pervasive, often intense enmity toward China felt throughout the executive 
branch in the late 1960s" and most agencies were charged with hostile missions toward 
China.456 This political mentality sustained the scheme of "One China, One Taiwan" 
and ''Two Chinas." Next, despite the ostensible rapprochement with Beijing, the Three 
Joint Communiques between the US and China were consistent with the three 
dimensions of the Roadmap. As Sino-US confrontation loomed, their arguments reveal 
well thought-out policy references. After the 1989 Tiananmen Incident, ''the political 
differences assumed centre-stage in the debate over American China policy;"457 the US 
Congressional and official use of ''human rights," "democracy'' and ''the future of 
Taiwan" strongly connote Sino-US "cultural conflict" and cross-Strait "cultural 
difference."458 The realization of democratisation and Taiwanization in the 1990s 
became the incarnation of self -determination. In other words, the general trend of 
Taiwan Strait affairs followed the arguments of the "Roadmap." According to Heritage 
Foundation research fellow John Tkacik, the status quo of Taiwan Strait in 2004 means 
"no unification, no independence and no war."459 This illustrates the ambiguity of US 
policy and shows that this policy is not aiming at achieving independence. However, 
the status quo of Taiwan Strait reveals the crystallization of perpetuating a de facto 
independent Taiwan. This is the latest footnote in America's long-term Taiwan policy 
vis-A-vis the insight of the "Roadmap." 
The Taiwan Independence Movement in the Early 1960s 
The Predicament of the KMT versus the Fruit of American Aid 
During the 1960 presidential campaign, Senator John F. Kennedy openly declared the 
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disengagement of American commitment to the islets of Quemoy and Matsu, and 
suggested these two islets be given up before they entangle US in the Chinese Civil 
War.460 This injured Chiang's nationalistic feeling but cheered many native Taiwanese 
scholars. Taiwanese secessionists had strong misgivings about Chiang's use of Quemoy 
and Matsu to maintain the fiction of a "national emergency" and prolong the "state of 
war" to justify his dictatorship and thereby suppress Taiwanese participation in 
constitutional democracy.461 
In February 1961, after Kennedy's inauguration as President, State Department legal 
adviser John Czyzak reaffirmed the denial of ROC's claim of sovereignty over 
Taiwan.462 Kennedy himself favoured ''Two Chinas," but worried about the huge 
domestic uproar that would accompany Communist China's admission to the UN.463 
__ After Chiang made a public promise to use the permanent membership in the Security 
Council to veto Outer Mongolia's admission to the UN on the grounds that the ROC 
represented Outer Mongolia and China, Washington pressured Taipei to prevent the veto, 
a demand to which Chiang finally agreed. 464 In the meantime, international questioning 
of ROC's representation of China mounted. The US persuaded several allies to 
co-sponsor a resolution classifying any change in Chinese representation as an 
"important question" which by definition would require a two-thirds vote under the UN 
Charter. In the early 1960s, this device helped the ROC to keep its seat on the UN 
Security Council.465 
As international reservations over the ROC's claim to represent China mounted, so did 
the KMT's sense of domestic insecurity and political paranoia at home. After the arrest 
of Lei Chen, Su Tung-chi Cl**m· a native councillor from Yunlin (~~) county, 
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persuaded his colleagues in the assembly to pass a resolution asking Chiang Kai-shek to 
pardon Lei. He was arrested on September 19, 1961 and later indicted by a military 
court upon flimsy charges of planning to overthrow the KMT.466 Perhaps in an attempt 
to tighten his control, Chiang declared in his 1962 New Year's Day message to the 
Chinese that the KMT forces had made adequate preparations to recover the mainland.467 
In retaliation, the Communists shelled Quemoy on June 17 and tensions escalated.468 
The Kennedy administration informed Beijing through Ambassadorial talks at Warsaw 
on June 23 that Washington would not support a KMT bid for recovery. 469 At a press 
conference days later, Kennedy openly reassured the defence character of American 
commitment to Taiwan.470 This was tantamount to a formal veto of Chiang Kai-shek' 
ambition to return to the mainland. 
The KMT positions were compounded when Yin Hai-kuang (~1/i::YC), a popular 
professor at Taiwan National University, and Li Ao (*!50, an aggressive anti-KMT 
historian, sparked a heated debate on Chinese and Western cultures in the journal 
Wenxing zazhi C3t~~. Literary Star) in 1962.471 Because Fairbank had been a 
vocal critic of Chinese traditional culture, domestic intellectuals who questioned China's 
traditional social values, advocated modernization on the Western model or had strong 
academic affiliations and friends in the US, such as Hu Shih, Ym Hai-kuang and their 
associates, became targets of attack by the KMT. Their critics were interpreted as 
issuing symbolic challenges to the Chiang Kai-shek regime. 472 The debate soon 
466 Up to March 1962, according to Formosan Quarterly, more than 400 Formosans were arrested relating 
to Su's case. He was sentenced to death on May 18, 1962. See "Councillor Su Tung-chi Sentenced to 
Death," Formosan Quarterly, Vol. 1, No.1 (1962): 17-18; Kerr, Formosa Betrayed, 448; Mendel, The 
Politics of Formosan Nationalism, 116. Su was released in 1976 after serving fifteen years in prison. 
See Chen Shih-hung and Chang Chien-lung, ed./'eds., Gong dangwai zhuxuantuan dao dangwai zongbu 
(Organization of Opposition Movement), 16. 
4f>1 Chan, China's Reunification and the Taiwan Question, 16. 
468 Harold C. Hinton, Communist China in World Poltics (Macmillan: Macmillan, 1966), 271-72. See 
also Chan, China's Reunification and the Taiwan Question, 16. 
469 Harold C. Hinton, China's Turbulent Quest: An Analysis of China's Foreign Relations since 1949 
(New York: Macmillan, 1972), 114. See also Chan, China's Reunification and the Taiwan Question, 16. 
470 Hinton, Communist China in World Poltics, 212. 
471 Chan, China's Reunification and the Taiwan Question, 22. 
472 Both Hu and Y'm were renowned scholars and critics of Chinese traditionai~~vaJ.ues and Dllililfuiiied 
close assOclatim;-with)~bn King Fairbank. See Ibid. See also Kerr, Formosa Betrayed, 449. Chiang 
Kai-shek regime even saw liberalism championed by these intellectuals "as a Trojan horse employed by 
the Chinese Communists for the destruction of traditional culture." See Mab Huang, Intellectual Ferment 
for Political Reforms in Taiwan, 1971-1973 (Ann Arbor: center for Chinese Studies, University of 
Michigan, 1976), 3. 
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degenerated into personal invective and lawsuits. Although the journal had not entered 
the political arena with a program of political reform, many famous professors and 
intellectuals were harassed, kept under surveillance, and persecuted. The journal was 
suppressed by the KMT in 1965.473 This illustrated not only the plight of liberal 
intellectuals under the Chiang Kai-shek regime, but also the political hysteria and 
predicament of the KMT regime in the 1960s. 
In contrast, American aid, started in 1948, was bearing fruit. The aid had been 
disrupted by the Communist victory over the KMT and resumed in the second half of 
1950 after the start of the Korean War.474 The US aid program, terminated in June 1965, 
had eased Taiwan's initial inflation, compensated for the island's international revenue 
deficit, and bolstered Taiwan's economic development.475 In addition, American aid 
had introduced American values and culture, and oriented Taiwan's economic and trade 
structure toward the American marlcet.476 This consolidated the ROC's reliance on 
America for international political legitimacy, economic and trade development and 
military support. The Taiwanese appreciated American good will. These 
developments, along with the KMT regime's efforts in fomenting animosity against the 
PRC, facilitated a US-oriented Taiwanese nationalism. American aid had far more 
significant implications. The resumption of aid in 1950 was designed to promote local 
autonomy and social and political rights for the Taiwanese. Since the 1960s, the 
growing economic power of the island enabled the Taiwanese to struggle against the 
social inequalities imposed by the Chiang Kai-shek regime. In 1966, the native 
members of the Provincial Assembly circulated a petition urging resignation of members 
elected in 1947 to the three national elective bodies to pave the way for new elections in 
473 Huang, Intellectual Ferment for Political Reforms in Taiwan, 1971-1973, 1, 2, 107 note 1. 
474 Chou, ed., "eds., Documentary Collection on US Aid to ROC, introduction 1-2. Although the 
American government avoided making any conclusive promises in providing military assistance to the 
KMT government in 1948, the US devised further plans to extend aid program to maintain the viability of 
Formosan economy; see page 40 of this thesis. 
475 Gao Lang, Zhonghua Minguo waijiao guanxi zhi yanbian, 1950-1972 (The Evolution of Republic of 
China's Diplomatic Relations, 1950-1972), 245-51. From 1952 unti11968, the US gave Taiwan around 
$1.5 billion of economic aig, which did not include military-assistance over the-same perlod;7 see'RamOifH. · 
Myeci; "lntrodUc:iion:-A Uniqtie Relationship," in A Unique Relationship: The United States and the 
Republic of China Under the Taiwan Relations Act, ed. Roman H. Myers (Stanford: Hoover Institution 
Press, 1989), 2. 
476 Gao Lang, Zhonghua Minguo waijiao guanxi zhi yanbian, 1950-1972 (The Evolution of Republic of 
China's Diplomatic Relations, 1950-1972), 245-51. 
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accordance with a constitutional amendment just approved.477 
The gerontocracy and natural attrition of the membership of the three national elective 
bodies was becoming a serious problem. Considering its international and domestic 
challenges, the KMT regime realized that grass-root support was its only hope for 
survival. The ROC's National Assembly amended the Constitution in 1966 to authorize 
Chiang Kai-shek to hold a supplementary election. In December 1969, fifteen, eleven 
and two new members were elected to the National Assembly, the Legislative Yuan and 
the Control Yuan respectively.478 All of these new members were native Taiwanese. 
American aid, local autonomy and natural attrition of the national elective bodies 
together conferred upon the Taiwanese the strength to request that the KMT regime open 
itself to an America-conceived ''Taiwanization." However, given the size of the three 
organs and the extent of KMT authoritarianism, the supplementary election was a token 
gesture.479 Furthermore, more native Taiwanese students pursued advanced studies 
overseas, where they were exposed to Western, especially American, values and were 
able to express their structuralistic Taiwanese nationalism more freely. 
The Overseas Taiwan Independence Movement in the Early 1960s 
Although many Americans and Japanese might have been sympathetic to the Taiwan 
independence movement, there was not much firm support in the early 1960s. The 
Communist China-Soviet bloc still posed a serious threat and bipolar confrontation forced 
the US to support the KMT. Attitudes toward the Taiwan independence movement in 
America and Japan diverged before 1970.480 However, American diplomats in Taiwan 
were more sympathetic.481 The "Formosa desk" and other diplomats in the US Embassy 
at Taipei kept a close eye on local affairs and exploited the gap between mainlanders and 
Taiwanese. 482 The general international situations thus were fertile ground for the 
overseas Taiwan independence movement. The following events are a chronology of the 
rise of overseas Taiwan independence movement in the early 1960s. 
477 See page 63 of this thesis. 
478 Clough, Island China, 35-36. . - --
4~ Huang, Intellectrial Ferment for Political Reforms in Taiwan, 1971-1973,5. 
480 For an analysis of American and Japanese views of Formosan nationalism before 1970, see Chapters 
8 and 9 of Mendel, The Politics of Formosan Nationalism. 
481 Ibid., 180. 
482 Ibid., 180-81. 
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• 1960 February 28, Taiwanese student Wang Yu-te (Ong Joktik, .:EW{!!!) organized the ''Taiwan 
Chinglian Hue" (Young Formosan Association, or Formosan Youth Association) in Tokyo and 
published the Japanese-language journal Taiwan Chinglian (The Young Formosan, or Formosan 
Youth, "El1l!lftif.) to advocate independence.483 
• 1960 March, UFI addressed an "Appeal for Justice" to the American people. Exiled Taiwanese 
leaders warned that unqualified support for Chiang since 1945 had damaged American prestige, called 
for recognition of the true American interests and Washington support of Taiwan independence, 
demanded an immediate UN Trusteeship over Taiwan, and asserted that a plebiscite would 
demonstrate an overwhelming sentiment in favour of independence.484 
• 1961 February 28, Edward Chen, Chairman of UFI, held a press conference in New York and made 
public for the first time the Taiwan independence movement in North-America.485 
• 1961, Taiwanese students at Kansas University organized the frrst Formosan Qub in America.4811 
• 1961, Senator William Fulbright helped Thomas Liao win a diplomatic victory by inviting Liao to 
deliver a speech ion the UN. However, because of the KMT's interference, Liao was not able to 
enter the US.487 
• 1961 August 4, the UFI launched the first demonstration of the Taiwan independence movement to 
protest the visit of the ROC Vice-President Chen Cheng to the UN. Although only seven or eight 
native Taiwanese (including children) attended the demonstration, it drew the attention of American 
media.488 
• 1962, the Taiwan Chinglian Hue in Japan published the Toklip Taiwan in Romanised Fukien dialect to 
conduct propaganda for the Taiwan independence movement in Taiwan.489 
• 1962 June, Shih Ming (~f!F.D published his famous book, Taiwan's 400 Years History, in Tokyo. 
• 1962 July, the "Formosan Association" began publishing The Formosan Qua11erly, an English 
counterpart of the monthly Taiwan Chinglian. Chairman Wang Yu-te strongly urged that the US 
"not be blind to what it is supporting in Formosa.tt490 
• 1963 June, Taiwanese students in Canada established the Formosan Association of Canada.491 
483 Ong Joktik .:E.Fif{!!!, "In The Beginning," Formosan Qua11erly, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1962): 3. Kerr, 
Formosa Betrayed, 468. 
484 Kerr, Formosa Betrayed, 412. 
485 Chen Ming-cheng and Shih Cheng-feng, ed./'eds., A History of World United Fonnosans for lndependence,35. 
4811 Lin Ming-hsien *f~IQ. Taiwan dulijianguo lianmeng dashiji (A Chronology of Relevent Events of 
World United Formosans for Independence) [internet] (WUFI, Jun 11 2003 [cited Jan 11 2005]), available 
from http://www. wufi.org.tw/. 
487 Ibid., ([cited). See also Chen Lung-chu and Lasswell, Formosa, China, and the United Nations, 
136-37. 
488 Lin Ming-hsien, Taiwan duli jianguo lianmeng dashi ji (A Chronology of Relevent Events of World 
United Fof7EOsansfodndependence) ([cited) .. _,."''· .. ~- · · ····· ··· ~- ·· c ·· - ~ • -~ --~ ·.c ·• • ---
. 
489
-Kerr:-Formosa Betrayed, 468. See also Lin Ming-hsien, Taiwan dulijianguo lianmeng dashiji (A 
Chronology of Relevent Events of World United Formosans for Independence) ([cited).-
490 Ong Joktik, "In The Beginning," 3. 
491 Mendel, The Politics of Formosan Nationalism, 169. See also Chen Ming-cheng and Shih Cheng-feng, 
ed./'eds., A History of World United Fonnosansfor lndependence,40. 
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• 1964 spring, League for Self-Determination of Formosans was established in Canada.492 
• 1964 February 29, UFI launched a demonstration commemorating the February 28 Incident in front of 
the ROC embassy. About seventy or eighty Taiwanese students took part in the event and again 
attracted the American media attention. The rise in attendance showed that UFI was gaining support 
among the Taiwanese community in the US.493 
As the Taiwan independence movement became more visible in America, more scholars 
and diplomats expressed their support for Taiwan independence. George F. Kennan, 
former Director of the Policy Planning Staff and US Ambassador to Russia and 
Yugoslavia and an eminent scholar, told Douglas Mendel in January 1964 that the US 
should solve this problem with a UN plebiscite.494 
Discourses of Taiwanese Nationalism 
Primordialism or Ethno-Nationalism 
Joshua and Thomas Liao's Formosan League for Re-Emancipation was regarded as the 
beginning of the Taiwan independence movement. America's resumption of separatist 
intentions after the outbreak of the Korean War prompted Joshua Liao to articulate 
Formosan nationalism in his Formosa Speaks, a document that bore the hallmark of 
primordialism, or ethno-nationalism. Yet the Liaos' argument that Taiwanese were not 
pure Chinese but a mixed race, and using this argument as a theoretical basis for racial 
self-determination was not popular among the Taiwanese.495 This is because among the 
Han-dominated Taiwanese there exists a strong sense of racialism, which believes the 
purity of ethnic-Han blood represents the superiority of Chinese culture.496 Despite 
Thomas Liao' s credibility in the US and Canada, he did not receive much support from 
the US or Japan because of the bi-polar Cold War confrontation.497 His dogmatism and 
the factionalism among independence organizations in Tokyo rendered his Provisional 
492 ChenMing-cheng and Shih Cheng-feng, ed.,Jieds.,A History of World United Fonnosansfor /ndependence,40. 
493 Lin Ming-hsien, Taiwan duli jianguo lianmeng dashi ji (A Chronology of Relevent Events of World 
United Formosans for Independence) ([cited). 
494 Mendel, The Politjc_s of-Formosan, Nationalism, 181.- Since 1949; Kennen, then-Director-ofthe Policy 
- Ptaruiing Staff iitire State Department, had strongly promoted separatism. See FRUS I 949 (v.9), 356-57. 
495 Kerr, Formosa Betrayed, 456-57. 
496 Shih Cheng-feng, "Taiwan yishi de tansuo (An Exploration of Taiwanese Consciousness)," 67. See 
also Shih Cheng-feng, Taiwan minzu zhuyi (Taiwanese Nationalism), 214. 
497 Mendel, The Politics of Formosan Nationalism, 148, 50, 52. 
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Government ineffectual. 498 Such structural, subjective and objective factors 
undermined the promotion of ethno-nationalism. Thomas Liao finally surrendered to 
the KMT and returned to Taiwan on May 14, 1965. 
Structuralism 
The subsequent overseas secessionists tended to dwell upon the structural inequities 
imposed by the KMT. After ROC Vice-President Chen Cheng was confronted by 
demonstrators for Taiwan independence in August 1961, Peng Ming-min (~a_,ij~) 
described the character of the independence movement in the US to KMT security 
officials: 
Their advocacy of independence . . . was . . . a general reaction to the basic policies of 
government in Formosa. They objected to the structure of government in Formosa. They were 
not content to take part only in a provincial organization while being excluded from an effective 
place in the national administration that absorbed provincial taxes and made decisions binding on 
the provincial administration.499 
Peng's description indicated that overseas Taiwan independence discourse at this time 
was characterized by structuralism. Structuralism, also known as instrumentalism, 
argues that the generation of collective national identity derives from structural inequities, 
in which government policy institutionalises dominance of one group over another, as 
evidenced by the unfair allocation of political power and material wealth, discrepancies 
in social status, and the enforced proscription of the oppressed group's cultural norms. 
Structuralist theory further argues that the resultant sense of disfranchisement compels 
opposition elites to exploit blood or cultural characteristics as a means by which to 
campaign for national liberation against alien dominators.500 
Constructuralism or Political Nationalism 
Political nationalism seemed a natural corollary to the dictatorship of Chiang Kai-shek. 
Lei Chen and his group had already proposed cooperation with the Taiwanese and the 
establishment of an opposition party to promote a democratic Formosa. Yet 
A98 Kerr, Formosa Betrr:iyed: 465-61. S~e also Mendel, The Politics of Formosan Nationalism, 148-49. 
499 Peng Ming-min, A Taste of Freedom, 116. Available online at: 
http://www.hi-on.org.tw/ AT ASTE.htm. 
500 Shih Cheng-feng, Taiwan minzu zhuyi (Taiwanese Nationalism), 93-94, 180, 88; Shih Cheng-feng, 
"Taiwan yishi de tansuo (An Exploration of Taiwanese Consciousness)," 60. 
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secessionist Taiwanese did not appreciate his desire to preserve the ROC. Some 
thoughtful independence theorists sought to tackle persistent Han racialism to highlight 
the subjectivity of Taiwanese. Shih Ming (~SJJ) and Peng Ming-min were two of the 
most important pioneers in these efforts. 
Shih Ming's Constrocturalism 
Shih Ming was a militant Taiwanese Communist. He became a fugitive in 1950 after 
the KMT discovered that he was organizing a paramilitary force against the KMT. He 
fled to Japan, where he became a close friend of Wang Yu-te, founder of the Formosan 
Association. To transcend Han racialism, he published his Japanese-language Taiwan s 
400 Years History in Tokyo in June 1962. This is the first postwar history of Taiwan 
written by a Taiwanese after WWll. Shih argued that for the past four hundred years, 
particularly in the previous century, the separate geographical and historical paths 
conspired to transform the Han Taiwanese into a more heterogeneous race.501 He 
sought to enshrine Taiwan's unique history and culture to transcend the ethnic and blood 
connections with Mainland China in order to establish an independent Taiwanese 
nation.502 This argument is constructuralism, which argues that a nation is an imagined 
community that can be constructed upon its collective history or memory, common 
experience in the present, and, more importantly, upon a shared wish for the future. In 
other words, a nation is constructed upon a subjective collective identity, and national 
identity can be an acquired matter of choice. Accordingly, national identity is highly 
fluid; a national movement looks to the future, aspiring to unite all residents, beyond the 
limits of consanguinity, language, culture and religion, in the construction of a new 
nation and establishment of a new country, of which the new titles can be determined 
through open debate. 503 
In July 1962, an article entitled "Why Formosa Wants Independence" appeared in the 
Fonrwsan Quarterly, the English-language organ of the Formosan Association. The 
501 Shih Ming, Taiwan's 400 Years History, 439-41. __ _ _ . ~- - -
- ~112- lbid.,-453; 64041. --see alSo Shlh -Cbeng-feng Mi!lE~ "Wo dui Shi Ming de renshi (My 
Understanding of Shih Ming)," in Huangye gudeng- Shi Ming (A Lone Lamp in the Wilds- Shih Ming), ed. 
Yeb Po-wen (Taipei: Shih Mingjiaoyujijinhui, 2001), 66-67. 
503 Shih Cbeng-feng, Taiwan minzu zhuyi (Taiwanese Nationalism), 52, 95-96. See also Shih Cbeng-feng, 
"Taiwan yishi de tansuo (An Explomtion of Taiwanese Consciousness)," 60. 
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article related Shih Ming's arguments and expounded the western concept of a nation: 
A nation consists of a part of people. Among the people of a nation, there are common feelings 
which ... can be created by various causes. . .. The most important cause is the possession of an 
historically defined territory where people share the same political tradition, a common memory of 
their history and a common pride and humiliation, joy and regret for past events. Or a nation can 
be expressed as a community of men which has been historically constructed. 
There is no doubt ... that we Formosans consist of a nation. .. . Formosa followed a different 
path from that of mainland China, and has made different advances in historical stage.so4 
Shih is well respected as a pioneer in interpreting the history of Taiwanese independence 
in the light of historical and cultural differences. However, he made scant reference to 
how to deal with mainlander Chinese on Taiwan. His militancy destroyed his 
association with Wang Yu-te and the Formosan Association; moreover, it left little room 
for cooperation with the US. In 1967, he founded the radical Independent Taiw~ 
Association. Because of the KMT crackdown of overseas secessionist publications and 
factional politics among secessionist camps in Japan and America, Shih Ming's 
constructuralism failed to gain substantial support at home or abroad.505 
Peng Ming-min's Constructuralism 
Peng Ming-min was a native Taiwanese authority in international law, and a faculty 
member at National Taiwan University. When asked about Taiwan's legal position by 
students, he explained that the foundations of a modem nation-state "are not formed on 
the basis of biological origin, culture, religion, or language, but rather on a sense of 
common destiny and a belief in shared interests .. that "rise out of a common history!'506 
This argument is typical of con structuralism or political nationalism. 
From 1955 to the early 1960s, Peng discerned that American policy was moving toward 
recognition of the Communists. He also witnessed the KMT's immobilism, pondered the 
reality of the two million mainlanders' perpetual residence on Taiwan, and was exploited 
504 Liau Kianliong, "Why Formosa Wants Independence," 7. 
sos For the role of faction@s111 ~()ng.Taiwan independence movement organizations'in US; see-Wang, 
TIUnJilst That Never s;tiies, 190-91. For the role played by factionalism in Japan, see Mendel, The 
Politics of Formosan Nationalism, 152-53. 
506 Peng Ming-min, A Taste of Freedom, 93. This political philosophy is enlightened by Ernest Renan's 
essay, Qu'est qu'une nation? ("What is a Nation?"); see Peng Ming-min, A Taste of Freedom, 26. Wu 
Mi-cha and Chang Yen-hsien, Jianli Taiwan de guomin guojia (Establish a Civic Nation for Taiwan), 153. 
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by the KMT who sent him to the UN and Washington.507 He attended two conferences 
hosted by Dr. Henry Kissinger in 1956 and 1960 respectively, where the "Formosan 
question was a frequent topic."508 During the 1960 conference, he argued publicly for 
the first time that the legal status of Formosa had not yet been settled by formal action, 
and suggested that the Formosan people have a say in their future.509 In 1961, he was a 
legal adviser to the KMT delegation at the UN, and was privy to the Kennedy 
administration's thwarting of the Chiang Kai-shek regime on Outer Mongolia's 
admission to the UN.510 In the second half of 1962, he called for "attention to the 
diverse peoples who had been cut off from their own past by colonial rule, and were now 
seeking to control their own destinies."511 The US government took Peng's words very 
seriously; American diplomats in Taipei frequently consulted him on matters relating to 
international politics.512 
In 1964, Peng issued a manifesto Taiwan zijiu yundong xuanyan ( iJ'tJl 13 ~~'§" ~, A 
Declaration of Formosan Self-Salvation,),513 in which he declared Chiang Kai-shek's 
dictatorship as the common enemy of the mainlander refugees and Taiwanese, appealed 
for joint support of self-determination and urged all people on Taiwan to unite on behalf 
of a new, independent and democratic Taiwan.514 This was the most radical brand of 
political nationalism to date. He and two of his students, Hsieh Tsung-min (ijl{J!!~) 
and Wei Ting-chao (a~!¥Jj), were arrested on September 20, 1964 when preparing to 
507 Peng Ming-min, A Taste of Freedom, 97-98, 108. 
508 Ibid., 96, 99. 
509 Ibid., 99-100. 
510 Ibid., 111. 
su Ibid., 122-23. 
512 The American Embassy held a thick folder about Peng; even Ambassador Admiral William J. Kirk was 
keen to invite Peng to his office for a long talk. Yet Kirk's invitation was not realized after Kirk returned 
to Washington for surgecy in Januacy 1963. See Ibid., 123. 
513 Ibid., 129. There are two translations for Peng's manifesto "#·I~PJ&ji!ltJ.:g~." The first one of 
April1966 from the Japan-based United Young Formosans for Independence (UYFI) was entitled The 
Independence Declaration of Formosa. See PengJVfing~min, ljsieh.Cbung-lllin, and Wei Ting-chao -!e 
BAfi&; JfQ!~; "Q~. ''The Independen~ -Declaration of Formosa," Independent Formosa, Vol. V, No. 
1-2 (1966): 2-9. The second was completed in May 1966 by US-based United Formosans for 
Independence (UFI) and entitled A Declaration of Formosans. See Mendel, The Politics of Formosan 
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issue ten thousand copies of the manifesto.515 
The Taiwan Independence Movement in the Late 1960s 
The Implications of the Peng Ming-min Case 
Peng was charged with "an attempt to overthrow the government by illegal means" and 
sentenced to eight years in prison in early 1965.516 However, under pressure from 
international news media, human rights organizations and Washington, the KMT regime 
yielded, commuting Peng's sentence on November 3, 1965 but keeping him under house 
arrest. 517 International support, particularly from the US, galvanized the secessionist 
camp. Taiwan's independence movement entered an era of unprecedented activity 
between the middle of 1965 and 1970.518 The significance of these events is described 
below. 
The Association between US Separatists and Taiwanese Secessionists 
After Peng was arrested, Fairbank published an editorial against the arrest in the New 
York 1imes. He and Dr. Scalapino, author of the Conlon Report, organized a lobbying 
campaign to compel Washington to make a formal protest of the arrest.519 As Peng's 
case attracted publicity, more high-level American diplomats openly spoke out in favour 
of Taiwan independence. In October 1964, George F. Kennan's article, "Japanese 
security and American policy" published in Foreign Affairs, demanded a solution of the 
Taiwan issue in accordance with the sentiments of the inhabitants.520 In 1965, Averill 
Harriman, a former Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East and later a roving 
515 Lai Tse-han, Myers, and Wei Wou, A Tragic Beginning, 185. See also Tai Kuo-hui, Wang Tso-jung, 
and Hsia Chen &ifGmJ~ • .:Ef'F~. I~. Aizeng Li Denghui (Love and Hatred of Lee Teng-hui) (Taipei: 
Tianxia yuanjian, 2001), 163-64. 
516 Peng Ming-min, A Taste of Freedom, 167, 74. 
517 Wtlliam Burr, Nixon's Trip to China [internet] (GWU, 2003 [cited Dec 112003]), available from 
http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB106fmdex.htm; Kerr, Formosa Betrayed, 468-69; Peng 
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in the New York Times, Dr. Kissinger of Harvard and the Dean of the Law School at McGill University 
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519 Fairbank's concern with the fate of intellectuals in Taiwan led him to contact American officials 
concerning expatriate Chinese scholars in need of immigration or financial help. See Evans, John Fairbank 
and the American Understanding of Modem China, 236-37. Peng Ming-min, A Taste of Freedom, 150. 
520 Mendel, The Politics of Formosan Nationalism, 181. 
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Ambassador for the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, told a Taiwanese student 
after a public lecture at Madison, Wisconsin, that ''The United States is going to support 
the inhabitants of Formosa in their struggle for independence. Even if they choose to 
join Communist China, we will support them in accordance with the principle of 
self-determination. "521 
After Peng was released, Fairbank published an article, entitled ''Taiwan: Myth, Dream, 
and Nightmare" in the Februacy 5, 1966 issue of The New Republic. He supported 
Taiwan independence on the basis of American principles of self-determination, 
Taiwan's economic-technological superiority, and the bloody suppression of the KMT in 
194 7. 522 He reaffirmed the ongoing cultural assimilation through integration between 
Taiwanese and mainlanders;523 and referred to the cultural conflict between America 
values and China's ancient ethnocentrism, which survived in the Communists and 
Nationalists alike.524 To defend Taiwan as an American cultural bastion, he reiterated: 
The American interest is to preserve the substance of Taiwan's independence without 
demanding that our cherished English-language formula of "self-determination" be accepted in 
Chinese terminology. Let us continue to leave the Seventh Fleet in the Formosa Straits and the 
Taiwan-China relationship ambiguous and not demand neat definitions.m 
On January 31, 1967, Edwin 0. Reischauer, Harvard Professor and former US 
Ambassador to Japan (1961-1966), testified before the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations that ''There is ... a completely viable unit on Taiwan with a population of 
between 12 and 13 million ... We have the actuality of an independent political and 
social organ living there."526 
The Integration of Taiwan Independence Organizations 
Efforts to free Peng, Thomas Liao's surrender to the KMT and his renunciation of 
secessionism in May 1965 combined to convince independence organizations in various 
regions to accelerate their reorganization and integration. With the increasing number 
S2l Ibid. 
522 Fairbank, China: The People's Middle Kingdom and the U.S.A., 75. The book was published in 1967 
but the article was published in The New ~eeeublic and dated February $,1966. 
523
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of Taiwanese students studying in the US, and the divisions within the independence 
camp based in Tokyo, the US gradually replaced Japan as the bastion for the Taiwan 
independence movement. sn Immediately after Peng's arrest, the League for 
Self-Determination of Formosans in Canada renamed itself the Committee for Human 
Rights in Formosa. On September 23, 1965, the Formosan Association in Japan was 
reorganized as the United Young Formosans for Independence (UYFI). In June 1966, 
the UFI in America became the United Formosans in America for Independence 
(UFAI).528 In spring 1967, the Union for Formosa's Independence in Europe (UFIE) 
was founded. Finally, to achieve unity, the four major organizations in US (UFAI), 
Japan (UYFI), Canada and Europe (UFIE) agreed on September 20, 1969 to organize the 
World United Formosans for Independence (WUFI), the largest Taiwan independence 
movement organization in the world, with its general headquarters in the US and 
branches in Canada, Japan and Europe. 529 
The Advance of Taiwanese Nationalism Discourse 
In April 1966, Peng's Declaration of Formosan Self-Salvation was first published in 
English by Independent Formosa, an organ of UYFI in Japan.530 In May 1966, the UFI 
had it re-translated and circulated in the US. Again, when there was a heated debate on 
seating Communist China in the twenty-first annual meeting of the UN Assembly, Peng's 
manifesto appeared in the New York 1imes on November 20, 1966 to promote 
international support.531 
To promote the Taiwan independence movement more effectively, the integration of 
organization and propaganda was necessary. Since May 25, 1968, the three major 
independence camps in America, Japan and Europe jointly published the monthly 
Chinese-language journal Taiwan Chinglian (The Young Formosan, or Formosan Youth, 
527 Lung-chu Chen believed that the success or failure of the Taiwan independence movement in the US 
would be decisive for the future; see Chen Lung-chu and Lasswell, Formosa, China, and the United 
Nations, 195. 
528 Ibid., 196. 
529 
"The Declaration on the Es~b~®lent"o(the World United Formosans for Independence," -Jildependiint Formosa, 
vor9; NO.1 (19'70): 3, ii' · · 
530 Peng Ming-min, Hsieh Chong-min, and Wei Ting-chao, "The Independence Declaration of Formosa," 
2-9. 
531 Lin Ming-hsien, Taiwan duli jianguo lianmeng dashi ji (A Chronology of Relevent Events of World 
United Formosans for Independence) ([cited). 
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t:lfll1fif::)532 and published "Taiwanren de zhuzhang" <-E11.1!1lAI¥J.:i:~. Taiwanese 
Propositions) in each issue. 533 These Propositions encapsulated and itemized the 
arguments of Peng's Declaration of Formosan Self-Salvation. Notably, the 
Propositions extended the definition of Taiwanese to anyone who identified Taiwan as 
their motherland and were committed themselves to its freedom, welfare and 
prosperity.534 This redefinition inspired a confident, flexible and pluralistic Taiwan 
identity. By the middle of 1968, the primary objective of overseas political nationalism 
or constructuralism had been accomplished and welcomed by overseas secessionist 
groups.535 The realisation of overseas political nationalism is important because, as will 
be seen in the next chapter, the influx of overseas political nationalism into Taiwan in the 
1980s fractured the national identity and helped the dissemination of secessionism at 
home. 
Human Rights as an Emergent Issue 
In the second half of 1960s, the KMT's heavy-handed policy of arresting and harassing 
overseas pro-independence Taiwanese students caused considerable human rights 
pressure from American academia and officialdom. The arrest of native student Huang 
Chi-ming (ji'@f~) on September 2, 1966 and the Nationalists' yielding to pressure and 
granting Huang a three-year suspended sentence in July 1967 is the finest example of the 
growing importance of human rights. 536 A spate of arrests of pro-independence 
students reinforced the perception of the KMT as a Leninist-type party. 
The KMT Fall and the Rise of Secessionism 
Toward the end of the 1960s, the Vietnam War and the split between the PRC and the 
USSR prompted the US to make gradual and subtle overtures to China. When Italy 
532 The Romanization of the journal's title was deliberately rendered according to Taiwanese 
gronunciation for political reasons. 
33 Chen Ming-cheng and Shih Cbeng-feng, ed., "eds., A History of World United Formosans for 
Independence, 11. See also Taidu lianmeng Riben benbu yuanqi (The Story of WUFI in Japan), [internet] 
(WUFI, Jun 11 2003 [cited Jan 11 2005]), available from http://www.wufi.org.tw/. 
534 Lin Ming-hsj.en, Tal wan duli_jianguo_/ianmeng dashiji-(AChronology4Relevent-Events of World 
Uriited Formosarufor Independence) ([cited). 
535 Secessionist scholar Lung-chu Chen argued in 1967 that the native Taiwanese and mainland Chinese 
should live, work and communicate in a shared destiny, see Chen Lung-chu and Lasswell, Formosa, China, 
and the United Nations, 198. 
536 Melvin Gurtov, "Recent Developments on Formosa," The China Quarterly, No. 31 (1967): 88. 
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proposed the creation of a UN study committee to investigate ways of breaking the 
Chinese representation deadlock in 1966, America, along with Canada, Japan and other 
nations, agreed.537 When Italy repeated its proposal to solve the Chinese representation 
deadlock in 1968, the US backed it again.538 
Although the UN General Assembly never had a chance to vote on a "Two Chinas" or 
"one China, one Formosa" formula because of opposition by both Chinas and by their 
respective partisans in the UN,539 the pervasive, intense anti-China climate in the US 
contributed to the rise of overseas secessionists.540 In 1967, Taiwanese secessionist 
scholar Chen Lung-chu and pro-separatism American scholar Harold Lasswell stated in 
their work Formosa, China, and the United Nations, ''To seat Communist China in place 
of the Nationalist delegation in both the General Assembly and the Security Council 
without guaranteeing a just status for Formosa would amount to a license for Peking's 
armed conquest of Formosa."541 The most appropriate solution, they argued, would be 
to apply the principle of self-determination and to hold a UN-supervised plebiscite.542 
They optimistically predicted that a UN resolution authorizing a plebiscite might 
provoke the K.MT regime into withdrawing from the UN and might even culminate in 
the disintegration of the KMT regime and the establishment of a new Republic of 
Formosa.543 Notably, in the preface of the book, the authors noted that they had 
received much help from both the scholarly and government communities. The 
substantial contribution from members of these communities is acknowledged by the 
authors, who termed their work a result of collaborative "decision seminar." 544 
Moreover, the book asserted the visible, gradual process of ''Taiwanization" among the 
537 Mendel, The Politics of Formosan Nationalism, 237. See also Wang Cheng-hua .:EJE~, ed.,"eds., 
Zhonghua minguo yu Lianheguo shiliao huibian - Zhong guo daibiaoquan (Documentary Collection on 
R.O.C. and United Nations- Chinese Representation) (Taipei: Academic Historica, 2001), 305, 15. 
538 Mendel, The Politics of Formosan Nationalism, 237. 
539 Ibid., 236. 
540 Oksenberg, "A Decade of Sino-American Relations," 176; Shambaugh, "Patterns oflnteraction in 
Sino-American Relations," 208. 
541 Chen Lung-chu and Lasswell, Formosa, China, and the United Nations, 138. 
542 Ibid., 139. -- - - - --- - - -
543 Ibid., 152-53. MendeL Yile ~lirlcs of Formosan Nationalism, 235-36. 
544 Chen Lung-chu and Lasswell, Formosa, China, and the United Nations, vi. Probably because of 
sensitivity, the authors did not name the officials contributing to their work. The authors did 
acknowledge gratitude to many famous scholars, including A Doak Barnett, John King Fairbank, and Neil 
H. Jacoby. 
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general mainlanders on the island.545 Considering the "channels and predispositions 
open to the champions of Formosa,"546 and the prevalent undercurrent of separatism, 
this means that by the end of the decade, ''Taiwanization" had become a proven and 
expanding consensus among American scholars, government officials and diplomats 
with an interest in Taiwan affairs. 
However, American withdrawal of its support of the KMT made the position of the 
regime untenable. The rising publicity of the Taiwan independence movement and the 
swelling number of participants in demonstrations gave rise to mass movement in 
overseas secessionist camp. The establishment of the WUFI on Januacy 1, 1970 
symbolized the culmination of the more than twenty years of partnership between the US 
and Taiwanese nationalists. WUFI believed that "the 1970s will be a turning point in 
the history of Taiwan and will be the decade during which to establish an independent 
State of Taiwan."547 Echoing Fairbank's rejection of "the misleading 'Two Chinas' 
concept," WUFI rejected "the ambiguous policy of 'Two Chinas' ."548 This confidence 
was shared by 0. V. Armstrong, a Taiwan expert at the US Embassy in Taipei. After 
serving five years as Taiwan specialist, Armstrong sent a telegram to the State 
Department in 1970, asserting that by the mid-1980s the KMT government "must 
somehow be encouraged to transfer more real power to the Taiwanese and acquiesce in 
the eventual Taiwanization of the Republic ofChina."549 
Summary 
Truman's interventionist measures during and after the Korean War marked the 
resumption of separatism on Taiwan. Both the ''Two China" and "One China, One 
Taiwan" policies served the goal of Taiwan independence. Throughout the 1950s and 
1960s, Cold-War bipolarisation apparently facilitated Chiang Kai-shek's authoritarian 
control of Taiwan. However, the US government used American aid - already used to 
promote Formosan autonomy and to deny Taiwan to the Communists before the Korean 
-S4S Ibid., 167.- -
546 Ibid., 200. 
547 
"The Declaration on the Establishment of the World United Formosans for Independence," 13. 
548 Ibid. See also Fairbank, China: The People's Middle Kingdom and the U.S.A., 63. 
549 Wang, "KMT's Localization Claim Is Empty." 
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War- to promote the social and political rights for the Taiwanese and to undermine the 
KMT. 
Truman's interventionism contributed to the emergence of Taiwanese ethno-nationalism. 
The administration of Chiang Kai-shek cemented an ethnic-provincial consciousness that 
was characterized by social inequalities and gave rise to Taiwanese structuralism. 
American aid reinforced Taiwanese structuralism against the KMT regime. Although 
the US suspended its aid to Taiwan in 1965, American aid had multi-dimensional, 
far-reaching socio-economic implications in the evolution of Taiwanese nationalism. 
The rapid economic growth from the late 1950s and the resultant socio-economic 
changes contributed significantly to the native political struggle against the mainland 
ruling elites and the transformation of the KMT authoritarian party-state system in the 
following decades. American aid also nurtured a US-oriented Taiwanese nationalism. 
In the context of Truman's separatist intention and Chiang Kai-shek's authoritarian 
control of Taiwan, American scholars with separatist sympathies and Taiwanese 
secessionist scholars respectively accomplished their theories for Taiwan independence. 
By the end of 1960, American scholars had shaped a roughly discemable "Taiwan 
Independence Roadmap" based on Sino-US cultural conflict, cross-Strait cultural 
differences and intra-island cultural assimilation. The values of "self-determination" 
pervade the Roadmap. Both democratisation and Taiwanization are alternative vehicles 
for "self-determination." Cultural assimilation or Taiwanization would ultimately break 
Taiwan away from the mainland. The "Roadmap" would lead to Taiwan's 
self-determination but not to full independence. The developments of US-PRC-Taiwan 
relations in the following decades follow this roadmap. 
American scholars appeared to have reached a consensus with their Taiwanese 
counterparts. On the part of Taiwan, western-style political nationalism seemed an 
inevitable of the KMT's authoritarianism and the constant threat from the Communists. 
Democratisation had become the shared goal of liberal mainlanders 3.!1d_ Taiwanese 
nationalists since the late 1950s. Peng Ming-min's manifesto was a typical discourse of 
political nationalism. Peng's case had far-reaching implications for the integration of 
overseas secessionist organizations and independence narratives. The accomplishment 
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of the discourse of overseas political nationalism, exemplified by the redefinition of 
Taiwanese identity, was important. From the late 1970s on, there were strong internal 
dynamics for political change on the island. The influx of overseas political 
nationalism into Taiwan in the early 1980s contributed to the division of national identity 
at home, which facilitated the dissemination of secessionism in the late 1980s. 
Since the late 1960s, the ROC's representation of China faced increasing challenges in 
the international community. In contrast, America's separatist intention on Taiwan, 
American aid and scholars' theories of independence resulted in a booming of the 
Taiwan independence movement. In terms of Taiwan policy, "Taiwanization" had 
become a proven and expanding consensus across the communities in the US. 
Consequently, overseas independence groups had every reason to be confident· that an 
independent state of Taiwan was going to be established in the 1970s. 
100 
Chapter 4: 1970-1989 
METAMORPHOSIS AND 
THE POLLINATION OF TAIWANESE NATIONALISM 
Introduction 
In the late 1960s, America began to reverse both its antagonism against Communist 
China and its support of the ROC. The shared perception of the Soviet threat prompted 
Nixon and Mao Zedong to set aside their differences and realign US-PRC relations on a 
new trajectory for security cooperation.55° From early 1969, the Nixon administration 
made cautious overtures to China.551 Washington began to paint a bright picture of 
Beijing as a strategic ally against the Kremlin and play down the differences between 
American and Chinese foreign policies. Accordingly, such issues as Sino-US cultural 
conflict and cross-Strait cultural differences were shelved. This, however, does not 
mean that American promotion of intra-island cultural assimilation or Taiwanization 
stalled. 
This chapter explores how the US reconciled the strategic need of US-PRC 
rapprochement with its promotion of Taiwanese nationalism by addressing several 
related questions. How did the US placate China with the Three Joint Communiques? 
How did the Three Joint Communiques fit into the Taiwan Independence Roadmap? 
How did the Three Joint Communiques affect the KMT regime and Taiwanese 
nationalism? What forces initiated the democratic transition in Taiwan? How did 
Chinese nationalists and Taiwanese nationalists interact in terms of national identity in 
the era of US-PRC rapprochement? 
The Entanglement of Nationalis!fl al!d __ ~tr~teg!~Jr1t~re~ts 
550 Myers, "Introduction: A Unique Relationship," 13; Oksenberg, "A Decade of Sino-American 
Relations," 177. 
551 Oksenberg, "A Decade of Sino-American Relations," 176. 
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Overseas Secessionists and American Supporters: Self-Determination 
With the joint efforts of American anti-Chiang Kai-shek left-wing groups, and Japanese 
and Taiwanese friends, Peng Ming-min fled from Taiwan to Sweden on January 3, 
1970.552 At the invitation of Secretary of State William P. Rogers, Chiang Ching-kuo 
(~*~~).then Deputy Premier and Chiang Kai-shek's heir apparent, paid a ten-day visit 
to the US from April 18, 1970. The WUFI staged demonstrations to protest Chiang's 
visit. WUFI President Tsai Tung-jung (~~~. Trong R. Chai) urged Nixon to endorse 
self-determination and an internationally supervised plebiscite for Taiwan.553 On April 
24, 1970, Huang Wen-hsiung (Ji3t0f) and Cheng Tzu-tsai (~§ :{), members of the 
WUFI, attempted to assassinate Chiang Ching-kuo at the Plaza Hotel in New York. 554 
This marked the beginning of secessionist Taiwanese terrorism. 555 On May 25, Dr. 
Douglas H. Mendel, author of the recently published The Politics of Formosan 
Nationalism, testified at the New York bail hearing for the two Taiwanese would-be 
assassins. Peng's escape from Taiwan, Mendel's work, and the assassination attempt 
publicized Formosan nationalism.556 On July 29, US Representative Donald M. Fraser 
presented a paper to the US Congress, "Political Repression in 'Free China'" and urged 
that US policy move away from support of Chiang Kai-shek and toward governance of 
Taiwan by Taiwanese in accordance with the principle of self-determination.557 
Peng was later offered a research post at the Centre for Chinese Studies at the University 
of Michigan. His visa application was approved by Secretary of State Kissinger and the 
State Department.558 On September 19, the US consular officers in Stockholm warned 
552 White House, "Memorandum of Conversation, 24 February 1972, 5:15p.m. - 8:05 p.m.," 1972, in 
N'lXon's Next Trip to China. Top secret, declassified 2003, George Washington University, 14. Available 
from http://www2.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB 1 06/NZ-3.pdf [accessed Dec 15 2003]. Peng 
has never revealed the identities of Americans that helped him escape from Taiwan. 
553 Chai Trong R. ~II"U~. "Telegram to President N'lXon," The Independent Formosa, Vol. 9, No. 1 
(1970): 9. 
554 
"Chiang and Ching and April24, 1970," The Independent Formosa, Vol. 9, No.1 (1970): 2; Chen 
Ming-cbeng and Shih Cheng-feng, ed.,"eds., A History of World United Formosans for Independence, 
55-57. 
sss For more cases of terrorist links, see James Tyson, "Christians and the Taiwanese Independence 
Movement: A Commentary," Asian Affairs, Vol14, No. Fall (1987): -165. · 
556 Douglas Hetisted Mendel, '1The Role of Violence in Liberation Movements: A Reader's Opinion," The 
Independent Formosa, Vol. 9, No.2 (1970): 12. 
557 
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558 Burr, Nixon's Trip to China ([cited). See also Peng Ming-min, A Taste of Freedom, 95-91. 
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Peng not to deviate from his original purpose of conducting research.559 However, after 
his arrival in America in late September as a political refugee, he was given few 
restrictions in "commenting on current world affairs."560 Peng became President of the 
WUFI in January 1972. In the same year, George Kerr helped him publish his memoirs, 
A Taste of Freedom.561 Harvard professor Edwin 0. Reischauer wrote a brief review of 
his memoirs in which he supported the establishment of an independent state of 
Taiwan.562 Senator Edward Kennedy also offered Peng his moral support.563 
Two Meetings between Kissinger and Zhou Enlai in 1971 
In 1970, 0. V. Armstrong asserted to the State Department that by the mid-1980s the 
KMT must somehow be encouraged to transfer more real power to the Taiwanese and 
acquiesce in the Taiwanization of the ROC.564 Before reorienting American China 
policy for security cooperation against the Kremlin, Nixon and Kissinger had the 
national security establishment assess the potential costs and benefits of rapprochement 
with the PRC. On Apri119, 1971 Kissinger instructed the national security bureaucracy 
to explore the impact upon US relations with the ROC.565 The NSC Interdepaitmental 
Group later replied: ''time is not necessarily in Peking's favor on the issue of Taiwan's 
eventual status. The drift of events, notably Taiwan's progressively greater viability, 
increases the possibility of a one China/one Taiwan solution."566 Self-determination 
through democratisation and Taiwanization, the theme of the ''Taiwan Independence 
Roadmap," was a viable course of action. In June 1971, the CIA proposed a 
Taiwanese-dominated electoral government through Taiwanization of the Taiwan 
S'9 Peng Ming-min, A Taste of Freedom, 232. 
S60 Ibid., 235. 
561 Ibid., xii. 
562 Paau Shiu-lam, Taidu' muhou (Behind the Scene of Taiwan Independence'), 34. See also Lai 
Tse-han, Ramon H. Myers, and Wei Wou *fi~lii. ~:B=•. ~~~. Beijuxing de kaiduan: Taiwan ererba 
shibian (A Tragic Beginning: The Taiwan Uprising of February 28, 1947), trans. Luojia Luo (Taipei: 
Shibao wenhua, 1993), 308. 
563 Lai Tse-han, Myers, and Wei Wou, Beijuxing de kaiduan, 308. 
564 See page 98 of this thesis. 
565 Henry A. Kissinger, National Security Study Memorandum 124: Next Steps towards the People's 
Republic of China (Apr 19,1971)[intemetl(GeorgeWasbington University; 1999 [cited A.pr 16 2002]); 1, 
available from http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB 19/02-0 1.htm. 
566 USDOS, "Memorandum for the Chairman, NSC Senior Review Group, NSSM 124: Next Steps 
Toward the People's Republic of China (PRC)," Apr 17 1971, in China and the United States: From 
Hostility to Engagement, 1960-1998. Top secret, declassified 1974, George Washington University, 4. 
Available from http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB19/03-0l.htm [accessed Sep 27 2002]. 
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regime. 567 Consequently, American confidence in "One China, One Taiwan" and 
Taiwanization facilitated US-PRC rapprochement. 
The Nixon administration made only limited concessions on the issue of Taiwan. On 
July 1, 1971, Nixon instructed Dr. Kissinger "not to indicate a willingness to abandon 
much of our support for Taiwan until it was necessary to do so;" Nixon also emphasized 
that "the overall statement with respect [to] Taiwan should be somewhat more 
enigmatic."568 When Kissinger secretly met Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai in 
Beijing on July 9, 1971, Zhou questioned him about State Department spokesman 
Charles Bray's reiteration of the ''undetermined legal status of Taiwan" as the position of 
the US government. Kissinger simply replied: "He hasn't repeated it1"569 As to the 
political future of Taiwan, Kissinger told Zhou that "we are not advocating a 'Two 
Chinas' solution or a 'One China, One Taiwan' solution." 570 Immediately after 
Kissinger returned to America in mid-July, Nixon delivered his shocking announcement 
of his decision to recognize the PRC. Later, Secretary of State Rogers recommended 
that the ROC relinquish the Security Council seat but reserve its UN membership for 
dual representation;571 on August 2 he openly stated that the US would call for seating 
the PRC but oppose any move to expel the ROC.572 Apparently, this was Nixon's "Two 
China" solution for preserving ''Taiwan's right to exist as an independent nation.''573 
On September 16, Nixon declared at a press conference that the ROC's Security Council 
seat should be ceded to the PRC. The ROC resolutely rejected this proposal574 and the 
PRC just as vigorously opposed ''Two Chinas" or dual representation. 575 A few days 
later, exile Peng Ming-min spearheaded a Taiwanese independence demonstration in 
567 Wang Hsiao-po, Iiang'an guanxi lunji (A Collection of Arguments on Cross-Strait Relations), 41. 
568 White House, "Memorandum for the President's Files: Meeting Between President, Dr. Kissinger, and 
General Haig, Thursday, July 1, Oval Office," Jul11971. Top secret, declassified 2001, George 
Washington University, 1-3. Available from 
http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB66/ch-33.pdf [accessed Jun 3 2002]. 
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on July 9 1971," Jul29 1971, USDOS. Top secret, declassified 2001, George Washington University, 9. 
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570 Ibid.," 13. 
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(Documentary Collection on RO,C.andUnitedNations- Chinese Representation); 534. · -
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front of the UN. 576 When the General Assembly discussed the issue of Chinese 
representation in mid-October, the WUFI launched demonstrations for independence 
around the world.577 
During his second visit to Beijing, on October 21, Kissinger returned to his rejection of 
"Two Chinas" or "One China, One Taiwan," and the creation of an Independent Taiwan 
Movement.578 In reply to Zhou's suspicion of the linkage among numerous Taiwan 
independence demonstrations, the CIA and the Pentagon, he repeatedly promised "If you 
have any information of any American engaging in those activities and you give me his 
name, I can promise you in the name of the President he will be removed."579 In 
response to the Taiwan problem, he said that the US would support any peaceful 
resolution. "We recognize that the People's Republic considers the subject of Taiwan 
an internal issue, and we will not challenge that.''580 He parried Zhou's question on the 
''undetermined legal status of Taiwan" by saying "That's not been said by any American 
spokesman since June."581 Zhou repeatedly expressed his grave concern that the 
Taiwan independence movement would rise up in accordance with the theory that the 
status remains undetermined. Kissinger replied: 
We do not challenge the fact that all Chinese maintain that there's only one China and that 
Taiwan is part of that China. And therefore we do not maintain that the status in that respect is 
undetermined .... I can also assure the Prime Minister that the phrase "undetermined" will not be 
repeated. 582 
Kissinger had notably mentioned "a framework of one China" for the first time: 
Our attempt will be to bring about a solution within a framework of one China and by peaceful 
means .... I can conium our position to bring about peaceful solution within a framework of one 
China. To "bring about'' may be too active; "to encourage" is more correct. It's for the Chinese 
themselves to settle. It's not something we should actively push. We should try within a 
framework of one China.583 
576 Peng Ming-min, A Taste of Freedom, 258. 
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While Kissinger was still in China, the UN Assembly voted on in favour of Resolution 
2758 to admit the PRC into, and expel the ROC from, the UN, thus thwarting Nixon's 
"Two China" solution.584 In 1971, fifteen nations established diplomatic relations with 
the PRC and eleven severed relations with the ROC.585 Doubts about the legitimacy of 
the KMT regime were raised at home. 
The KMT: Under the Pressure of Taiwanization 
Repeated diplomatic setbacks prompted many young intellectuals to enter the political 
arena; the Daxue zazhi (j(~~~. The Intellectual) journal took a leading role in 
fomenting moves for political reforms.586 The Daxue zazhi intellectuals had become 
politicised since late 1970 by the controversy over America's unilateral decision to 
transfer the sovereignty of the Diaoyutai (f-jfil1\ j§j') Islands (Japanese, Senkaku islands) to 
Japan without consulting the PRC or the ROC, both of which claimed sovereignty over 
the islands.587 The intellectuals, who were really disillusioned Chinese nationalists, 
decried the KMT's defence posture toward the US and Japan as "a sign of weakness and 
betrayal of national interest."588 In July 1971, they insisted that only a thorough reform 
could save the nation. 589 In October, fifteen prominent liberal, reformist intellectuals, 
mainlanders and native Taiwanese alike, proposed a reform program. They insisted that 
Taiwan should indefinitely remain a de facto autonomous political entity and achieve an 
open and democratic society as an alternative to the Communist system in China.590 
This appeal was especially true when public awareness of the chaos resulting from the 
1966 Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution grew.591 
Chang Chun-hung (~~). a native Taiwanese, editor of Daxue zazhi, and a staff 
member of the Secretary General of KMT, condemned the representatives in the three 
584 Wang Cheng-hua, ed., ~'eels., Zhonghua minguo yu lianheguo shiliao huibian - Zhong guo daibiaoquan 
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national elective bodies as an aging privileged group and urged regular elections.592 
Chen Shao-ting (~JR:Jr~). a native Taiwanese and President of Daxue zami, was the first 
to demand a "comprehensive re-election" of all members of the three national elective 
bodies.593 After the expulsion of the ROC from the UN, on October 27 the KMT 
pledged to strengthen the people's national representative organs "in accordance with the 
principle of a democratic constitutional system."594 
Taiwanese Nationalists at Home: Call for Self-Determination 
Since Kao Chun-ming ~13t~. C. M. Kao) was elected Secretary General of the Taiwan 
Presbyterian Church in 1970, he had aggressively led the Presbyterian Church to join the 
political struggle against the KMT.595 After Kissinger's visits to Beijing and the ROC's 
expulsion from the UN, the Presbyterian Church issued a "Statement on Our National 
Fate," on December 29. The Statement requested that the global society respect the 
principle of self -determination and urged the KMT regime to "grasp the opportunities 
available to raise our demand for justice and freedom, and for internal renewal" by 
holding elections within the Taiwan area "of all representatives to the highest 
government bodies to succeed the present representatives who were elected twenty-five 
years ago on the mainland."596 It threw down the gauntlet to the aging national elective 
bodies that symbolised Chinese rule. In the same year, to support the position of 
Taiwan Presbyterian Church, Huang Chung-hui (Jii'ilf3*i), together with other Taiwanese 
Christians, founded "The Formosan Christians for Self-Determination" ( t:r•£1f{ig §I 
#it~IU) in New York:.597 
On the eve of the First Joint Communique, Taiwanese nationalists at home and abroad 
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it did not draw so much publicity uritil the eai'ly 1970s. 
596 Liu Hua-yi and Kao Chun-ming ;rJ$ft, ~~ly:j, Statement on Our National Fate by the 
Presbyterian Church in Taiwan [internet] (Presbyterian Church in Taiwan, 1971 [cited Sep 27 2003]), 
available from http://www.pct.org.tw/english/statesments_1.htm. 
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"Notes: In Memoriam Reverend Dr. Shoki Coe," Taiwan Communique, No. 37 (1988): 21. 
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alike articulated their desire for self-determination; Beijing seemed satisfied with 
Kissinger's promises, and the KMT already felt the pressure forTaiwanization. 
1972 - The First Joint Communique 
Nixon Administration: "One-China" vs. Taiwan's Undetermined Status 
Between October 1971 and February 1972, the US repeatedly used the "carrot and stick" 
measures to discourage Taipei from derailing the US-PRC rapprochement.598 During 
his February 1972, Nixon informed Zhou of the five principles of his China policy: 
Principle one. There is one China, and Taiwan is a part of China. There will be no more 
statements made ... that the status of Taiwan is undetermined. Second, we have not and will not 
support any the Taiwan independence movement. Third, we will ... discourage Japan from 
moving into Taiwan as our presence becomes less ... we do not want Japan moving in on Taiwan 
and will discourage Japan from doing so. The fourth point is that we will support any peaceful 
resolution of the Taiwan issue ... Finally, we seek the normalization of relations with the People's 
Republic. 599 
Nixon and Kissinger assured Zhou that they would not support the Taiwan independence 
movement; however, Kissinger noted that they could not "suppress the movement on 
Taiwan if it develops without our support."600 Nixon also persuaded Zhou to accept the 
reality of US military presence in Japan because "our interest in peace in the Pacific was 
to restrain Japan."601 The Carter administration later called these principles "Nixon's 
Five Points."602 Nixon's first point was paraphrased as "Status is determined - One 
China, Taiwan is part of China" in Harding's A Fragile Relationship: The United States 
598 Robert A Madsen, "Chinese Chess: US China policy and Taiwan, 1969-1979" (PhD thesis, Oxford, 
1999), 88-90. 
599 White House, "Memorandum of Conversation, 22 February 1972, 2:10p.m.- 6:00p.m." Top secret, 
declassified 1999, 2003, George Washington University, 5. Available from 
http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchi v/nsa/publications/DOC _;:eaderslkissinger/nixzhou/12-0 1.htm [accessed Mar 
27 2002, Dec 18 2003]. This document was first declassified on January 21, 1999 with the third principle 
partly sanitized. The document was completely declassified on May 30, 2003 and published for the first 
time by the National Security Archive on the web on December 11, 2003 after Taiwan President Chen 
Shui-bian defied US President Bush's warning on Taiwan's referendum legislation. 
600 White House, "Memorandum of Conversation, 24 February 1972, 5:15p.m.- 8:05p.m.," 14. This 
top-secret position, the US would not supportbl).t could not suppress TIM,-was not made-Irnow:tffuitiltlie 
National Security Archive posted the newly declassified documents on December 11,2003. 
601 Ibid.," 11. 
602 Shirley A Kan, "CRS Report for Congress: RL30341: China/Taiwan: Evolution of the 'One China' 
Policy- Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei," (Washington DC: Library of Congress, 
2001), 11. 
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and China since 1972.603 Yet the historical Shanghai Communique issued on February 
28 deliberately circumvented the oral, non-binding principle of the determined status of 
Taiwan. According to the Communique: 
The US government acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain 
there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not 
challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by 
the Chinese themselves.604 
The so called "one China Policy" - all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait 
maintain that there is only but China and Taiwan is a part of China- has been embedded 
in the ''Three Joint Communiques" and replaced the "undetermined status of Taiwan" 
since 1972. However, the delibemte selection of "acknowledges" instead of 
"recognizes" reflected the hollowness of Nixon's words - not to mention the 
undetermined status ofTaiwan.605 Harvey Feldman, a career diplomat who assumed the 
position of Director of the Office of ROC Affairs in September 1977 and created the AIT 
when the Second Joint Communique was signed, explained the word "acknowledges" as 
polite, diplomatic speech for "we understand that this is the position you take."606 
Consequently, the deliberately ambiguous "acknowledges" preserves the essence of the 
''undetermined status of Taiwan." Some Taiwanese secessionist scholars have read 
between the lines and have argued that the wording had never settled the legal status for 
Taiwan.607 Secessionist Shih Cheng-feng believes that America's "one China policy" is 
very different from China's "one China principle" and that the US stance of "not support 
Taiwan independence" is just a perfunctory position to pacify China.608 In addition, the 
condition of "peaceful settlement" to the Taiwan issue legitimises US military 
603 Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China Since 1972 (Washington: The 
Brookings Institution, 1992), 43-44. 
604 US DOS, "Joint Communique of the United States of America and the People's Republic of China 
(Shanghai Communique of 1972)," (Shanghai: 1972). See also N'txon, The Memoirs of Richard Mxon, 
576. 
605 In the Chinese text, the word for "acknowledge" is "cheng ren" (jp:~, recognize), a change from "ren 
shi" (~~.acknowledge), used in the 1972 Shanghai Communique. Kan, "RL30341," note 29. 
606 Harvey Feldman, "The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1429: A Primer on U.S. Policy Toward 
the 'One-China' Issue: Questions and Answers," (Washington DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2001). 
fn1 Lee Hung-hsi *~iM. "Dangqian tongdu lunzhan de xianfaxie di xili (A Constitutionalistic Analysis 
of the Contemperary Dispute between UniftcatiO_!lll!ld !fldependence)," in Guojia rentong xueshu 
yantaohui lunwenji (Collectii:Jiiof Articles frOm the Conference on National Identity) (Taipei: Caituan 
faren xiandai xueshu ya.Qjiujijinhui, 1993}, 4. 
608 Shih Cheng-feng, "Tai-Zhong guanxi yu guojia anquan - Meiguo de yinsu, guojia rentong, yiji minzu 
rentong (Taiwan-China Relations and National Security- The American Factor, State Identity, and 
National Identity)". 
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intervention in the case of a PRC strike across the Taiwan Strait. 
Furthermore, John H. Holdridge, a former student of John King Fairbank and Edwin 
Reischauer, 609 then a senior staff member for East Asia and the Pacific at the NSC under 
Kissinger, wrote that "it was helpful that both the CCP and the Kuomintang regarded 
Taiwan as part of China, for by accepting this point and affirming our interest in the 
settlement of the sovereignty question 'by the Chinese themselves • we would affront 
neither side."610 Holdridge recounted that the wording of "all Chinese" was originally 
formulated as "all people," but the State Department objected to the use of "people" 
because some inhabitants on Taiwan regarded themselves as ''Taiwanese" and would not 
agree that Taiwan was a part of China.611 In short, behind each fa~ade of "one China" 
policy, there is always a back door that allows "One China, One Taiwan." 
As far as Taiwan was concerned, the Communique was a further setback for the ROC. 
In 1972 alone, fourteen nations severed diplomatic relations with the ROC and seventeen, 
including Japan, established relations with the PRC.612 Moreover, since February 1972, 
American official documents had not used the title of "the Republic of China" but 
adopted ''Taiwan" when referring to the government and people on the island. 613 
Furthermore, for the remainder of 1972 and 1973, the Nixon administration gradually 
restricted Taipei's access to senior US officials; the ROC had only rare opportunities to 
engage in diplomatic discussions with officials in the highest levels of the US 
govemment.614 
US Congress: Mixed Support for the PRC and Taiwan 
Some Congress members had strong personal and political interests in the sudden thaw 
in Sino-US relations. As Peng Ming-min stated in 1972, ''To our misfortune, the term 
'self-determination' seems to have become an unsavoury phrase in the American 
609 John H. Holdridge, Crossing the Divide: An Insider's Account of Normalization of U.S.-China 
Relations (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), xii. 
610 Ibid., 89. Also refer to Kan, "RL30;l4l,"-11~12., note22. 
61LHoldridge, Crossiiig-t& -Divide, 93. -Also refer to Kan, "RL30341," 11-12., note 22. 
612 Gao Lang, Zhonghua Minguo waijiao guanxi zhi yanbian, 1950-1972 (The Evolution of Republic of 
China's Diplomatic Relations, 1950-1972), 37. 
613 Madsen, "Chinese Chess", 104. 
614 Ibid., 104-05. 
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vocabulary." 615 On February 21, 1973, Senator Edward Kennedy introduced a 
resolution strongly urging the US to establish full diplomatic relations with the PRC and 
to make it clear that the US was prepared to, alongside the American unilateral guarantee 
of the security of Taiwan, "reaffirm the commitment contained in the Cairo Declaration 
of 1943 and the Potsdam Proclamation of 1945 that Taiwan shall be restored to China;" 
and "reaffirm the interest of the United States in a peaceful reunification of Taiwan with 
mainland China."616 However, as Feldman argues, even after the issuance of the 
Shanghai Communique in 1978, had the ROC abandoned the claim as the legal 
government of all China and sought American recognition as a separate state, "there 
would have been intense political pressure in the United States to grant such recognition, 
despite the consequences for relations with the PRC."617 Many American conservatives 
hoped that Taipei would solve its internal political dilemma over constitutional 
legitimacy and become a separate state. 
Chiang Ching-kuo's "lndigenisation" and American Involvement 
Chiang Kai-shek started grooming Chiang Ching-kuo as his heir apparent immediately 
after the KMT retreated to Taiwan; Chiang Ching-kuo had been in charge of Taiwan 
before becoming Premier in May 1972.618 American rapprochement with the PRC took 
its toll on the KMT. In response to the internal and external questions on the legitimacy 
of KMT rule, international isolation and to domestic calls for reform, the KMT decided 
to strengthen its legitimacy at home by promoting "indigenisation,"619 resolved to 
survive international isolation by mounting "flexible diplomacy," and to weather the 
economic impact by adopting developmentalism to expand Taiwan's exports.620 
615 Peng Ming-min. A Taste of Freedom, 257-58. 
616 S.RES.68, 93th Congress. 
617 Feldman. "A New Kind of Relationship," 29-30. 
618Chen Ming-tong, Paixi zhengzhi yu Taiwan zhengzhi bianqian (Faction Politics and the Political 
Transition of Taiwan), 119-32. 
619 Peng De-fu, "A Study on Taiwan's Local Election and Democmtic Tmnsition", 56. Chang Mau-kuei, 
"Shengji wenti yu mizu zhuyi (Provincialism and Nationalism)," 243; Bruce J. Dickson, "The Kuomintang 
before Democmtization: Organizational Change and the Role of Elections," in Taiwan's Electoral Politics 
and Democratic Transition: Riding the Third Wave, ed. Tien Hung-mao (London: M. E. Sharpe, 1996), 
53-56; Wu Mi-cha and GhangYen-hsien.Jianli Taiwan de guo11dn guojia (Establish a CiVicNationfor 
Taiwan), 131-33. 
620 Wu Jo-yu, Zhanhou Taiwan gongying shiye zhi zhengjing fenxi (The Political-Economic Analysis of 
the State-Run Business in Postwar Taiwan), 151-54. See also Li-Min Hsueh, Chen-Kuo Hsu, and Dwight 
H. Perkins, Industrialization and the State: The Changing Role of Government in Taiwan's Economy, 
1945-1998 (London: Harvard University Press, 2000), 36-37. 
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From the perspective of indigenisation, Chiang Ching-k:uo promoted Taiwanese for 
important posts in the party and the government to win native approval of his regime on 
the one hand; on the other hand, the government continued to hold national 
supplementary elections to rally support for the KMT -dominated parliament. 621 Six out 
of the sixteen cabinet members (including Lee Teng-hui, *Ji:)$), the Taipei Mayor and 
Provincial Governor were Taiwanese.622 America closely watched the Taiwanization of 
the ROC government. The State Department's intelligence note on June 21, 1972 
commented that "the new appointments pointed to eventual advancement of Taiwanese 
to positions of real power."623 In the 1972-1973 national supplementary elections, 
fifty-three, fifty-one and fifteen new native members were elected to the National 
Assembly, the Legislative Yuan and the Control Yuan respectively.624 Although these 
elections ''had been designed more to co-opt the opposition than to expand 
participation," 625 with each election, these national bodies became increasingly 
representative of Taiwanese. 626 He also decreed the release of many political 
prisoners.627 In addition, he endeavoured to reduce the differences between the native 
Taiwanese and the ethnic groups from the mainland.628 
An invisible crack existed between Chiang Ching-k:uo's indigenisation and Washington's 
anticipation of Taiwanization. Chiang's indigenisation aimed to strengthen domestic 
legitimacy, while the US expected Taiwanization to lead to separatist self-determination; 
Chiang cautiously drew a line in between. 629 The difference was most evident in 
American government's interest in orienting dissidents for Taiwanization beyond the 
621 Peng De-fu, "A Study on Taiwan's Local Election and Democratic Transition", 56. See also Chou 
Hsiu-huao and Chen Shih-huog, ed./'eds., Zudang yundong (Organizing the Opposition Parties), 120. 
622 Li Hsiao-feng *mel!$, 424 ciJiang an de lishi yiyi (The Historical Significance of the Assassination 
Attempt against Chiang on April 24) [internet] (Li, Hsiao-feng, 2000 [cited Oct 2 2003]), available from 
http://wwwjimlee.idv.tw/. 
623 Wang, "KMT's Localization Claim Is Empty." 
624 Chao, China's Reunification and the Taiwan Question, 35-36; Clough, Island China, 26. 
625 Cheng Tun-jeo, "Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan," 485. 
626 Chao, China's Reunification and the Taiwan Question, 35-36; Clough, Island China, 26. 
627 Huang, Intellectual Ferment for Political Reforms in Taiwan, 1971-1973, 81-101. See also Nancy 
Bernkopf Tucker,J"aiwan, Hong Kong, and the UnitedStates,-1945-1992: -Uncertain Friendships (New 
York: Twayoe Publishers, 1994), 150. 
628 A James Gregor and Maria Hsia Chang, The Republic of China and U.S. Policy: A Study in Human 
Rights (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1983), 69. 
629 There is a distinct difference between Chiang Ching-k:uo's indigeoisation and Lee Teng-hui's 
Taiwaoization; see page 160 of this thesis. 
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indigenisation of the KMT. For instance, heeding the call for regular elections, the 
State Department invited Chang Chun-hung to visit the US.630 The purpose of such 
invitation might have been designed to boost his popularity in the 1972 year-end 
elections. This kind of invitation later became an established but subtle means of making 
contact with Taiwanese dissidents.631 The US Embassy's report to the State Department 
on March 6, 1973 reinforced American confidence in Taiwanization. The report said: 
"both government and citizens [of the ROC] rejected reunion with the PRC and there is 
near universal agreement on the desirability of continued separation or independence 
from mainland control."632 Meanwhile, Chiang Ching-kuo's indigenisation was not 
limited to the promotion of natives to the decision-making bodies; by 1975, the KMT 
had significantly increased the native Taiwanese presence in its membership, and at the 
district and county levels.633 
From the perspective of flexible diplomacy, the KMT regime promoted civilian and 
commercial exchanges with other countries, substituting economic ties for diplomatic 
recognition, and trade and cultural offices for consulates and embassies.634 The ROC 
established a Congressional Affairs Section in the Washington embassy in 1972 and 
invited Congress members to visit Taiwan during the 1970s; Taipei thus overcame its 
diplomatic dilemma and considerably enhanced its influence in Congress. 635 Public 
awareness of the disastrous Cultural Revolution provided the ROC with a pulpit from 
which to promote its image of freedom and traditional values. Taipei made excellent 
use of American public relations firms and, following their guidance, increased the 
number of advertisements and propaganda articles published in newspapers and 
magazines to sway public opinion.636 Meanwhile, Taipei gradually de-emphasized the 
purely ideological anti-Communist argument and in favour of invoking Washington's 
630 Huang, Intellectual Ferment for Political Reforms in Taiwan, 1971-1973, ix, 77. 
631 See page 129 for another example. 
632 Wang, "KMT's Localization Claim Is Empty." 
633 Dickson, "The Kuomintang before Democratization: Organizational Change and the Role of 
Elections," 54-56; JUrgen Domes, "The Kuomintang and the Opposition," in In the Shadow of China: 
Political Developments in Taiwan since 1949, ed. Steve Tsang (London: Hurst, 1993), 118; Huang Teh-fu, 
"Elections and the Evolution of the Kuomintang," 115. 
634 Gao Lang, Zhonghua Minguo Wf!iiiao_guanxj zhi_yanbian, 1950-1972 (The Evolution of Republic of 
Ghina'sDiplomatic Relations, 1950~1972), 39. See also Hughes, Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism, 49. 
Madsen, "Chinese Chess", 226-29. 
635 The KMT leadership endorsed the proposal of establishing the Congressional Affairs Section in 1971; 
see Madsen, "Chinese Chess", 14648. 
636 Ibid., 149. See also Tucker, Uncertain Friendships, 153-55. 
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moral obligation to protect Taiwan, credibility of its global commitments, and American 
geopolitical interests. 637 Despite the tacit prohibition in US diplomatic ciiCles against 
treating the ROC as a sovereign entity, in August 1974 the State Department generously 
announced that it would allow the ROC to open five consulates in US territory over 
Beijing's protests. 638 Hence, flexible diplomacy eroded the one-China policy and 
endowed Taiwan with greater independence in international community.639 
From the perspective of Taiwan's economic development, US involvement was most 
evident. In the face of the exodus of foreign investment as a result of Washington's 
contact with Beijing since 1970, the US helped bolster international confidence in 
Taiwan's economic future by encouraging an influx of foreign capital and expanding 
American economic ties with Taiwan.640 This helped Chiang launch the "Ten Major 
Development Projects" which were synonymous with economic modernization or 
industrialization. Chiang's developmentalism permeated the fabric of society, raised 
the standard of living, strengthened the legitimacy of KMT, and contributed to the 
proliferation of bilateral commeiCial interests.641 Between 1971 and 1980, the annual 
GDP rose by approximately 10%.642 Growing economic prosperity fuelled flexible 
diplomacy. 643 Taiwan's trading power and modernization won the sympathy and 
support of many American industries, companies, political and social leaders and 
citizens. 644 There were, however, accusations that members of Congress had been 
bribed in exchange for their support.645 
Therefore, US-PRC rapprochement institutionalised Chiang Ching-kuo's indigenisation, 
which considerably enhanced US-Taiwan unofficial and economic ties and transformed 
bilateral strategic cooperation in the era of bipolar confrontation. The growing US 
Congressional concern over the future of Taiwan was evidence of this change. Before 
637 Madsen, "Chinese Chess", 150-51. 
638 This raised the number of such offices from 9 to 14. Ibid., 127, 231. 
639 Hughes, Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism, 50. 
640 Madsen, "Chinese Chess", 113-14, 28-29. See also Tucker, Uncertain Friendships, 143-44. 
641 Madsen, "Chinese Chess", 114, 28-29. 
642 Wu Jo-yu, Zhanhou Taiwan gongying ~hiye zhi zhengjingfenxi (The Political;;.EconomicAnalysis of 
the State-Run'Businesi in Postwar"Taiwan), 160. See also Madsen, "Chinese Chess", 225. 
643 Wu Jo-yu, Zhanhou Taiwan gongying shiye zhi zhengjingfenxi (The Political-Economic Analysis of 
the State-Run Business in Postwar Taiwan), 159-60. 
644 Madsen, "Chinese Chess", 230-33. 
645 Tucker, Uncertain Friendships, 281 note 106. 
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the signature of the Second Joint Communique, Congress passed numerous resolutions 
requiring that the US do nothing to compromise the freedom of the ROC and maintain 
close relations with the ROC. The proposed legislation created an environment and 
affected policy, even if they were never enacted.646 Beyond .these tangible fronts, 
America advanced its values and lifestyle on the island and consolidated US-oriented 
Taiwanese nationalism that had taken root since the input of American aid.647 
Overseas Taiwanese Nationalism: "Community of Shared Destiny" 
US-PRC rapprochement galvanized the Taiwan independence movement in the US. 
While Nixon and Kissinger sought to improve US-PRC relations, Peng Ming-min, facing 
the reality of mainlanders' indefinite residence on the island, endeavoured to deal with 
the division between the Taiwanese and mainlander ethnic groups and the tenacious Han 
racialism shared by both groups, so as to create a consolidated, new and independent 
nation. He advanced his constructuralist discourse by promoting the concept of a 
"community of shared destiny'' to enlighten Chinese and Taiwanese about the formation 
of modem nation-states. In his memoir, published in 1972, he stated: 
... it is difficult for the Chinese to understand that modem nation-states are not formed on the 
basis of biological origin, culture, religion, or language, but rather on a sense of common destiny 
and a belief in shared interests. There are subjective feelings which rise out of a common history, 
and are not necessarily related to these objective criteria of biological origin, culture, religion, and 
language. 648 
The first Communique dealt a blow to the independence movement; the secessionist 
camp lost some of its leaders and a part of its membership.649 Peng's "community of 
shared destiny'' served as a rallying point for overseas secessionists. 
Domestic Taiwanese Nationalism: The Rise of Dangwai 
Developmentalism: Advancement of Taiwanese Wealth and Opposition 
From the late 1970s, leading dissidents at home managed to unite into a loose non-KMT 
6411 For·example, ·see Lampton, Same Bed, Different Dreams, 333. 
647 Tucker, Uncertain Friendships, 156-57. 
648 Peng Ming-min, A Taste of Freedom, 244. See also Hughes, Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism, 
97-98. 
649 Madsen, "Chinese Chess", 111. 
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coalition- the so-called Dangwai (lf$;~. outside the party).650 The source of Dangwai 
can be traced to Chiang Ching-kuo's developmentalism of the early 1970s. The tapping 
of American aid had created a sizable new middle class and a literate urban working 
class by the 1970s. 651 Chiang's economic modernization helped many 
government-operated corporations to flourish.652 The landowner class that had been 
displaced by KMT land reform and compensated with state-owned-enterprise stock in 
the early 1950s prospered accordingly. Industrialization also benefited the owners of 
well-situated land. 653 In addition, owners of private enterprises, who were 
predominantly native Taiwanese and major recipients of US aid, expanded their business 
domain. 654 As a result, Chiang's developmentalism, through urbanization, rural 
industrialization, land speculation and the expansion of large public construction projects, 
advanced the control of most of the island's wealth by native businessmen and local 
factions.655 This had serious implications for the KMT's patron-client system. Tien 
Hting-mao (EB~Dt> argues: 
Many groups and their leaders derive income and resources form the private sector of the 
economy, thus diluting the leverage stemming from the authorities' patronage. In other words, 
growth of the private sector plus general economic prosperity have created economic sources of 
power independent of government control. Between 1952 and 1988, the ratio of privately owned 
enterprises in Taiwan's economy surged from 43.4 percent to 82 percent. As economic groups 
become less vulnerable to the party-state's political manipulation, they progressively gain autonomy 
from political intervention from the party-state . 
... Even groups traditionally under the party-state's strict corporatist control, ... are subject to 
internal divisions that allow the political opposition to organize countergroups for protest purposes . 
... In addition, economic prosperity and expansion of the private sector have created abundant 
private wealth and autonomous sources of income that can be channelled into political activities.656 
Consequently, US-PRC rapprochement fortuitously contributed to the rapid 
accumulation of Taiwanese wealth, which was translated into greater activism among the 
6so Chou Hsiu-huan and Chen Shih-hung, ed.,"eds., Zudang yundong (Organizing the Opposition Parties), 
121. Lu, "Political Opposition in Taiwan: The Development of the Democratic Progressive Party," 124. 
651 See page 64 of this thesis. 
652 For example, China Steel Corporation, China Shipbuilding Corporation and Chinese Petroleum 
Corporation expanded their business rapidly with huge official investment. 
653 Kaplan, The Court-Martial of the Kaohsiung Defendants, 5. 
654 Shiau Chyuan-Jenq, "Elections and the Changing State-Business Relationship," 218-19. 
m Kaplan, The Court-Martial o!J~ Kaohsiung Defendants, 5; Shiau Chyuan-Jenq, "Elections and the 
Chariging State-Busuies-s Relationship," 218-19; Tyson, "Christians and the Taiwanese Independence 
Movement," 164-65. 
656 Tien Hung-mao EBa. "Transformation of an Authoritarian Party State: Taiwan's Development 
Experience," in Political Change in Taiwan, ed. Cheng Tun-jen and Stephan Haggard (Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner, 1992), 37-38. 
116 
opposition. The rapid development of industrialization and urbanization broadened the 
middle class and gave rise to new political opposition. 657 Many members of the new 
opposition movement were socially connected to native small and medium businesses, 
which "offered political funds and a fall-back career to leaders of the political 
opposition."658 These businesses were the main beneficiaries of American aid, which 
was intended to help "disperse economic power and to create new power sectors in 
society" and promote native Taiwanese input in the political field. The rise of 
Taiwanese opposition is one of the most prominent socio-economic legacies of American 
aid. 
"Dangwai": Reformism out of the lndigenisation I Taiwanization Fissure 
As mentioned earlier, Chiang Ching-kuo was careful to draw a line between 
indigenisation and Taiwanization. In addition, the KMT was paralysed by the fear of 
American liberalism's connection with Communist infiltration. 659 These fears 
hampered the KMT from adopting bona fide reforms. As the contributors to the 
reformist Daxue zazhi decreased in late 1972, new blood from the intelligentsia and the 
bourgeoisie joined native dissidents, who then seized the initiative for democratic 
reformism. 660 They soon rose from the fault line between indigenisation and 
Taiwanization. The opposition movement demanded the abandonment of the concept 
of constitutional legitimacy, that all representatives stand for re-election, that martial law 
be lifted and that the provisions of the Constitution be implemented. 661 Dissident Kang 
Ning-hsiang cm~t$) vehemently attacked the authoritarian KMT regime. Before an 
American audience, he proclaimed that "the political and social status of Taiwanese was 
657 Cheng Tun-jen, "Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan," 474; Hu Fu, "The Electoral 
Mechanism and Political Change in Taiwan," 148; Huang Teh-fu, "Elections and the Evolution of the 
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Progressive Party," 122-23; Tien Hung-mao, "Transformation of an Authoritarian Party State," 35-38. 
658 Cheng Tun-jen, "Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan," 474, 81, 83-84. A typical 
example was the native landlord Yu family in Kaohsiung. See Chapter 5 of Chen Shih-hung and Chang 
Chien-lung, ed.,"'eds., Cong dangwai zhuxuantuan dao dangwai zongbu (Organization of Opposition 
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worse than that of Negroes in the United States."662 Again, these arguments were 
typical structuralism. Kang was elected to the Legislative Yuan in late 1972. Some 
reformist mainlanders, such as legislator Fei Hsi-ping (it:ff.rZJS), joined the native 
opposition camp. 
In late 1973, dissidents, including Kang Ning-hsiang and Chang Chun-hung, founded the 
United Independence Front.663 After a visit to the US at the invitation of the State 
Department, in response to KMT accusations about his sympathy for the Taiwan 
independence movement, Chang issued a campaign pamphlet in which he argued that if 
the Taiwan independence movement was interpreted as a movement for sovereignty and 
autonomy from Chinese Communist rule, he could see nothing wrong with it; if it was 
referred to as a Western civil rights movement, he was certainly in favour of it.664 In 
August 1975, Kang, Chang and Huang Hsin-chieh (Jiffifl'") established the first 
dissident journal, Taiwan Zhenglun (iJ'1J!ilil&~. Taiwan Political Review), to promote the 
opposition movement. When the December elections approached, the journal enjoyed a 
large readership and enthusiastic support from dissident candidates; this alerted the KMT 
regime to the journal's influence.665 The journal's demand for the lift of martial law 
was more than the KMT could tolerate. The journal was banned for "sedition" after 
just five issues.666 
The local elections since 1950 engendered a participatory political culture for the 
Taiwanese;667 the infusion of American dollars had improved their economical and 
political status; and the change of political climate since the early 1970s pushed the 
opposition into the vanguard of reformism. This opposition, which had originated as 
a reform movement at the beginning of the decade, had, by the late 1970s, coalesced into 
the Dangwai coalition which was able to take collective action to highlight the structural 
662 William Glenn, "Beating the System," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 79, No. 1 (1973): 13. See 
also Tucker, Uncertain Friendships, 150. 
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inequality between "'hereditary' politics at the central level and democratic politics at the 
local level." The coalition scored a significant electoral victory in 1977.668 This was 
also a long-awaited goal of the US. 
Dangwai: Beneficiary of Carter's Human Rights Diplomacy 
Calls for independence came from the far end of the Dangwai spectrum. In June 1977 
a leaked NSC study known as PRM-24 revealed that the Carter administration was eager 
to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC.669 John King Fairbank withdrew his 
support for Taiwan independence and in late summer 1977 urged Taipei to accept 
Beijing's demand to drop the 1954 Mutual Defence Treaty {MDT) because ''Taiwan's 
security would be better assured if Washington and Peking achieved a workable 
normalization."670 A sense of crisis permeated the secessionist groups and pushed them 
into action. At this juncture, Carter's human rights diplomacy was an inspiration to the 
opposition movement in Taiwan.671 
On August 16, six days before Secretary of State Cyrus Vance's visit to China,672 the 
Taiwan Presbyterian Church issued A Declaration on Human Rights to advocate 
independence. It urged Carter to "uphold the principle of human rights," claiming that 
"the future of Taiwan shall be determined by the 17 million people," and demanding that 
the KMT "face reality and to take effective measures whereby Taiwan may become a 
new and independent country."673 This statement revealed the connections between 
"human rights," "the future of Taiwan," "self-determination" and "independence," which 
carried different political weight but pointed in the same direction. Under the KMT, 
radical appeal for independence might be out of the platform of the opposition; but the 
widespread appeals for democracy and human rights justified the opposition movement's 
668 Cheng Tun-jen. "Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan," 484-85. 
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struggle against the KMT. The five local elections scheduled on November 19, 1977, 
prompted Dangwai to coordinate island-wide campaign activities. US Ambassador 
Leonard Unger had warned Taipei of Carter's extraordinary interest in human rights. 
This interest was evidenced by the inauguration of the annual human rights report and 
the creation of the Bureau of Human Rights in Humanitarian Affairs pinpointing abuses 
in Taiwan. As a result, in the 1977 election campaign, the Dangwai platform focused 
on two themes: liberal democracy and self-determination.674 Carter's human rights 
diplomacy effectively deterred the KMT from a policy of political suppression and 
benefited opposition movement in Taiwan.675 
Defections of the KMT's Native Clients 
After the KMT retreated to Taiwan, the KMT's patron-client system allowed native 
factions to hold onto local economic privileges, control local power apparatus and 
nurture more local followers; however, it alienated the general public, who criticized the 
KMT for conniving with the corrupt local politicians.676 The KMT had devised a 
faction replacement policy in an attempt to sap local factions; the KMT nominated 
younger, native KMT staff to replace localleaders.677 Encouraged by the success of the 
policy in 1968 and 1972 elections, the KMT decided to neutralize the local factions in 
1977.678 However, Taiwan's flourishing economy had clearly increased the economic 
strength 679 and the political autonomy 680 of local factions. The KMT's faction 
replacement policy outraged local factional leaders, who then mobilized their followers 
to vote for Dangwai dissident candidates. 681 As a result, the KMT lost four county 
magistracies and twenty-one seats in the Provincial Assembly; non-KMT politicians 
claimed 29.6% and 33.3% of the county magistrate and Provincial Assembly votes 
674 Lu, "Political Opposition in Taiwan: The Development of the Democratic Progressive Party," 134. 
675 Tucker, Uncertain Friendships, 151. 
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respectively. 682 The 1977 local contests proved a watershed in Taiwan politics; 
Dangwai evolved into an inchoate opposition party. 683 In a sense, the relaxation of the 
KMT's patron-client ruling alliance with native local factions in 1977 was a turning 
point for the democratisation of Taiwan.684 Indeed, the convergence between dissident 
politicians and rebellious factional leaders indicated that local factions were no longer 
monopolized by the KMT; to maximize their interests, local factions could easily defect 
to the opposition, thereby making an unintentional contribution to democratisation of 
Taiwan.685 
Legacies of the 1977 Elections 
The Chungli (cp~) Incident was an important by-product of the 1977 victory. On the 
evening of November 19, acting upon allegations of ballot rigging by the KMT, 
supporters of dissident Hsu Hsin-liang (~rn.f~U attacked a local police station. The 
mass violence enabled Hsu to win the post of Taoyuan (*i~ll!) county magistrate. The 
Chungli Incident thus symbolized a victory of mass movement. The sweet victory of 
1977 local elections was tainted by bitter provincial politics because of the minority 
status of Dangwai in the Provincial Assembly; this often caused the frustrated opposition 
leaders to resort to mass action. 686 It was in this context that the incident foreshadowed 
the split of the Dangwai camp over the line of mass movement. 687 
The 1977 victory inspired dissidents to seek a bigger success in the 1978 year-end 
national supplementary election. On June 5, 1978, a Japanese newspaper published the 
account of Dulles' testimony to Congress about his 1954 conversation with Chiang 
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Kai-shek in which he indicated that Chiang Kai-shek was aware of the impossibility of 
his recovering the mainland.688 The news reinforced dissidents' belief that the KMT 
had resorted to martial law as a pretext to justify its suppression of opposition. 689 
Carter's human rights diplomacy at this juncture inspired more challenge to the KMT 
regime. Shih Ming-teh (:fjfgSJ31!) was an activist in the independence movement. He 
served fifteen years in prison (1962-1977) on the charge of sedition because of his 
involvement in the case of Su Tung-chi. After his release, he helped Su's wife win a 
seat in the Provincial Assembly by emphasizing the contradiction between human rights 
and KMT political persecution.690 In June 1978, Shih upset the KMT by publishing a 
book proposing the addition of a fourth national elective body for the people on 
Taiwan.691 To protect Shih from imminent arrest, US human rights activist Linda Gail 
Arrigo married Shih on June 15, 1978. Because Arrigo called the US. Embassy and 
Amnesty International whenever her Taiwanese friends faced arrest, this marriage 
reinforced the Taiwanese opposition movement's connection with Amnesty International 
and the US Embassy in Taipei. 692 "Human rights" carried the least political weight in 
the opposition appeals; it was, however, the key to undermining the authoritarian KMT 
system. 
In the autumn of 1978, not long before the signature of the second Communique, Harvey 
Feldman, Director of the Office of ROC Affairs at the State Department, visited the 
Taiwan Presbyterian Church in support of the Taiwanese opposition movement. 693 
Taking advantage of Carter's human rights diplomacy and aspiring for victory in the 
December 23 supplementary elections for the National Assembly and the Legislative 
Yuan, Huang Hsin-chieh telegrammed Carter on behalf of the Dangwai campaign 
coalition on December 9 to draw his attention to the opposition movement on Taiwan.694 
688 See page 65 of this thesis. 
689 Chen Shih-hung and Chang Chien-lung, ed./'eds., Cong dangwai zhuxuantuan dao dangwai zongbu 
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690 Ibid., ed.,"eds., 8. For the case of S11, see page 83 of this thesis. 
~l Ibid:, ed.,"eds~.-16-17. . . - -
692 Ibid., ed.,"eds., 14-22. 
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1978- The Second Joint Communique 
The Carter Administration: Safeguarding an Independent Taiwan 
During the campaign, Carter had referred to Taiwan as the ROC and stated that he 
"would never let our friendship [with Beijing] stand in the way of preservation of the 
independence and freedom of the people on Taiwan." 695 After the election, he 
commented that Sino-US interdependence would be a better bulwark for Taiwan than the 
MDT.696 His National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, thought that Washington 
should move swiftly to establish diplomatic relations with Beijing and tilt the global 
balance of power towards the US.697 While Secretary of State Cyrus Vance was in the 
Middle East and the Congress in recess, Brzezinski dominated the last-minute 
negotiations with Beijing.698 On December 15, 1978, the Second US-China Joint 
Communique (Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations) was 
released. The Carter administration announced that it would establish full diplomatic 
relations with the PRC on January 1, 1979 and that the US would sever formal relations 
with Taiwan, terminate its MDT with Taiwan, and withdraw all US forces from the 
island; these measures met the "three conditions for normalization" demanded by Deng 
Xiaoping (~lj\ZfS) in November 1974.699 
This did not mean that Carter was indifferent to the future of Taiwan, however. Carter 
had decided as early as June 1977 that normalization must meet three premises: 
continued US arms sales to Taiwan, continued unofficial relations between the US and 
695 Madsen, "Chinese Chess", 165. See also NIT, "Foreign Policy Questions," Oct 17 1976,28. 
696 Madsen, "Chinese Chess", 188. 
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Taiwan, and peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue?00 On December 30, 1978, Carter 
issued a memorandum to all government departments and agencies instructing that all 
existing treaties and agreements between the US and the ROC "shall continue in force" 
and "whenever any law, regulation, or order of the United States refers to a foreign 
country, nation, state, government, or similar entity, departments and agencies shall 
construe those terms and apply those laws, regulations, or orders to include Taiwan."701 
A critic remarked, ''This memorandum in fact wiped out most of the legal effect of US 
de-recognition of the ROC."702 In fact, this memorandum gave Taiwan a de facto status 
of a state.703 
In February 1979, Senator Jacob K. Javits noted that the word "acknowledge" had been 
changed into "recognize" in the Chinese version 704 of the 1972 Shanghai Communique. 
During the process of enacting the Taiwan Relations Act, he said that "it is very 
important that we not subscribe to [the Chinese position on one China] either way." In 
response, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher asserted, "We regard the 
English text as being the binding text. We regard the word 'acknowledge' as being the 
word that is determinative for the U.S."705 
Congress: The Taiwan Relations Act 
The Carter administration's secret negotiation with Beijing on the establishment of 
diplomatic relations enraged the KMT, 706 the American people and Capitol Hill. 707 
Beijing's hawkish attitude toward Taiwan also fuelled the backlash in the Congress. In 
response to Carter's statement on peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue, Beijing 
immediately announced that "As for the way of bringing Taiwan back to the embrace of 
the motherland and reunifying the country, it is entirely China's internal affair." 
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Stressing that it is legitimate for a country to use force to settle its internal affairs, 
Beijing's statement amounted to a rejection of Carter's request.708 Deputy Prime 
Minister Deng Xiaoping further made it clear at a Beijing press conference on January 5, 
1979 that Beijing could not renounce the use of force for unification and reaffirmed that 
the future of Taiwan "is entirely an internal Chinese affair."709 The irredentist and 
militant Chinese nationalism solidified the American commitment to the security of 
Taiwan. 
After a frenetic and complex struggle, the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) was signed into 
law (Public Law 96-8, or PL96-8) by Carter on April 10, 1979 and was retroactive to 
January 1, 1979. The biggest controversy over the TRA was that it codified Taipei's 
legal rights and responsibilities under US law.710 On the issue of security, the PRC's 
invasion of Vietnam in February resulted in Section 2(b) of the 1979 TRA which 
required the US to provide defence material and services to Taiwan, and to consider with 
"grave concern" any non-peaceful means to determine Taiwan's future.711 The wording 
"grave concern" was deliberately chosen so as not to specify the conditions under which 
the US military would defend Taiwan or to commit the United States to a particular 
response to any actions taken by Taiwan to change its declared political status. This 
was later termed the "ambiguity strategy." However, Harvey Feldman argues that the 
TRA replaced the MDT to empower the US as Taiwan's ambiguous protectorate with a 
unilateral American guarantee of Taiwan's security.712 
Section 15(2) defines ''Taiwan" as "the islands of Taiwan and the Pescadores, the people 
on those islands, corporations and other entities and associations created or organized 
under the laws applied on those islands, and the governing authorities on Taiwan 
recognized by the United States as the Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979, and 
any successor governing authorities."713 Section 4(b)(1) stipulates: "Whenever the laws 
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of the United States refer or relate to foreign countries, nations, states, governments, or 
similar entities, such terms shall include and such laws shall apply with respect to 
Taiwan."714 The TRA also legalized the new US relationship with Taiwan. Under the 
bill, the US sells Taiwan arms, lends it money, recognizes its passports and grants its 
diplomats immunity.715 In effect, the TRAmandated the US to continue to treat Taiwan 
as an independent country, reaffirming its status as a de facto state. In addition, the 
TRA promotes Taiwan's flexible diplomacy. Section 4(c) states "Nothing in this Act 
may be construed as a basis for supporting the exclusion or expulsion of Taiwan from 
continued membership in any financial institution or any other international 
organization."716 Feldman argues that the legislative history of the TRA makes it plain 
that Congress intended the US to support Taiwan's membership in international 
organizations."717 
Last but not the least, the Carter administration's interest in identifying human rights 
abuses by the KMT was inserted in the TRA Section 2(c) "lest the disruption of official 
contact suggest a diminution of interest."718 
Chiang: Control at Home and the Five Principles in US-Taiwan Relations 
In urgent response to de-recognition, Chiang Ching-k:uo suspended the December 23, 
1978 supplementary elections and all campaign activities for the National Assembly and 
the Legislative Yuan. To weather the impact of de-recognition, Chiang advanced the 
"five principles" during the Christopher negotiations: recognition of the "reality'' that the 
ROC is the effective government of Taiwan; "continuity" in the bilateral treaties and 
agreements; American guarantee of Taiwan's "security," a legal foundation for bilateral 
ties; and "inter-governmental" exchange and communication.719 Therefore, the Carter 
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administration's secret negotiations which led to the establishment of relations with 
Beijing, Beijing's irredentist nationalism, and the KMT's response to de-recognition 
prompted the US Congress to enact the TRA, a US law that helps Taiwan's breaking 
away from China and institutionalises the Taiwanization of the ROC. 
Taiwanese Nationalism and the Kaohsiung Incident 
Carter's announcement not only interrupted the national supplementary elections, but 
also stimulated mass movement of the opposition. In December, Deng Xiaoping had 
for the first time proposed the so-called "one country, two systems" for peaceful 
unification with Taiwan. Shih Ming-teh was concerned by America's abandonment of 
Taiwan and Chinese Communist attempt to liberate Taiwan; in an unpublished statement 
he had expounded the principle of "popular sovereignty" and used it to reject the CCP's 
attempt for unification in accordance with the principle of human rights. 720 The 
Dangwai camp convened a national affairs conference and issued a statement on 
December 25. The statement echoed the Presbyterian Church's appeal of the previous 
August that ''the future of Taiwan shall be determined by the 17 million people."721 The 
PRC issued a Message to Compatriots in Taiwan ('Sf:J11![13]Jffi:rl=) on January 1, 1979, 
suspended the bombardment of Quemoy and proposed "three links" (mail, air and 
shipping services, and trade) and "four exchanges" (relatives and tourists, academic 
groups, cultural groups, and sports representatives) with Taiwan to relay Deng's 
overtures for peace.722 
The Dangwai camp was upset with the suspension of the supplementary elections. In 
the climate of mass movement and human rights, Yu Teng-fa (~If~). an influential 
landlord and magistrate of Kaohsiung county, planned to unite island-wide dissidents and 
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factions to push for resumption of the elections. The KMT responded by arresting Yu 
on January 21 and implicating him in seditious activity; this triggered a series of violent 
confrontations between dissidents and the KMT. 723 The disruption of dissidents' 
political participation thus aggravated -the split of the opposition camp over the line of 
mass movement?24 In June 1979, Kang Ning-hsiang founded the journal Bashi niandai 
()\ +1f.-R, The Eighties Monthly), which took the moderate line of parliamentary 
electioneering within the KMT system. Yet Kang's compromise with the KMT on 
suspending campaign activities alienated the other main dissidents and left Huang 
Hsin-chieh to inherit leadership of the mainstream opposition.'25 On August 24, 1979, 
Huang founded the journal Meilidao (~H~. Formosa Magazine), which took the 
radical line of mass movement outside KMT system.726 Formosa soon became an 
influential platform for political dissents. Its circulation of 100,000 and networked 
organizations and activities throughout Taiwan alarmed the KMT. 727 During the 
Formosa faction's rise to popularity in 1979, the number of violent clashes between 
Dangwai radicals and the KMT regime soared. 
In June 1979, Chen Chu CII*~), a human rights and Formosa activist, visited the US to 
establish ties with overseas associates. Despite Kang Ning-hsiang's lecture in New 
York in June urging better relations with the KMT, overseas secessionists saw eye to eye 
with the Formosa faction and spent the summer sponsoring a series of demonstrations, 
including hunger strike in front of the Coordinating Committee for North American 
Affairs (CCNAA, ROC's representative office in the US after de-recognition). There 
was an explosion in front of the CCNAA.728 Terrorist attacks on ROC officials and 
723 For the details, see Chapter 5 of Chen Shih-hung and Chang Chien-lung, ed.,"'eds., Cong dangwai 
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offices surged at home and abroad?29 
The US continued to intensify Taiwanization. On September 15, the State Department 
invited Lin 1-hsiung (#~flt), a Fonnosa activist and a Provincial Assembly councillor, 
to visit the US.730 On November 4, Chen Chu hosted a seminar in Kaohsiung to brief 
two hundred Fonnosa supporters of the political activities of overseas secessionists. A 
clash occurred the next day. 731 To publicise the struggle for human rights and 
democracy, Shih Ming-teh, general manager of the journal Fonnosa, spearheaded a mass 
demonstration in Kaohsiung on December 10, 1979 to commemorate International 
Human Rights Day. The rally ended in a riot when demonstrators and policemen 
clashed. Taiwan's police started massive searches and arrests from December 13.732 
Partnership between the US Congress and Taiwanese Nationalists 
President of the journal Fonnosa Hsu hsin-liang sought political asylum in the US, 
where he was travelling when the violence occurred. 733 Hsu united ten overseas 
secessionist groups and announced the establishment of the "United Front for the 
Nation-Building of Taiwan" in New York on December 15 in protest of the arrests.734 
Chen Tang-shan (~~Ll!. Mark Chen), head of the secessionist World Federation of 
Taiwanese Associations (WFTA), urged US Congress to put pressure upon the KMT to 
release the arrested dissidents. Congressional leaders expressed concern about the 
rights of the accused to the KMT leadership.735 Soon most of the arrested were released. 
Finally, eight Fonnosa leaders were indicted for sedition by a military court. Kang 
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[internet] (WUFI, 1979 [cited Oct 6 2003]), available from http://www.wufi.org.tw/. 
732 Kaplan, The Court-Martial of the Kaoluiung Defendants, 17-18. Wang, The Dust That Never Settles, 
217. Tyson, "Christians and the Taiwanese Independence Movement," 166. See also Huang Tzu-yang, 
Gaoxiong shijianjishi (A Faithful Account of the Kaohsiung Incident) ([cited). 
733 Chan, China's Reunification and the Taiwan Question, 28; Lillian Graig Harris, "Towards-TaiWan's -
Independence," Pacific Review; Vol. 1, No.1 (1988): 31. See also Rigger, From Opposition to Power, 
20. 
734 Chou Hsiu-huan and Chen Shih-hung, ed.,"eds., Zudang yundong (Organizing the Opposition Parties), 
219-21. 
735 Wang, The Dust That Never Settles, 218. 
129 
Ning-hsiang organized a team of defence attomeys?36 During the pre-trial hearing, 
defendant Lin I-hsiung's mother and his six-year-old twin daughters were stabbed to 
death in their home in Kaohsiung on February 28, 1980 after she had tried to contact 
Amnesty Intemational.737 
In mid-March, Senator Edward M. Kennedy said that the crackdown could jeopardize 
the remaining unofficial US ties to Taiwan and called for a speedy end to the thirty-one 
years of martial law. Ramsey Clark, former US Attorney General, said a "brutal use of 
martial law is being directed at moderate political opposition.'.738 After Kennedy's 
request for a fair trial, the military court was opened to foreign media and human rights 
groups, and newspapers published the transcripts?39 The court martial revolved around 
the dissidents' argument for Taiwan independence.740 Shih Ming-teh testified that 
Taiwan was already a sovereign country and its current name was the ROC; he argued 
for "evolutionary independence" for Taiwan?41 
On March 20, 1980, Representative James A. Leach introduced a bill urging Taiwan 
authorities to relax restrictions on freedom of expression, continue democratic 
development, and show a spirit of reconciliation on the Kaohsiung Incident?42 On 
April 18, the eight main defendants were sentenced to terms ranging from twelve years 
to life imprisonment.743 Kao Chun-ming, Secretary General of the Taiwan Presbyterian 
736 Rigger, From Opposition to Power, 21. 
737 Kaplan, The Court-Martial of the Kaohsiung Defendants, 25. See also Chan, China's Reunification 
and the Taiwan Question, 28; Tucker, Uncertain Friendships, 152. Chai Trong R. ~Ill]~. "The Future 
of Taiwan," Asian Survey, Vol. 26, No. 12 (1986): 1311. Robert Edmondson labelled the murder an 
intelligible act of the KMT. See Edmondson, "The February 28 Incident and National Identity," 33. 
This case has to date not been solved. 
738 James P. Sterba, "8 Taiwan Dissidents Go On Trial Today," NYT, Mar 18 1980. 
739 The Re-Formation of a Unified Actor: Taiwanese Quest for National Unity and Identity, [internet] (Sep 
6 2002 2002 [cited Jun 15 2004]), available from 
http://www6.plala.or.jp/masak12/polscilir/#Anchor-27-45980. 
740 Kaplan, The Court-Martial of the Kaohsiung Defendants, 28, 31. Wang, The Dust That Never Settles, 
218. See also Li Hsiao-feng, Jin bainian Taiwan minzhuyundong gaiyao (A Summary of the Democratic 
Movement in Taiwan in the Recent One Hundred Years) ([cited). _ _ . . . . 
741
-Lo Hsia~ho and Ho.Cheri-chung R!~~. fiiJ#&J~,. ·"Daxuan qian fu Mei, Shi Mingde xuanze taoli 
(Shih Ming-teh's Choice to Flee to the US before the Presidential Election)," UDN, Oct 19 2003. See 
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742 A Resolution Expressing Concern over the Kaohsiung Incident in Taiwan, 96th Congress, H.RES.616. 
743 Chai Trong R., "The Future of Taiwan," 1311. 
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Church, was arrested on April 24 for having provided sanctuary to Shih Ming-teh.744 
Activists of the Formosan Association for Human Rights appealed to the US Senate for 
help. In May, 1,200 Taiwanese Christians in Los Angeles and Chicago held a five-week 
hunger strike to demand Kao's release.745 In support of Taiwanese dissidents, Leach 
introduced another resolution to reaffirm support for human rights in Taiwan. 746 
Consequently, the Kaohsiung Incident facilitated a partnership among members of US 
Congress, overseas secessionists and domestic dissidents in the name of human rights. 
Because the ROC simply could not survive without US support, the KMT regime had to 
pay heed to the US opinion. In the following years, Congress used "human rights" and 
"democracy" to build up domestic and international pressure on the KMT for 
Taiwanization. This helped the dissidents remain politically resilient. After the 
Kaohsiung Incident, the opposition movement was dominated by the moderate wing; the 
KMT re-instituted supplementary elections to normalize the political process. 747 
Dangwai candidates, including many relatives and attorneys of these defendants, 
campaigned in the elections, which were held on December 6, 1980. These candidates 
claimed 25% and 15% of the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan votes, 
respectively.748 
In June 1981, native Taiwanese Professor Chen Wen-cheng (~3(~) at Carnegie-Mellon 
University was found dead on the campus of National Taiwan University after the 
Taiwan Garrison Command detained and interrogated him about his political activities in 
the US. The death sparked Congressional investigations into KMT spy networks on 
American campuses.749 House Representative Stephen Solarz sponsored an amendment, 
H.AMDT.434, to prohibit military aid or sales to countries with a pattern of intimidating 
or harassing individuals in the US.75° Chen Tang-shan wrote an open letter to Chiang 
Ching-kuo on March 22, 1982, pointing out that the protection of human rights had 
744 Tucker, Uncertain Friendships, 152. See also Tyson, "Christians and the Taiwanese Independence 
Movement," 167. 
745 Lin Ming-hsien, Taiwan duli jianguo lianmeng dashi ji (A Chronology of Relevent Events of World 
United Formosans for Independence) ([cited). 
746 H. RES. 708. 
747 Cheng Tun-jen, "Democratizing th.e_Quasi-Leninist Regime in -Taiwan," 487. -
748Peng De-fu, ".A Study on Taiwan's Local Election and Democratic Transition", 72, 75. Chou 
Hsiu-huan and Chen Shih-hung, ed./'eds., Zudang yundong (Organizing the Opposition Parties), 229. 
749 Tucker, Uncertain Friendships, 152. 
150 H.AMDT.434, 97th Congress.See also Tucker, Uncertain Friendships, 152-53. David E. Kaplan, 
Fires of the Dragon (New York: Atheneum, 1992). 
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become a prerequisite for US arms sale to Taiwan.751 This amendment intensified the 
domestic and American pressure for opening the KMT to Taiwanization. 
More family members and attorneys of Formosa defendants won seats in 1981 local 
elections. Many opposition journals, many of which were founded by dissident 
politicians, also appeared after the 1980 and 1981 elections?52 The KMT situation was 
compounded when the Reagan administration, as a strategic measure, bowed to Beijing's 
pressure. As the Reagan administration adjusted its China policy, in early 1982 the 
secessionist WUFI planned to set up a broadcast station to publicise Taiwan's 
independence movement. After this program failed, the WUFI founded the Formosan 
Association for Public Affairs (FAPA), a Taiwanese lobbying organization based in 
Washington OC?53 The FAPA later played a prominent role in enlisting Congressional 
allies in attacking the human rights violations of the KMT regime and in advocating 
self-determination for Taiwan. 754 Senators Kennedy and Pell and Representatives 
Solarz and Leach jointly issued an open letter urging the KMT to end martial law on 
May 20, 1982; thirty-one Representatives also added their signature.755 
1982- The Third Joint Communique 
The Reagan Administrati_on: The TRA over the August 17 Communique 
Beijing had always strongly opposed US arms sales to Taiwan. The normalization of 
Sino-US relations was due to the Chinese tacit agreement "to defer the issue by 
proceeding to normalize relation even though they knew the Americans intended to 
751 Hsueh Yueh-shun, Tseng Pin-tsang, and Hsu J ui-hao, ed., "eds., Cong jieyan dao jieyan (The Martial 
Law Era), 287-88. 
752 Chou Hsiu-huan and Chen Shih-hung, ed.,"eds., Zudang yundong (Organizing the Opposition Parties), 
309, 18. Li Hsiao-feng, Jin bainian Taiwan minzhu yundong gaiyao (A Summary of the Democratic 
Movement in Taiwan in the Recent One Hundred Years) ([cited). 
753 Lin Ming-hsien, Taiwan duli jianguo lianmeng dashi ji (A Chronology of Relevent Events of World 
United Formosans for Independence) ([cited). 
154 Feldman, "A New Kind of Relationship," 40; Lampton, Same Bed, ·Different Dreami, l04;Rober --
Sutter, "The TRA and the United States' China Policy," in A Unique Relationship: The United States and 
the Republic of China Under the Taiwan Relations Act, ed. Roman H. Myers (Stanford: Hoover Institution 
Press, 1989), 75. 
155 Hsueh Yueh-shun, Tseng Pin-tsang, and Hsu Jui-hao, ed.,"eds., Cong jieyan dao jieyan (The Martial 
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continue such arms sales."756 Finally, in Januacy 1982, Beijing declared, ''The whole 
question of United States arms sales to Taiwan is a major issue affecting China's 
sovereignty, which must be settled through discussions between the United States and 
Chinese governments."757 After months of negotiations, the US and China reached a 
compromise and issued the 1982 August 17 Communique. However, on July 14, 1982, 
one month before the third Communique, Reagan made "six assurances" to Taiwan?58 
At the end of July, John H. Holdridge, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the 
Pacific, sent a report to Congress listing the "six assurances" that the US position made 
regarding the sovereignty of Taiwan. He wrote that "while we would continue to regard 
Taiwan as part of China, the question of unification would be left to the Chinese 
themselves, with our only stipulation being that unification be by peaceful means." 
According to Holdridge, the last point of the "six assurances" stated, "the United States 
would not formally recognize China's sovereignty over Taiwan."759 Before signing the 
Communique, Reagan stated: 
Arms sales will continue in accordance with the act and with the full expectation that the 
approach of the Chinese Government to the resolution of the Taiwan issue will continue to be 
peaceful. We attach great significance to the Chinese statement in the Communique regarding 
China's "fundamental" policy, and it is clear from out statements that our future actions will be 
conducted with this peaceful policy fully in mind .... We have an abiding interest and concern that 
any resolution be peaceful. I shall never waver from this fundamental position?60 
On August 17, 1982, the third Joint Communique- the "August 17 Communique" - was 
promulgated. The US stated that it did not seek to cany out a long-term policy of arms 
sales to Taiwan; that its arms sales to Taiwan would not exceed, either in qualitative or in 
156 A. Doak Barnett, U.S. Arms Sales: The China-Taiwan Tangle (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 
1982), 21. Deng Xiaoping played a key role in the normalization process and was regarded as the key 
figure responsible for the decision to defer the issue of US arms sales to Taiwan. See Barnett, U.S. Arms 
Sales: The China-Taiwan Tangle, 23. 
757 Barnett, U.S. Arms Sales: The China-Taiwan Tangle, 30. 
758 The six assurances state that the US has not agreed to set a date for ending arms sales to Taiwan; has 
not agreed to hold consultations with the PRC prior to agreeing on arms sales to Taiwan; will not act as a 
mediator between Taiwan and the PRC; has not agreed to revise the Taiwan Relations Act; has not altered 
its position on the question of sovereignty over Taiwan; will not pressure Taiwan to enter into negotiations 
with the PRC. See Key Documents and National Policy Statements, [internet] (CSIS, [cited Jan 23 
2003]); 16, available from http://www.csis.org/isp/taiwan!US/us_keydocs.pdf. 
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assurances" were combined as point 5 in Holdridge's account. The wording of Point 6 in Holdridge's 
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760 OPROC, Vice President Lu Receives Rep. Ben Gilman, Honorary Chairman of the International 
Relations Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives [internet] (2001 [cited Feb 5 2004]), available 
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quantitative terms, the level of those supplied since the establishment of diplomatic 
relations; and that it intended gradually to reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan, leading, to a 
final resolution?61 This immediately raised questions about the integrity of the TRA. 
The State Department argued that "final resolution" was not synonymous with 'ultimate 
termination"'; therefore the Communique did "not provide for termination of arms 
sales."762 Davis R Robinson, State Department legal advisor, told the Congress on 
September 27: 
[The Communique] is not an international agreement and thus imposes no obligations on either 
party under international law. Its status under domestic law is that of a statement by the President 
of a policy which he intends to pursue .... The Taiwan Relations Act is and will remain the law of 
the land unless amended by Congress. Nothing in the joint Communique obligates the President to 
act in a manner contrary to the Act or, conversely, disables him from fulfilling his responsibilities 
underit?63 
Thus the Reagan administration tended to insist on the legal precedence of the TRA over 
the August 17 Communique. After a few meetings over the conflict on arms sales issue, 
the Senate Subcommittee on Separation of Power, chaired by conservative Republican 
Senator John East decided that the Communique and the TRA were not fundamentally 
contradictory. 764 To mitigate the adverse implication of the Communique, the US 
agreed in the mid-1980s to transfer military technology to help Taiwan manufacture 
weaponry and thereby strengthen its defence capabilities?65 
In addition, the August 17 Communique repeated the US position of peaceful resolution 
of the Taiwan question. Harvey Feldman asserted that US insistence on peaceful 
resolution through the Three Joint Communiques entrusted the ultimate status of Taiwan 
to islanders themselves. 766 Consequently, the Three Joint Communiques were 
consistent with Truman's ''undetermined status of Taiwan" and espoused ultimate 
"self-determination" from the very beginning. Indeed, as A. Doak Barnett, one of the 
761 US DOS, "Joint Communique of the United States of America and the People's Republic of China 
(August 17 Communique of 1982)," (Beijing: 1982). 
762 Tucker, Uncertain Friendships, 140. 
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765 Chiu Hungdah, "The Taiwan Relations Act and Sino-American Relations", 29. Bush, "Helping the 
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contributors to the idea ofTaiwanization,767 noted in a policy review article published by 
the Brookings Institute, America helped the KMT "successfully [operate] a de facto 
separate regime" and that ''the prospects for reunification of China appeared to decline 
steadily."768 
Congress: Human Rights, Democracy and Economy for Taiwanization 
After the resignation of Secretary of State Alexander Haig, perhaps the highest official 
urging closer relations with China in July 1982, the new Secretary of State George Shultz 
and the new Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs Paul Wolfowitz decided to 
downgrade China's strategic importance to the US.169 Furthermore, the US proved 
persistently unwilling to accede to Beijing's pressure. In this political environment, the 
secessionist FAPA strived to advance Congressional concerns over Taiwan. Some 
Congress members that were sympathetic to Taiwan independence held hearings and 
introduced resolutions to express their concerns over Taiwan's human rights and 
democracy and the future of the island republic. On September 16, 1982, Solarz 
sponsored a resolution calling upon the KMT authorities to end martial law and replace it 
with a democratic system. 770 On February 28, 1983, Pell initiated S.RES.74, 
demanding that the future of Taiwan be settled in a manner that was both acceptable to 
the people of Taiwan and consistent with the TRA?71 On March 1, Leach brought the 
appeal to the floor of the House.772 On May 19, 1983, Pell introduced a concurrent 
resolution urging the KMT to end martial law in order to establish a more democratic 
society.773 On May 25, Solarz and thirty colleagues cosponsored a similar resolution.774 
The House invited Huang Chang-hui, founder of ''The Formosan Christians for 
Self-Determination" and a member of board of directors of the FAPA, to testify in a 
767 See page 78 of this thesis. 
768 Barnett, U.S. Arms Sales: The China-Taiwan Tangle. 
7(/J Sutter, "The TRAand the United States' China Policy," 69-71. 
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773 A Concurrent Resolution Expressing the Sense of the Senate concerning Martial Law on Taiwan, 98th 
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Taiwan hearing on human rights.775 Moreover, the economic viability of Taiwan 
continued to be a subject of concern. In April and May 1983, two resolutions were 
introduced in the House and the Senate to demand that Taiwan retain full membership in 
the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and not be expelled as a precondition for the 
admission of the PRC. 776 Despite Beijing's protests, the Reagan administration 
threatened to reduce the US' contribution should the ADB expel Taiwan.777 
Taiwanese Nationalism: The Publicization of Political Nationalism 
Although the KMT regime repeatedly rejected Beijing's peace overture, Taipei leaders 
gradually eased their ban on contacts with the mainland. Accordingly, there were some 
nonofficial contacts in third countries and a rapid growth of indirect trade exchanges.778 
Taiwanese nationalists were always worried that the KMT might sell out the interests of 
Taiwan. As cross-Strait nonofficial contacts and indirect trade increased, so did the 
misgivings of the Taiwanese nationalists. In an internal assembly on September 28 
1982, the opposition adopted "self-determination" as its common platform, arguing that 
the future of Taiwan should be decided by its 18 million people.779 Under the KMT, 
only a small part of the members of the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan 
were receptive to so-called supplementary elections. Parliamentary electioneering 
could neither change the political structure of the parliament nor secure more political 
resources for Dangwai camp; instead it would facilitate factionalism and paralyse both 
the line of parliamentary electioneering and the line of mass movement. The younger 
generation of the opposition camp began to criticize Kang Ning-hsiang's line of 
parliamentary electioneering. They stressed the need for the construction of a "people's 
party" with the salient ideology of "self-determination." Consequently, 
"self-determination" became an important weapon of the opposition against the 
ns "Notes: In Memoriam Reverend Dr. Shoki Coe," 22. The hearing was held on May 31, 1984. 
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traditional KMT suppression of dissidence.780 At this juncture, the strong pressure in 
support of human rights and democracy and the concern about the future of Taiwan from 
the US Congress aided themes of liberal democracy and self-determination of the 
opposition. As mentioned above, pro-Taiwanese Congress members such as Pell, 
Leach and Solarz introduced resolutions or held hearings on the future of Taiwan, the 
TRA, martial law, human rights and democracy in 1983 and 1984. 
The renewed dynamics for "self-determination" in the US Congress and Taiwan 
emboldened overseas secessionist groups. In June 1983, the WUFI formally proposed 
draft guidelines for revolutionary nation-building and used the redefined Taiwanese as a 
rallying cry to promote an alternative national identity and "self -determination" in an 
ethnically divided Taiwan.781 The publicization of political nationalism had new and 
compelling significance after the signing of the Three Joint Communiques, which over 
the past decade had repeatedly prompted the ethnically divided community to face 
common crises, reconcile internal differences and reflect upon their shared future. 
Meanwhile, on June 26, Deng Xiaoping proposed six points to elaborate his "one country, 
two systems" for peaceful reunification; the KMT rejected them with ''Three Noes," 
namely "no contact, no negotiation and no compromise."782 The KMT's rebuff served 
as a vantage point for political nationalism and set the stage for the debate on national 
identity. 
In August 1983, at the height of Congressional concern over human rights, martial law, 
democracy and the future of Taiwan, Representative Solarz paid a visit to Taiwan. 
The Dangwai camp held a grand reception for him. During the run-up to the year-end 
Legislative Yuan elections, Dangwai activists for the first time proposed "Democracy, 
780 Ibid., ed.,"eds., 334-37. Chiu 1-jen (.!il3fit:) is the champion for "self-determination." He was keen 
on criticizing Kang 's parliamentary electioneering. See Chou Hsiu-huan and Chen Shih-hung, ed.,"eds., 
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Self-determination, Save Taiwan" as their slogan?83 Senator Pell convinced the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee to pass S.RES.74 in November 1983 to endorse the 
dissidents' appeal for self-determination?84 Because of KMT hostility to the idea of 
self-determination, the moderate Kang Ning-hsiang clique compromised and dropped it. 
However, the aggressive Formosa clique insisted on the demand for "self-determination" 
and scored relatively better than other dissident candidates in the December 1983 
election.785 Elections since then provoked the people to greater political consciousness, 
which was reflected in the increased concern for democratisation and Taiwanization and 
a conflict of identity.786 
In July 1984, more House colleagues joined Solarz in calling for the KMT to end martial 
law and to protect the human rights of Taiwanese so as to achieve full democracy.787 
The Congress advanced the human rights issue after amending the International 
Financing Institutions Act to monitor violations of human rights and tasked the Secretary 
of the Treasury to make a quarterly report on of US opposition to multilateral assistance 
to a country based on the country's human rights record.788 
In 1984, a more audacious dissident organ, the New Tide Magazine (~~mt), emerged in 
Taiwan. It was marked by "the highest intellectual level, the strictest discipline, the 
strongest commitment to struggle and the hardest ideology." It put special emphasis on 
mass protest and a pro-independence position; it opposed parliamentary participation as 
the primary goal.789 
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Chiang Ching-kuo: Deepening lndigenisation 
Facing relentless challenges, Chiang Ching-kuo stuck to indigenisation to preserve the 
ruling status of the KMT. After his deputy, the native Hsieh Tung-min (~jf~:l~). retired 
in 1984, Chiang promoted Lee Teng-hui as Vice President. Moreover, by the 
mid-1980s, the socio-economic changes unleashed by rapid economic growth, including 
expansion of the middle class, blurred ethnic lines between mainlanders and Taiwanese, 
swelling native membership in the KMT, the ascent of Taiwanese in KMT power 
hierarchy, the development of a collective consciousness favouring the conception of 
civil society, and the rise of a kind of participatory political culture, were pushing the 
KMT for democratisation. 790 Even under such pressure, Chiang intended to use 
indigenisation to extend the party-state system. The relaxation of the patron-client 
system after the 1977 elections exposed a serious weakness of the KMT: the corruption 
and defection of local factions. Chiang Ching-kuo continued to suppress local 
factions.791 Kuan Chung (IBJcp) introduced the US primacy election in 1984 in an effort 
to neutralize local factions and advance KMT competitiveness in the emergent 
democratic market.792 
Partnership for the Pollination of Secessionism 
The following events made Chiang Ching-kuo realize that indigenisation alone would be 
insufficient: more had to be done to strengthen KMT legitimacy. 
Chiang Ching-kuo's Democratisation: The Prelude to Taiwanization 
Scandals 
79° Cheng Tun-jen, "Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan," 495; Chou Yangsun and 
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On October 15, 1984, Liu 1-liang ( ~U 1§: .5! , Henry Liu), a Chinese-American 
double-agent and author of an unflattering biography of Chiang Ching-kuo, was shot to 
death near Solarz's home in California by three Bamboo Gang gunmen dispatched by the 
ROC's Military Intelligence Bureau (Mffi). 793 The State Department called the 
involvement of the ROC's Mm in the murder "a very serious matter."794 There were 
allegations that Chiang Hsiao-wu Of~~Jtt), Ching-kuo's second son, instructed Vice 
Admiral Wang Hsi-ling (¥.3:1f.f~), head of Mffi, to silence Liu. 795 The murder 
unexpectedly brought the human rights issue to a climax.796 In February and April 
1985, Solarz and Kennedy persuaded their colleagues to pass non-binding resolutions 
requesting that the ROC deliver suspects charged with the murder of Liu to the US for 
triat197 Solarz urged the enforcement ofH.AMDT.434?98 Reagan's State Department 
and FBI refused to allow human rights issue to interfere with arms sales to Taiwan or 
disrupt Taipei's financial support for the Nicaraguan Contras.799 At home, in early 1985, 
Taiwan was hit by the Tenth Credit Cooperative scandal, the worst financial scandal in 
its history. KMT legislator Tsai Chen-chou (~.o:Rm-D was at the core of the scandal. It 
had immense repercussions due to the likely loss of savings deposited by many islanders, 
and the number of high profile officials who were implicated. Finally, Economic 
Minister Hsu Li-de (~li.it) stepped down, Finance Minister Lu Jun-kang (~1F~.m) was 
forced to resign and many others being dismissed or reprimanded. 800 The murder and 
the financial scandal caused turmoil on the island and wreaked havoc on the image of the 
793 For the detailed story of Hemy Liu and the murder, see Kaplan, Fires of the Dragon. 
794 Parris H. Chang, "The Changing Nature of Taiwan's Politics," in Taiwan: Beyond the Economic 
Miracle, ed. Denis Fred Simon and Michael Y.M. Kau (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1992), 28. 
795 Tucker, Uncertain Friendships, 183. However, Wang His-ling hinted in 2004 that Chiang Ching-kuo 
himself gave the instruction to kill Liu. See Liu Kai-ping IUIWJZJS, "Jiang Nan an, Wang Xiling: Jiang 
Jingguo buyuan guanwo. zhe ni jiu dongle (Wang Hsi-ling's Hint on Hemy Liu's Murder: CCK Unwilling 
to Jail Me. You Know What It Means)," UDN, Oct 15 2004. 
796 Robert A. Scalapino, "U.S.-ROC-PRC Relations: Accident and Purpose in International Relations," in 
R.O.C.-U.S.A. relations, 1979-1989, ed. Jaw-ling Joanne Chang (Taipei: Institute of American Culture, 
Academia Sinica, 1991), 20. 
797 A Concurrent Resolution Expressing the sense of Congress that the Taiwan Authorities Should 
Cooperate Fully in the case of Henry Iiu, 99th Congress, H.CON.RES.49; A Concurrent Resolution 
Expressing the Sense of the Congress that the Authorities on Taiwan Should Continue to Cooperate Fully 
in the Case of Henry Iiu, 99th Congress, H.CON.RES.110; A Concurrent Resolution Expressing the Sense 
of the Congress that the Taiwan Authorities Should Cooperatef'fully in t/1{! Case. ofHenry Liu, 99th 
Congress, S:CON.RES.lO: , - - ---- - -. - . 
798 For the contents of the amendment, see page 131 of this thesis. 
799 Tucker, Uncertain Friendships, 183. See also Lin Cheng-yi, "The U.S. Factor in Taiwan's Political 
Development," 132. 
800 For details, see Chang, "The Changing Nature of Taiwan's Politics," 29. 
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KMT. In addition, Taiwan's export-led strategy earned huge trade surplus from the US 
and inevitably invited the revenge of US protectionism;801 this caused huge uneasiness 
and lent dynamism to social movements on Taiwan in the second half of the 1980s. 802 
Beginning of Democratisation 
After the PRC and the United Kingdom signed a joint declaration in December 1984 on 
the return of Hong Kong to China on July 1, 1997, the future of Taiwan again became a 
subject of concern. In the campaign for provincial and municipal elections scheduled 
for November 18, 1985, Dangwai camp proposed "New Party, New Atmosphere, and 
Self-determination Will Save Taiwan" as their slogan. In the end they claimed 30% of 
the vote. The result encouraged the opposition camp to hasten their efforts for a new 
party.803 On the day of the Taiwan elections, Solarz introduced a resolution urging the 
KMT to permit the formation of opposition parties, end censorship and guarantee 
freedom of speech, expression and assembly, and move toward full representative 
govemment.804 On March 25, 1986, Senator Kennedy introduced another resolution 
calling for the establishment of a genuinely democratic system. 805 During the run-up to 
the formation of the DPP in September 1986, scores of Congress members joined Solarz 
801 The US first experienced a deficit in its trade with Taiwan in 1968. This deficit began to increase 
significantly after 1975. As a result, in 1977 Washington forced Taipei to comply with an "orderly 
marketing agreement" designed to curb supplies of low-priced footwear to the US market. In early 1978, 
the US pressed a textile accord targeting apparel shipments for a period of five years, injuring some of 
Taiwan's most profitable clothing production. See Tucker, Uncertain Friendships, 143. Peng De-fu, 
"A Study on Taiwan's Local Election and Democratic Transition", 11. Shiau Chyuan-jenq, "Civil Society 
and Democratization," in De11Wcratization in Taiwan: Implications for China, ed. Steve Tsang and Tien 
Hung-mao (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), 107. 
802 This is evidenced by the rise of Jenkins' bill, the passage of the Trade Enhancement Act, and 
withdrawal of Taiwan's eligibility for Generalized System ofPreferences support in the Congress in 1986. 
The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act was passed in 1988. See Tucker, Uncertain Friendships, 
170. In December 1987, 3000 fruit farmers demanded the government to deal with a drastic price decline 
caused by imported fruit which came mainly from the US; see Hsin-huang Michael Hsiao Jlff:t.!i!, "The 
Rise of Social Movements and Civil Protests," in Political Change in Taiwan, ed. Tun-jen Cheng and 
Stephan Haggard (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992), 64. The most remarkable social movement was 
the May 20 Incident. On May 20, 1988, more than 4000 farmers held demonstrations in front of the 
Legislative Yuan requesting the KMT government not to permit the import of American turkey and fruits. 
The demonstration ended with a clash with the civilian and military police forces. See Li Hsiao-feng, Jin 
bainian Taiwan minzhu yundong gaiyao (A Summary of the De11Wcratic Movement in Taiwan in the 
Recent One Hundred Years) ([cited). 
803 Rigger, From Opposition to Power, 24. See also Chou Hsiu-huan ~d Chen"Shib-hung, ed.,"eds., 
Zudangyundong (Organizing the~Oppositiofi Parlies), 464. ~ · · 
804 A Concurrent Resolution Expressing the Sense of the Congress concerning Representative Government, 
Political parties, and Freedom of Expression on Taiwan, 99th Congress, H.CON.RES.233. 
805 A Concurrent Resolution Expressing the Sense of the Congress concerning Representative Government, 
Political parties, and Freedom of Expression on Taiwan, 99th Congress, S.CON.RES.121. 
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and Kennedy in these demands. 
fu response to these accumulated pressures, Chiang Ching-k:uo embarked upon a policy 
of political and economic liberalization in an attempt to maintain the dominance of the 
KMT.806 fu March 1986, he set up a twelve-man task force to create a blueprint for 
democratisation. Accordingly, the pent-up opposition force was released. fu March, 
exile Hsu Hsin-liang called his revolution-minded associates in the US to return to 
Taiwan to speed up the demolition of the KMT regime.807 From mid-1986, the island 
was inundated by spontaneous mass movements. The Dangwai camp held street 
campaigns for six months to appeal for the end of martial law. 808 On September 28, the 
opposition camp established the Taiwanese-dominated Democratic Progressive Party 
(DPP). The Taiwan Presbyterian Church, with 100,000 members in southern Taiwan 
and international connections, lent its weight to the DPP.809 The two main themes of 
the opposition, liberal democracy and self-determination, became the ideology of the 
DPP.810 Despite adequate resources to resist democratisation, Chiang did not suppress 
the new party. He accepted that democratisation was the right thing for the Chinese 
nation and Taiwan. 811 He declared that new parties must honour the constitution, 
oppose communism and not advocate secessionism.812 These three principles became 
the essence of the 1987 National Security Law (NSL), which critics attacked as a veiled 
attempt to suppress secessionism. 813 
806 Some scholars draw a line between liberalization and democmtisation; for example, see Constance 
Squires Meaney, "Libemlization, Democmtization, and the Role of the KMT," in Political Change in 
Taiwan, ed. Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992), 97, 100; Peng 
De-fu, "A Study on Taiwan's Local Election and Democmtic Tmnsition", 24, 57. The pressure for 
economic libemlization mainly came from protectionism of the US; see Chang Mau-kuei, "Shengji wenti 
~ mizu zhuyi (Provincialism and Nationalism),'' 250-51. 
07Liu Ching-pai, Taiwan dulijianguo lianmeng Meiguo benbu yu Taiwanjianguo yundong z/wng banyan 
juese (The Role ofWUFI Headquarters-USA in Taiwan's Nation-Building Movement) ([cited). See also 
Chou Hsiu-huan and Chen Shih-hung, ed./'eds., Zudang yundong (Organizing the Opposition Parties), 
465. 
808 Chou Hsiu-huan and Chen Shih-hung, ed./'eds., Zudang yundong (Organizing the Opposition Parties), 
465-67. See also Li Hsiao-feng, lin bainian Taiwan minzhu yundong gaiyao (A Summary oft he 
Democratic Movement in Taiwan in the Recent One Hundred Years) ([cited). 
809 Lu, "Political Opposition in Taiwan: The Development of the Democmtic Progressive Party," 134. 
810 Ibid. 
811 Tsang, "Tmnsforming a Party State into a Democmcy," 13-14. _ _ 
812 Chou Yangsun and Andrew J. Natfuul, "Democraticc Tmnsition in Taiwan," 289; Harris, "Towards 
Taiwan's Independence," 28; Hsueh Yueh-shun, Tseng Pin-tsang, and Hsu Jui-hao, ed.,"eds., Congjieyan 
dao jieyan (The Martial Law Era), 438, 40, 47-49; Peng De-fu, "A Study on Taiwan's Local Election and 
Democmtic Tmnsition", 47-48. 
813 Harris, "Towards Taiwan's Independence," 31. 
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American Connections to Taiwan's Democratisation 
Although there is no question that democratic transition in Taiwan began in 1986, the 
sources of democratisation remain controversial. No scholars have investigated the link 
between these sources and external forces, such as the influence of the US. This part 
will clarify the connection between the US and present traditional arguments about the 
sources of democratisation. There are four theories. 814 First, theorists of 
modernization argue that democracy is a consequence of rapid economic growth and 
social change. 815 The origin of many socio-economic correlates of democracy such as 
high levels of industrialization, urbanization, per capita income, literacy rates and mass 
communication in Taiwan can be traced to the US. American aid prepared the ground 
for industrialization and urbanization, and raised per capita income and literacy rates; 
American confidence in Taiwanization enabled the unfolding of US-PRC rapprochement, 
which initiated Chiang Ching-kuo's policies of industrialization and urbanization. 
Finally, industrialization and urbanization advanced Taiwanese wealth and political 
opposition, and led to the burgeoning of mass communication. The US may not be the 
only source for these socio-economic changes; however, undoubtedly it is the most 
important force dedicated to such changes. 
Second, some argue that democracy was the result of the KMT's long-term commitment 
to democracy or stress Chiang Ching-kuo's critical role in supporting democratisation.816 
814 There are many other theories and research methodologies on the democratisation of Taiwan. 
However, examination of each of these theories is beyond the scope of this thesis. Examples of other 
approaches to the study of the democratisation of Taiwan are detailed in Peng De-fu, "A Study on 
Taiwan's Local Election and Democratic Transition", 8-15. See also William L Parish and Charles 
Chi-hsiang Chang, "Political Values in Taiwan: Sources of Change and Constancy," in Taiwan's Electoral 
Politics and Democratic Transition: Riding the Thi.rd Wave, ed. Tien Hung-mao (London: M. E. Sharpe, 
1996), 28; Wu Mi-cha and Chang Yen-hsien, Jianli Taiwan de guomin guojia (Establish a Civic Nation for 
Taiwan), 178-79. 
815 Cheng Tun-jen, "Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan," 471-72; Peng De-fu, "A Study 
on Taiwan's Local Election and Democratic Transition", 9-10; Tien Hung-mao, "Dynamics of Taiwan's 
Democratic Transition," 103-05; Tsang, "Transforming a Party State into a Democracy," 10-11. Chu and 
Lin argue that "the transition was triggered by a protracted process of diplomatic derecognition and 
facilitated by the cumulative social and political mobilization produced by "rapid industrialization and 
strong economic growth." See Chu Yun-hail arid Lin Tse~ffiin, "The Process of Democratic Consolidation 
in Taiwan," 82. 
816 Chang, "The Changing Nature of Taiwan's Politics," 31; Chou Yangsun and Andrew J. Nathan, 
"Democratic Transition in Taiwan," 283; Huang Teh-fu, "Elections and the Evolution of the Kuomintang," 
106; Tien Hung-mao, "Dynamics of Taiwan's Democratic Transition," 105-06; Tien Hung-mao, 
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On October 7, 1986, Chiang told Katherine Graham, owner of the Washington Post, that 
the KMT would soon lift martial law and legalize the formation of new political 
parties. 817 The next day, Chiang impressed on his colleagues the necessity for 
adjustment because "the world is changing and the situation is changing" and the ruling 
KMT must adopt reforms.818 Until his death from diabetes in January 1988, he did not 
groom any successor; instead, he dismissed right-wing efforts to gain control of the 
KMT.819 Although he was instrumental in democratisation, the context of Taiwan's 
political development, his indigenisation in particular, was primarily defined by 
separatist intention of the US after the Korean War; and a great deal of credit should be 
attributed to the socio-economic changes in the following decades, which were legacies 
of separatism-oriented American aid. As mentioned earlier, in 1970 0. V. Armstrong 
had axgued that by the mid-1980s the KMT "must somehow be encouraged to transfer 
more real power to the Taiwanese and acquiesce in the eventual Taiwanization of the 
Republic of China."820 Given the widening of political and economic differences across 
the Strait, the immense economic and political power of native Taiwanese, and the 
relentless pressure from the US, 821 Chiang Ching-k:uo must have realized that 
democratisation was irreversible and Taiwanization was inevitable. 
Third, counter-elites argued that democratisation was the result of democratic opposition 
forces. 822 As explored above, the rise and growth of political opposition was linked to 
rapid economic growth and socio-economic changes. More importantly, American 
economic assistance to Taiwan had long been an integral part of the separatism-oriented 
Formosan autonomy movement. After the Korean War, the resumption of US aid was 
designed to first aggrandize the economic power of native Taiwanese and then promote 
"Transformation of an Authoritarian Party State," 39-40; Tsang, "Transforming a Party State into a 
Democracy," 13. 
817 Hsueh Yueh-shun, Tseng Pin-tsang, and Hsu Jui-hao, ed., "'eds., Gong jieyan dao jieyan (The Martial 
Law Era), 437-38. 
818 Chang, "The Changing Nature of Taiwan's Politics," 31. 
819 James Wang believes that Chiang Ching-kuo had "clearly indicated his resolve to surrender real 
political power to the Taiwanese." See Wang, "KMT's Localization Claim Is Empty." See also Tai 
Kuo-hui, Wang Tso-jung, and Hsia Chen, Aizeng li Denghui (Love and Hatred of Lee Teng-hui), 80, 
84-85. Chu Yun-han and Lin Tse-min, "The Process of Democratic Q:msolidation in Taiwan;' 83; 
820 See page 98 ofthis thesis; · · - - ·· --- -- --- -· · _- c. 
821 Dickson, "The Kuomintang before Democratization: Organizational Change and the Role of 
Elections," 64, 65. 
822 Tien Hung-mao, "Dynamics of Taiwan's Democratic Transition," 106-08. See also Hsueh Yueh-shun, 
Tseng Pin-tsang, and Hsu Jui-hao, ed., "eds., Gong jieyan dao jieyan (The Martial Law Era), v-x. 
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Taiwanese political input. Apparently, American aid and subsequent economic support 
fostered the growth of the Taiwanese-dominated private sector, created sources of 
economic power, and enabled the Taiwanese political opposition to undermine the KMT 
regime. 
Fourth, some argue that since 1977 a series of calculated moves by both the KMT and 
the opposition, or "a continuous process of bargaining," resulted in democratic 
transition. 823 Again, the sphere of the KMT's political manoeuvre is defined by 
separatist intention of the US and the rise and growth of the opposition was a result of 
American economic assistance. 
There is another convincing argument. The disruption of the patron-client system, as 
demonstrated in the local factions' rebellions against the KMT, enabled the opposition's 
victory in the 1977local elections and initiated democratisation.824 However, economic 
growth emboldened local factional leaders, undermined the KMT's patron-client system 
and helped the opposition to take advantage of the internal divisions of the local factions. 
Consequently, Taiwan's democratisation evolved in the context of separatist intention of 
the US, a protracted process of US-PRC rapprochement, the Taiwanese nationalist 
opposition movement, the legacies of American aid, and the partnership between some 
US Congress members and Taiwanese nationalists. Almost every source can be traced 
to US influence, which is most manifest in American aid, which aimed to promote 
Taiwanese nationalism. In short, Taiwan's democratisesation is a natural corollary of its 
progression along a different historical and civilization trajectory under the influence of 
the US. 
Economic Liberalization 
American protectionists were the most important factor that pushed for economic 
823 Cheng Tun-jen, "Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwail," 490. See also Chu Yon-han 
aJ1d LinTse-min,~TheProcess of Democratic Cori86lidition1ri Tlliwait.'' SO; Peng De-fu, "A Study on 
TaiWan's Local Election and Democratic Transition", 11; Tien Hung-mao, "Dynamics of Taiwan's 
Democratic Transition," 107-08. 
824 Chen Ming-tong, Paixi zhengzhi yu Taiwan zhengzhi bianqian (Faction Politics and the Political 
Transition ofTaiwan), 268-70. 
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liberalization of Taiwan.825 The proliferation of the service industries, stock exchange 
companies and private banks was the legacy of economic liberalization. The source 
and the legacy had two implications. Firstly, after the mid-1980s, in order to deal with 
US protectionism and overseas competition, many businessmen became more politically 
involved in politics and elections. 826 They were congenial with the opposition; it was 
said that the DPP was primarily funded by donations from small and medium-sized 
businesses. 827 Secondly, many local faction members "entered the service industries or 
shared in the establishment of stock exchange companies and private banks," 828 
furthering their economic strength and political autonomy from the mainlander elite. 
Due to ethnicity, the native factions had little difficulty changing their identity. Soon 
after Chiang Ching-kuo died, some native factional leaders united to challenge China 
identity.829 Moreover, in the early 1990s, both the native businessmen and factional 
leaders, together with the DPP, united around Lee Teng-hui in his power struggle against 
the mainlander elites. 830 Because both the rise of the opposition and the enhancement 
of the political autonomy of the native local factional can be traced to the economic 
boom associated with American aid, the implications of economic liberalization again 
remind us of the success of American aid in helping the rise of Taiwanese structuralism. 
Before democratisation, there was no distinction between democratisation and 
Taiwanization; Taiwanese opposition to dictatorship, support of democratisation and 
structuralist aspirations to end the domination of the mainlander elites amounted to the 
same thing.831 However, democratic transition lent dynamism to secessionism. 
Secessionism and the Conflict over National Identity 
From Opposition to Revolution 
In late October 1986, overseas secessionists began stealing into Taiwan to a warm 
825 Shiau Chyuan-Jenq, "Elections and the Changing State-Business Relationship," 219. 
826 Chen Ming-tong, Paixi zhengzhi yu Taiwan zhengzhi bianqian (Faction Politics and the Political 
Transition of Taiwan), 240; Shiau Chyuan-Jenq, "Elections and the Changing State-Business 
Relationship," 218. 
827 Shiau Chyuan-Jenq, "Elections and the Changing State-Business Relationship," 222. 
828 Chen Ming-tong, Paixi zhengzhi yu Taiwan zhengzhi bianq!flTJ (Faction Politics andthe Political 
-Transition ofTaiwan),-24142; ShiaueChyrian-Jenq, "Elections and the Changing State-Business 
Relationship," 218. 
829 For the detail, see page 150 of this thesis. 
83° For the detail, see page 159 and 171 of this thesis. 
831 Chang Mau-kuei, "Shengji wenti yu mizu zhuyi (Provincialism and Nationalism)," 244. 
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welcome from their supporters. 832 The radical New 1ide faction spearheaded a fusillade 
of social movements to capitalize "the power of a popular, democratic revolution;'' it 
intended to carve a strong mass movement as the foundation to bring the DPP to 
power. 833 This gave rise to two tactics of the DPP: political agitation and mass 
education, and mobilization of activists and supporters to participate in party-organized 
or party-sponsored demonstrations, rallies, and parades. 834 During the run-up to the 
Legislative Yuan and National Assembly elections on November 10, 1986, the DPP 
aggressively promoted independence and self-determination. The New 1ide admitted 
that "self-determination" was a code word for independence. 835 The debate on national 
identity consequently intensified. To mitigate the division over national identity to win 
election, the DPPmanifesto advocated that the future of Taiwan should be decided by the 
residents of Taiwan, stressing the common ground of self-determination instead of the 
blatant call for independence. 836 In addition, the 1986 year-end central supplementary 
elections and opinion polls showed that all DPP candidates underscored a distinct 
national identity and supported democratic reform issues that were quite consistent with 
the emphasis on Taiwan identity. 837 Democratic transition thus considerably 
undermined the authoritarian rule of the KMT. 838 In fact, democratic elections since the 
1980s had become an instrument of the nationalist oppositionists to realize 
independence. 839 
In June 1987, Hsu Shih-kai (~lft!:tffiD chaired the WUFI and urged the expeditious 
transfer of overseas secessionist power to Taiwan.840 Not long after the KMT lifted 
martial law and replaced it with the National Security Law on July 15, the New 1ide 
pushed the DPP to formally adopt a plank in its platform on November 10: "people have 
832 Chang Mau-kuei, "Political Transformation and Ethnization of Politics in Taiwan". 
833 Rigger, From Opposition to Power, 28. 
834 Lu, "Political Opposition in Taiwan: The Development of the Democratic Progressive Party," 129. 
835 Ibid., 136. Or, "self-determination" is a "soft'' version of Taiwan independence; see Cheng Tun-jen 
and Hsu Yung-ming, "Issue Structure, the DPP's Factionalism, and Party Realignment," 146. 
836 Hughes, Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism, 43; Lu, "Political Opposition in Taiwan: The Development 
of the Democratic Progressive Party," 137. _ _ _ ___ __ __ _ __ _ 
837 Hu Fu~ "The Electonu MechanisiiiandPoliticai ch;Dge iO Taiwan," 158-59,62. 
838 Ibid., 167. 
839 Ibid., 167-68. 
840 Lin Ming-hsien, Taiwan dulijianguo lianmeng dashiji (A Chronology of Relevent Events of World 
United Formosans for Independence) ([cited). 
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the freedom of advocating Taiwan independence." 841 Domestic oppositionists and 
overseas secessionists reached an agreement on national identity; they gradually 
integrated into a secessionist group despite initial hesitation; they launched mass protest 
movements and exploited billowing social movements to promote self-determination and 
independence.842 This constituted a massive and intensive "enlightenment'' process of 
secessionism. Consequently, domestic political opposition was no longer limited to the 
struggle for democracy; it became an independent nation-building movement attempting 
to persuade the general public to oppose the KMT and support independence. 843 
Accordingly, the political conflict over national identity between the Taiwanese and 
mainlanders replaced the provincial conflict that had been characterized by social 
structural inequalities since 1945.844 As a result, two concurrent developments - the 
politicization of ethnic cleavage and the emergence of national identity crisis -
compounded the democratisation ofTaiwan.845 Democratisation altered the distribution 
of power between ethnic groups and entailed the change in political symbolism and 
identity. 846 These developments vindicated the prediction of the Conlon Report in late 
1959 about the political crisis that would accompany democratisation.847 
Continued US Pressure for Taiwanization 
Meanwhile, the US legislative and executive branches continued pressing for 
Taiwanization. On AprilS, 1987, Senator Kennedy introduced a resolution that stressed 
the free and fair election of all members of all central representative bodies as steps 
toward a genuinely representative govemment.848 Solan followed suit in the House on 
May 13.849 On October 14, 1987, the State Department invited Chang Tsan-hung (~~ 
841 Rigger, From Opposition to Power, 29. See also Hughes, Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism, 43. 
842 Chang Mau-kuei, "Political Transformation and Ethnization of Politics in Taiwan"; Lu, "Political 
Opposition in Taiwan: The Development of the Democratic Progressive Party," 130. For the initial 
disputes on the issue of independence, see Cheng Tun-jen and Hsu Yung-ming, "Issue Structure, the DPP's 
Factionalism, and Party Realignment," 146-50; Lu, "Political Opposition in Taiwan: The Development of 
the Democratic Progressive Party," 134-38,40-42. 
843 Chang Mau-kuei, "Political Transformation and Ethnization of Politics in Taiwan". 
844 Ibid., 8 
845 Chu Yun-han and Lin Tse-min, "The Process of Democratic Consolidation in Taiwan," 81, 82. 
846 Cheng Tun-jen and Hsu Yung-ming, "Issue Structure, the DPP:S Fa~tionalism, and Party-Realignment," 
146. - - -~ " - - ... - . . 
847 See page 74 of this thesis. 
848 A Concurrent Resolution Expressing the Sense of the Congress concerning Representative Government, 
Political Parties, and Freedom of Expression on Taiwan, 100th Congress, S.CON.RES.46. 
849 Ibid., H.CON.RES.124. 
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~), former WUFI Chairman, to deliver a speech in a closed session of the Secretary's 
Open Forum. His speech reiterated active Taiwanese demands for self-determination, 
fair and free plebiscite and independence. He proffered three suggestions on Taiwan 
policy: the suspension of arms sales to Taiwan, the threatened use of economic sanctions 
to force Chiang Ching-kuo regime to allow more freedom of speech and assembly, and 
support for the Taiwanese home-returning campaign. This event marked America's first 
official contact with the secessionist camp. 850 
Awakened Identity of Veterans 
On October 15, the KMT approved a statute raising the prohibition on visiting family 
members on the mainland by Chinese veterans in Taiwan despite the official policy of 
"no contact, no negotiation, no compromise." The humanitarian policy delivered a 
message: "The veterans would have the free choice to live in China or settle down in a 
democratic Taiwan."851 The US ostensibly welcomed the warmer relationship between 
the two rival regimes; but, soon Washington expressed its concern to Taipei that the pace 
of KMT mainland policy was too rushed; some US officials were worried about the 
result of ensuing economic and political interaction. 852 However, as veterans flocked to 
visit relatives on the mainland, they found themselves categorized as "Taibao" (iJ'ffel, 
Taiwan compatriots) by Beijing, which helped justify the rise of political nationalism on 
Taiwan.853 
The Escalation of Identity Confrontation at Home 
After Lee Teng-hui became president upon the death of Chiang Ching-kuo on January 13, 
1988, nationalist forces mounted their challenge to the KMT. On February 27, in a 
lecture commemorating February 28, WUFI Chairman Hsu Shih-kai again urged 
members to return to Taiwan to advocate secessionism. The publicization of 
850 George T. Chang ~~~. Taiwan: Old Myths and New Realities [internet] (WUFI, 1987 [cited Nov 
24 2003]), available from http://www.wufi.org.tw/eng/chnamyth.htm. See also Yang Chih-chieh ~~fl. 
84 Zhang: Zhang Canhong de yanshuo (Chapter 84: A Speech by Zhang Canlwng) [internet] (Taiwan Tati 
Cultural And Educational Foundation, 1987 [cited Nov 24 2003]), available from 
http://tai wantt.org.tw/bookslcryingtai wan4/content/content2.htm. 
851 Wang, "KMT's Localization Claim Is Empt)i."- - - - - ~ · 
852 Wang Hsiao-po, Iiang'an guanxi lunji (A Collection of Arguments on Cross-Strait Relations), 42-43. 
853 Chang Mau-kuei, "Shengji wenti yu mizu zhuyi (Provincialism and Nationalism)," 252; Shih 
Cheng-feng, Taiwan minzu zhuyi (Taiwanese Nationalism), 214; Shih Cheng-feng, "Taiwan yishi de 
tansuo (An Exploration of Taiwanese Consciousness)," 77. 
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secessionism worried other factions with different positions on national identity in the 
DPP. Although the DPP's April 17 Resolution maintained the common ground of 
self-detennination854 to mitigate the tension among internal factions,855 legislator Chen 
Shui-bian ( ~.* 71< $) proposed four conditions for advocating independence. 856 
Meanwhile, due to ethnicity, the native factions in the KMr had little difficulty changing 
their identity. On April 22, 1988, many native KMr legislators joined forces to 
establish the first subsidiary organization within the KMr- "Jisi zaocanhui" (~J]S':!f.~ 
"'(t, often abbreviated to Jisihui, $J~1f). Rs foremost initiator Huang Chu-wen (Jij: 
3() openly indicated the organization's ambition to snatch power from the mainlander 
elites, which could also be seen as a challenge to China identity. 857 This escalated the 
confrontation of national identity. The dividing issue made Taiwanese nationalism 
exclusive, even within the DPP itself.858 Senior mainlander members Lin Cheng-chieh 
(#IE~) and Fei Hsi-ping came under Taiwanese nationalist attack; they left the DPP in 
late 1988.859 
Internal and External Confrontation in 1989 
The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (STARr) talks in June 1982 marked another period 
of detente between the superpowers. After Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev 
assumed office in 1985, US-USSR relations quickly thawed. This led to a summit 
meeting in Moscow on May 29, 1988. Next, the USSR completed its withdrawal of 
forces from Afghanistan on February 15, 1989. Soon the tide of democratisation began 
to sweep Eastern Europe. As a result, from the mid-1980s Sino-US relations began to 
854 Rigger, From Opposition to Power, 29. 
855 Hughes, Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism, 43-44. 
856 
"If the Kuomintang and the Communists enter into one-sided peace ta1ks, if the KMT sells out the 
interests of the Taiwanese people, if the Chinese Communists "unify'' Taiwan, or if the KMT does not 
institute real democratic constitutional government, this party should advocate Taiwan independence." 
See Rigger, From Opposition to Power, 29-30. 
857 Among the original twenty-one members, fifteen had faction background; three years later, twenty-six 
out of forty-five members had support of local factions; see Chen Ming-tong, Paixi zhengzhi yu Taiwan 
zhengzhi bianqian (Faction Politics and the Political Transition of Taiwan), 229, 32. See also Chang 
Mau-k:uei, "Shengji wenti yu mizu zhuyi (PioviDCfalism and Nationalism)," 245. This clique later 
became Lee Teng-hui's close ally in struggling against mainlander elites. 
858 Gold, "Taiwan's Quest for Identity in the Shadow of China," 175. 
859 Hughes, Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism, 43-44; Lu, "Political Opposition in Taiwan: The 
Development of the Democratic Progressive Party," 132. 
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reflect "intrinsic bilateral interests and interactions." 860 Two events followed the 
change of international power politics. Domestically, in December 1988, WUFI 
Chairman Hsu Shih-kai's "Draft of the Republic of Taiwan Constitution" was published 
in the journal Ziyou niandai (~ E81f:1-t. The Liberty Era Monthly). Soon, the journal 
founder Cheng Nan-jung (~i'¥J~). a second-generation mainlander secessionist, was 
indicted by the KMT. He refused to be arrested alive and set himself on fire on April 7, 
1989. This stimulated many to think of the issue ofTaiwan independence.861 
On the mainland, the Tiananmen Incident occurred on June 4. KMT anti-Communist 
propaganda in the past four decades had already severely undermined the sense of racial 
unity across the Strait. 862 The Tiananmen Incident prompted many in Taiwan to 
questions the future of reunification with Communist China.863 Given the political 
antagonism and insurmountable economic gap across the Strait, the ''Taiwanized" 
mainlanders and their families were obliged to identify their interests and sentiments 
with Taiwan.864 In terms of Sino-US relations, ''the hostility felt for each other's 
political system" that "helped to sustain the Sino-American confrontation throughout the 
1950s and 1960s" immediately dominated America's China policy.865 The day after the 
Tiananmen Incident, President George H.W. Bush urged the US not to let China "pull 
back to its pre-1972 era of isolation and repression."866 To calm the domestic backlash 
against Beijing's bloody suppression of dissidents, Bush issued sanctions on June 5 and 
20 banning high-level visits, reducing technology transfers, and restricting aid 
programs. 867 However, American hostility to Beijing after the Incident made most 
860 Shambaugh, ''Patterns of Interaction in Sino-American Relations," 206. 
861 Li Hsiao-feng, lin bainian Taiwan minzhu yundong gaiyao (A Summary of the Democratic Movement 
in Taiwan in the Recent One Hundred Years) ([cited); Meaney, "Liberalization, Democratization, and the 
Role of the KMT," 101. 
862 Hsu Tsung-mao, Taiwanren lun (An Analysis of the Taiwanese), 82. 
863 Li Hsiao-feng, lin bainian Taiwan minzhu yundong gaiyao (A Summary of the Democratic Movement 
in Taiwan in the Recent One Hundred Years) ([cited). 
864 Tien Hung-mao, "Transformation of an Authoritarian ~arty State," 43. 
865 Shambaugh, "PatternS of Interaction in Sino-American Relations," 206, 08. 
866 NARA. The President's News Conference, June 5, 1989 [internet] ([cited Jan 29 2003]), available from 
http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/papers/1989/89060SOO.html. 
867 Gang Dongjun and Chen You lbllff'*~· ~. Meiguo dui Hua zhengce 50 nian (America's China 
Policy in the Past 50 Years) (Guangdong: Guangdong renmin, 2001), 311-12. 
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politicians more willing to criticise China. 868 Many Congressional resolutions 
rekindled the issues of Sino-US cultural conflict and cross-Strait cultural differences. 
The Senate passed an amendment on July 19 which denounced Beijing's "willingness to 
use force against the Chinese people who were demonstrating peacefully for 
democracy," and reiterated that the future of Taiwan should be settled peacefully, without 
coercion, and in a manner acceptable to the people on Taiwan. The amendment 
maintained that US-PRC relations should depend upon Beijing's willingness to refrain 
from the use or the threat of force in resolving Taiwan's future.869 On November 16, 
Pell introduced a resolution mandating that the President oppose all loans by the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to China which failed to meet 
basic human needs; increase funds to the Voice of America for transmissions into China; 
support Taiwan's accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT); and 
impose further sanctions on China.870 On November 18, a resolution was introduced to 
draw attention to the differences between Taiwan and the PRC on the development in 
human rights and democracy; it required that the US foreign policy "accurately reflect 
the primacy that U.S. policy places on political and economic freedom and human 
rights."871 On the same day, Solarz introduced two resolutions; one repeated the 
concern over the future of Taiwan;872 the other urged Taipei to continue to advance 
human rights and democracy.873 Consequently, after the 1989 Tiananmen Incident, 
terms such as "human rights," "democracy" and "the future of Taiwan" came to connote 
Sino-US "cultural conflict" and cross-Strait "cultural difference." 
From May to November, more blacklisted secessionists returned to Taiwan. Solarz 
mentioned Congressional interest in the upcoming elections on December 2 as a key test 
868 Ezra F. Vogel, "Introduction: How Can the United States and China Pursue Common Interests and 
Manage Differences?" in Living with China: U.S/China Relations in the Twenty-first Century, ed. Ezra F. 
Vogel (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), 24. 
869 S.AMDT.285, lOlst Congress. 
870 A Resolution Expressing the Support of the Senate regarding Democratic Reforms and Human Rights 
on Taiwan, lOlst Congress, S.RES.210. 
871 Expressing the Sense of the Congress with Respect to_ United States Relations with the People's 
Republic ofCiiina and With t/W Republic of China on Taiwan, lOlst Congress, H.CON.RES.233. 
872 Expressing the Sense of the Congress 'rVith Respect to the Future of Taiwan, lOlst Congress, 
H.CON.RES.234. 
873 To Express the Sense of the Congress regarding Democratic Reforms and Human Rights in Taiwan, 
lOlth Congress, H.CON.RES.235. 
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of Taipei's commitment to democracy. He referred to the blacklisted secessionists and 
warned that the US would be very concerned about the KMT legal actions taken against 
them because of their political activities and statements while in the US.874 Solarz even 
led a delegation of American politicians in a visit to Taiwan, monitored the elections and 
supported secessionist candidates. 875 As a result, in the local and legislative elections 
on December 2, 1989, the DPP claimed 38.3% and 28.2% in the local and national 
elections respectively. 876 The New 1ide Magazine and other DPP candidates who joined 
the New Nation Alliance (Xin guojia lianxian, ~~~~), organized by Lin 1-hsiung 
and characterized by secessionist platform, performed especially well. Their success 
proved the feasibility of advocating secessionism. 877 In contrast, mainlanders began to 
realize that they had become an ethnic group of "new residents" in the political arena and 
had to face the redistribution of power that was demanded by native Taiwanese. 878 
Summary 
American confidence in "One China, One Taiwan" and Tai wanization facilitated 
US-PRC rapprochement. Throughout the Three Joint Communiques, the US 
government preserved the spirit of Truman's political assertion of the undetermined legal 
status of Taiwan by ostensibly "acknowledging" "one China;" furthermore, the condition 
of a "peaceful resolution" to the Taiwan issue, enshrined in each of the Joint 
Communiques, legitimised US military intervention in the case of a PRC strike across 
the Strait. The TRA further consolidated the American position on Taiwan. 
Consequently, the Three Joint Communiques, along with the TRA, inherited the spirit of 
separatist intention and reconciled the need of US-PRC rapprochement with the 
874 Ibid. 
875 Paau Shiu-lam, Taidu' mulwu (Behind the Scene of Taiwan Independence'), 18, 33. 
876 DPP, Minjindang dashi nianbiao (A Chronology of Relevent Events of the Democratic Progressive 
Party) [internet] (DPP, [cited Oct 16 2003]), available from http://www.dpp.org.tw/. 
877 Hughes, Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism, 44-45; Rigger, From Opposition to Power, 30. According 
to Hughes, DPP candidates affiliated with the New Nation Alliance claimed 7 out of the 10 new 
Legislative seats won by the DPP and 13 in the municipal councils of Taipei and Kaohsiung. _ 
87~ _Chang Mau-kuei, "Shengji wenti yu mizu zhuyi (Provincialism and Nationalisni)," 247; Hu Tai-li ~ 
"ElJII, "Yuzai yu fanshu- Taiwan 'rongmin' de zuqun guanxi yu rentong (Yam and Sweet Potato- Ethnic 
Relations and Identity of Veteran-Mainlanders in Taiwan)," in Zuqun guanxi yu guojia rentong (The 
Relations among Ethnic Groups and National Identity) (Hong Kong: Yeqiang, 1993), 319-21; Shih 
Cheng-feng, "Taiwan yishi de tansuo (An Exploration of Taiwanese Consciousness)," 77. 
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promotion of Taiwanese nationalism. 
Each communiques took its toll on the KMT regime but benefited Taiwanese nationalism. 
On the one hand, each communique challenged the legitimacy of the KMT. Although 
Chiang Ching-kuo launched indigenisation to strengthen legitimacy, indigenisation 
facilitated US-expected Taiwanization, eroded the "one China" policy, substantiated 
Taiwan's independence in the international community, promoted US-Taiwan unofficial 
and commercial relations, benefited the political and economic advance of the Taiwanese, 
and expanded American values and lifestyles in Taiwan. On the other hand, each 
communique galvanized political nationalism, justified the opposition's appeals for 
democratic reforms, advanced the partnership between some US Congress members and 
secessionist Taiwanese in the name of human rights and democracy, and built up 
domestic and international pressure for democratisation and Tai wanization. 
Despite the debates over the sources of Taiwan's democratisation, America's separatist 
intention since the Korean War, a protracted process of US-PRC rapprochement, the 
nationalist opposition movement, the socio-economic changes, and the partnership 
between some US Congress members and Taiwanese nationalists together constituted the 
context of Taiwan's democratisation. Almost every source can be traced to US 
influence, which is most manifest in American economic aid, which was intended to 
promote Taiwanese nationalism. Taiwan's democratisation is a natural corollary of its 
progression along a different historical and civilization trajectory under the influence of 
the US. 
Furthermore, US aid helped to create Taiwanese structuralism, instances of which 
include the Provincial Assembly proposition in 1966, the rise of the opposition in the 
1970s, the establishment of the DPP in 1986, the native faction's ambition to take power 
from mainlander elites in 1988; even the victory of Lee Teng-hui's power struggle 
against the mainlander elites in the early 1990s were connected to Taiwanese 
structuralism. 
The influx and publicization of overseas political nationalism in the early 1980s 
undermined the traditional Chinese national identity and caused division of national 
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identity at home. Committed secessionists further instrumentalized billowing social 
movements to promote self -determination and independence. As a result, they 
transformed domestic political opposition movement into an independent nation-building 
movement. Meanwhile, after the forty-year separation from the mainland and Chiang 
Ching-kuo's political liberalization, mainlanders became increasingly ''Taiwanized" 
through the identification of their interests and sentiments with Taiwan. The 
Tiananmen Incident prompted societal reflection over the choice of national identity. 
The electoral victory of secessionist candidates in December 1989 reflected the success 
of the pollination of secessionism on the island. 
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Chapter 5: 1989-2000 
STRATEGIC REALIGNMENT AND 
THE FRUITION OF TAIWANESE NATIONALISM 
Introduction 
Deng Xiaoping's policies of reform and openness facilitated China's strong economic 
and military development; the PRC gradually rose as a regional power. On the eve of 
the conclusion of the Cold War, China's looming hegemony worried the governments of 
America, Japan and Taiwan. The shared perception of the threat from Beijing prompted 
conservative forces in Washington and secessionist politicians in Taipei to realign their 
interests for security cooperation. On the one hand, America began adjusting its 
strategic cooperation with China. After the 1989 Tiananmen Incident, the US Congress 
often uses "human rights," "democracy'' and "the future of Taiwan" to connote Sino-US 
"cultural conflict" and cross-Strait "cultural difference." On the other hand, native 
Taiwan leader Lee Teng-hui was at the threshold of Taiwanization, riding the irrevocable 
trend of democratisation. The collapse of the communists in Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union in next two years removed the common interests between Washington and 
Beijing. Communist China itself became a target of American containment. The 
progress ofTaiwanization thus carried tremendous strategic significance. 
This chapter explores how America and Taiwanese nationalists realigned their strategic 
interests by jointly promoting Taiwanization. Some main questions include: How was 
Lee's Taiwanization linked to Chiang Ching-kuo's indigenisation and US-anticipated 
Taiwanization? How did Lee meet internal challenge and dominate the track of 
Taiwanization? How did he deliver the political engineering? How did America 
support his Taiwanization? How did Taiwanization affect domestic ethnic groups and 
national identity? What had Lee's political engineering achieved in terms of the 
progress of ''Taiwan Inciep~ndellce,Roadmap"? 
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Lee Teng-hui's Initial Rise to Power and the US 
Signs of Divergence from Chiang Ching-kuo's lndigenisation 
After Chiang Ching-kuo's demise, the power struggle in the KMT was intense. The 
internal struggle between Premier Yu Kuo-hua ( lfrJ~¥) and KMT Secretary General Li 
Huan <*~) and the help of James Soong <*~fitr) resulted in Lee Teng-hui's 
succession as Chairman of KMT on July 8 1988.879 As head of both the party and the 
state, Lee consolidated his power cautiously. To minimize the challenge from the 
conservative elements in the KMT, he pledged to follow Chiang Ching-kuo's 
"indigenisation." 
In February 1988 he introduced a new "retirement plan" to ease elderly mainlanders out 
of the Legislative Yuan, National Assembly and Control Yuan in the name of 
democratisation. This was conducive to the goals of the DPP's mass movements: force 
all senior legislators to retire and make the public aware of the desirability of founding a 
"new and independent state." 88° From October 1988, he tolerated the return of 
blacklisted overseas dissidents to Taiwan. The passage of People's Organization Law 
on January 27, 1989 legalized the formation of opposition parties and admitted political 
pluralism. When 1989 year-end local and legislative elections approached, more 
overseas secessionists sneaked into Taiwan from May to November to promote 
independence. Some high-profile secessionists, including Kuo Pei-hung ($1)-ffi~). Li 
Ymg-yuan ($J!!JC), even appeared at campaign events. 881 Representative Solarz 
openly supported these blacklisted secessionists and even visited Taiwan to help 
secessionists' campaigns.882 After being sentenced to a ten-year prison term, exiled 
secessionist Hsu Hsin-liang was granted commutation to six years and eight months; 
radical secessionist Huang Hua ( Ji ¥) assumed the leadership of the Taiwan 
879 For the details of Lee's succession, see Chen Ming-tong, Paixi zhengzm yu Taiwan zhengzm bianqian 
(Faction Politics and the Political Transition of Taiwan), 194-95. See also Harris, "Towards Taiwan's 
Independence," 29; Liu Xurui and Shi Guoqiang IJ:mJiffi, ~IJ!]9i, Ii Denghui dig!U! rru:J!i_('[l_u!_~T!d of 
Lee Teng-hui's Empire) (Hong Kong: Li weri, 2000), 45-49; Tuctrer~ Uncertdin Friendships, 166. 
880 Lu, "Political Opposition in Taiwan: The Development of the Democratic Progressive Party," 130. 
881 Chen Ming-tong, Paixi zhengzm yu Taiwan zhengzm bianqian (Faction Politics and the Political 
Transition of Taiwan), 206. 
882 See page 152 of this thesis. 
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independence movement. 883 Lee seemed very tolerant and showed little interest in a 
crackdown. In terms of foreign affairs, Lee had advocated pragmatic diplomacy since 
January 1989.884 In March 1989, Lee visited Singapore and accepted the title of 
President from Taiwan. During 1989, Taipei welcomed ties with Grenada, Belize and 
Liberia despite their formal recognition of the PRC. Lee's pragmatic diplomacy 
became a practice of dual recognition, marldng a departure from the one-China 
principle. 885 In terms of economic development, Lee seemed more interested in 
intemationalisation. In cross-Strait relations, Lee seemed indifferent to the 1989 
Tiananmen Incident. 886 These developments signalled his deviation from Chiang 
Ching-kuo's indigenisation. 
American Support of Lee's Watch Cabinet 
Conservative American politicians soon noticed Lee's departure from the line of Chiang 
Ching-kuo. American support for Lee was most manifest in political encouragement 
and economic cooperation. The strong urge for Taiwan to continue to promote 
democracy from the US Congress helped Lee minimize the likely political resistance to 
his rise to power at home. To ease the increasing trade deficit with Taiwan and to 
strengthen Taiwan's international economic viability, some Congress members proposed 
a US-Taiwan Free Trade Area (FTA) agreement. The first FTA resolution came in 1988 
and two more followed in early 1989.887 After the 1989 Tiananmen Incident, numerous 
resolutions were introduced to denounce Beijing and support Taipei, rekindling the 
issues of Sino-US cultural conflict and cross-Strait cultural differences. 888 A resolution 
was introduced on June 15 to urge Bush to encourage the Organization for Economic 
883 Chen Ming-tong, Paixi zhengzhi yu Taiwan zhengzhi bianqian (Faction Politics and the Political 
Transition ofTaiwan), 206. 
884 Lee Teng-hui $~ll1!I. Taiwan de zhuzhang (An Argument of Taiwan) (Taipei: Yuanliu, 1999), 127-28; 
Lee Teng-hui $~ll1!I, Yazhou de zhilue (A Strategy of Asia) (Taipei: Yuanliu, 2000), 252. 
885 Chu Yun-han and Lin Tse-min, "The Process of Democratic Consolidation in Taiwan," 84; Tucker, 
Uncertain Friendships, 163. 
886 Chen Ming-tong, Paixi zhengzhi yu Taiwan zhengzhi bianqian (Faction Politics and the Political 
Transition of Taiwan), 206. _ ~ ___ _ 
887 A Bill to Authorize the Establishmenrijfa Uiiiti!'d Staies-Taiwan Free Trade Area, lOOth Congress, 
H.R.5563; A Bill to Authorize the Establishment of a United States-Taiwan Free Trade Area, 101st 
Congress, S.944; To Authorize the Establishment of a United States-Taiwan Free Trade Area, 101st 
Congress, H.R.1748. 
888 See page 152 of this thesis. 
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Cooperation and Development (OECD) to consider Taiwan's membership. 889 On 
November 20, 1989, the Congress introduced a bill to influence the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB) to reconsider the title of ''Taipei, China" for Taiwan and to resolve this 
dispute in a fashion acceptable to Taiwan. It was signed by Bush and became law the 
next day.890 The strong US support helped Taiwan evade the sovereignty issue and 
entered the General Agreement Tariffs and Trade (GAIT) on January 1, 1990 under the 
title "the Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Quemoy and Matsu."891 
Lee's Concealed Agenda for Taiwanization 
Lee's toleration of secessionists and efforts for dual recognition worried many in the 
KMT. 892 As the March 1990 presidential election approached, the power and 
ideological struggle split the KM1' into two camps: the mainstream camp supporting Lee, 
and the non-mainstream camp headed by Taiwanese Lin Yang-kang (~~~) and 
mainlander Chiang Wei-k:uo (~*'mi). Lin was one of the earliest native elites 
promoted by Chiang Ching-k:uo; Wei-k:uo was Ching-k:uo's brother. The split led to the 
"February power struggle." Lee received strong support from native businessmen and 
factions while most mainlander politicians backed the non-mainstream camp. 893 
Although Lee mobilized eight seniors to persuade the non-mainstream contenders to 
resign from KMT nomination, it was not successful; the balance "was finally tilted in 
Lee's favour by a senior islander politician who had a mixture of local faction and 
business backgrounds."894 The unity of native businessmen and factions thus helped 
Lee secure the KMT nomination and win the election for the Eighth President of the 
ROC on March 20, 1990. This symbolized another victory of Taiwanese structuralism 
and for US aid. 
889 To Amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, lOlst Congress, H.R.2655. 
890 Making Appropriations for Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs for the 
Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 1990, lOlst Congress, H.R.3743. 
891 Tucker, Uncertain Friendships, 169. 
892 Chen Ming-tong, Paixi zhengzhi yu Taiwan zhengzhi bianqian (F_action Politics and the Political 
Transition ofTaiwan);-206;-- -
893 Shiau Chyuan-Jenq, "Elections and the Changing State-Business Relationship," 223. 
894 Ibid. The politician in question is Tsai Hung-wen (~~3(); for the detail, see Chen Ming-tong, Paixi 
zhengzhi yu Taiwan zhengzhi bianqian (Faction Politics and the Political Transition of Taiwan), 200-04, 
21. 
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Lee began to focus on Taiwan's relations with China and democratisation.895 Probably 
there was one central motive behind his efforts. Lee shared Taiwanese nationalist belief 
that the island had been oppressed by alien regimes in the distant past. In consequence, 
he asserted that the biggest problem for Taiwan was how to remove the alien regime. 896 
Meanwhile, he was determined to resolve the identity issue of ethnic groups: There is an 
exclusive choice between Chinese identity or Taiwan identity. He believed that the goal 
of democratisation is "bentuhua" pfs:±1t, indigenisation) of Taiwan and that identity is 
the most critical issue in Taiwan's democratisation process.897 
Most scholars referred to Chiang Ching-kuo's recruiting Taiwanese since around 1970 as 
"bentuhua;" Lee also asserted his political engineering as "bentuhua." For the 
convenience of differentiating his efforts from Chiang Ching-kuo's indigenisation, Lee's 
political engineering is referred to as ''Taiwanization." 898 In contextual terms, 
indigenisation is different from Taiwanization. The former is for the KMT regime to 
strengthen its ruling legitimacy in the wake of US-PRC rapproachement, while the latter 
is for ethnic Taiwanese to achieve political domination of the island in the wave of 
democratisation. 899 This differentiation is pertinent and helpful in explaining the 
fundamental differences between Chiang's and Lee's administrations. 900 This 
differentiation is particularly valid because Lee had always regarded the KMT as an alien 
regime, and, since early 1994, he had openly accused the KMT as being such. His 
political engineering was to produce an exclusive Taiwan identity in the process of 
895 Lee Teng-hui, Yazhou de zhilue (A Strategy of Asia), 249. 
896 Ibid., 35. Some may argue that Lee's work, A Strategy of Asia, was published much later and 
therefore the source is not reliable. Actually, it is hard to give an exact assessment of Lee's mindset in 
1990. At this point of time, he was surrounded by KMT conservatives and increasingly enmeshed in 
power struggle; revealling his disapproval, if not hatred, of the KMT would only prompt his opponents to 
unite against himself. Only after gradually consolidating power, did Lee begin accusing the KMT as an 
alien regime. He openly did so for the first time during an interview by Japanese journalist Ryotaro 
Shiba in March 1994; for further detail, see page 173 of this thesis. 
897 Ibid. 
898 For the definition of ''Taiwanization," see page 75 of this thesis. 
899 Taiwanization is different from democratisation; the latter has started since the second half of the 
1980s due to a whole range of people who want more efficient and representative government, while the 
former is for ethnic Taiwanese to achieve political domination of the island in the wave of democratisation 
in the 1990s. See also Yu, "The Politics ofTaiwanisation (II): The Road to~!!_New Identity," 29. -
900 Some scholars may argue that Taiwanizationimplies bi:Jilditig an- exclusive ethnic conception of the 
Taiwan nation and that Taiwanization comes after 2000. However, considering the context in which the 
term ''Taiwanization" first appears and the utility in differentiating Lee's political engineering from 
Chiang's, the author applies the original definition of Taiwanization given on page 75 throughout the 
thesis. 
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' 
democratisation, so as to remove the control of the alien KMT regime. His 
"Taiwanization" thus aimed to achieve "Taiwanese domination of Taiwan." In addition, 
after retirement in 2000, he became the standard bearer of secessionist fundamentalism; 
his Taiwanization actually aimed to break Taiwan away from the mainland. 
Consequently, Lee's Taiwanization served two gaols: to achieve Taiwanese domination 
of Taiwan and to break Taiwan away from China. This was different in essence from 
Chiang Ching-kuo's indigenisation which sought to justify and extend the rule of the 
KMT over Taiwan. By contrast, Lee's goals concurred with the Taiwanization expected 
by America, which aimed for separatist self-determination. To achieve the goals, he 
concealed his agenda from the mainlander elites but collaborated with the DPP. 
Furthermore, his motivation to relieve the Taiwanese of the control by the mainlander 
group was typical of structuralism.901 
The First Stage of Lee's Taiwanization and the US 
During the 1990 presidential election, the mainlander members of the National Assembly 
used the election for political extortion; they raised attendance fee for themselves and 
requested that their term of office be extended. This sparked island-wide protests and 
student demonstrations in March 1990.902 Furious students presented four proposals: to 
disband the National Assembly, to abolish the Temporary Provisions Effective During 
the Period of Communist Rebellion, to convene a National Affairs Conference, and to set 
a timetable for democratic reforms.903 These appeals were consistent with the DPP's 
positions on political reform.904 On March 21, Lee announced that he would convene a 
National Affairs Conference (NAC) in late June to review constitutional reform and 
national unification. He deliberately used the NAC as an irregular approach to evade 
the checks of the KMT party-state system and promote Taiwanizing reforms.905 
901 For the definition of structuralism, see page 89 of this thesis. 
902 Hughes, Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism, 58-59; Liu Xurui and Shi Guoqiang, Li Denghui diguo mori 
(The End of Lee Teng-hui's Empire), 52. See also Peng De-fu, "A Study ®J'aiwan's Loca1Electionand 
Democratic Transition", 52. - · -- · - · · · · · - ·. · ·· . 
903 Peng De-fu, "A Study on Taiwan's Local Election and Democratic Transition", 52. 
904 DPP, Minjindang dashi nianbiao (A Chronology of Relevent Events of the Democratic Progressive 
Party) ([cited). 
905 Lee Teng-hui, Yazhou de zhilue (A Strategy of Asia), 249. 
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US Congress' Messages after Taiwan's 1990 Presidential Election 
Before the election, Lee dismantled the KMT's established advantages, tapped overseas 
secessionist forces into the island, and leveraged his pragmatic diplomacy with economic 
prosperity and the credit of democratisation. After the election, he made conciliatory 
gestures toward the student demonstrators and DPP. These moves painted a promising 
prospect for US-expected Tai wanization. US Congress members sought to promote 
closer relations with Taiwan. On March 27, Solarz introduced a concurrent resolution 
that had for the first time suggested that the future of Taiwan be determined "through 
effective democratic mechanisms, such as a plebiscite;" thirty colleagues joined the 
co-sponsorship. 906 On May 24, Representative Donald J. Pease introduced a resolution 
granting the Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) status to the PRC on condition that Beijing 
accede to Taiwan's admission into GATr; the resolution was co-sponsored by nineteen 
Representatives. The House passed the bill in mid-October.907 On June 7, Senator 
William V. Roth introduced a resolution which again advocated Taiwan's membership in 
the GATT; sixty-five colleagues became co-sponsors.908 A bill expressing support of 
the issue of Taiwan's title in the ADB was introduced on June 21; it became law on 
November 5.909 In October 1990, Congress invited Shih Ming-teh to attend a testimony 
and deliver a speech on Capitol Hill. 910 Before and after the NAC, surging 
Congressional support of Lee reinforced his agenda ofTaiwanization. 
Achieving Taiwanese Domination of Taiwan 
The NAC since June 28, 1990 raised the curtain of Taiwanization. The consensus 
reached by the NAC included the direct election of President and Governor, the speedy 
retirement of senior representatives in the national elective bodies, the termination of the 
Period of Communist Rebellion and the Temporary Provisions, and the amendment of 
906 Expressing the Sense of the Congress concerning the Future of Taiwan, lOlst Congress, 
H.CON.RES.293. 
907 Regarding the Extension of Most-Favored-Nation Treatment to the Products of the People's Republic 
c:ls China, IOlst Congress, H.R.4939. 
8 A Resolution to Express the Sense of the Senate the Support ofTaiwan's Membership in the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, IOlst Congress, S.RES.296. _ _ _ __ ~-- ~ _ 
-
909 Malcing Appropriations for Foreign- Operations, Export Financing, and Relat~dPrograms for the 
Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 1991, andfor Other Purposes, IOlst Congress, H.R5114. 
910 DPP, Minjindang dangshiguanlliren dangzhuxi/Shi Mingde (Democratic Progressive Party 
History/Chajrmen/ShihMing-teh) [internet] (DPP, [cited Feb 16 2005]), available from 
http://www.dpp.org.tw/. 
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the constitution. 911 Althought these points are democratic political reforms that have 
to take place without regard to the ethnicity of the population, they all contributed to 
ethnic Taiwanese political domination of the island republic. Taiwanization unfolded in 
accordance with the consensus of the NAC.912 
Domestic Politics: Constitutional Reforms, Ideological Partnership and Constructuralism 
Lee launched the first constitutional reform in April 1991. On April 22, 1991, Lee 
declared the conclusion of the Period of Communist Rebellion, abolished the Temporary 
Provisions, confined the constitutional jurisdiction within Taiwan, admitted the legality 
of the PRC's rule over the mainland, and stipulated that the people of Taiwan were alone 
eligible for membership in the national elective bodies.913 For his American audience, 
this constitutional reform carried out US scholars John King Fairbank's and Douglas 
Mendel's suggestions in the 1970s about impairing Beijing's sovereign right of using 
force against Taiwan by unilaterally eliminating the rationale of the "civil war'' and 
disclaiming the ROC's sovereignty over the mainland.914 It also fulfilled US diplomat 
Armstrong's prediction that once the Taiwanese gained power, "the island will undergo a 
virtual political revolution" by abolishing many existing policies such as abandoning 
"the claim that a government on Taiwan is that of all China."915 
In accordance with the consensus of the NAC, the second formal National Assembly 
election was held on December 21, 1991 and all the senior representatives of the national 
elective bodies were retired on December 31, 1991. Due to their demographic 
dominance, native Taiwanese had secured a dominant share in the National Assembly 
since 1991. Lee then accomplished the second constitutional reform in May 1992. 
The second article of the amendment stipulated that the president and vice president 
were to be elected only by the people of Taiwan. Consequently, national institutions 
911 Peng De-fu, "A Study on Taiwan's Local Election and Democratic Transition", 52-53. 
912 Peter Yu argues that Taiwanization starts with Lee Teng-hui's embarkment on amending the 
Constitution; see Yu, "The Politics of Taiwanisation (ll): The Road to a New Identity, "30. 
913 Lee Teng-hui *If:]$,J.i Denghui zhizheng gaobai shilu (A Faithful Accowzt of Lee Teng-hui 's Rule) 
(Taipei: Yinke, 2001), 230. . . ~ _ _ _ . __ . __ ---
914 Faibank believed "a mere declaration from Taipeftliit tlie -regime is ruling only its presently held 
territory might be enough to create a new situation [for lending plausibility to the idea of Taiwan's 
independence]." See Fairbank, "Taiwan: Our Hardy Perennial Problem," 135. Mendel, The Politics of 
Fomwsan Nationalism, 226. 
915 Wang, "KMT's Localization Claim Is Empty." 
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only represented the people of Taiwan; the ROC government was granted its ruling 
power and legal authority only by the people of Taiwan and had nothing to do with the 
people on the mainland.916 The first and second constitutional reforms consequently 
legalized the domination of Taiwan by the people on the island and foreshadowed Lee's 
proposition of "special state-to-state relationship" in July 1999.917 
The DPP convened a National Party Congress in June 1991. The New Tide leader Lin 
Cho-shui (~7.1<) proposed to adopt a clear plank in its platform and charter calling for 
an independent Republic of Taiwan. Chen Shui-bian softened the proposal by calling 
for a referendum on Taiwan independence rather than a unilateral declaration by a DPP 
government, thereby stressing the role of the democratic process in such a vital decision. 
The DPP National Party Congress passed this amendment on June 23, 1991.918 The 
independence plank, which cemented the DPP's image as an "independence party," read 
as follows: 
In accordance with Taiwan's actual sovereignty, an independent country should be established 
and a new constitution promulgated in order to create a legal and political system appropriate to the 
realities of Taiwan society, and to return to international society in accordance with principles of 
international law .... Based on the principle of popular sovereignty, the establishment of a sovereign, 
independent and self-government Republic of Taiwan and promulgation of a new constitution 
should be carried out by all residents of Taiwan through a national referendum.919 
This appeal is consistent with "self-determination" since a new constitution and a 
national referendum are presented in terms of a democratic scheme. However, some 
uneasiness lurks behind the formula. By nature, the appeal for a new country with a 
new constitution no longer constitutes a political democratic reform within the ROC 
system, but a political revolution for nation-building.920 The "independence plank" 
satisfied secessionist aspirations for de jure independence; it inevitably involved a 
change of status quo, which could easily trigger a militacy conflict in the crisis-prone 
Taiwan Strait. Therefore, in the context of the Taiwan Strait, secessionist 
916 Lee Teng-hui, Li Denghui zhizheng gaobai shilu (A Faitliful Account of Lee Teng-hui 's Rule), 230. 
917 Ibid. For Lee's proposing of"special state-to-state relationship" in July 1999, see page 193 of this 
thesis. .. " 
918
- DPP, Minjindang dashi nianbiao (A Chronology of Relevent Events of the Democratic Progressive 
Party) ([cited); Rigger, From Opposition to Power, 125. 
919 Rigger, From Opposition to Power, 125. 
920 Cheng Tun-jen and Hsu Yung-ming, "Issue Structure, the DPP's Factionalism, and Party Realignment," 
139; Hu Fu, "The Electoral Mechanism and Political Change in Taiwan," 168. 
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fundamentalism can be defined as the pursuit of a Republic of Taiwan in accordance with 
the "independence plank," regardless of international opposition and the risk of a 
catastrophic war. 921 
The relationship between Lee and the DPP grew closer. Between 1990 and 1992, Lee 
"actively sought political compromise and ideological accommodation from the DPP by 
conceding to various DPP political demands."922 Lee also began giving the DPP 
tangible financial support in the name of promoting multi-party politics. In the 
following years, he stressed "popular sovereignty'' of the independence plank on many 
occasions. In response, the DPP sided with Lee whenever it was possible to undermine 
the non-mainstream camp.923 Meanwhile, the DPP made the subject of commemorating 
the February 28 Incident part of an ethno-national narrative.924 In the early stage of 
democratisation, nationalist mobilization based on ethnicity, or politicisation of ethnic 
identity, was the most effective strategy available to the opposition.925 
Moreover, Lee cautiously roused an anti-KMT sentiment, which gave birth to an 
anti-KMT populism. 926 Since the early 1990s, Lee has appealed to Taiwanese 
consciousness for mass support to push aside the mainlander rivals; in fact, this 
anti-KMT sentiment was more structuralist than populist. The "Lee Teng-hui 
syndrome" won the general support from the native Taiwanese. 
Lee's use of division structuralism and his strategizing with DPP's ethno-nationalism 
deepened the cleavage in ethnic relations and the crisis of national identity that had 
emerged since the democratic transition. To promote a united community identity and 
921 As will be demonstrated in Chapter 6, the "independence plank" heralded the rise of fundamentalism 
after the DPP became ruling party in 2000. 
922 For the details of these demands, see Chu Yun-han and Lin Tse-min. "The Process of Democratic 
Consolidation in Taiwan," 85. 
923 Ibid; Hughes, Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism, 88; Shih Cheng-feng, Taiwan minzu zhuyi (Taiwanese 
Nationalism), 18, 79, 82. 
924 Edmondson, "The February 28 Incident and National Identity," 36. 
925 Chang Mau-kuei, "Shengji wenti yu mizu zhuyi (Provincialism and Nationalism)," 234, 44-45; 
Edmondson, "The February 28 Incident and National Identity," 33; Wu Mi-cha and Chang Yen-hsien, 
Jianli Taiwan de guomin guojia (Establish a Civic Nation for Taiwan), 100-0~; Wu ~ai~teh, "Ethnic 
Consciousness, Political Support,-and National Identity," 49~50.e- -- -- --
926 For the original definition of populism, see Chen Ming-tong, Paixi zhengzhi yu Taiwan zhengzhi 
bianqian (Faction Politics and the Political Transition ofTaiwan), 8; Torcuato S. Di Tella, "Populism and 
Reform in Latin America," in Obstacles to Change in Latin America, ed. Claudio Veliz (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1965), 47. 
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political harmony, Lee proposed "shengming gongtongti'' (~$~[1:Uft; literally "living 
community") in August 1991.927 Consistent with the definition ofTaiwanization, it was 
a deliberate attempt to include all ethnic groups in the polity, especially members of the 
mainlander elites, during ethnic Taiwanese rise to dominate the political arena on the 
island. In addition, this was Lee's first constructuralistic argument for the imposition of 
a new vision of nation-building in the direction of Taiwanization. 
Foreign Relations 
Congressional support for Taiwan's plebiscite, entry to the GATT and title in the ADB 
surged after Lee's election. Solarz introduced a resolution on July 11, 1990 opposing 
international loans to China and promoting peaceful evolution in China, imposing further 
sanctions on China and advancing Taiwan's economic viability and political 
independence.928 This encouraged Lee to raise Taiwan's visibility and challenge the 
"one China" policy. In the days leading to the First Persian Gulf War, Taipei proposed 
to donate US$100 million in September 1990 to attract international publicity.929 Even 
though Lee's donations were dubbed "money diplomacy," Taiwan's economic prosperity 
and political democratisation led Bush to praise the democratic development of Taiwan 
since May 1991.930 Lee responded immediately. The following month, a group of 
eighty KMT legislators petitioned for the ROC to reapply to the UN "at an appropriate 
time."931 On July 8, 1991, Taiwan placed a large advertisement in the New York Tzmes 
to declare its flexibility and pragmatism.932 Capitol Hill's association between China's 
MFN status and Taiwan's accession to GATT pushed the Bush administration to express 
its support for Taiwan's entry into GATT. The US became the first major power in 
GATT to announce that it favoured Taiwan's application.933 Following the dissolution 
927 Lee himself translates "gongtongti" as "community;" see Cunzai xi wang fazhan: Li Denghui xiansheng 
'shengming gongtongti' zhiguo linian (Existence, Hope, Development: Lee Teng-hui's Political Philosophy 
of 'Living Community'), ed.,Aeds., (Taipei: Zhengzhong, 1993), 13-14, 16, 64. 
928 Imposing Additional Conditions on the Extension of Most-Favored-Nation Treatment to the Products 
of the People's Republic of China, 10 1st Congress, H.R5252. 
929 Tucker, Uncertain Friendships, 163. 
930 Bush remarked: "Driven forward by the engine of economic growth and trade, especially with the U.S., 
South Korea and Taiwan have shed their once-authoritarian rule in favour of democracy and freer trade." 
NARA, Remarks at the Yale University Commencement Ceremo!Jy in !iftHillaven, Connec#cut, May 27, 
J99J[intemet] ([cited Jan 29 2003]),-available from -- - - - -
http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/papers/1991191052700.html. 
931 Tucker, Uncertain Friendships, 163. 
932 Ibid. 
933 Ibid., 169. 
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of the Warsaw Pact in July, Taiwan won another symbolic victory in joining Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) along with the PRC and Hong Kong. 
Economic Development 
Lee initiated the "Six-Year Project of National Economic Construction" to promote 
economic competitiveness in 1991. By 1992, Taiwan possessed $82 billion in foreign 
exchange reserves, the largest in the world. Per capital income had reached US$10,000 
a year and Taiwan was the sixth largest trading partner of the US and the thirteenth 
largest trading power in the world. Some six hundred US companies maintained offices 
in Taiwan at the beginning of the 1990s.934 As American commercial stakes on Taiwan 
increased, US-Taiwan unofficial relations grew stronger. 
Breaking Taiwan away from China 
In order to dispel Beijing's suspicions of his independence sentiments, Lee adopted the 
"Guidelines for National Unification" passed by the National Unification Council (NUC) 
in 1991.935 These guidelines asserted the principle of "one China, two political 
entities," recognized the PRC' s jurisdiction over the mainland, called for eventual 
unification on the basis of "parity," and spelled out conditions for unification. The 
Guidelines proved a paradoxical rejection of unification with the mainland because "the 
further apart the political and economic systems of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait 
might grow, the further away would be the actual act of unification."936 After his 
retirement, Lee openly confessed to the news media that both the NUC and the 
"Guidelines for National Unification" had been used to provoke the PRC. 937 In 
addition, Lee adamantly refused to lift the ban on direct air and sea links with the 
mainland.938 
Strategic Realignment in the Name of Regional Peace and Stability 
After the resignation of Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Soviet Union 
934 Ibid., 167-68. 
935 Lee Teng-hw; Yazhou de zhilue~(A Strategy of Asia); 254. 
936 Hughes, Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism, 67. 
937 Lin Ho-ming ~.::g, "Li Denghui: Guotonghui dou Zhonggong yongde (Lee Teng-hui: The National 
Unification Council Was Used to Provoke the PRC)," UDN, May 18 2002. 
938 Chu Yun-han and Lin Tse-min, "The Process of Democratic Consolidation in Taiwan," 84. 
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Communist Party, the Soviet Communist regime faced imminent dissolution; Bush 
immediately reasserted at a press conference on August 24, 1991 that the goals of US 
foreign policy were freedom, democracy and self-detennination.939 The collapse of the 
Soviet Union in late December 1991 undermined the strategic basis for America's close 
relations with China. Because Washington saw China as the only power with the 
potential to challenge US dominance in the Asia-Pacific region, Taiwan again became 
part of the Sino-US strategic equation and a "burr in the saddle" of Sino-US relations.940 
For practical considerations of winning votes and consolidating strategic position, Bush 
announced on September 2, 1992 that the US would sell 150 F-16 NB fighters worth 
$5.9 billion to Taiwan; he claimed that the deal was in the interest of maintaining peace 
and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.941 This arms sales decision was a remarkable 
contradiction to the August 17 Communique. Bush dismissed Beijing's vehement 
protest by stating that "the importance of the 1982 Communique on anns sales to Taiwan 
lies in its promotion of common political goals: peace and stability in the area through 
mutual restraint."942 Maintaining peace and stability in the Asia Pacific had thus 
overridden the August 17 Communique. Moreover, these arms sales highlighted 
Section 3 (b) of the TRA, which stipulates: ''The President and the Congress shall 
determine the nature and quantity of such defence articles and services based solely upon 
their judgment of the needs of Taiwan ... "943 Beijing's increasing verbal threats and 
military build-up made successive US administrations conclude that it was necessary to 
continue providing the military articles and services necessary to Taiwan's defence- just 
as American law provides.944 
Moreover, neither the Shanghai Communique nor US de-recognition of Taiwan 
interrupted the cooperation between the CIA, National Security Agency (NSA) and 
Taiwan's Military Intelligence Bureau (Mill) in intelligence-gathering activities. The 
939 Shih Ko-min 1ifBJlfj(, Cong huafu kan Taibei (Watch Taipei from Washington DC) (Taipei: Zheng 
zhong sbuju, 1993), 124. 
940 Klintworth, "China and Taiwan- From Flashpoint to Redefining One China," 20. 
941 Kan, "RL30341." See also NARA, Remarks to General Dy"!l!'Jlcs Employees in Fort Worth, Texas, 
September 2, 1992 [internet] ([cited Jan 30 2003]), available'fioin . 
http://bushlibrary .tamu.edulpapers/1992/92090202.html. 
942 NARA, Remarks to General Dynamics Employees ([cited). 
943 Taiwan Relations Act. Emphasis is my own. 
944 Feldman, "The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1429." 
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NSA continued to staff a listening post outside Taipei that monitored radio frequencies 
used by the China Air Force. 945 The US and Taiwan even extended their 
intelligence-gathering net to cover India in order to monitor the PLA's military build-up 
in the Asia-Pacific region. By 1993, this extensive intelligence-exchange network had 
begun bearing valuable fruit.946 
The Second Stage of Lee's Taiwanization and the US 
With the collapse of Leninism, Stalinism and Maoism, American perception of its 
traditional values was reinforced; so were its assertions of their universal validity.947 
During the 1992 presidential campaign, Bill Clinton attacked Bush for not giving 
stronger support for Taiwan. After Clinton was elected President in November 1992, 
many conservative Republicans were immediately ready to throw the same accusation at 
him. In the meantime, the political power of native Taiwanese had significantly 
increased. To maintain KMT domination in the national elective bodies, KMT 
Secretary General James Soong <*~ffrl) nominated wealthy and powerful native 
factional leaders in the 1991 National Assembly and the 1992 Legislative Yuan 
elections.948 Therefore, native factional leaders and businessmen inundated the national 
elective bodies. However, the remarkably increased nomination of native factional 
leaders and tycoons lent credence to the DPP's accusation of KMT corruption and 
plutocracy, tarnishing the KMT but benefiting the DPP;949 DPP votes exceeded 30% in 
national elections for the first time.950 After the 1991 and 1992 national elections, 
native politicians from across the political spectrum dominated the state power apparatus. 
945 Tucker, Uncertain Friendships, 145-46. 
946 For details, see Hsieh Chung-Jiang and Chu Ming ~~,$!.. *1!13· "Tai-Mei gaojieting, Yindu kai 
'houmen' (India Joins Taiwan and America's Intelligence Exchange to Monitor the PLA)," Yi Zhoukan 
(Next Magazine), Jan 3, No. 32 (2002), 42-47. 
947 Oksenberg, "Living with China," 60. 
948 In the 1991 National Assembly election, seventy-nine out of one hundred and eighty-three KMT 
runners (43.16%) were native factional leaders or businessmen; in the 1992 Legislative Yuan election, 
fifty-eight out of ninety-eight KMT runners (59.18%) were native factional leaders or businessmen; see 
Chen Ming-tong, Paixi zhengzhi yu Taiwan zhengzhi bianqian (FactionPoliti~SJRUithe Political ----
Transition of Taiwan), 226-28, 42-45; 49. - ·-~· -· - · . 
949 Ibid., 227-28, 42-45, 49; Chu Yun-han and Lin Tse-min, "The Process of Democratic Consolidation in 
Taiwan," 87-88, 98. 
950 DPP scored 31.7% in this legislators election in 1992. See Peng De-fu, "A Study on Taiwan's Local 
Election and Democratic Transition", 75. 
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The domestic politics in the US and Taiwan alike facilitated calls for support of the 
island republic in accordance with values of democracy and self-determination, 
underscoring Sino-US cultural conflict and cross-Strait cultural differences. 
Legalization of the TRA's Precedence over August 17 Communique 
Some conservative Congress members favoured formal efforts ''to strengthen US-Taiwan 
relations in ways sure to antagonize the PRC."951 They dismissed Beijing's criticism 
that arms sales and other aspects of continued US support reduced Taipei's interest in 
negotiations on the reunification of Taiwan with the mainland.952 They were interested 
in using Taiwan's democratisation as a wedge to "foster separatist tendencies among 
ethnic groups that Beijing regards as threatening to state security."953 In early 1993, the 
House Republicans proposed H.R.2333, calling for Clinton to send Cabinet-level 
officials to Taiwan and to show clear support for Taiwan.954 Section 706 of H.R.2333 
asserted the TRA's legal primacy over the August 17 Communique. Section 706 
(Applicability ofTRA), known as the Murkowski Amendment, declared: 
Section 3 [of the TRA] ... is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: 
'(d) The provisions of subsections (a) and (b) of this section [on arms sales] shall supersede any 
provision of the August 17, 1982, Joint United States-China Communique related to these matters 
and regulations, directives, and policies based thereon. ' 955 
Despite Acting Secretary of State Strobe Talbott's letter of March 8, 1993 to Senator 
Claiborne Pell, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, urging the deletion 
of Section 706,956 H.R.2333 was still introduced by Representative Lee H. Hamilton to 
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on June 8. The Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee unanimously adopted the Amendment to TRA on July 15, 1993. Clinton 
signed H.R.2333 into PL103-236 on April30, 1994. It stipulates that Section 3 ofTRA 
951 Derry B. Dumbaugh, "CRS Issue Brief for Congress: IB98034: Taiwan: Recent Developments and US 
Policy Choices," (Washington DC: Library of Congress, 2001). 
952 Ibid. 
953 Ibid. 
954 Kan, "RL30341," note 62. See also To Authorize Appropriations for tly! DeJJartmem ot State,_the 
Q~ited States Information Agency, .and Related Agencies, to Aiitlibnze Appropriations for Foreign 
Assistance Programs, 103rd Congress, H.R2333. 
955 H.R.2333. The Senate Foreign Relations Committed adopted Murkowsk:i Amendment to TRA by a 
vote of20-0 on July 15, 1993; see Lasater, The Changing of the Guard, 139-43. 
956 Lasater, The Changing of the Guard, 143. 
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(on arms sales) takes precedence over the August 17 Communique.957 
Achieving Taiwanese Domination of Taiwan 
Domestic Politics: Ideological Partnership, Constitutional Reforms, and Constructuralism 
The 1991 and 1992 elections brought Lee new allies in the power struggle. In hopes of 
maintaining political dominance, the KMT significantly increased the share of native 
faction leaders and tycoons in the central power apparatus in the early 1990s, marking 
the elevation of plutocracy from local to national level and transforming the KMT into a 
party of "state elites, local factions, and big business."958 After Lee consolidated power 
in the party and in the state, he became the paramount patron of the KMT's patron-client 
system.959 After Chiang Ching-kuo's death, many native KMT legislators showed their 
ambition to snatch power from the mainlander elite. When native factions and tycoons 
sensed Lee's identity agenda, they rallied to Lee against his opponents in the KMT. 960 
Lee also used internecine balancing to prevent rivals from uniting against him. 961 
Accordingly, Premier Hau Po-tsun (gfflfetf), former Chief of General Staff, a mainlander 
heavyweight in the non-main stream camp, and a strong Chinese nationalist who had 
repeatedly asserted that the ROC army would not fight for Taiwan independence, soon 
became a salient target for Lee and many native KMT legislators that supported Lee.962 
The DPP's victory in the 1992 year-end Legislative Yuan election gave Lee a decent 
chance to oust Hau. Plutocratic forces, native factions and the DPP united, with Lee's 
9S7 Kan, "RL30341," note 62. 
958 Chen Ming-tong, Paixi zhengzhi yu Taiwan zhengzhi bianqian (Faction Politics and the Political 
Transition of Taiwan), 232-33, 44-45; Chu Yun-han and Lin Tse-min, "The Process of Democratic 
Consolidation in Taiwan," 88. 
959 Chen Ming-tong, Paixi zhengzhi yu Taiwan zhengzhi bianqian (Faction Politics and the Political 
Transition of Taiwan), 248. 
960 Ibid., 232; Huang Kuang-k:uo JiJI:;IiJ, Mincui wangTai lun (Populism Will Destroy Taiwan) (Taipei: 
Shangzhou wenhua, 1997), 17; Shiau Chyuan-Jenq, "Elections and the Changing State-Business 
Relationship," 223. For example, Huang Chu-wen, one of the leaders of "Jisi zaocanhui" (see page 150 
of this thesis), later became Lee's chief aid. Lee promoted Huang to Minister of Internal Affairs in the 
mid-1990s. After Lee retired and vigorously supported secessionism since 2000, Huang allied other 
like-minded associates to establish Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) in 2000 under Lee's encouragement. 
TSU is often seen as the most fundamentalist party for Taiwan independence. It respects Lee as its 
sEiritualleader. 
9 1 Liu Xurui and Shi Guoqiang, l.i Denghui diguo mori (The End of Lee Teng-hui s Empire), 55-56. 
~-For the sharp differences betwee11 tee and Hau;-see Clien Ming=toitg,Paiii zhengzhfyu Taiwan 
zhengzhi bianqian (Faction Politics and the Political Transition of Taiwan), 207-15; Hughes, Taiwan and 
Chinese Nationalism, 60, 79-80; Lu Keng and Ma Si-ping ~~. ~ifflm, Bienaole, Denghui xiansheng: 
12 ~i guanjian renwu tan l.i Denghui (Stop the Farce, Mr. Teng-hui: 12 Key Figures' Accounts on Lee 
Teng-hui) (Taipei: Tianxia yuanjian, 2001), 101-23. 
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acquiescence, to attack and humiliate Hau, who was forced to resign on February 2, 
1993.963 Lee won another vital battle on August 10, 1993, after some reformist KMT 
elites declared their intention to desert the corrupt, Lee-led KMT and established the 
China New Party.964 The departure of the mainlander elites from the ruling KMT 
symbolized the victory of Taiwanese structuralism; this could also been seen as an 
extended legacy of American aid. 
In the summer of 1994, Lee launched his third constitutional reform, which considerably 
enhanced presidential powers and was thus likened to an "emperor system."965 In 
addition, the constitutional reform enabled the first elections to be held for the mayors of 
Taipei and Kaohsiung and for provincial governor in December 1994.966 In the 1994 
year-end Taipei mayoral election, Lee engineered a "dump-save" to split the KMT 
supporters and trigger native unity, resulting in Chen Shui-bian's election as Mayor of 
Taipei in December 1994. 967 Christopher Hughes argued that Lee used the 
constitutional reform to bring the DPP into govemment,968 and that Lee's strong 
presidential system appeared to have "achieved a wide degree of consensus with the DPP 
based on its function of steering Taiwan between the Charybdis represented by the 
dangers of ethnic conflict and the Scylla of mainland policy."969 In other words, Lee 
used a self-destructing ethnic conflict and provoking mainland policy in the 
democratisation process to deliver his political engineering of Taiwanization. As a 
result, the ethnic conflict and ideological struggle over national identity at home 
worsened. Michael Chang asserted that the most critical political issues in Taiwan were 
963 Chu Yun-han and Lin Tse-min, "The Process of Democratic Consolidation in Taiwan," 85-86; Hughes, 
Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism, 82; Lee Teng-hui, Yazhou de zhilue (A Strategy of Asia), 244-46; Liu 
Xurui and Shi Guoqiang, Li Denghui diguo mori (The End of Lee Teng-hui's Empire), 29, 54-55. 
964 Chu Yun-han and Lin Tse-min, "The Process of Democratic Consolidation in Taiwan," 88-89, 101. 
965 Hughes, Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism, 87. 
966 Ibid. 
967 There were three main contenders in the election, including incumbent, native KMT Huang Ta-chou 
(Ji::klftl), popular mainlander New Party Chao Shao-kang Of:m1?'00 and native DPP Chen Shui-bian. A 
few months before the election, a large fire claimed many lives and dealt a heavy blow to mayor Huang. 
It was reported that when be was to announce to drop out of the race at a press conference, Lee Teng-hui 
called Huang a few minutes before the press conference demanding him to stay as KMT runner. This 
divided the traditional supporters of the KMT. Lee's manoeuvre also al~rt~dTaiwanese voters to_d1JID.p 
unpopular native Huang and save Dative Chen: -AS aresiilt,-Chen scored 43.7%, Huang 25.9% and Chao 
30.2%. Had Huang dropped, KMT supporters could have cast their votes for Chao, who might have won 
the election. 
968 Hughes, Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism, 87. 
969 Ibid., 88. 
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the conflicts among ethnic groups and nationalisms.970 This fulfilled Scalapino's 
prediction in the 1959 Conlon Report that political crises would follow 
democratisation. 971 
The newly established China New Party, often denigrated as the most conservative of 
mainlander elements, did not take a strong position on unification or openly advocate 
Chinese nationalism; within months of its establishment, it quietly dropped "Chini' from 
its title.972 The depression of China identity, exemplified by the New Party's dropping 
of "China" from its title to maintain its political competitiveness, suggested the success 
of cultural assimilation by the dominant, native Taiwanese ethnic group. Lee further 
publicized "shengming gongtongti" at a press conference on May 20, 1993.973 This was 
to reaffirm his desire for political harmony and his vision of nation-building in the 
direction ofTaiwanization. On March 31, 1994, Lee had a controversial interview with 
Japanese journalist Ryotaro Shiba. In the interview, published as "The Sorrows of Born 
Taiwanese," Lee nostalgically described his Japanese identity, accused the KMT of being 
an alien regime, echoed "popular sovereignty" in DPP independence plank, called the 
argument of Taiwan belonging to China a "strange dream," and expressed his hope for a 
regime that was dedicated to the welfare of the Taiwanese.974 Then, on December 30, 
1994, Lee juxtaposed "popular sovereignty" with "shengming gongtongti'' during a KMT 
conference. He explained that the former was to "stir up the consciousness of every 
citizen to be 'master of his own country"' while the latter was to "[integrate] the free will 
of the individual with the wealth and good of society.'.975 The two terms proved to be 
constructuralistic arguments for imposing a new vision of nation-building and breaking 
the island away from the mainland. 
Breaking Taiwan away from China 
910 Chang Mau-kuei, "Political Transformation and Ethnization of Politics in Taiwan". 
971 See page 74 of this thesis. 
972 Chu Yun-han and Lin Tse-min, "The Process of Democratic Consolidation in Taiwan," 101; Hughes, 
Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism, 84. 
973 Cunzai xiwangfazhan: Ii Denghui xiansheng 'shengming gongtongti'zhigll()_/ir)ian,(Existence, Hope, 
[)evelopment:.Lee Teng-hui's Political Philosophy of'Iiving CoininunitY1), ed., ~ds., 13-14, 16, 64. 
974 UDN, 'Hui' hui yixiu, gaobie shier nian zhizheng/jianjie yu nianbiao/Li Denghui dashiji [internet] 
(2001 [cited Feb 7 2003]), available from 
http://udn.com/SPECIAL_ISSUFJFOCUSNEWSILEFJframed.htm. 
975 Hughes, Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism, 98. 
173 
Lee grew more vocal in simultaneously advancing Taiwan's economic viability and 
political independence in global society. Taipei had been pushing for re-entry into the 
UN since August 1993. To suppress the bid, Beijing issued the first White Paper on 
Taiwan on August 31, 1993. Moreover, there was ongoing economic integration across 
the Strait, consistent with the rise of the Greater China phenomenon, or Greater China 
Economic Circle.976 Lee was displeased to see the growing economic dependence of 
the island on the mainland. In February 1994, after leading a 140-member trade 
delegation to visit Philippine President Ramos, Indonesian President Suharto, and His 
Majesty King Bhumipol Adulyadej of Thailand, he announced the "Southwards Policy" 
in an attempt to decrease cross-Strait economic interdependence, which many 
secessionists believe would lead to Taiwan's dependence on Mainland China.977 
The Alliance between Congress and Lee 
Lee's Taiwanization smacked of anti-Chinese nationalism. Most US Congress 
members and conservatives sought a strategic alliance with him. In May 1994, Lee 
made a state visit to Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and South Africa. In Costa Rica, he 
elaborated upon "popular sovereignty" by arguing that Taiwan's sovereignty resided in 
the people of Taiwan.'m An episode provided Congress with an opportunity to support 
Lee. The State Department had allowed him to make a refuelling stop in Hawaii en 
route to Costa Rica but denied him a visa to enter the US.979 This enraged Senators 
Hank Brown and Frank H. Murkowski. On May 19, they invited Lee to the US and 
sent a sharply worded letter to Clinton; in the letter, they blasted the State Department's 
rude treatment of Lee and informed Clinton of their invitation to Lee.980 On the same 
day, Murkowski alluded to the MFN and human rights issues related to China and 
asserted that Taiwan and Hong Kong should be an integral part of US Asian policy.981 
976 Tucker, Uncertain FriendsiUps, 177-78. 
977 Shih Cheng-feng, Taiwan minzu zhuyi (Taiwanese Nationalism), 166. 
978 UDN, 'Hui' hui yixiu, gaobie siUer nian ziUzheng/jianjie yu nianbiao/li Denghui dasiUji ([cited). 
979 This happened when Lee visited Central America and Africa and stopped halfway in Hawaii. Lee 
delibemtely refused to get off the plane in protest of being denied a visa to enterthe_US. This incident 
clrew the attention of supporters of Taiwan in the Congress. -See tee-Teng-hui, Ii Denghui zmzheng 
gaobai siUiu (A Faitliful Account of Lee Teng-hui's Rule), 264-65. See also Kan, "RL30341," note 62. 
98° Frank H. Murkowski, United States Policy toward CIUna and Taiwan (Senate- May 19, 1994) [internet] 
(1994 [cited Mar 12 2003]), available from http://www.fas.org/news/taiwan/1994/s940519-taiwan.htm. 
981 Ibid., ([cited). 
174 
According to leaked secret and top-secret documents, in June 1994 Lee instructed the 
Taiwan National Security Bureau to establish a secret US$100 million fund to buy 
influence with foreign governments, institutions and individuals. Influential lobbyists, 
think tanks, researchers and politicians with access to Taiwan's lobbying fund thus 
endeavoured to win American public sympathy for Taiwan, to increase US arms sales to 
Taiwan, to support Taiwan's bid for re-entering the UN, and to integrate Taiwan into 
US-Japan theatre-missile-defence (TMD) system.982 Many institutions such as Cassidy 
& Associates, the Pacific Forum, the American Enterprise Institute and the Heritage 
Foundation had business relationships with this lobbying fund; three top Bush appointees 
in the State Department, including Carl Ford Jr. (Assistant Secretary of state for 
intelligence and research}, James Kelly (Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs), John Bolton (Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International 
Security), former Japanese prime minister Ryiitaro Hashimoto, and former Japanese 
Vice-Defence Minister Masahiro Akiyama were all alleged to have been implicated in 
this lobbying fund in the 1990s.983 Of the seven steering committees established by 
Lee's lobbying funds, the Mingde (~t!) Committee exerted the most significant 
influence upon the subsequent relations between the US, Japan and Taiwan.984 
The influence opemtions proved successful. To challenge the regulation that senior 
Taiwan officials tmnsiting the US en route to other countries were not permitted to 
remain in the US for twenty-four hours, Senator Hank Brown, along with other 
Congressional supporters of Taiwan proposed two amendments between July and 
October to ensure that the Taiwan President could enter the US under certain 
982 David Corn, Taiwangate?- Bush Appointees linked to Secret Slush Funds Update [internet] (The 
Nation, Apr 10, 2002 2002 [cited Feb 9 2003]), available from 
http://www.thenation.com/capitalgamesfmdex.mhtml?bid=3&pid=42; Hsieh Chung-liang ~'~~. 
"Guoaqjujuemi wenjian puguang, Li Denghui feifa nuoyong 35 yi (Leaked National Security Agency 
Top-Secret Document Revealed Lee Teng-hui Illegally Misappropriated $3.5 Billion New Taiwan 
Dollars)," Yi Zhoukan (Next Magazine), Mar 21, No. 43 (2002), 10-23; John Pomfret, "Secret Taiwan Fund 
Sought Friends, Influence Abroad," WP, Apr 5 2002. 
983 Com, Taiwan gate? ([cited); Hsieh Chung-liang, "Guoanju juemi wenjian puguang, Li Denghui feifa 
nuoyong 35 yi (Leaked National Security Agency Top-Secret Document Re_vealed Lee Teng-hui Illegally 
~sappropriated $3.5 Billion New Taiwan Dollars)," 11; Pomfret,-"Secret Taiwan Fund Sought Friends, 
Influence Abroad." 
984 Hsieh Chung-liang, "Guoanjujuemi wenjian puguang, Li Denghui feifa nuoyong 35 yi (Leaked 
National Security Agency Top-Secret Document Revealed Lee Teng-hui Illegally Misappropriated $3.5 
Billion New Taiwan Dollars)," 16-19. 
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conditions. 985 In the meantime, Murkowski and his associates pushed the Clinton 
administration to increase contacts with Taiwan. After conducting the ''Taiwan Policy 
Review," the Clinton administration decided in September 1994 to allow the CCNAA to 
change its name to Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office (TECRO), and 
to support Taiwan's membership in international organizations without requirement of 
statehood.986 However, in response to Taipei's second bid for readmission into the UN 
in 1994, the Clinton administration made it clear that the US did not support this bid.987 
The Taiwan Policy Review resulted in a modest increase in contacts with Taiwan. 
Senator Murkowski introduced a resolution on September 28, calling for the US to 
welcome the Taiwan President and other high-level officials to the US; to allow 
unrestricted office calls by all Taiwan representatives to all US departments and agencies; 
to send cabinet-level officials to Taiwan on a regular basis; to support a proposal in the 
UN for formal observer status for Taiwan, a proposal for its full admission into 
international organizations, change the name of Taiwan's representative office in the US 
to the ''Taipei Representative Office"; to approve defensive arms sales to Taiwan based 
solely on its self-defence needs; to upgrade the status of the AIT; to include a report by 
the Secretacy of State to specified congressional committees on US relations with Taiwan; 
and to raise US concerns about the PRC's threat to forcefully reunify with Taiwan. The 
resolution was passed on October 5.988 
1995-96 Taiwan Strait Crises 
Lee's Visit to Cornell University and the Ensuing Crises 
The Mingde project was established in 1994 with the budget interest of part of Lee's 
lobbying funds. It successfully established secret political, intelligence and security 
985 S.AMDT.2150, 103rd Congress; S.AMDT.2462, 103rd Congress. The conditions set by the two 
amendments include: (i) Trade or business with Taiwan that will reduce the U.S.-Taiwan trade deficit; (ii) 
Prevention of nuclear proliferation; (iii) Threats to the national security of the United States; (iv) The 
protection of the global environment; (v) The protection of endangered speci,~~;_or_(iv) RegionaL __ 
humanitarian disasters. -see-also Holdridge,-Crosiing- tlie Divide, -i56; Kan, "RL30341, II note 61. 
986 Kan, "RL30341," note 61. 
981 Ibid. 
988 A Resolution to Express the Sense of the Senate concerning U.S. Relations with Taiwan, 103rd 
Congress, S.RES.270. 
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cooperation between Taiwan, America and Japan and foreshadowed the aggravation of 
cross-Strait relations.989 Financed by Lee's lobbying funds, lobbying firm Cassidy & 
Associates continued to drive for Lee's visit to the Cornell University.990 In March 
1995, three concurrent resolutions were introduced to request that Clinton promptly 
declare that the US would welcome a private visit by Lee to Cornell University.991 On 
April 6, a resolution to amend the TRA to permit visits to the US by the democratically 
elected leadership of Taiwan was introduced in the House. 992 Clinton yielded to 
Congressional pressure and announced his approval of Lee's visa application on May 
22.993 Lee thus delivered his lecture "Always in my heart" at Cornell University on 
June 9. The lecture boasted of Taiwan's economic prosperity, political reforms and 
respect for human rights, and advocated "popular sovereignty" to highlight the 
differences across the Strait.994 He believed that PRC President Jiang Zemin (1_I~~) 
had known about his visit; the deterioration of cross-Strait relations resulted from the rise 
of the hawkish forces in Beijing. 995 The bottom line was that Beijing broke off 
high-level talks on cross-Strait relations and excoriated Lee for attempting to lead 
Taiwan toward independence. On July 21, 1995, the PLA conducted its first 
nuclear-capable M-9 short-range ballistic missile test-firings, and military exercises 
began during the following months. 
China's military intimidation evoked different reactions from the Clinton administration, 
Congress, and Taiwan. Clinton maintained his faith in "one China." A few weeks 
after the PRC's first missile test-firings toward Taiwan, Secretary of State Warren 
989 Hsieh Chong-liang, "Guoanjujuemi wenjian puguang, Li Denghui feifa nuoyong 35 yi (Leaked 
National Security Agency Top-Secret Document Revealed Lee Teng-hui illegally Misappropriated $3.5 
Billion New Taiwan Dollars)," 14, 16. 
990 Ibid., 22; Pomfret, "Secret Taiwan Fund Sought Friends, Influence Abroad." 
991 A Concurrent Resolution Expressing the Sense of the Congress regarding a Private Visit by President 
Lee Teng-hui of the Republic of China on Taiwan to the United States, 104th Congress, S.CON.RES.9; 
Expressing the Sense of the Congress regarding a Private Visit by President Lee Teng-hui of the Republic 
of China on Taiwan to the United States, 104th Congress, H.CON.RES.53; H.CON.RES.33. 
992 To Amend the Taiwan Relations Act to Permit Visits to the United States by the Elected Leaders of the 
People of Taiwan or Their Elected Representatives, 104th Congress, H.R1460. The resolution failed to 
become a section of the TRA. 
993 Kan "RL30341 " ~4 Lee disclosed the author-ofAlway.Hn My HearHo be Jason H:u, then-tiireeto;..<:kn~nil: Gove~ent 
Information Office. Refer to Lee Teng-hui, Li Denghui zhizheng gaobai shilu (A Faithful Account of Lee 
Teng-hui's Rule), 266. 
995 Lee Teng-hui, Yazhou de zhilue (A Strategy of Asia), 239; Tai Kuo-hui, Wang Tso-jung, and Hsia Chen, 
Aizeng Li Denghui (Love and Hatred of Lee Teng-hui), 157. 
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Christopher reportedly delivered a letter from Clinton to Jiang Zemin. In the letter, 
Clinton assured Jiang for the first time of his "Three Noes" policy: the US would oppose 
or resist Taiwan independence; not support ''Two China" or "One China, One Taiwan;" 
and not support Taiwan's entcy to the UN.996 In the meantime, US Congress members 
vehemently denounced China's belligerence while applauding Taiwan's democmcy.997 
Beijing's harsh rhetoric and military provocations caused mixed reactions on Taiwan. 
On the one hand, Beijing's behaviour advance political nationalism. Calling for 
domestic harmony and unity, Lee first proposed "New Taiwanese" in August 1995; he 
argued that anyone who identifies with the interests of Taiwan is a Taiwanese.998 This 
position was identical to the constructumlistic definition of Taiwanese that had been 
proposed by overseas secessionists.999 In December 1995, in response to internal and 
external crises, the DPP Central Standing Committee passed a resolution stating that 
Taiwan's government should include representatives of all political foiCes. 1000 DPP 
Chairman Shih Ming-teh said, "if we come to power, we will not need to, nor will we 
declare independence." 1001 This position softened the 1991 "independence plank." 
He invited the New Party for "Grand Reconciliation" coffee on December 14, 1995. 
Shih and the New Party concluded a symbolic reconciliation between Taiwanese and 
mainlander ethnic groups so as to present a united front to the PRC. On the other hand, 
however, Beijing's intransigence strengthened Taiwanese ethno-nationalism. Shih did 
not win much credit within the DPP. In the climate of primitive and chauvinistic 
ethno-nationalism, many colleagues questioned Shih's integrity, ability and intelligence 
for associating with the New Party that had been impugned by the DPP as PRC "fellow 
tmvellers." Even Peng Ming-min, champion of constructuralistic nationalism, rejected 
the theme of Grand Reconciliation.1002 
Beijing's leadership seemed to disregard the alliance between Lee and many Congress 
996 James Mann, About Face: A History of America's Curious Relations/Up with China, from Nixon to 
Clinton (New York: Vintage, 2000), 330. Also refer to Kan, "RL30341." 
997 See, for example, Shella Jackson-Lee, Taiwan and World Recognition [internet] (Library of Congress, 
1995 [cited Mar 3 2003]), available from http://thomas.loc.gov. 
998 Lee Teng-hui,Taiwande zhuzhang(AnArgrimeiat ofTtilwan), 77. 
999 See page 95 of this thesis. 
1000 Rigger, From Opposition to Power, 103. 
1001 Ibid., 129. 
1002 Ibid., 130. 
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members and discount Taiwanese nationalist sentiment. Taiwan would hold its ninth 
presidential election on March 23, 1996. Hoping to influence the result, Beijing 
announced on March 5 that it would launch another round of successive missile test 
firings and military exercises beginning on March 8. On March 6, the Senate passed a 
resolution condemning the missile tests, called for Beijing to cease its bellicose actions, 
and requested that in accordance with the TRA the President should immediately consult 
with Congress on an appropriate US response to the tests and re-examine the nature and 
quantity of defence articles and services necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a 
sufficient self-defence capability in light of the heightened threat. 1003 The 
administmtive staff objected to the resolution. As scheduled, Beijing conducted missile 
test-firings in two impact areas near Taiwan on March 8, followed by military 
exercises. 1004 
America's Bottom Line on Taiwan Security 
The Clinton administmtion responded with the following comment on March 14, 1996: 
However serious, the present situation does not constitute a threat to Taiwan of the magnitude 
contemplated by the drafters of the TRA. The PRC pressure against Taiwan to date does not add up 
to a "threat to the security or the social or economic system" of Taiwan .... The United States 
recognizes the Government of the PRC as "the sole legal Government of China." The US 
acknowledges the Chinese position that "there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China." In 
1982, the US assured the PRC that it has no intention of pursuing a policy of "Two Chinas" or "One 
China, One Taiwan."1005 
Disgruntled Congress members strongly urged Clinton to re-examine the US-China 
relationship.1006 In the meantime, Lee launched influence opemtions to pressure the 
Clinton administmtion into changing its attitude toward the PLA's military exercise. 
According to news reports, Lee sent his confidant Peng Run-tzu (~~~).president of 
Taiwan Transport Machinery Corpomtion and a member of the Mingde Committee, to 
urge Ryiitaro Hashimoto, Japanese prime minister and also a member of Mingde 
Committee, to ask the US to send troops to protect Taiwan. Ryiitaro Hashimoto's secret 
envoy told Clinton that Tokyo had only two options: Japan would either surrender to 
1003 A Concurrent Resolution Expressing the Sense of the Congress regardi~g Pt:_qposet],!l(is~i[(J]ests fly 
the People'sRepublic~ofChina,104th~CongresS, S~CON.RES.43: - ~- 0 
1004 Lee Teng-hui, Li Denghui zhizheng gaobai shilu (A FaitlifulAccount of Lee Teng-hui's Rule), 268-76. 
toos Kan, "RL30341." 
1006 Craig Thomas, Taiwan Resolution (Senate- March 15, 1996) (Library of Congress, 1996 [cited Mar 
17 2003]), available from http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-binlquery/D?r104: 1./templ-r104Y13XHt. 
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China or establish nuclear force instantly, if the US would not use its military force to 
protect Taiwan. 1007 Moreover, the House overwhelmingly passed a concurrent 
resolution on March 19 to request that the US "maintain a naval presence sufficient to 
keep open the sea lanes in and near the Taiwan Strait" and should "assist in defending 
them against invasion, missile attack, or blockade by the People's Republic of 
China."1008 This gave the people on Taiwan an unrealistic prospect of guaranteed 
American rescue in case of war.1009 The Senate unanimously passed the concurrent 
resolution on March 21. 
Clinton finally bowed to the domestic and allies' pressure. Citing the security clause of 
the TRA, Section 2(b) of which requires the US consider with "grave concern" any 
non-peaceful means to determine Taiwan's future, Clinton sent two carrier battle groups 
to defuse the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis.1010 This was the bottom line of US policy on 
Taiwan. In peacetime, the US deliberately downgraded the strategic significance of 
Taiwan to smooth its association with the PRC. In case of imminent war, the US would 
neutralize the Taiwan Strait, even at the cost of war with the PRC, to ensure Taiwan's 
security. This had been the case in the Cold War era and in 1996 under the terms of the 
TRA. This will be particularly true in future US-PRC strategic competition. 
Lee Teng-hui's Re-election 
On March 20, 1996, Lee claimed 54% of the vote in a field of four candidates in 
Taiwan's first direct presidential election, a sign of the completion of democratisation.1011 
Lee's re-election reinforced his alliance with many Taiwanization-minded Congress 
1007 Hsieh Chung-liang, "Guoanjujuemi weqjian puguang, Li Denghui feifa nuoyong 35 yi (Leaked 
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1009 Liu Xurui and Shi Guoqiang, Li Denghui diguo mori (The End of Lee Teng-hui's Empire), 51. 
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democratisation; see Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth 
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members and conservatives. The election drew an ideological, political and strategic 
line of demarcation between democratic Taiwan and totalitarian China.1012 Many US 
Congress members paid tribute to Lee every year on Inauguration Day, his anniversary in 
office, National Day and in their meetings with Lee. In return, Lee repeatedly stressed 
to US Congress members that Taiwan was a symbol of American value system and 
idealism, freedom and democracy, that Taiwan represented significant geo-strategic 
value, that the PRC was bellicose and infleXible and that China was divided. These 
ceremonial exchanges reaffirmed Sino-US "cultural conflict" and cross-Strait "cultural 
differences." The 1996 direct presidential election also symbolized the alternative 
incarnation of "self-determination." Senator Murkowski urged his colleagues in the 
Senate to give "our continued support as he now moves forward to map out Taiwan's 
destiny." He joined "many friends in Taiwan in celebrating President Lee's triumph as 
Taiwan marks a milestone in civilization's march down the road of 
self-determination." 1013 Moreover, Taiwan's democratisation carried a far more 
important message. As Representative Dan Burton said, "Democracy is not a system of 
government unimportant to Asians." 1014 It is a common thought of American 
politicians that Taiwan has a vital role to play in the peaceful evolution of China. 
As cross-Strait relations worsened, Taiwan's economic viability became a prime concern. 
On July 26, 1996, a resolution was introduced in the House to urge Taiwan's entry to the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) as a separate customs territory without making it 
contingent · upon the previous or simultaneous entry of the PRC. 1015 Many 
conservatives in Washington shared Lee's views that the "Greater China" was more a 
trap than an attraction. Taiwan's admission to the WTO became another point of 
contention between the US and China. 
1012 House Representative Tom Lantos's remark was most typical. See Tom Lantos, Congratualtions to 
President Lee Teng-hui and the People of Taiwan on the First Democratic Election- March 25, 1996 
[internet] (Library of Congress, 1996 [cited Mar 4 2003]), available from 
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DPP's Discourse after 1996 
After the missile crisis and presidential election in March, the DPP moderated its rlletoric 
and took a new emphasis of substantive independence. In the "Manifesto for the 
Taiwan Independence Movement in a New Era" published in May, some secessionism 
activists expressed a preference for substantive over formal independence. The 
document declared: "Taiwan independence does not necessarily require changing the 
name of the country to 'Taiwan.' The national name, flag and anthem are not important 
goals of the Taiwan independence movement." This caused some DPP hardliners to 
announce in August that they would leave the party and establish the Taiwan 
Independence Party (TAIP). 1016 
Congressmen-Lee Alliance vs. Clinton's "One China" 
Entrenched Independence Stance and Strategic Alliance 
On April 17, 1996, Clinton and Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryiitaro (;flfj:$:ft~ 
~B) signed "Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21st Century," 
reaffirming American determination to consolidate its hegemonic position in East 
Asia.1017 The Clinton administration seemed to follow "one China" in principle more 
than in policy. In a speech on "American Interests and the US-China Relationship" on 
May 17, Secretary of State Christopher stated that ''Taiwan has prospered under the 'one 
China' policy," reminded Taiwan to pursue an expanded international role "in a way that 
is consistent with a 'one China' policy," and strongly urged ''both sides to resume the 
cross-Strait dialogue that was interrupted last summer."1018 On June 28, 1996, the US 
and Japan commenced reviewing the Guidelines for Defense Cooperation. This 
inevitably created worry in Beijing. In July, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake 
travelled to China to pursue the "strategic dialogue." Lake scheduled a meeting with 
Wang Daohan (¥~~).chairman of the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan 
1016 Rigger, From Opposition to Power, 129. 
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Strait (ARATS). Although the arrangement was cancelled after Lake's arrival in China, 
it marked a new proactive US stance on cross-Strait relations.1019 
Conservative American politicians and strategists continued to advance their position on 
Taiwan. After the European Parliament adopted a bill supporting Taiwan's participation 
in the community of nations, including the UN, on July 24, the House passed a 
concurrent resolution to endorse the European Parliament's initiative.1020 On October 1, 
1996, Representative David Funderburk warned China that it "must learn to bend, to 
change its old mindset about Taiwan being a province. Taiwan has never been under 
People's Republic of China's jurisdiction." 1021 Meanwhile, Lee entrenched his 
independence stance. In September, Lee broached his "no haste, be patient" policy at a 
National Unification Council meeting. The policy placed restrictions on investment 
more than US$50 million, investments in high technology industries, and investment in 
infrastructure.1022 Despite his pointed reference to restrictions on Taiwanese investment 
in but not on trade with the mainland, the attempt to resist economic integration was 
evident.1023 
In December, Lee convened a National Development Conference, another 
unconventional approach to circumvent the resistance to independence from residual 
KMT loyalists in the state and party apparatus. Lee, his supporters in the KMT, and the 
DPP together claimed that the government of Taiwan province, the biggest bureaucratic 
organisation in the ROC political structure, should be "streamlined" to promote 
administrative efficiency. Lee actually intended to eliminate Taiwan "province" in 
order to refute the PRC's argument that Taiwan was a renegade "province" of China.1024 
According to the Taiwan Solidarity Union (fSU), a fundamentalist party that revered 
Lee as its spiritual leader, removing the "province" system was a follow-up of the 1991 
and 1992 constitutional reforms to break Taiwan away from China and resolve the issue 
1o19 Ibid. 
1020 Endorsing the Adoption by the European Parliament of a Resolution Supporting the Republic of 
China on Taiwan's Efforts at Joining the Community of Nations, 104th Congress,"H.CON.RES.212 . 
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of sovereignty altogether. 1025 This conclusion was realized in Lee's fourth 
constitutional reform in July 1997. Removing the province system not only reinforced 
the independence stance, but also vitiated the power base of mainlander group by 
pushing aside James Soong, the incumbent Governor of Taiwan province.1026 
Very few members of the US Congress considered this strategic alliance with Lee unwise. 
On January 30, 1997, Senator Dianne Feinstein requested that Congressional Record 
publish a speech that she had made to the Asia Society, "China: The Future." In the 
speech, she warned, ''Taiwan must understand that its efforts to assert itself 
internationally cannot be a guise for moving towards independence" and "containment 
[of China] is not in the interest of the United States."1027 However, Congressional 
support for this strategic alliance was overwhelming. Article 5 of the Guidelines for 
US-Japan Defense Cooperation under revision stipulated bilateral "cooperation in 
situations in areas surrounding Japan." Although Japan tended to interpret the scope of 
activities as "situational," the possibility of US-Japan cooperation in any conflict over 
Taiwan was inevitably called into question and was criticized vehemently by the 
PRC.1028 Especially, Japanese political leaders such as Kajiyama Seiroku (Japanese 
Liberal Democratic Party Cabinet Secretary), and Ozawa Ichiro (Liberal Party leader) 
had stated that the Taiwan Strait did indeed fall within the scope of US-Japan bilateral 
cooperation.1029 At the height of the debate over the term "situational," on March 30, 
1997 the New York Times reported that Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich had made it 
absolutely clear in Shanghai how the US would respond to PRC's use of force against 
Taiwan. He told Chinese top leaders that if the PRC attacked Taiwan, "We will defend 
Taiwan. Period." 1030 Therefore, the Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation 
reinforced the faith of secessionist Taiwanese. They were convinced that the US and 
Japan would jointly defend Taiwan in case of war. Lee asserted tltat Japanese Prime 
1025 TSU, A-hui bo jiaoshi: ni buneng bu zhidao de U Denghui (Uncle Hui Classroom: Something You 
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Minister Hashimoto Ryiitaro indicated on April 9 that the 1997 Guidelines would apply 
to areas including Taiwan and the Spratly Islands.1031 
After Gingrich led a Congressional delegation to Asia, House Representative Alcee L. 
Hastings relayed on May 6, 1997 to his colleagues Lee's remarks stressing Taiwan as 
symbol of American values and idealism, freedom and democracy, the geographic 
significance of Taiwan and the fact of a divided China.1032 One month after Hong 
Kong's reversion to China on July 1, 1997, the Senate referred to the Committee of 
Foreign Relations a resolution that stated: 
(1) The transfer of Hong Kong to the People's Republic of China does not alter the current and 
future status of Taiwan; 
(2) The future of Taiwan should be determined by peaceful means through a democratic process 
in accordance with the principle of self-determination, as outlined in the Charter of the United 
Nations; 
(3) The United States should assist in the defence of Taiwan in case of threats or military attack 
by the People's Republic of China against Taiwan. 1033 
The sponsor of the resolution, Senator Torricelli, claimed, "No treaties exist which 
determine the future status of Taiwan, and Taiwan has maintained a de facto 
independence since 1949. The formula of 'one country, two systems' ... has no 
relevance to Taiwan."1034 This resolution marked a third-party's rejection of Beijing's 
"one country, two systems." Noticeably, it amounted to a quasi-formal revival of the 
"undetermined status of Taiwan" which had been suspended since the Nixon 
administration. 
On September 23, 1997, the US and Japan finally adopted the revised Guidelines for 
US-Japan Defense Cooperation. The revised Guidelines reinforced Taiwan's 
independence stance and the strategic alliance between Taiwanization-minded Congress 
1031 Lee Teng-hui, Li Denghui zhizheng gaobai shilu (A Faitliful Account of Lee Teng-hui's Rule), 384. 
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members and Lee. 
The "Three Noes" Policy in 1997,98 Summit Talks 
As more US Congress members became more vocal in their support of Taiwan, the 
Clinton administration deepened its commitment to "one China." In the Joint 
US-China Statement of 1997 Clinton-Jiang Summit in Washington, despite failing to 
satisfy the PRC's desire to have a "fourth Communique," the Clinton administration 
reiterated that "it adheres to its 'one China' policy and the principles set forth in the three 
US-China joint Communiques" with no reference to the TRA at all.1035 At the press 
conference, Clinton expressed the hope that the PRC and Taiwan would resume a 
constructive cross-Strait dialogue and expand cross-Strait exchanges. "Ultimately, the 
relationship between the PRC and Taiwan is for the Chinese themselves to determine -
peacefully." He added that "the most important thing the US can do to facilitate a 
peaceful resolution of the differences is to adhere strictly to the one China policy" and 
"the Chinese people know how to resolve this [differences] when the time is right, and 
we just have to keep saying we hope the time will be right as soon as possible. Sooner is 
better than later."1036 James Mann noted in his About Face: A History of America's 
Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton: 
At this press conference with Jiang Zemin, Clinton seemed to add one potentially important new 
element to the American position on Taiwan ... Before that time, no American president had 
sought to put such time pressure on the need for reunification of China and Taiwan."1037 
However, White House officials later insisted that Clinton's remark was extemporaneous 
and was not intended to change US policy. On October 31, the State Department for 
the first time made public the ''Three Noes" policy: 
We certainly made clear that we have a one-China policy; that we don't support a one-China, 
one-Taiwan policy. We don't support a two-China policy. We don't support Taiwan 
independence, and we don't support Taiwanese membership in organizations that require you to be 
a member state. We certainly made that very clear to the Chinese.1038 
The wording of "oppose or resist efforts by Taiwan to gain independence" in the 
1035 Kan, 11RL30341. 11 For the details regarding the 1997 Summit, see Mann, About Face, 355-56. 
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1995-Three Noes had been changed into a more neutral "don't support Taiwan 
independence." 
TRA vs. Clinton's "Three Noes" 
Alarmed by the Clinton administration's pronounced leaning toward Beijing, the Lee 
camp in Taipei and the conservative camp in Washington reinforced each other in 
defying Clinton's commitment to Beijing. On November 6, 1997, the House passed the 
"United States-Taiwan Anti-Ballistic Missile Defence Cooperation Act." The Act 
reaffirmed the American commitment to the security of Taiwan, peaceful resolution of 
Taiwan issue, Taiwan's strategic significance, PLA's missile threat and the 
''undetermined status of Taiwan." Section 3 (relating to establishment and operation of 
a theatre ballistic missile defence system in the Asia-Pacific region) mandated: 
Not later than July 1, 1998, the Secretary of Defence shall submit to the Committee on National 
Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate a 
report containing ... a description of any existing United States missile defence system that could be 
transferred to Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act in order to allow Taiwan to 
provide for its self-defence against limited ballistic missile attacks. 1039 
Section 4, on the transfer of ballistic missile defence systems to Taiwan, stated: 
It is the sense of the Congress that the President, if requested by the Government of Taiwan and 
in accordance with the results of the study under section 3, should transfer to the Government of 
Taiwan appropriate defence articles or defence services . . . for the purpose of establishing and 
operating a local-area ballistic missile defence system to protect Taiwan ... 1040 
The resolution was passed with a remarkable margin of 245-175. The tug of war 
between the US legislative and executive branches continued. Representative Sherrod 
Brown introduced a bill on February 12, 1998 to request the US government's support 
for Taiwan's representation in the World Health Organization (WHO). Forty-five 
colleagues agreed to co-sponsor. 1041 On June 27, 1998, at the 1998 Clinton-Jiang 
Summit in Beijing, Clinton reaffirmed "one China" policy to Jiang and urged the pursuit 
1039 This act was first introduced on September 3, 1997. To Implement the Provisions of the Taiwan 
Relations Act concerning the Stability and Security of Taiwan and United States Cooperation with Taiwan 
on the Development and Acquisition-Of Defensive Military A.iiick~-[;, United States-Taiwan Anti-Ballistic 
Missile Defense Cooperation Act), 105th Congress, H.R.2386. 
1040 Ibid. 
1041 Relating to Taiwans participation in the World Health Organization, 105th Congress, 
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of cross-Strait discussions.1042 On June 30, Clinton informally reiterated his ''Three 
Noes" policy: 
I had a chance to reiterate our Taiwan policy, which is that we don't support independence for 
Taiwan, or Two Chinas, or one Taiwan-one China. And we don't believe that Taiwan should be a 
member in any organization for which statehood is a requirement. So I think we have a consistent 
policy. Our only policy has been that we think it has to be done peacefully. That is what our law 
says, and we have encouraged the cross-Strait dialogue.1043 
In response to Clinton's ''Three Noes" policy, concerned members in both the Senate and 
the House overwhelmingly passed resolutions (92-0 in the Senate on July 10 and 390-1 
in the House on July 2), reaffirming the US commitment to Taiwan in accordance with 
the TRA.1044 On July 22, 58 Representatives sponsored a resolution to reconsider the 
issue of Taiwan's entry to the WH0!045 Representative Gerald B. H. Solomon repeated 
the WHO issue on October 7 to mitigate Taipei's difficulty resulting from Clinton's 
''Three Noes" policy; the House unanimously passed the concurrent resolution on 
October 10!046 
Jigsaw Puzzles in the Taiwan Independence Roadmap 
Lee's Neo-Taiwanese-ism for Cultural Assimilation 
On July 22, 1998, Lee delivered a speech on the future of Taiwan to the National 
Unification Council. Explicitly, he reaffirmed the intention for peaceful reunification. 
However, he reiterated "one divided China," rejected "one country, two systems," 
stressed Taiwan's geo-strategic importance, expressed hope for admission to 
international organization, and criticized Clinton's ''Three Noes" policy. Representative 
Benjamin A. Gilman urged his colleagues on August 6 to read this "provoking and 
insightful" speech and asked for its inclusion in the Congressional Record. 1047 
Representative Robert Smith repeated Lee's message to his colleagues on September 
1042 Kan, "RL30341. II 
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24!048 On October 9, 1998, Representative Gerald Solomon not only repeated these 
similar points in the Congress but also called for his colleagues to support Lee's 
nomination for the Nobel Peace Prize.1049 
As some Congress members hurried to nominate Lee for the Nobel Peace Prize, he was 
in fact sailing the state between self-destructive ethnic conflicts at home and sensitive 
mainland policy across the Strait. In the past, Lee had used divisive structuralism and 
cooperated with the DPP's ethno-nationalism in an attempt to remove the control of 
mainlander elites on the one hand; on the other hand, he proposed constructuralistic 
arguments such as "shengming gongtongti'' and "popular sovereignty'' to remedy ethnic 
conflict and ideological cleavage. To deal with the escalation of ideological and ethnic 
conflicts that were created by the power struggle at home, on October 24, 1998, the eve 
of Taiwan Retrocession Day, Lee formally proposed his neo-Taiwanese-ism. This 
called for the four main ethnic groups to disregard the demarcation between unification 
and independence camps in the interest of national unity, "regardless of the time of their 
arrival, their mother tongue or their geographical origins."1050 Neo-Taiwanese-ism is 
inherently antagonistic to Chinese nationalism; Lee hoped the new, consolidated 
Taiwanese would fight against the rival power China. 1051 Following "shengming 
gongtongti'' and "popular sovereignty," neo-Taiwanese-ism was Lee's third 
constructuralistic argument to inspire the diversified ethnic groups for a new nation and 
to impose a new vision of nation-building. It was the culmination of Lee's agenda. To 
live up to his duty· as KMT chairman, Lee bestowed upon mainlander KMT candidate 
Ma Ymg-Jeou C~~JL) the title of "new Taiwanese" to help him in the 1998 year-end 
campaign for Mayor of Taipei against incumbent Chen Shui-bian.1052 After Ma won 
the election, he established the "New Taiwanese Foundation." 
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Synergy in the China-US-Taiwan Power Struggle 
Lee's allies in Congress continued to advance Taiwan's defence capability, economic 
viability and political independence in global society. More resolutions were passed to 
support Taiwan's participation in international organizations such as the WHO, to 
promote the TRA, and to address the issue of military balance across the Strait. The 
Department of Defence completed its mandated report of ''The Security Situation in the 
Taiwan Straif' on February 1, 1999.1053 The report intensified controversy on whether 
the US should provide ballistic missile defence systems to Taiwan despite vehement 
criticism from Beijing. Representative Dana Rohrabacher introduced a resolution on 
March 11, 1999 to express grave Congressional concerns over the PRC's growing 
arsenal of nuclear and conventionally armed ballistic missiles, the movement of those 
missiles into a closer geographic proximity to Taiwan, and the effect that military 
build-up might have on stability in the Taiwan Strait.1054 On March 24, 1999, Senators 
Helms and Torricelli jointly introduced S.693, the ''Taiwan Security Enhancement Act" 
(fSEA). Senator Helms questioned Clinton's ''Three Noes" policy, elaborated that 
TSEA sought to suppress 1982 August 17 Communique, promoted arms sales to Taiwan, 
required the President to make annual report on Taiwan's defence requests, and redressed 
Taiwan's readiness deficiencies resulting from its isolation in the past two decades by 
enhancing bilateral military exchanges, joint training, and establishing direct 
communication.1055 
To allay the pressure from the Congress, some prominent officials in the Clinton 
administration made a laundry list of suggestions for resumption of cross-Strait talks 
since January 1998. On March 24, Assistant Secretary of State Stan Roth proposed the 
"interim agreement" across the Strait.1056 fu response to Senator Jesse Helms' questions 
about Clinton's ''Three Noes" policy, Stan Roth cited the precedents: a 1971 statement 
by Kissinger, a 1972 statement by Nixon, a 1979 statement by Deputy Secretary of State 
1053 DoD, ''The~security Situation in ttie Taiwan Strait," (1999). 
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Warren Christopher, and President Reagan's 1982 Communique.1057 In the meantime, 
many secessionist Taiwanese joined the melee in Washington DC. In April1999, DPP 
Legislator Tsai Tung-jung led a delegation from Taiwan to lobby for TSEA on Capitol 
Hill. He and some of the delegates were scheduled to meet Carl Ford, Asia specialist in 
the Pentagon.1058 In addition, supporters of the secessionist Formosan Association for 
Public Affairs (FAPA) and the Taiwan independence movement campaigned in the 
Washington Post for the passage of the TSEA.1059 Accordingly, the House introduced 
another version of the TSEA, H.R.1838, on May 18, 1999.1060 
Military balance across the Strait became the focus of attention. Senator Trent Lott 
introduced an amendment on May 26 to direct the Secretary of Defence to submit to the 
Congress a report by February 1 of each year, in both classified and unclassified form, 
detailing the security situation in the Taiwan Strait.1061 He introduced S.AMDT.576, on 
June 8 to direct the Office of Net Assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defence 
and the United States Pacific Command to address all gaps in military balance, and direct 
the US National Defence University and other defence research centres to perform 
further research and analysis.1062 Both amendments became parts of two separate laws 
in October 1999.1063 
The events since the early 1990s illustrate a cyclic pattern of interaction between the 
Clinton administration, Taiwanization-minded Congress members and conservatives, Lee 
Teng-hui, and the Beijing leadership. When Clinton strengthened his "one China" 
commitment or Beijing pressed its goals on Taiwan, Lee responded by insisting upon "a 
divided China," rejection of "one country, two systems" and the ideological, political and 
strategic demarcation of democratisation. Taiwanization-minded Congress members 
and conservatives criticized Clinton's commitment to China, decried Beijing's military 
build-up and intimidation, echoed Lee's arguments and aspirations, emphasized the 
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cross-Strait differences and promised more effective assistance and commitment to the 
security of Taiwan. Congressional support fuelled Lee's assertion about his agenda on 
identity and cross-Strait relations and assured the progress of Taiwanization, which in 
tum antagonized Beijing leaders, who then resorted to rhetorical and military 
intimidation against Taiwan and rushed the Clinton administration for more commitment 
to "one China."1064 Thus the cycle repeated itself. Any move could trigger a new 
cycle to strengthen the "one China" commitment but at the same time reinforce the 
Congress-Lee alliance. This demonstrates a synergy in the trilateral power struggle 
between China, America and Taiwan. This explains why the US simultaneously 
advanced relations with China and Taiwan against competing needs across the Strait in 
the 1990s. 
Discourses on Taiwan's Future toward the End of the 20th Century 
DPP's "Resolution on Taiwan's Future" 
The DPP had been gaining ground in local elections since its foundation. The DPP's 
advance in popularity from the early 1990s on was due in large part to the extremely 
poor governance of the KMT, with rising corruption and a deterioriation in law and order. 
In addition, Lee's assistance and straightforward Congressional support helped its 
advance. In the county magistrate elections on November 29, 1997, the DPP claimed 
43% of the votes and won twelve seats, administering 71.59% of the population on 
Taiwan.1065 Lee's Taiwanization originated as a local triumph. This victory brought 
euphoria for independence activists. However, some moderates in the DPP took the 
rising economic integration across the Strait into consideration. In February 1998, the 
DPP held a symposium on China policy. Hsu Hsin-liang proposed "dadan xijin" <*life 
iZ§~. Go West Boldly), advocating deeper economic engagement with the PRC. He 
argued that the best way to avoid forcible "annexation" was to integrate the mainland 
Chinese and Taiwanese economies and embed Taiwan in international economic 
institutions. Formosa faction leaders believed that direct postal, trade, and 
1064
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transportation links with the mainland would deter PRC aggression.1066 His close ally 
Shih Ming-teh suggested that Taiwan consider a commonwealth arrangement with the 
mainland.1067 But the New Tuie faction strongly opposed moderation on the cause of 
independence. 1068 
DPP' s mainstream believed that maintaining status quo or de facto independence instead 
of declaring de jure independence best served the electoral requirement of Taiwan. To 
allay people's fear of reckless declaration of independence and to launch the campaign 
for the presidency in 2000, the DPP National Party Congress reached a compromise and 
on May 8, 1999 passed the "Resolution on Taiwan's Future": 
DPP leaders have. consistently reiterated that the party will not provoke China by declaring 
independence or otherwise, nor will the DPP call for a referendum on the issue as long as the 
current political environment's status quo remain unchanged .... Therefore, unless Taiwan's 
independent sovereignty is immediately threatened, the DPP will not initiate calls to hold a 
referendum on Taiwan independence, even when the party comes to power.1069 
This resolution formally recognized de facto independence as established independence. 
It was a compromise between hardliners and moderates. Shortly thereafter, some 
heavyweight moderates such as Hsu Hsin-liang and Shih Ming-teh were forced to resign 
from the DPP. The DPP became increasingly fundamental in its quest for 
independence. 
Lee's "Special State-to-State Relationship" 
As Lee's term of office drew to a close, he became more aggressive in his secessionist 
agenda. On July 9, 1999, during an interview by Deutsche Welle, he argued: 
Since the PRC's establishment, the Chinese communists have never ruled Taiwan, Penghu, 
Jin-men, and Ma-zu, which have been under the jurisdiction of the Republic of China .... Since our 
constitutional reform in 1991, we have designated cross-Strait ties as nation-to-nation, or at least as 
special state-to-state ties, rather than internal ties within "one China" between a legitimate 
government and a rebellion group, or between central and local govemments.1070 
Moreover, there were well-grounded allegations that Lee attempted to aggrandize the 
1066 Rigger, From Opposition to Power, 130. 
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power of the National Assembly and extend the Assembly members' terms of office in 
order to put his "special state-to-state relationship" into the constitution; he even 
attempted to extend his own tenure to ensure "special state-to-state relationship" would 
be part of the next constitutional refonn.1071 However, under questioning from AIT 
Director Darryl Norman Johnson about whether the argument of "special state-to-state 
relationship" had deviated from the ROC constitution, Lee still vigorously defended his 
goal for unification with Mainland China.1072 On July 22, Lee took great pains to 
assure Richard Bush, AIT/Washington Director, that he adamantly opposed Taiwan's 
independence but approved of peaceful unification.1073 
Clinton's '7hree Pillars" Policy 
Lee's "special state-to-state relationship" immediately escalated the tensions across the 
Strait and intensified the tug of war between the US executive and legislative branches. 
Clinton issued his ''Three Pillars" policy on July 21, 1999. On the question of whether 
the US was obligated to defend Taiwan militarily if it abandoned the one China policy 
and would continue to provide military aid if Taiwan pursued separatism, he stated: 
Well, let me say frrst of all, a lot of those questions are governed by the Taiwan Relations Act, 
which we intend to honor. Our policy is clear: We favor the one China policy; we favor the 
cross-Strait dialogues. The understanding we have had all along with both China and Taiwan is that 
the differences between them would be resolved peacefully. 1074 
US Conservatives' Urge to End the "Ambiguity Strategy'' 
On that day, Helms, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee said that Lee's 
statement had "created an opportunity to break free from the anachronistic, 
Beijing-inspired one-China policy which has imprisoned US policy toward China and 
Taiwan for years." 1075 On July 29, Representative Sherrod Brown urged the US 
government to adopt a "One China, One Taiwan" policy that would reflect the reality 
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that Taiwan and China were two separate nations.1076 On July 30, Senator Slade Gorton 
excoriated Clinton's "constructive engagement" with China, defended Lee's statement as 
reasonable, and requested the article "On the Wrong Side," a conservative Washington 
Post column by Michael Kelly, be inserted as into the Congressional Record.1071 On 
August 20, twenty-three members of the conservative Heritage Foundation and the 
Project for the New American Century, including Richard Armitage and Paul Wolfowitz, 
issued the "Statement on the Defence of Taiwan," which stated: 
It has ... become essential that the United States make every effort to deter any form of Chinese 
intimidation of the Republic of China on Taiwan and declare unambiguously that it will come to 
Taiwan's defence in the event of an attack or a blockade against Taiwan ... 
The United States should also make clear that ... the future of Taiwan must reflect the will of 
the people of Taiwan as expressed through their duly elected government. If the people of Taiwan 
do not want to be united with the mainland until China becomes a democracy, the United States has 
a moral obligation and strategic imperative to honor that determination. 
Efforts by the Clinton administration to pressure Taipei to cede its sovereignty and to adopt 
Beijing's understanding of "One China" are dangerous and directly at odds with American strategic 
interests, past US policy, and American democratic ideals. 
The time for strategic and moral "ambiguity" with regard to Taiwan has passed. We urge the 
administration and leaders in Congress to make a clear statement of America's commitment to the 
people of Taiwan. Such a commitment is consonant with our nation's interests and ideals, and will 
help ensure peace in :East Asia. 1078 
To defend the Clinton administration's position, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 
Susan Shirt proposed on September 5 "one country, three systems" as a possible 
approach for "one China."1079 On September 7, Representative Gilman, Chairman of 
the International Relations Committee, wrote to Clinton that it was a "common 
misperception" that Washington officially conceded that Beijing was the capital of the 
"one China" that included Taiwan. He urged, ''under no circumstances should the 
United States move toward Beijing's version of 'one China'." 1080 At the 1999 
Clinton-Jiang APEC Meeting, on September 11, Clinton defused the crisis by reaffirming 
his policy on Taiwan: 
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My message is that our policy has not and will not change. We favor one China. We favor a 
peaceful approach to working out the differences. We favor the cross-Strait dialogue. Our policy has 
not changed and it will not change.1081 
The US had remained outside the debate on whether to place the issue of the ROC's 
membership on the agenda of the General Assembly, since Taipei launched the first 
annual appeal in 1993. On September 15 1999, the Clinton administration declared for 
the first time that the US opposed Taiwan's bid to re-enter the UN.1082 
An earthquake measuring 7.3 on the Richter scale struck Taiwan on September 21. 
This disaster delayed but did not interrupt the escalation of tension. Preoccupied with 
the struggle on the diplomatic arena, Beijing was insensitive to the sufferings of the 
Taiwanese people. The two amendments on Taiwan security introduced by Senator 
Lott became a section of two separate laws in October. 1083 Despite the great 
international pressure and the seismic catastrophe, Lee continued to repeat his "special 
state-to-state relationship" in Foreign Affairs in November. 1084 By the end of 
November 1999, in the Appropriation Act for the Fiscal Year 2000, the US Congress 
consolidated its position in terms of consultations on arms sales to Taiwan, military 
balance across the Strait and participation of Taiwan in international organizations.1085 
Then on February 1, 2000, the House overwhelmingly passed the TSEA by a vote of 
341-70. Stressing the political antithesis across the Strait, the TSEA called on the US to 
"maintain the capacity to resist any form of coercion that jeopardizes the security, or the 
social or economic system, of the people of Taiwan."1086 Chairman of the House 
International Relations Committee Benjamin A. Gilman issued a challenge to Clinton 
over his opposition to the TSEA bill. 1087 
Beijing's 2000 White Paper and Premier Zhu Rongji's Warning 
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Other Purposes, 106th Congress, H.R.3194. It became PL106-113 on November 29, 1999. 
1086 Taiwan Security Enhancement Act. 
1087 Benjamin A Gilman, Gilman Challenges Clinton over Taiwan [internet] (USDOS, 2000 [cited Mar 
11 2003]), available from http://usinfo.state.gov/regionallealuschina/giltaiw.htm. 
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Mao Zedong had claimed that China would be patient in the goal of reunification and 
recognized that a cross-Strait solution might require decades; however, subsequent 
leaders viewed the Taiwan issue with greater urgency and "feared that continuation of 
the existing de facto situation could lead to the permanent separation of Taiwan rather 
than to reunification."1088 On February 21, just weeks before Taiwan's presidential 
election, Beijing issued The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue, which declared: 
The so-called controversy about democracy and system is an excuse for obstructing the 
reunification of China. In recent years the Taiwan authorities have repeatedly declared that 
"democratisation on the China mainland is the key to the reunification of China" and that ''the real 
essence of the cross-Straits issue is a contest between systems." This is an excuse for postponing 
and resisting reunification ... 1089 
Beijing thus created a new, third condition for the use of force against Taiwan, "if the 
Taiwan authorities refuse, sine die, the peaceful settlement of cross-Straits reunification 
through negotiations."1090 This time Beijing's arbitrary rebuff of democracy and new 
threat to Taiwan caused tremendous concern. This white paper was seen as the latest 
attempt to interfere with the upcoming Taiwan presidential election and to warn the US. 
The white paper elicited wide criticism from the Clinton administration, the Pentagon, 
Congress, academia and the American media. 1091 White House spokesman Joe 
Lockhart said on February 22 that the US viewed any threat to Taiwan with "grave 
concern" and indicated that the US would respond by sending aircraft-carrier battle 
groups to support the fledgling democracy just as it did in the 1996 Taiwan Strait 
Crisis.1092 On the same day, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Helms and 
House International Relations Committee Chairman Gilman issued separate statements 
saying they were "deeply concerned" by the PRC's new threats to Taiwan. 1093 
According to Gilman: 
1088 Barnett, U.S. Arms Sales: The China-Taiwan Tangle, 22. 
1089 TAO, The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue [internet] (2000 [cited Mar 10 2003]), available 
from http://english.peopledaily.com.cnlfeaturesltaiwanpaperltaiwan.html. The ftrst White Paper on Taiwan 
was issued in August 1993. 
1090 Ibid., ([cited). The ftrst two ifs are: if a grave turn of events occurs leading to the separation of 
Taiwan from China in any name, or if Taiwan is invaded and occupied by foreign countries. 
1091 Tsao Chang-ching lfntff. Zhongguo dui Tai baipishu zao quanqiu qianze (China's White Paper 
Caused Global Condemnation) [internet] (Asia Democracy Foundation, 2000 [cited Mar 11 2003]), 
available from http://asiademo.org/2000/03/20000304a.htJ!1~" __ _ __ _ __ _ _. _ _ _ 
1092
-Reutets;"Wa.mings-to-China.:.WashiDgfoiiTilis Threats to Taiwan Very Seriously," ABC News, Feb 
22 2000. 
1093 Jesse Helms and Benjamin A Gilman, Text: Chairmen Helms, Gilman Statements on Threats against 
Taiwan (Congressional Foreign Affairs Leaders 'Deeply Concerned') [internet] (USDOS, 2000 [cited Mar 
11 2003]), available from http://usinfo.state.gov/regionallea/uschinalhelmsgl.htm. 
197 
It is a clear example of bow the Clinton administration bas led Beijing to believe the United 
States will not stand behind its moral and security commitments to Taiwan. 
The administration's policy of accommodation toward Beijing is proving to be ineffective and is 
destabilizing the region. A firmer stance toward Beijing is required. 1094 
On February 23, Undersecretary of Defence Walter B. Slocombe warned China that it 
would face "incalculable consequences" if it followed through on threats to use force 
against Taiwan.1095 In late February, the news media, including the four national papers, 
the New York Tzmes, the Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal and the Los Angeles 
Tzmes, published editorials condemning Beijing for its reckless action and showing 
sympathy toward Taiwan.1096 Lee seized the chance to step up his influence operations 
in Washington. According to the Washington Post: 
The Mingde Committee also used Cassidy to lobby for increased arms sales to Taiwan. Among 
the Cassidy lobbying team at the time was Carl W. Ford Jr., now assistant secretary of state for 
intelligence and research. Taiwanese officials said Ford helped fashion a March 1, 2000, letter to 
then-President Clinton from then-Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-MS.) suggesting that congressional 
approval of permanent normal trade relations with China might depend on the Clinton 
administration's moving "promptly" to approve Taiwan's weapons request. 
Ford also testified before Congress, where be was identified as a consultant to the Taiwan 
Research Institute, in favor of major arms sales, including destroyers equipped with the Aegis radar 
system, a view that goes further than the current Bush administration. The Mingde group also 
arranged for Ford to travel to Taiwan in 2000 during George W. Bush's presidential election 
campaign. documents and Taiwanese officials said.1097 
On March 15, in response to a Hong Kong reporter's question on the "three ifs" 
mentioned in The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue, Chinese Premier Zhu 
Rongji (~£) asserted that some people in some specific country have been viewing 
China as a potential enemy, using Taiwan as an unsinkable "aircraft carrier'' to oppose 
China and intending the Taiwan issue to be postponed indefinitely. He added: ''These 
people would be happy to see the Taiwan issue drag on indefinitely. . .. There have also 
been threats of retaliation, possibly armed intervention, against China if it tries to settle 
the Taiwan issue."1098 Next, asked by a Singaporean reporter about his opinion on the 
1094 Ibid., ([cited). 
1095 Dumbaugh, "IB98034."; Steven Mufson and Helen Dewar, "Pentagon Issues Warning to China-U.S. 
Officials Criticize Beijing's Broadening of Reasons to Use Force Against Taiwan," WP, Feb 23 2000, 16. 
1096 Tsao Cbang-ching, Zlwngguo dui Tai baipishu ~ q~iu qianze (China's White Paper-Caused 
Global-CondemnationF([Cited)". - - - -- --
1097 Pomfret, "Secret Taiwan Fund Sought Friends, Influence Abroad." 
1098 Zhongyang dang'anguan, ed./1eds., Zlwngguo gongchandang bashinian zhengui dangan (Valuable 
Documents of Chinese Communists in the Past Eighty Years), 1769-70. See also CNN, Zhu: China Will 
Never Allow Taiwan to Declare Independence ([cited). 
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rising popularity of secessionist Chen Shui-bian, Zhu seriously warned, "Taiwan tongbao, 
nimen yao jingti a Ca1Jt!QJOOl • ffr\f11~ff·r~lllij; My Taiwanese fellows, you must be 
alert) !" 1099 
A few hours later, Gilman released a statement regretting the PRC official's statements 
"designed to intimidate the Taiwanese people into voting for a candidate acceptable to 
China." He hoped that the Taiwanese would "ignore these contemptible threats" and 
said: 
It is also regrettable that the Chinese have turned to blaming the United States for the problems 
in their relationship with Taiwan. It seems to me that the refusal to renounce the use of force, an 
unprecedented military buildup, and threatening rhetoric against Taiwan would be more central to 
the difficulties in the relationship. The United States has been key to the peace and stability that we 
have seen across the Taiwan Strait for over 50 years."uoo 
The Fruition of Nationalism and the Accomplishment of Taiwanization 
Zhu Rongji's warning caused a backlash on Taiwan. Many were fed up with Beijing's 
rlletoric and military intimidation. When Lien Chan (~~) stated, "if Chen is elected, 
young men would have to trade in their 'A-bian' knitted caps for bullet-proof helmets," 
these remarks came uncomfortably close to siding with Beijing.1101 Many believed that 
Lee Teng-hui again practiced a "dump-save" strategy. That some of Chen's important 
endorsements came from Lee's allies or close friends, including native industrial tycoon 
Hsu Wen-lung (~3tft), was offered as evidence of conspiracy. Hsu suggested 
publicly that Chen was the most appropriate heir to Lee's legacy. 1102 On March 18, 
Chen and his running mate Lu Hsiu-lien (§3§:~. Annette Lu) were elected president 
and vice president of the ROC, with 39.3% of the votes. James Soong claimed 36.84% 
and Lien Chan 23.1%.1103 Obviously, Chen had benefited by the "dump-save" effect 
between cognate but divided James Soong and Lien Chan. DPP's victory in 2000 
election marked the first transfer of power and advanced the Taiwanese nationalists' 
1099 Zhongyang dang'anguan. ed.,"'eds., Zhong guo gongchandang bashinian zhengui dangan (Valuable 
Documents of Chinese Communists in the Past Eighty Years), 1770-71. 
uoo Benjamin A. Gilman, Gilman Blasts Chinese Intimidation of Taiwan [internet] (USDOS, 2000 [cited 
Mar 11 2003]), available from http://usinfo.state.gov/regio~~\1S~bjpa/gilmn315.htm. 
uo_1 Rigger; From Opposition tcJPower, -193~ - - - · 
ll02 Ibid., 193-94. 
uo3 Xuanju nianduji leibie yilan biao (A Table of Election Years and Categories), [internet] (Central 
Election Commission, Dec 24 2003 2003 [cited Jan 4 2004]), available from 
http:l/210.69.23.140/cec/cechead.asp. 
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aspiration for "self-determination." 
However, the voting results reflected the wounds of ethnic division and identity struggle. 
Secessionist Chen Shui-bian won only 39.3% of the votes. Pro-unification Soong and 
Lien together claimed 59.94%. Had there been no "dump-save" effect, Soong could 
have become president-elect. Lien and Soong originally attempted to campaign as a 
team, with one as the presidential candidate and the other as the vice presidential 
candidate; but this plan was strongly opposed by Lee Teng-hui and thus aborted. 
Noticeably, although Soong dropped out of the KMT and ran as a maverick, he organized 
a "New Taiwanese Service Team" to draw support. Consequently, despite all the 
difficulties of ethnic conflicts and the cleavage of national identity, "neo-Taiwanese-ism" 
has become the political consensus about the future of Taiwan. It is a natural 
by-product of Taiwanization. 1104 "Neo-Taiwanese-ism" represents the fruition of 
constructuralism, which produces the seeds of political and ideological harmony and 
symbolizes the preliminary accomplishment of intra-island cultural assimilation or 
Tai wanization, though it may take decades to repair the damage done by ethnic conflict 
and ideological cleavage. The accomplishment of cultural assimilation, or 
Tai wanization, has far more significant implications. The consolidation of "new 
Taiwanese" constructuralism may seal Taiwan as a cultural bastion of America in the 
epochal Sino-US struggle. 
Congress was very satisfied with the election result. In late March, Congress passed 
two concurrent resolutions to congratulate the people of Taiwan for the successful 
conclusion of their presidential elections.nos 
Summary 
Since 1990, Lee's democratisation sought to produce an exclusive Taiwan identity; the 
1104 George Woei Tsai, "The Politics ofTaiwanisation (I): ~s.e oU.lewTaiwanism," inTaiwansation: Its 
Origin-and-Politics; ed; Natioiuil UniversitY ofS1ngai)Qre(Singapore: World Scientific, 2001), 3. 
1105 A Concurrent Resolution Congratulating the People of Taiwan for the Successful Conclusion of 
Presidential Elections on March 18, 2000, 106th Congress, S.CON.RES.99; Congratulating the People of 
Taiwan for the Successful Conclusion of Presidential Elections on March 18, 2000, 106th Congress, 
H.CON.RES.292. 
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ultimate goal of his democratisation was Taiwanization, which would secure the 
Taiwanese domination of Taiwan and break Taiwan away from China. This was 
identical with US-anticipated, separatist Taiwanization, which would secure ethnic 
Taiwanese political domination of the island and include members of mainlander elites in 
the process. The support from the US Congress and the Bush administration reinforced 
Lee's agenda. The strategic realignment was dedicated to the promotion of Taiwan's 
economic viability and political independence in the international community and the 
island republic's defence capability. 
Lee used divisive structuralism and connived with the DPP's ethno-nationalism to push 
the mainlander elites aside. 1106 The departure of the mainlander elites in 1993 
symbolized another victory of Taiwanese structuralism and another extended legacy of 
American aid. Lee also launched constitutional reforms to materialize secessionist 
institutional changes, advance his domination of the power apparatus and aggrandize the 
DPP. He delivered his identity agenda to the rancour of domestic mainlander groups 
and the cross-Strait agenda to the hostility of Mainland China. 
Domestic politics in America and Taiwan after late 1992 witnessed more calls to support 
Taiwan in accordance with "democracy" and "self-determination" and expedited bilateral 
strategic realignment. After the collapse of the Communist bloc, the US legalized the 
primacy of the TRA over the August 17 Communique to advance its arms sales to 
Taiwan in the name of maintaining regional peace and stability. The goal of 
Taiwanization prompted many Congress members and conservatives to establish a 
strategic alliance with Lee in the name of supporting democratisation; the latter then 
used clandestine lobbying funds to reinforce his relationship with the former. In the 
climate of US-Taiwan strategic realignment, a unique synergy effect enabled the US to 
advance its relations simultaneously with China and Taiwan; the strategic alliance 
between many US Congress members and Lee helped dismiss Clinton's faith in "one 
China," counter Beijing's rhetoric and military intimidation, and assure Taiwanization. 
The 1996 presidential election symbolized the completion of democratisation and the 
1106 For the definition of structuralism. see page 89 of this thesis. 
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alternative incarnation of "self-determination." However, Lee's structuralism and 
connivance with etbno-nationalism worsened ethnic conflict and ideological cleavage. 
Because Tai wanization requires the inclusion of members of mainlander elites during 
ethnic Taiwanese rise to dominate the political arena, to remedy these maladies, unite the 
diversified ethnic groups and impose a new vision of nation-building, Lee proposed 
constructuralistic arguments such as "shengming gongtongti," "popular sovereignty" and 
"new Taiwanese." 
Taiwanization was accomplished in 2000. Despite the crises of ethnic conflicts and 
ideological cleavage, "neo-Taiwanese-ism" has become the political consensus about the 
future of Taiwan. It is a natural by-product of Taiwanization, represents the fruition of 
constructuralism, and symbolizes the preliminary accomplishment of cultural 
assimilation or Taiwanization. In retrospect, Taiwanization resulted from 
democratisation, domination of political agenda by Taiwanese nationalists, 1107 ambience 
of US-Taiwan strategic realignment, and the maturity of political nationalism. The 
consolidation of "new Taiwanese" constructuralism may indefinitely seal Taiwan as a 
cultural bastion of America in the epochal Sino-US struggle. 
1107 Taiwanese nationalists here include not only the ethnic Taiwanese-dominated opposition party DPP, 
but also president Lee Teng-hui and his native supporters in the political and business field. Together, 
they are immensely strong and influencial. 
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Chapter 6: Since 2000 
STRATEGIC SYMBIOSIS AND 
THE DISPERSION OF TAIWANESE NATIONALISM 
Introduction 
After the pro-independence DPP took power in 2000, the government seemed 
dissatisfied with the alternative incarnation of self-determination with the completion of 
democratisation and Taiwanization, but eager for the adventure beyond de facto 
independence. Congress became increasingly adamant in consolidating its position on 
Taiwan. Many advisors of presidential candidate George W. Bush repeatedly issued 
hawkish opinions against China. In late October 2000, China had made clear in its 
biggest military show in thirty-five years that it viewed the US as potential enemy 
Nqmber One.1108 As a result, the crisis-prone Taiwan Strait has become a regional 
flashpoint. The US-China strategic competition is a realistic phenomenon. The US 
and Taiwan need each other more than ever to expand their mutual interests and prepare 
for the worst. 
This chapter shows how Washington and Taipei have cooperated to prepare for 
US-China strategic competition. The focus here is the central argument of strategic 
symbiosis. The chapter first demonstrates how Sino-US strategic competition 
facilitates US-Taiwan strategic symbiosis and explores the essence of this symbiotic 
partnership. It then studies the impact of the September 11,2001 (9/11) Incident on this 
partnership. The following section examines how and why the referendum and new 
constitution have come to dominate the trilateral interaction in the Taiwan Strait. 
Finally, the chapter explores the implication of Chen Shui-bian's re-election in 2004. 
1108 Associated Press, Eyeing Taiwan, Balkans, China Prepares Scenarios for War with U.S. [internet] 
(CNN, 2000 [cited Dec 5 2004]), available from 
bttp://arcbives.cnn.com/2000/ASIANOW/east/10/22/china.gunningforamerica.ap/. 
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Chen's Initial Policies and the US 
The Compromising "Five Noes" and the "New Middle Way" 
After the 2000 election, maverick James Soong established the People First Party (PFP). 
The New Party, PFP and many .KMT reformist elites were eager to redeem the honour of 
their spiritual leader Chiang Ching-kuo, rehabilitate the KMT and prevent the DPP from 
rushing for declaring independence. Because the main colour of the party flag of the 
.KMT is blue, the three cognate opposition parties coalesced to form an ideologically 
pro-unification pan-blue camp. Considering Clinton's faith in "one China," Beijing's 
hostility and the prospective containment by the looming pan-blue camp, Chen 
cautiously proposed in his May 20 inauguration speech a compromising "Five Noes" 
policy: he will "not declare independence," "not change the national title," "not push 
forth the inclusion of the so-called "state-to-state" description in the Constitution," "not 
promote a referendum to change the status quo," and "the abolition of the National 
Reunification Council or the National Reunification Guidelines will not be an issue."1109 
The "Five Noes" provided a provisional peace structure across the Strait. 
Chen proposed his "New Middle Way" at the London School of Economics in December 
1999 as a discourse of a Taiwanese presidential candidate's political philosophy for an 
international audience. His New Middle Way incorporated the concepts of democratic 
reform, regional and national security, and globalisation. mo After the election, he 
expanded it to incorporate ideas of pluralism, balancing and sharing. au Because both 
the "Five Noes" and the "New Middle Way" were a compromise between ideal and 
reality, his initial national policies were characterized by compromise. 
Domestic Politics 
Consistent with the "New Middle Way," Chen aimed to establish a political middle 
ground by embracing pluralism and removing radicalism to build a functioning civil 
1109 OPROC, Inaugural Speech (200015120): Taiwan Stands Up- Toward the Dawn of a Rising Era 
[internet] (2000 [cited Jan 23 2004]), available from 
http://www.president.gov.tw/l_president/e_subject-06e.html~ __ . _. __ 
1 ~~0 OPROC, The Third Way for Taiwan: ANew Political Perspective [internet] (2000 [cited Jan 26 
2004]), available from http://www.president.gov.tw/l_president/e_subject-041e.html. 
1111 OPROC, Zongtongjiejian geguo qinghetuan (President Receives Congratulatory Delegations from 
Various Countries) [internet] (2000 [cited Jan 26 2004]), available from 
http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/shownews.php4. 
204 
society. mz Despite his words for ethnic reconciliation, at a press conference on July 31, 
Chen dismissed the "1992 consensus" on "one China, respective interpretations" as 
"1992 spirit" of "dialogue, exchange and shelving disputes.''1113 Chen's denial of "one 
China" revived bitter partisan and ideological struggle. As a minority power-holder in 
the legislature, the DPP's arbitrary decision on October 27 to abort the partially built 
fourth nuclear power plant further exacerbated political instability. In addition, many 
secessionist groups intended to compensate Chen's inappropriateness in promoting 
independence as ROC president. In December 2000, sixty groups founded a 
secessionist World Taiwanese Congress (WTC) in Washington DC. Chen extolled the 
contribution of these peripheral, civilian groups in promoting Taiwan independence.m4 
Economic Development 
Chen stressed further liberalization and internationalization by supporting Taiwan's 
membership in the WTO. Supporting Taiwan's entry to the WTO had become routine 
in Congress since July 1996. A resolution was introduced on March 2, 2000 to request 
that the US counter any effort by any WTO member country to block Taiwan's entry to 
the wro.ms In mid-May. days before Chen took office, three resolutions, including 
H.R.4444, were introduced.m6 Chen urged Clinton's Secretary of Transportation 
Rodney E. Slater on June 15 not to allow Beijing's preceding accession to hinder or 
delay Taiwan's accession to the WI'O.m7 H.R.4444 became law in October 2000. 
1112 OPROC, The Third Way for Taiwan ([cited). Chen's "New middle Way" seemed to cover many 
aspects in theory. In practice, it emphasized the mitigation of ethnic conflicts and the promotion of ethnic 
reconciliation. Meyers believed the term "ci vii society" is used in the context of Taiwan ''to include both 
an ideological market process and private organizations that share an adjusted political culture." See 
Ramon H. Myers, "A New Chinese Civilization: The Evolution of the Republic of China on Taiwan," The 
China Quarterly, No. 148, Special Issue: Contemporary Taiwan (1996). 
m 3 OPROC, Presidential Press Conference(2000/07131) [internet] (2000 [cited Jan 28 2004]), available 
from http://www.president.gov.tw/l_presidentle_subject-06.html. 
1114 Crystal Hsu, "Chen Walks Fine Line at WTC," IT, Mar 18 2001. 
ms Expressing the sense of Congress on the accession ofTaiwan to the World Trade Organization, 106th 
Congress, H.CON.RES.262. 
lll6 Expressing the sense of Congress regarding the accession of Taiwan to the World Trade Organization, 
106th Congress, H.CON.RES.330; To Authorize Extension of Nondiscriminatory Treatment (Normal 
Trade Relations Treatment) to the People's Republic of China., 106th Congress, H.R.4444; To Require 
Any Authorization of Extension of Nondiscriminatory Treatment (Most~Favored-Nation Treatment)-to the 
Products of the People's Republic of China to Be Ef!eci{ve Qi,~y after a Vote Is Taken by the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference regarding the Decision and Protocol of Accessionfor 
Chinese Taipei (Taiwan) and after China's accession to the WTO, 106th Congress, H.R.4509. 
lll7 OPROC, President Chen Meets with US Secretary of Transportation /Wdney E. Slater [internet] (2000 
[cited Jan 23 2004]), available from http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/showenews.php4. 
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Chen began promoting a knowledge-based economy in June 2000. Taiwan's economic 
upgrading was closely related to three links with the mainland. However, the 
sovereignty issue and ideological conflict interfered with economic exchange with the 
mainland. In addition, fundamentalist independence forces were deeply concerned 
about the destructive "hollow-out" effect of China on Taiwan's economy.m8 Although 
Chen openly admitted that it was right time for three links,1119 only modest, symbolic, 
decriminalising "mini-three-links" between Taiwan's two frontline islands of Kinmen 
(:~F~) and Matsu and China's Xiamen (Jj[F~) and Fuzhou <tim) harbours in Fujian (tM 
ij!) Province were put into practice on January 1, 2001. But he promised at the end of 
2000 to replace Lee Teng-hui's patience policy with '~iji kaifang, youxiao guanli" (fff~ 
~11:5<: • :ff~f:!I!. positive openness with effective management) on cross-Strait economic 
exchange as Taiwan marched toward a knowledge-based economy.1120 
Unfortunately, the global economic recession and inept decision-making compounded 
the difficulties. The twist of aborting and resuming the fourth nuclear power plant 
project entailed huge legal compensations. The failing economic performance since the 
March presidential election only fuelled ethnic and ideological strife. These events 
precluded consensus on political and financial reforms. As a result, exodus of 
industries, sluggish investment and rising unemployment continued.1121 
Foreign Relations: Dispersion of Taiwanese Nationalism 
Chen actively highlighted independent sovereignty and denied "one China." Taipei 
strongly objected to Beijing's reference to "one China" as the PRC and asserted that 
accepting "one China" was tantamount to accepting "one country, two systems," which 
1118 Vice President Lu even attributed Taiwan's economic recession since 1988 to Taiwanese 
businessmen's feverish investment in Mainland China. See OPROC, Fuzongtong canjia '2001 caijing 
gaofeng huiyi' kaimu (Vice President Attends the Opening Ceremorry of the '2001 Economic and Financial 
Summit Meeting') [internet] (2001 [cited Feb 2 2004]), available from 
h~:l/www.president.gov.tw/php-binlprez/shownews.php4. 
m OPROC, Presidential Press Conference (2000109116) [internet] (2000 [cited Jan 31 2004]), available 
from http://www.president.gov.tw/1_presidentle_subject-06.html. 
1120 OPROC, President Chen's Cross-Century Remarks [internet] (2()()() [cited_ Feb 2 2004]),available 
from http://www.president.gov.tw/php.;;binfpretJshowneVis.php4:~ · · 
1121 OPROC, Zongtong chuxi 'jingjifazhan zixun weiyuan huiyi'yubei huiyi (President Addresses the 
Opening Ceremorry of the Preparatory Session of the Economic Development Advisory Conference) 
[internet] (2001 [cited Feb 8 2004]), available from 
http://www.president.gov.tw/php-binlprez/shownews.php4. 
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Taiwan would never accept.1122 Chen avidly promoted a comprehensive relationship 
with the EU and launched head of state diplomacy by inviting heads and prominent 
guests of other states to Taiwan and making state visits to friendly nations. Chen and 
his deputy Lu Hsiu-lian (Annette Lu) made good use of liberal and neo-liberal 
philosophy to expand international support. They associated with non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and other groups to build up interconnectedness and 
interdependence with global society, focused their attention on the security of 
Asia-Pacific and Taiwan Strait, and supported Taiwan's bid for readmission into the UN. 
By drawing attention to Taiwan's independent sovereignty and advocating its ties to and 
participation in international society, the DPP is in effect dispersing the seeds of 
Taiwanese nationalism in the global community and crafting a comprehensive regional 
security alliance against China.1123 
Accumulating Dynamics for a New Age 
In August 2000, the DPP heated up the issue of readmission into the UN in the capacity 
of government. Convinced by Lee Teng-hui's account that the US did not oppose his 
"special state-to-state relationship" but was only offended that Washington had not been 
informed in advance, 1124 Chen argued on August 28 that unification with the PRC 
contradicted the principles of freedom, democracy and self-detennination.1125 Chen 
thus became the first president to openly oppose unification with China. 
Congressional support soared. Two concurrent resolutions calling for direct 
communication with top Taiwanese officials and to reduce restrictions on high-level 
visits by Taiwanese officials were referred to both House Committee on International 
Relations and Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in September.1126 In October, 
1122 OPROC, Presidential Press Conference(2000108/28) [internet] (2000 [cited Jan 28 2004]), available 
from http://www.president.gov.tw/l_president/e_subject-06.html. 
1123 
"Comprehensive security" broadens the concept of security beyond military security; it originally 
stressed to extend economic power for security ends, see Hook et al., Japans International Relations, 135; 
Christopher W. Hughes, Japan's Economic Power and Security: Japan and North Korea (London: 
Routledge, 1999), 22, 26... Chen aims to strengthen regional security by. employing more approaches to 
expand interdependence and interconnectedness. 
1124 Lee Teng-hui, Li Denghui zhizheng gaobai shilu (A Faitl(ul Account of Lee Teng-hui 's Rule), 242-44. 
1125 OPROC, Presidential Press Conference(2000108128) ([cited). 
1126 Expressing the Sense of the Congress regarding High-Level Visits by Taiwanese Officials to the 
United States, 106th Congress, H.CON.RES.401. A Concurrent Resolution Expressing the Sense of 
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Congress passed a concurrent resolution, signed by eighty-six of its members, supporting 
Taiwan's appropriate participation in the UN and other international organizations and 
calling for the US government to extend active support. 1127 A resolution was 
introduced on October 27 to request that Taiwan issue be resolved peacefully through a 
democratic mechanism and with the express consent of the people of Taiwan.1128 On 
the issue of US arms sales to Taiwan, a resolution was introduced on May 9 to request 
that a mechanism to be devised to allow for Congressional input in the decision making 
of arms sales to Taiwan.1129 Two resolutions were introduced in July and October to 
direct the President to consult with congressional leaders, committee chairmen, and 
ranking members not less than thirty days prior to the next round of arms talks between 
the US and Taiwan. This became public law in early November 2000.113° Congress 
thus secured a stronger position in decision-making on arms sales to Taiwan. Added to 
the Congress' promotion of Taiwan's international political status and defence arms 
acquisition were strong calls to remove the ambiguity strategy on Taiwan from members 
of the Bush campaign team, such as Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Condoleezza 
Rice, Robert Zoellick, Richard Armitage and George W. Bush himself. In short, 
pro-Taiwan US Congress members and conservatives and Taiwanese secessionists were 
encouraging each other to leap the hurdle presented by the "one China" faith of the 
outgoing Clinton administration. 
Strategic Symbiosis on the Basis of Taiwanization 
Raising the Curtain of US-PRC Strategic Competition 
Congress regarding High-Level Visits by Taiwanese Officials to the United States, 106th Congress, 
S.CON.RES.l40. 
1127 Expressing the sense ofthe Congress regarding Taiwan's participation in the United Nations, 106th 
Congress, H.CON.RES.390. 
1128 Expressing the Sense of the House of Representatives That the Future of Taiwan Should Be Resolved 
Peacefully through a Democratic Mechanism and with the Express Consent of the people of Taiwan, 106th 
Congress, H.RES.659. 
1129 An Original Bill Making Appropriations for Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related 
Programs for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2Q01, 4!J(ifor Ptber Purposes, 106th Congress, 
S.2522.--- ---- - - - - . 
1130 Making Appropriations for Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs for the 
Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2001, and for Other Purposes, 106th Congress, H.R5526; Making 
Appropriations for Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs for the Fiscal Year 
Ending September 30, 2001, andfor Other Purposes, 106th Congress, H.R4811. 
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During the campaign, Bush said it was time to remove the ambiguity about US policy on 
Taiwan; after his election, many of his advisers, including Defence Secretary Rumsfeld 
and Deputy Defence Secretary Wolfowitz, were outspoken advocates of clarity when it 
comes to defending Taiwan from PRC.1131 Before joining the Bush Administration, 
Rice, Zoellick, and Armitage all articulated conservative views of how to manage the 
challenges that a rising China poses to the interests of peace and democracy in Asia. 1132 
Rice believed that despite the argument for economic interaction with Beijing, "China is 
still a potential threat to stability in the Asia-Pacific region. . .. China resents the role of 
the United States in the Asia-Pacific region." She asserted that China is a "strategic 
competitor, not the 'strategic partner' the Clinton administration once called it."1133 
Armitage and Wolfowitz had already made their positions clear in the "Statement on the 
Defence of Taiwan." 1134 After Bush's election, three alleged beneficiaries of Lee 
Teng-hui's lobbying funds, Carl Ford Jr. (Assistant Secretary of state for Intelligence and 
Research), James Kelly (Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific affairs), 
and John Bolton (Undersecretary of State for Anns Control and International Security), 
became top Bush appointees in the State Department.1135 On January 17, 2001, at his 
confirmation hearing for the position of Secretary of State, General Colin L. Powell 
defined China as a strategic competitor and a potential regional rival, but neither a 
partner nor an inevitable and implacable foe. 1136 In an internal briefing, George J. Tenet, 
Director of CIA, enumerated the "rise of Chinese power, military and other," together 
with terrorism and WMD as the three top threats facing the US.1137 
H.R.428 was introduced on February 6, 2001 to advocate Taiwan's participation in the 
WHO; ninety-two Representatives were co-sponsors. 1138 Since early 2001, in 
numerous receptions with visiting American dignitaries, Chen Shu-bian sought to 
redeem the reputation of "trouble maker'' for Taipei and accused Beijing of refusing to 
1131 Kelly Wallace, Bush Pledges Whatever It Takes to Defend Taiwan [internet] (CNN, 2001 [cited Dec 9 
2003]), available from http://www.cnn.com/2001/ALLPOUTICS/04/24/bush.taiwan.abc/. 
1132 Tkacik, The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1717 ([cited). 
1133 Condoleezza Rice, "Promoting the National Interests," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 1 (2000): 55-56. 
1134 See page 195 of this thesis. __ __ -- - --- . ·- - .-
11;5 Corn, Taiwangate?([cited); Pomfret, "SecrefTiiiwan Fund Sought Friends, Influence Abroad." 
1136 USDOS, Confirmation Hearing by Colin L. Powell [internet] (2001 [cited Jan 13 2004]), available 
from http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2001/443.htm. 
1137 Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), 34-35. 
1138 Concerning the Participation of Taiwan in the World Health Organization, 107th Congress, H.R.428. 
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deal with the new DPP government and continuing to expand its military build-up and 
increase its missiles against Taiwan.1139 In particular, on March 19, on the issue of 
ROC's new Asia-Pacific strategy, he assured some US delegates to the "2001 Taipei 
Roundtable" that ''Taiwan will continue dedicating itself to playing the role of 
'maintaining peace, security and balance' in the Asia-Pacific region."1140 Congress 
responded with a reaffirmed commitment to the TRA. 1141 On March 28, 2001, 
Representative David Vitter introduced a bill to urge to incorporate Taiwan into the TMD 
project.1142 In the meantime, the US National Defence University (NDU) made its first, 
one-week tour in Taiwan in March 2001 in accordance with S.AMDT.576 to gain 
first-hand information on the island republic's defence capabilities.1143 The US Air War 
College (AWC) was going to visit Mainland China in May to gain information on PLA's 
offence capabilities. The NDU and the AWC together were performing research and 
analysis about the gap of military balance across the Strait. 
Sealing Taiwan as a Symbiotic Partner 
On April 1, 2001, a US Navy surveillance aircraft and a Chinese jet fighter collided in 
mid-air over international waters. The damaged US airplane made an emergency 
landing on China's Hainan {14iji¥J) Island. The plane and its twenty-four crewmembers 
were detained by the PRC for eleven days. This marked Bush's first foreign policy 
crisis. The Bush administration judged that China had become a serious challenge to 
many US interests in Asia.1144 The Chen Shui -bian government has been looking 
forward to joining the TMD project and volunteered to play the role of "maintaining 
peace, security and balance" in the Asia-Pacific region. This incident prompted Bush 
1139 Chen's s with Anthony Lake and Stanley Roth were just two of many examples. See OPROC, 
Zongtong jiejian Meiguo guowuyuan qian yatai zhuli guowuqing Lushida (President Receives Former US 
Assistant Secretary of State for Asia and Pacific Affairs Stanley Roth) [internet] (2001 [cited Feb 2 2004]), 
available from http://www.president.gov.tw/php-binlprezlshownews.php4; OPROC, Zongtong jiejian 
Meiguo qian guojia anquan guwen Leike (President Receives Former US National Security Advisor Lake) 
[internet] (2001 [cited Feb 2 2004]), available from 
http://www.president.gov.tw/php-binlprezlshownews.php4. 
1140 OPROC, President Chen Meets with U.S. Delegates to the '2001 Taipei Roundtable' [internet] (2001 
[cited Feb 2 2004]), available from http://www.president.gov.tw/php-binlprezlshowenews.php4. 
1141 Expressing the sense of the Congress relating to the Taiwan Relations Act, 107th Congress, 
H.CON.RES.67 . 
. 
1142 To Establish the Policy of the Unitea Str:ites-With Risp~cFt~ D~pl~y~nt of Missile Defense Systems 
Capable of Defending Allies of the United States against Ballistic Missile Attack, 107th Congress, 
H.R.1283. 
1143 For the contents of S.AMDT.576, see page 191 of this thesis. 
1144 Tkacik, The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1717 ([cited). 
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and Chen to forge a partnership in the name of defending the democratic achievement 
and economic prosperity of Taiwan and preserving peace and stability of Asia Pacific 
region. 
As tensions rose between the US and the PRC, Taiwan immediately came to the fore. 
On April 12, Ambassador Harvey Feldman asserted, "It is important to bear in mind that 
the absence of US diplomatic recognition does not alter [the ROC on Taiwan's] status [as 
a state] in international law!145 The ·ruling DPP pursued closer defence cooperation 
with America. When receiving US Congress members in early and mid-April, Chen 
urged Washington to provide advanced defence weapons to Taiwan in 2005 to redress the 
military imbalance which was shifting in favour of the mainland, and relax restrictions 
on visit exchange of high-level officials in charge of security, diplomatic and defence 
affairs. 1146 At the same time, Taipei more enthusiastically dispersed the seeds of 
Taiwanese nationalism in global community and wove a comprehensive regional security 
alliance against China. On April 16, Vice President Annette Lu, who has been 
promoting some form of Asia alliance through the connection of "soft national power'' in 
the form of NGOs, called for regional countries to initiate NGO efforts to form an 
Asia-Pacific Community to deal with the common military threat of the PRC.1147 On 
April 19, President Chen boasted to use "duoyuan waijiao" ( ~ 7G j} 3( , 
poly-diplomacy) - multi-faceted diplomacy such as head of state, trade, democracy, 
humanity and all-people diplomacy- to expand Taiwan's international exposure. He 
announced his plan to attend a summit meeting in Latin America in May.1148 
At this juncture, both American and Japanese governments decided on April 20 to grant a 
visa to former Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui, who turned out in retirement to be a 
standard bearer of independence fundamentalism. Washington's granting of the visa to 
Lee pleased Taipei but enraged Beijing. On April 23, Bush authorized a record $7 
1145 Feldman, "The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1429." 
1146 For instance, see OPROC, President Chen Meets with a Delegation of the U.S. Senate Committee on 
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs [internet] (2001 [cited Jan 31 2004]), available from 
h,://www.president.gov.tw/php-binlprez/showenews.php4, ____ ~- _ _ __ _ _ _ _ -- .. ·-
1~4--0PROC; Vice President Lu Addresses the Asian Forum on Women and Power [internet] (200 1 [cited 
Feb 2 2004]), available from http://www.president.gov.tw/php-binlprez/shownews.php4. 
1148 OPROC, Zongtong jiejian zhongnan meizhou waijiao jizhe fanghuatuan (President Receives Visiting 
Diplomatic Correspondents from Central America) [internet] (2001 [cited Feb 2 2004]), available from 
http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/shownews.php4. 
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billion arms sales to Taiwan, including four Kidd class destroyers that would be ready by 
2003, eight diesel submarines, twelve P-3C Orion anti-submarine aircraft, and many 
other advanced weapons. These weapons had very high strategic significance. The 
new submarines and anti-submarine aircraft together would provide Taiwan's navy the 
capability to destroy the PRC's maritime transportation, launch maritime onslaught, 
blockade and special operations to counter PLA's blockading efforts. 1149 Military 
experts believe that Kidd class destroyers are a complement for TMD-capable Aegis 
destroyers. Despite the formal deferral of the release of Aegis to Taiwan, news media 
disclosed that the Bush administration had privately informed Chen Shui-bian and 
Defence Minister Tang Yao-ming (~IJII:!f.l) that the US intended t to sell Aegis 
destroyers to Taiwan once the related defence research was done by the US.1150 White 
House officials who were briefing reporters said that whether the Aegis destroyers were 
sold in 2001 or not, they will still be available to Taiwan by 2010.1151 This revealed the 
American scheme to restore a security alliance with Taiwan by integrating the island into 
its TMD project. 
Furthermore, Bush said in an interview on ABC's "Good Morning America" on April 24 
that the US would do "whatever it took to help Taiwan defend herself' in the event of 
attack by China.1152 He seemed to have openly removed the ambiguity about whether 
the US would defend Taiwan in case of attack by Communist China, which has been the 
essence of the so-called "ambiguity strategy" since the enactment of the TRAin 1979. 
The comment aroused concern from Congressional Democrats. Later that day Bush 
reminded Taiwan that he also supported "one China" policy and implied that, if Taipei 
declared independence, the US would not feel obligated to defend Taiwan from the 
military consequences. This warning proved hollow because Taipei chose to believe his 
1149 Lu Te-yun JA\t~.ft. "Guofangbu: weilai Iiangnian Taiba.ijunli youshi xiang zhonggong qingxie 
(Ministry of National Defense: Military Balance across the Taiwan Strait Will Shift to Favor the PRC in 
Two Years)," UDN, Jul3 2004. 
1150 UDN, "Taiwan qude shendunjian sbiji yuelai yue bull (Increasingly Adverse Timing for Taiwan to 
Acquire the Aegis-Class Destroyers)," Jan 28 2004. In June 2004, native Legislative Speaker Wang 
Chin-ping reaffirmed that the US would sell Aegis destroyers to Taiwan. See Lin Pao-cbing ;f.f:lf)Jt, 
"Wang Jinping: qianjian guozao buneng meiyu xiansh!_ (\V@llg Chin-ping: Policy to Produce Indigenous 
Submarines Must Take Reality into Consideration)," UDN, Jun 25 2004. 
1151 Charles Snyder, "No Aegis, but Hefty Package Offered," IT, Apr 25 2001, 1. 
1152 ABC, Bush Vow.r Taiwan Support [internet] (ABC, 2001 [citedJun 19 2004]), available from 
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/us!DailyNewsltaiwanOl0425.html. See also Charles Snyder, "US 'Will 
Defend' Taiwan," IT, Apr 26 2004, 1. 
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earlier guarantee. Taipei issued a formal statement on April 25 welcoming the arms 
sales decision, readily accepting the role of proxy balancer. 1153 
The Essence and Fortification of Strategic Symbiosis 
Defining Strategic Symbiosis 
These events had far more critical significance. The 2000 Taiwan presidential election 
symbolized the completion of Taiwanization. On the basis of Taiwanization, the DPP 
government's acceptance of the role of proxy balancer fulfils American exploitation of 
Taiwanese nationalism in the epochal Sino-US antagonism, as assumed in the ''Taiwan 
Independence Roadmap." 1154 Moreover, the use of Taiwanese nationalism is not 
limited to proxy balancing. It could inflame Chinese nationalism, which in turn would 
(1) alert the international community, especially East Asian countries in disputes with 
China on the sovereignty of islands on the sea-line-of-communication, to the renewed 
threat of China; (2) facilitate Taipei-sought poly-diplomacy and regional comprehensive 
security alliance against Beijing; (3) justify the US presence and security alliance in East 
Asia; and (4) solidify Taiwanese nationalism, as exemplified in 1996 and 2000 
presidential elections. 
Consequently, US-Taiwan strategic symbiosis consists of proxy balancing and influence 
operations. America and Taiwan strengthen mutual defence cooperation against 
China. 1155 This is proxy balancing for wartime purposes. On the other hand, 
secessionist Taipei relentlessly disperses the seeds of Taiwanese nationalism to promote 
regional comprehensive security alliance against Beijing. Any of Beijing's 
intimidations, military or rhetoric, can easily trigger backlash from Taipei and misgivings 
from neighbouring countries, and help expand US-Japan security alliance and justify 
continued domination or expansion of American influence in Asia Pacific and in the 
global community. By dispersing the seeds of Taiwanese nationalism, Taipei diffuses 
its influence upon the ideology of other countries. This is Taipei's influence operations 
1153 OPROC, Presidential Office Responds to US Arms Sales_to Taiwan [internet) (2001 [cited Feb 2 
2004]), available from·http:J/w\VW:president.gov.twlphp-binlprezlshowenews.php4. 
m 4 See page 79 of this thesis. 
tm Robert S. Ross, "Navigating the Taiwan Strait: Deterrance, Escalation Dominance, and U.S.-China 
Relations," International Security, Vol. 27, No.2 (2002). Available from 
http://museJhu.edu/j ournalslinternational_security/tocfms27 .2.html. 
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in peacetime. 1156 The symbiotic partnership goes against China's rise to regional 
hegemony and global superpower. Moreover, this strategic partnership goes along well 
with the seemingly altruistic goals of defending the democratic achievement and 
economic prosperity of Taiwan and preserving peace and stability of Asia Pacific region. 
Therefore, the ultimate goal of strategic symbiosis could be construed as to make the 
PRC a democratic and free country, or a constructive member of the world community, 
as Chen has claimed.1157 
Fortification of Strategic Symbiosis 
Congress became even more interested in promoting Taiwan's political independence 
and bilateral security cooperation. On April 27, Representative Henry J. Hyde 
introduced H.R.1646 to treat Taiwan as a major non-NATO ally with respect to the sale 
of defence articles or services and to promote AIT like an embassy. 1158 The US Air War 
College cancelled a visit by a group of graduating line officers to China and visited 
Taiwan instead in a show of support. In late April and mid-May, Congress introduced 
two resolutions to welcome Chen's visit to the US. m 9 Moreover, the Bush 
administration planned to increase the American forward presence, including two carrier 
task forces with overwhelming superiority and three Los Angeles-class attack 
submarines to stations in Guam in preparation for a major war against China. The US 
Navy would have increased access to facilities in Singapore and the Philippines. 
America would adopt a rapid pre-emptive strategic strike as a prelude to intervention. 1160 
1156 This is different from Lee Teng-hui influence operations, in which Lee used clandestine lobbying 
funds to buy influence with foreign governments, institutions and individuals; see page 175 of this thesis. 
1157 OPROC, Zongtong jiejian Meiguo lianbang canyiyuan waijiao weiyuanhui zhuxi Baideng (President 
Chen meets with U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Joe Biden) [internet] (2001 [cited 
Feb 5 2004]), available from http://www.president.gov.tw/php-binlprez/shownews.php4. See also 
Benjamin A. Gilman, Welcoming Madame Chen Wu Sue-jen - Hon. Benjamin A Gilman (Extensions of 
Remarks- September 18, 2002). (internet] (Library of Congress, 2002 [cited Mar 1 2004]), available from 
h~:/lthomas.loc.gov/cgi-binlquery/D?r107:1Jtemp/-r107gpjAJg. 
11 To Authorize Appropriations for the Department of State for Fiscal Years 2002 and 2003, and for 
Other Purposes, 107th Congress, H.R1646. H.R1646 became PL 107-228 on September 30,2002. 
Section 693 prescribes: "American Institute in Taiwan and the residence of the director of the American 
Institute in Taiwan should publicly display the flag of the United States in the same manner as United 
States embassies, consulates, and official residences throughout the world." Section 1206 prescribes: 
"Taiwan shall be treated as though it were dC?Signateda major non-NATO ally.'.'. - . ---- - .~ ~ 
-I1S9-Ji Resolution Eipresiing tlie SenseOfthe Senate Welcoming Taiwans President Chen Shui-bian to the 
United States, 107th Congress, S.RES.89. Expressing the Sense of the Congress Welcoming President 
Chen Shui-bian of Taiwan to the United States, 107th Congress, H.CON.RES.135; H.AMDT.41, 107th 
Congress. 
1160 Ross, "Navigating the Taiwan Strait," 77-78. 
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The Pentagon launched programs to strengthen Taiwan's C41SR for joint operations in 
the future. 1161 
America's strong support reinforced Chen's secessionist foreign policies. On May 17, 
during his videoconference with the Council on Foreign Relations, he urged Washington 
to relax restraints that had been imposed on him for his next transit in the US three days 
later. 1162 When Chen transited the US during his ambitious fifteen-day five-nation state 
visit to Latin America, the US government elevated its reception of Chen in terms of 
transit lengths and treatment. Meanwhile, H.R428, regarding Taiwan's participation in 
the WH0,1163 became PL107-10 on May 28, 2001. This marked the first time that a 
US president had officially endorsed Taipei's WHO efforts. 
Chen continued to challenge the notion of "one China." Dr. Joseph S. Nye, former 
Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Affairs of the Clinton 
administration, tried to reverse the course of US-PRC strategic competition. He 
proposed to Chen on July 5 his "interim agreement" which aimed to decrease tension and 
preserve peace across the Strait under the notion of "one China." Chen used his "Five 
Noes" to reject Nye's proposal. 1164 Chen's audience in the Congress did not like 
Clinton's top officials' idea of "one China" either. They promoted more arms sales to 
Taiwan and Taiwan's international status. Representative Jim Kolbe introduced a bill 
on July 17 to request more Congressional input on the decision to sell arms to 
Taiwan.1165 This became US law in January 2002. Representative Gary L. Ackerman 
introduced a bill on July 24 to endorse Chen's participation in APEC in October 
2001.1166 1h August and September, two resolutions were introduced to urge Taiwan's 
u
61 C'ISR is a military term referring to command, control, communication, computer, information, 
surveillance, reconnaissance. 
i16l OPROC, President Chen's Videoconference with the Council on Foreign Relations [internet] (2001 
[cited Feb 3 2004]), available from http://www.president.gov.tw/php-binlprez/showenews.php4. 
i16J See page 209 of this thesis. 
1164 OPROC, President Chen Meets with Dr. JosephS. Nye, Dean of the John F. Kennedy School of 
Government, Harvard University [internet] (2001 [cited_Feb_4 2004]), available from- -
-h~:l/www.president.gov.tw/php-birilpfez/sliownews.php4. · 
11 Making Appropriations for Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs for the 
Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2002, and for Other Purposes, 107th Congress, H.R.2506. 
1166 Expressing the Sense of Congress to Encourage Full Participation in the Asian Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) Forum, 107th Congress, H.CON.RES.194. 
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membership in the UN and other international organizations. 1167 Representative 
Sherrod Brown introduced a resolution, H.R.2739, to carry PL107-10 a step further by 
authorizing the Secretary of State to initiate a plan to endorse and obtain observer status 
for Taiwan at the annual summit of the WHA in May 2002 and to instruct the US 
delegation there to implement such plan. 1168 
Taipei reinforced its influence operations. Chen's deputy Annette Lu again urged 
members of a visiting US think tank on May 22 to form a "North East Asia Alliance" to 
help preserve peace and stability in the Asia Pacific region.1169 After Beijing won the 
bid to host the 2008 Olympics Games, Lu instantly warned the world of the danger of 
inflated Chinese nationalism.1170 In mid-August, the Lu's Taiwan Alliance for Global 
Peace sponsored a "Global Peace Rally'' in Taipei. Five Nobel Peace Prize winners, 
legislators from numerous countries, distinguished guests of NGOs, and scholars 
attended the conference on "Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait."1171 
In addition, Chen's thoughts on cross-Strait economic exchange were war-oriented, 
despite his professed desire to promote normalization of economic and trade relations. 
The DPP government convened an Economic Development Advisory Conference 
(EDAC) in late July 2001 to consult economists and entrepreneurs about how to pursue 
economic upgrading with an appropriate division of labour with the mainland so as to 
maintain Taiwan's competitive advantage in the "economic war with China."1172 
Overall, Chen's expectation of the trilateral relations is best exemplified by two meetings. 
1167 Expressing the Sense of the House regarding United States Policy toward Taiwan£ Membership in 
International Organizations, 107th Congress, H.RES.221. Expressing the Sense of Congress regarding 
United States Policy toward Taiwans Membership in International Organizations, 107th Congress, 
H.CON.RES.219. 
1168 To Amend Public Law 107-10 to Require a United States Plan to Endorse and Obtain Observer Status 
for Taiwan at the Annual Summit of the World Health Assembly in May 2002, 107th Congress, H.R.2739. 
1169 OPROC, Fuzongtong jiejian Meiguo zhiku xuezhe fanghua tuan (Vice President Receives a 
Delegation of US Think Tank Scholars) [internet] (2001 [cited Feb 4 2004]), available from 
h~://www.president.gov.tw/php-binlprez/shownews.php4. 
11 OPROC,Inaugural Statement of the Taiwan Alliance for Global Peace [internet] (2001 [cited Feb 5 
2004]), available from http://www.president.gov.tw/php-binlprez/showenews.pbp4.-- · · · ·- · · - -
1171 OPROC, President Chen s Congratulatory Message to the 2001 Global Peace Assembly [internet] 
(2001 [cited Feb 5 2004]), available from http://www.president.gov.tw/php-binlprez/showenews.php4. 
1172 OPROC, Zongtong chuxi Jingjifazhan zixun weiyuan huiyi'yubei huiyi (President Addresses the 
Opening Ceremony of the Preparatory Session of the Economic Development Advisory Conference) 
([cited). 
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On August 6, he assured a delegation led by Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
Chairman Joe Biden that Taiwan supported the US' interest in developing constructive 
relations with the PRC so as to make China a free and democratic country. Chen urged 
Washington to play the role of, if not mediator, "messenger, balancer and facilitator'' to 
facilitate negotiations across the Strait.1173 He repeated the message on August 23 to a 
thirty-three-member delegation spearheaded by House International Relations 
Committee Chairman Heruy Hyde. He boasted Taiwan could exert a "beacon effect" 
for the democratisation of China.1174 Chen's ultimate security scheme was, as he told a 
group of Pacific Forum CSIS scholars on August 31, to extend the US-Japan security 
alliance to cover other Asian countries to assure the peace of Taiwan Strait. 1175 
The Impact of 9/11 
The Impact on US-Taiwan Strategic Symbiosis 
The terrorist attacks on the US on September 11, 2001 overshadowed strategic 
competition between the US and China. After 9/11, anti-terrorism became America's 
primary national security policy. Because of the need for anti -terrorism measures, the 
Bush administration restored US-PRC strategic partnership. Many American 
conservatives believed that "in a post-September 11 world, the Administration's 
preoccupation with the war on terrorism, Iraq, and especially North Korea has led 
policy-makers to downplay China's resistance and hostility to US initiatives in Asia and 
elsewhere." 1176 Since 9/11, the Bush administration publicly made its support of 
Taiwan secondary to winning Beijing's cooperation. For the need of anti-terrorism 
campaign, the US established close military relations with Uzbekistan, Georgia, 
Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Azerbaijan and Armenia. Consequently, 
1173 OPROC, Zongtong jiejian Meiguo lianbang canyiyuan waijiao weiyuanhui zhuxi Baideng (President 
Chen meets with U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Joe Biden) ([cited). 
1174 OPROC, Zongtong jiejian Meiguo lianbang zhongyiyuan guoji guanxi weiyuanhui zhuxi Haide 
(President Chen Meets with U.S. House International Relations Committee Chairman Henry Hyde) 
[internet] (2001 [cited Feb 5 2004]), available from 
hm'://www.pr~sident.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/shownews.php4. __ _ - - - - -c • - · 
117 
--OPROC, Zongtongjiejian laihua canjia 'Yatai anquan guoji luntan 2001 nian Taibei yuanzhuo huiyi' 
yuhui waibin (President Chen Meets with Participants in the ~ia Pacific Security Forum 2001 Taipei 
Roundtable' [internet] (2001 [cited Feb 2 2004]), available from 
h~://www.president.gov.tw/php-binlprez/shownews.php4. 
117 Tkacik. The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1717 ([cited). 
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American military influence entered the backyard of the PRC. The US even considered 
deploying the NMD in Mghanistan to link with the TMD that were scheduled for 
deployment in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. At the same time, the US also 
strengthened its military cooperation with traditional allies such as New Zealand, the 
Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand and Singapore by conducting a series of military 
exercises.1177 There are some in the PRC who are concerned about the possibility of the 
War on Terror being used as a smokescreen to contain China. Some secessionist power 
holders in Taipei notice that the US is expanding its military presence in Asia Pacific and 
assert that the situations after 9111 benefit Taiwan. With fewer strings attached, the US 
Congress continued to make multifarious efforts to strengthen relations with Taiwan. 
Strategic Interests and Military Balance 
Within a week of 9/11, three bills were introduced in the Senate to transfer to Taiwan 
four Kidd class destroyers, a complement for TMD-capable Aegis destroyers. Bill 
S.1438 became PL107-107 on December 28, 2001.1178 It was reported that the Bush 
administration had privately informed Chen Shui-bian and Minister of Defence Tang 
Yao-ming that the US intended to sell Aegis destroyers to Taiwan once the related 
defence research had been completed.1179 
The unclassified summary of CIA's December 2001 "Foreign Missile Developments and 
the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015" asserted that before 2015 the US would in all 
likelihood face ICBM threats from North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Russia and China.1180 The 
Pentagon disclosed the unclassified part of its "Nuclear Posture Review'' in January 2002 
and categorized "a military confrontation over the status of Taiwan" as one of several 
immediate contingencies.1181 In fact, the Pentagon informed the US Congress of its 
1177 For a comprehensive record of events marking US military expansionism in Asia Pacific after 9/11, 
see Chang Ya-chung and Sun kuo-hsiang ~c:p, ~Iii~. Asia-Pacific Comprehensive Security 
Prospecting Review 2001-2002 (Taipei: Yuan-Liou, 2002), 253. 
1178 A Bill to Authorize Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2002 for Military Activities of the Department of 
Defense, 107th Congress, S.1438. 
117 UDN, "Taiwan qude shendunjian shiji yuelai yue buli (Increasingly Adverse Timing for Taiwan to 
Acquire the Aegis-Class Destroyers)." _ . .. __ _ .. 
_1~~0 CIA, Foreign Missile Developments aiid thi Biilliiiic MisSile Threat through 2015 [inemet] (CIA, 
2001 [cited Mar 18 2004]), available from 
http://www.cia.gov/nic/PDF _GIF _otherprodlmissilethreat200 1.pdf. 
1181 Nuclear Posture Review [Excerpts], [internet] (Global Security.org, 2002 [cited Mar 15 2004]), 
available from http://www.globalsecurity .org/wmdllibrary/policy/dodlnpr .htm. 
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possible emergency use of nuclear weapons against China and six other nations.1182 
In May 2002 Congress passed H.R.4546, National Defence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2003. The original Section 1202 instructed the Secretary of Defence to implement 
a comprehensive plan to conduct joint operational training and exchanges of senior 
officers to improve the defensive capabilities of Taiwan and to enhance interoperability 
of US-Taiwan joint operations.1183 Had this version of the bill been passed, this would 
have been equivalent to the restoration of the defence assistance mechanism. 
Additionally, the bill set the parameters for defence spending and was worth $383 billion, 
including the full amount requested by Bush to develop a missile defence system. 
Beijing worried an anti-ballistic missile umbrella could emasculate its small nuclear 
deterrent and be stretched to cover Thiwan. PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman Kong 
Quan HL~) thus called parts of the bill "anti-China."1184 
The Pentagon submitted to the Congress on July 12 the "Annual Report on the Military 
Power of the PRC." Three days later, the US-China Security Evaluation Committee 
published "US-China Security Review Report." These two reports together argued that 
without adopting democracy and reforms, China's economic rise would continue to pose 
a military threat to the peace and stability of Taiwan and East Asia and thus endanger US 
national security. The US even questioned Beijing's commitment to anti-terrorism. 
US Air Force General Richard Myers publicly doubted on August 9, 2002 that the PRC 
was providing weapons to al Qaeda forces that were believed to be hiding in 
Pakistan.ttss 
The status of the TRA has continued to rise. On August 14, three days before the 
twentieth anniversary of the 817 Communique, NSC Spokesman Sean McCormack 
asserted that the governing law on US arms sales to Taiwan is the TRA, indirectly 
1182 Michael R. Gordon. "U.S. Nuclear Plan Sees New Targets and New Weapons," review of Nuclear 
Posture Review, NIT, Mar 10 2002. 
1183 To Authorize Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2003 for Military Activities oft he Department of Defense, 
107th Congress, H.R.4546. There were seven versions o_!!_his_b!ll; fo_ur_versions, H.R.4546.RH; EH, PCS, 
BAH, included this section.- The last version did not.- - -
1184 Joseph E. Stiglitz, China Says U.S. Defence Bill Violates Sovereignty [internet] (NucNews, 2002 
[cited Mar 18 2004]), available from http://nucnews.net/nucnews/2002nn10205nn1020512nn.htm#020. 
1185 USDOS, Air Force General Doubts Chinese Assisting AI Qaeda [internet] (U.S.D.O.S., 2002 [cited 
Mar 19 2004]), available from http://usinfo.state.gov/regionallea/uschina/alqaedaw.htm. 
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reaffirming the TRA's precedence over the August 17 Communique.1186 Bush further 
signed H.R.1646 1187 into PL107-228 on September 30 and H.R.4546 1188 into 
PL107-314 on December 2, 2002. Section 1210 of PL107-314 stipulates that the 
President shall "submit to Congress a report on the feasibility and advisability of 
conducting combined operational training with, and exchanges of general and flag 
officers" between the US and Taiwan forces. The timing of its enforcement depends on 
the US interpretation of the threat from China. As a preliminary step toward this highly 
elevated exchange, Congress approved the dispatch of active staff and officers to work in 
the AIT in the name of improving administrative efficiency.1189 This certainly helped 
the interoperability for future US-Taiwan joint operations against the PLA, although the 
original controversial Section 1202 of H.R.4546 was dropped.1190 In 2003, Congress 
introduced two additional bills. On March 26, 2003, a resolution sought to incorporate 
Taiwan as an NATO member in the development and deployment of TMD as soon as 
technologically possible.1191 On June 26, 2003, a more specific resolution demanded 
that China dismantle the missiles that threatened Taiwan, otherwise Bush would 
authorize the sale of the Aegis system to Taiwan for self-defence against the threat of a 
missile attack by China.1192 These bills reflected continuing American attempts to 
restore a para-strategic security alliance with Taiwan by integrating the island into its 
TMD project. 
High-Level Visit Exchange 
When Annette Lu made her first state tour to Central America in late September 2000, 
the Clinton administration did not allow her a transit in New York. During her 
ambitious "soft diplomacy tour'' to Central America in January 2002, however, she was 
allowed to have a transit in New York, attend a public banquet hosted by local Taiwanese 
1186 USDOS, NSC Briefing for Foreign Meida, Sean McCormack, National Security Council Spokesman, 
Washington DC, August 14, 2002 [internet] (2002 [cited Mar 19 2004]), available from 
h,://www.fpc.state.gov/12693.htm. 
11 For the contents of the bill, see page 214 of this thesis. 
1188 For the contents of the bill, see page 219 of this thesis. 
1189 Wang Li-chuan fff,j~, "Meijunzhi renyuan zhuTai, Zhonggong fandui (PRC Opposes the 
Assignment of Active US Military Personnel to Taiwan)," UDN, Dec _22_2004. _ - _ 
119ll_Seepage219ofthisthesis;-- ---- -,~ -------o- · · 
1191 To Establish the Policy of the United States 'With Respect to Deployment of Missile Defense Systems 
Capable of Defending Allies of the United States Against Ballistic Missile Attack, 108th Congress, 
H.R1454. 
1192 Expressing the Sense of Congress regarding Security for Taiwan, 108th Congress, H.CON.RES.232. 
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Americans, have a breakfast meeting with American financial entrepreneurs, and arrange 
some other public activities in Los Angeles.1193 The US-Taiwan Defence Summit 2002 
was held in Florida from March 10 to 12. Deputy Defence Secretary Paul Wolfowitz 
and Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs James Kelly met 
privately with Taiwan Defence Minister Tang Yao-ming. This was the first time a 
Taiwan Defence Minister had visited the US in decades. Wolfowitz reiterated Bush's 
commitment of "whatever it takes" to defend Taiwan. 
On April 23, PRC Vice President Hu Jintao (i!i..§~ti) made his first official visit to the 
US. In the face of US-PRC cooperation for anti-terrorism, a formal visit by Chen 
Shui-bian to the US was impossible. However, transit diplomacy, or a special reception 
for Chen during his transit to other countries, would reap the same political effect. 
With the manoeuvring of the Congressional Taiwan Caucus, a bipartisan organisation 
dedicated to promoting US-Taiwan relations, Chen enjoyed a public banquet and 
exchanged opinions with many Congress members during his transit in New York en 
route to his state visit to four African countries in early July. Even after Chen's remark 
of "one side, one country" on August 3, the Taiwan Caucus successfully orchestrated 
Taiwan first lady Chen Wu Shu-jen (~~~f~')'s ostentatious ten-day visit to the US in 
late September. 1194 
Taiwan's Participation in International Organizations 
After the 2001 April aircraft collision, support for Taiwan's participation in international 
organizations became an established part of American foreign policy. Due to America's 
adamant support, Taiwan became a formal member of wro on January 1, 2002. 
Wmning a seat in the WHO is another target of Taipei. In fact, support for Taiwan's 
participation in the WHA and WHO has been an annual ritual. H.R.428 was introduced 
in early February 2001;1195 after the incident with the military planes, it was signed into 
1193 OPROC, Fuzongtongjiejian Meiguo zaiTai xiehui lishi zhuxi Buruizhe (Vice President Meets with 
AlT Chairman Richard Bush) (2002 [cited Mar4 2004]), availabkfrom ___ _ 
--http://www.president.gov.tw/php-biD/preZ/showne\Vs.php4~ · · 
1194 OPROC, Zongtong jiejian Meiguo lianbang zhongyiyuan 'guohui taiwan lianxian 'fangwentuan 
(President Chen Receives a U.S. Congressional Taiwan Caucus) (2001 [cited Mar 12 2004]), available 
from http://www.president.gov.tw/php-binlprez/shownews.php4. 
1195 See page 209. 
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PL107-10 in late May 2001. H.R27391196 and a Senate resolution in February 2002 
led to PL107-158 on April 4, 2002.1197 After the outbreak of the SARS epidemic in 
South-East Asia, two resolutions supporting Taiwan's participation in WHA and WHO 
were signed into law as PL108-28 in late May 2003.1198 In 2004, three resolutions led 
to PL108-235, another endorsement of Taiwan's participation in the WH0. 1199 
Free Trade Agreement 
For many decades Taiwan's economic viability has been a major concern for the power 
holders on the island. To many Taiwanese secessionists, economic integmtion across 
the Strait spells Mainland China's economic annexation of Taiwan. The DPP 
government saw the establishment of a Free Trade Agreement {FfA) with the US and 
other countries as a solution to prevent economic annexation by China. Taipei has been 
lobbying for FfA for many years. On November 6, 2001, just five days before the 
WfO approved China's and Taiwan's simultaneous entry at its ministerial meeting in 
Doha, Qatar, the ASEAN+l Summits in Brunei Darussalam endorsed PRC Premier Zhu 
Rongji's proposal to set up a "Framework on Economic Cooperation" and to establish 
within ten years an ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (AFTA), which boasts to have GOP 
of US$2 trillion and two-way trade of US$1.23 trillion based on a combined market of 
1.7 billion people. 1200 This proposal would make the PRC's rise to economic 
hegemony in Asia inevitable. Hours later, Senator Max Baucus introduced a bill to 
advocate an FfA with Taiwan.1201 In November 2001, China replaced the US and 
became Taiwan's largest export market; Taiwan's economic dependence on the Mainland 
1196 See page 216 of this thesis. 
1197 Before H.R2739 became law, a similar resolution, S.1932, was introduced on February 12, 2002; see 
A BiU to Require a United States Plan to Endorse and Obtain Observer Status for Taiwan at the Annual 
Summit of the World Health Assembly in May 2002, 107th Congress, S.1932. 
1198 A Bill concerning Participation of Taiwan in the World Health Organization, 108th Congress, S.243; 
To Amend Public Law 107-10 to Authorize a United States Plan to Endorse and Obtain Observer Status 
for Taiwan at the Annual Summit of the World Health Assembly in May 2003, 108th Congress, H.R.441. 
S.243 became PL 108-28 on May 29, 2003. 
1199 Concerning participation of Taiwan in the World Health Organization, 108th Congress, H.R.3793. 
A Bill To Address the Participation of Taiwan in the World Health Organization, 108th Congress, S.2092. 
To Address the Participation of Taiwan in the World Health Organization, 108th Congress, H.R4019. 
George W. Bush, Statement by the President on S. 2092, an Act concerning participation of Taiwan in the 
WHO (internet] (White House, 2004 [citedJan 1320()5]), available from _ 
h~://www. whiteliouse.gov/newslreleases/2004/06/20040614-9 .html. 
1 ASEAN, Press Statement by the Chairman of the 7thASEAN Summit and the Three ASEAN + 1 
Summits, Brunei Darussalam, 6 November 2001 (ASEAN, 2001 [cited Mar 13 2004]), available from 
h~://www.aseansec.org/5316.htm. 
120 United States-Taiwan Free Trade Agreement Act of2001, 107th Congress, S.l636. 
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continued to deepen. Six months later, the PRC and ASEAN launched formal 
negotiations to conclude a Free Trade Area pact. These developments made the FfA an 
urgent issue for Taipei. Chen promoted on September 9, 2002 the establishment of FfA 
between Taiwan and the US, Japan and ASEAN. 1202 Although Beijing warned all 
nations with which it had diplomatic relations not to sign the FfA with Taiwan, the 
House introduced a resolution in March 2003 to urge the US to enter into an FfA with 
Taipei.1203 A week later, a more aggressive bill was introduced to reaffirm American 
commitment to the TRA, address the PRC's threat to Taiwan and urge the US 
government to publicly support an FfA with Taiwan.1204 
The US Congressional Taiwan Caucus 
On December 20, 2001, a hundred days after 9/11, Representative Robert Wexler raised 
the idea of a Taiwan caucus with President Chen.1205 Wexler announced the formation 
of the 85-member Congressional Taiwan Caucus on April 9, 2002. It proved the fastest 
growing congressional caucus; in a few months, the membership expanded to more than 
one hundred members. In the name of strengthening bilateral relations in accordance 
with the TRA, the Taiwan Caucus actively promoted economic and strategic cooperation. 
The Caucus's efforts enabled Chen to enjoy a special transit reception in New York in 
early July, and his wife to undertake a ten-day visit to the US in late September 2002.1206 
The Impact on DPP Government's National Policies 
After 9/11, Taipei noticed the US was expanding its military presence in the Asia Pacific 
region; Annette Lu soon asserted that the situation benefited Taiwan.1207 The DPP 
1202 OPROC, President Chen Addresses the Opening of the 26th Joint Conference of ROC-USA & 
US-Taiwan Business Councils (2002 [cited Mar 16 2004]), available from 
http://www.president.gov.tw/php-binlpre:z/showenews.php4. 
1203 Expressing the Sense of Congress relating to a Free Trade Agreement between the United States and 
Taiwan, 108th Congress, H.CON.RES.98. 
1204 Expressing the Sense of Congress that the United States Government Should Reqffirm Its Unwavering 
Commitment to the Taiwan Relations Act as the Cornerstone of United States Relations with Taiwan, 
108th Congress, H.CON.RES.117. 
1205 Robert Wexler, Wexler Announces Formation of Congressional Taiwan Caucus [internet] (2002 [cited 
Feb 3 2004]), available from http://www. wexler.house.gov/pressJeleases/ Apr_9 _02.htm. 
1206 OPROC, Zongtong jiejian Meiguo lianbang zhongy_iyuan _'guohui_taiwan lianxian 'Jangwentuan -
(President Chen Receives a u.-s.- Congressional Taiwan Caucus) ([cited). 
1207 OPROC, Fuzongtong zai 'chengda qiye guanli xiejinhui 'yi 'tansuo Taiwan qiantu' weiti fabiao 
yanjiang (Vice President Makes a Speech on 'Exploring the Future of Taiwan' to the 'Cheng Ta Business 
Administration Association') (2001 [cited Mar 3 2004]), available from 
http://www.president.gov.tw/php-binlpre:z/shownews.php4. 
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gained another victory in the election for the fifth Legislative Yuan on December 1, 2001, 
winning 87 of the 225 seats. The newly established secessionist Taiwan Solidarity 
Union (TSU) claimed 13 seats.1208 The DPP, TSU along with other secessionist parties 
are refereed to as the pan-green camp. In the pan-blue camp, the KMT gained 68 seats, 
the PFP 46, and the New Party 1 seat. The DPP became the largest party.1209 On 
March 17, at the second World Taiwanese Congress (WTC), boasting the DPP's 
dominant position in the Legislative Yuan, Chen told the strongly pro-independence 
WTC that he shared their dream, without specifying what it was.1210 Therefore, the 
expansion of US influence after 9/11 helped Chen slip away from his "New Middle 
Way" to favour secessionism. 
However, domestic and international pressure for cross-Strait "three links" was mounting. 
To balance secessionism with the need of "three links," Chen claimed to pursue the 
normalization of cross-Strait relations and a balanced political, economic and military 
relationship.1211 When inspecting the frontline Tatan islet C::kfli)l%) on May 9, Chen 
announced his intention to organize a high-level DPP delegation to visit Beijing to 
resume cross-Strait talks and to commit to the normalization of economic and trade 
relations.1212 Before and after the talk, many entrepreneurs visited Beijing or declared 
approval of the "three links." On May 18, Formosa Plastics Group chairman Wang 
Yung-ching (3::7]<!f) pressed Chen for ''three links;" he asserted that Taiwanese were 
also Chinese and that both Taiwan and Mainland were part of China. The influential 
American Chamber of Commerce in Taipei (AmCham) also strongly urged Chen in its 
2001 and 2002 White Papers to establish direct sea, air and communication links with 
China to take advantage of Taiwan's proximity to the world's most populous market.1213 
1208 The TSU was only established on July 24, 2001. It respected Lee Teng-hui as its spiritual leader and 
proved a fundamentalist force for the cause of Taiwan independence. 
1209 Xuanju nianduji leibie yilan biao (A Table of Election Years and Categories), ([cited). 
1210 OPROC, Zongtong chuxi shijie taiwanren dahui (President Chen Attends the Second Annual World 
Taiwanese Congress) (2002 [cited Mar 4 2004]), available from 
hm'://www.president.gov.tw/php-binlprez/shownews.php4. 
121 OPROC, President Chen's Address to the CSIS Taipei Roundtable 2002 (2002 [cited Mar 4 2004]), 
available from http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/showenews.php4. 
1212 OPROC, Zongtong peitong meiti zhuguan qianwang Jinmen diqu bing zhi dadandao canfang 
(President Accompanies News Media Directors to Visit Kinmen and Tatan Islet) (2002 [cited Mar 5 2004]), 
available from http://www.president.gov.tw/php-binlprez/shownews.php4. 
1213 AmCham, 2001 Taiwan White Paper Part 1 (2001 [cited Mar 8 2004]); 5, available from 
http://amcham.com.tw/publications.php; AmCham. 2002 Taiwan White Paper Overview (2002 [cited Mar 
8 2004]); 12, available from http://amcham.com.tw/publications.php. 
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Chen: "One Side, One Country" 
However, as usual, the audacious ''Tatan talk" received little good response from Beijing, 
which seemed content with its economic attraction and elevated international status as a 
result of US-PRC anti-terrorism cooperation. Beijing was deeply suspicious of Chen 
and denied him any credit in promoting economic exchange. At this juncture, Chen 
was pleased to learn about the bright prospect of global and domestic economic 
recovery. 1214 Therefore, Beijing's rigidity only escalated tensions in the diplomatic 
battlefield. Chiu I-jen (.lil3~j£{-), Secretary-General of Taiwan's National Security 
Council, urged the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) on July 18 to launch offensive 
diplomacy, or ''fenghuo waijiao" Ci*V<j}~, flames-of-war diplomacy), to expand 
Taiwan's foreign relations.1215 When Chen Shui-bian was sworn in as DPP chairman on 
July 21, the PRC had reportedly offered US$60 million in aid and US$77 million toward 
debt relief to the Pacific islet state Nauru to buy its swing of recognition from Taipei to 
Beijing.1216 In response to the humiliation, Taipei broke off diplomatic relations with 
Nauru; Chen warned that he had not ruled out the possibility of "going our own way."1217 
In his opening address at the twenty-ninth annual meeting of the secessionist World 
Federation of Taiwanese Association (WFTA) on August 3, Chen expounded: 
What does "Taiwan to walk its own road" mean? ... Taiwan's own road is Taiwan's road to 
democracy, Taiwan's road to freedom, Taiwan's road to human rights, and Taiwan's road to peace . 
. . . In short, Taiwan and China standing on opposite sides of the Strait, there is one country on 
each side. This should be clear .... Only the 23 million people of Taiwan have the right to decide 
the future, fate, and status of Taiwan. [This decision] will be made by referendum. 1218 
1214 OPROC, Zongtong tingqu Zhonghuajingji yanjiuyuan 'guoneiwaijingji xiankuang zhanwang'jianbao 
(President Attends the Briefing of Chung Hua Institution for Economic Research on 'Prospect of 
International and Domestic Economic Development') (2002 [cited Mar 6 2004]), available from 
hm':l/www.president.gov.tw/pbp-bin/prez/shownews.pbp4. 
121 Monique Chu, "NSC Urges 'Offensive' Foreign Policy," IT, Jull9 2002. 
1216 Monique Chu, "Nation Left with 27 Friends after Nauru Defection," IT, Jul22 2002. 
1217 Lin Chieh-yu, "Taiwan May Go 'Own Way': Chen," IT, Jul22 2002. 
1218 See OPROC, President Chen Delivers the Opening Address of the 29th Annual Meeting of the World 
Federation of Taiwanese Associations via live Video link (2002 [cited Mar 5 2004]), available from 
http://www.president.gov.tw/php-binlprez/showenews.php4. OPROC's translation is different from 
CNN's, which goes as "Each side is a country. This needs to be clear." See CNN, Taiwan Leader Calls 
for Independence Vote [internet] (CNN, 2002 [cited Mar 5 2004]), available from 
bttp://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/east/08/03/taiwan.chen/. Taiwan's Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs standardizes the term "yibian yiguo" as "There is one country on each side of Taiwan Strait"; 
or "one side, one country." See 
http://www.mofa.gov.tw/mofa91/web/application.php?oid=web_statistic_trans_cn. 
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This was a clear departure from the "Five Noes;" CNN interpreted his talk as a call for a 
vote on independence. 1219 Indeed, this remark heralded his proposition of national 
referendum for a new constitution that would symbolize a new, independent nation in the 
second half of 2003. Chen's proposition of "one side, one country" was not merely an 
expression of diplomatic frustration or revenge. The prospect of economic recovery, 
and, more importantly, the steady progress of the US-Taiwan symbiotic partnership must 
have emboldened him. This diplomatic setback was a catalyst for a showdown with 
Beijing. 
Chen's United Front under Democracy, Economy and Security 
"One side, one country" crystallized DPP secessionism, aggravated cross-Strait 
relations and caused immediate concern from Washington. Chen held a series of 
high-level strategic meetings to integrate all fronts of policies to deal with the political, 
economic and military challenges posed by Beijing. In late August 2002 he 
summarized that democracy, economy and security were the three pillars of peace and 
prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region.1220 On the issue of democracy, he declared the 
creation of an "Asian Democratic Alliance" and a ''Taiwan Foundation for Democracy" 
to establish a democratic regional community. 1221 This echoed Bush's campaign 
promise to work "toward a day when the fellowship of free Pacific nations is as strong 
and united as our Atlantic partnership." As it was in NATO, the US would be an 
indispensable leader of an Asian democratic alliance.1222 The US was happy to see 
Taiwan promote regional awareness of political risks in association with China; 
''Taiwan's attainment of real democracy has established a deep and enduring bond 
1219 CNN, Taiwan Leader Calls for Independence Vote ([cited). For the contents of the "Resolution on 
Taiwan's Future," see page 193 of this thesis. 
1220 OPROC, President Chen s Remarks on the Eve of the Anniversary of the September 11 Attacks (2002 
[cited Mar 5 2004]), available from http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/showenews.php4; OPROC, 
President Chen Addresses the Opening Ceremony of the 2002 Asia-Pacific Democratic Cooperation 
Forum (2002 [cited Mar 8 2004]), available from 
hm'://www.president.gov.tw/php-binlprez/showenews.php4. 
122 OPROC, President Chen Addresses the Opening Ceremony of the 2002 Asia-Pacific Democratic 
Cooperation Forum ([cited); OPROC, Zongtong jiejian canjia 'Yatai minzhu hezuo luntan dahui' yuhui 
waibin (President Meets with Participants in the Asia-Pacific Democratic Cooperation Forum) [internet] 
(2002 [cited Mar 19 2004]), available from http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prezlshownews.php4. 
The Taiwan Foundation for Democracy was established on June 17, 2003. 
1222 Ellen Bork. Replace ASEAN (New American Century, 2001 [cited Mar 8 2004]), available from 
http://www.newamericancentury.org/eastasia2001.htm. 
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between it and the US."1223 
On the issue of economy, Chen had urged Taiwan in July 2001 to face the challenge from 
a rising China to win the inevitable "economic war."1224 To avoid focusing outbound 
investment on the mainland and maintain economic independence, on July 29, 2002, 
Chen revived the discredited "Southwards Policy" of Lee Teng-hui to encourage 
Taiwanese investment in Southeast Asian countries.1225 Annette Lu visited Indonesia 
in mid-August to demonstrate commitment to the policy." Taipei also sought to reach 
FfA with regional countries. These measures helped restore Lee's "no haste, be 
patient" policy. In the face of China's economic rise, many countries in the region 
endured the blows of economic "hollow-out effect" and exodus of foreign direct 
investment. 
On the issue of security, Premier Yu Hsi-kun (7J/j.f5;W!J promised former US Defence 
Secretary William Cohen in a closed-door meeting in Haiti on August 7 that Taiwan 
planned to allocate NT$700 billion for arms procurement through 2012.1226 This was 
on the one hand Taipei's strategy to appease America's backlash against Chen's "one side, 
one country'' with a huge arms procurement plan. On the other hand, it was also 
Taipei's commitment to the role of proxy balancer. Taipei's call for regional security 
awareness goes beyond self-defence. Beijing had portrayed Taiwan independence as a 
terrorist movement. In return, on September 10, Chen argued that the planned 
"unlimited war'' of the PRC against Taiwan was strikingly similar to terrorism. He 
claimed that the four hundred tactical guided missiles against Taiwan, adding to this 
arsenal fifty missiles a year, posed a grave threat to security in the Taiwan Strait and 
Asia-Pacific region. 1227 
1223 USDOS, Good U.S.-China Relations Require Clarity, Directness [internet] (2002 [cited Mar 8 2004]), 
available from http://lists.state.gov/archi ves/us-china.html. 
1224 OPROC, Zongtong chuxi Jingjifazhan zixun weiyuan huiyi'yubei huiyi (President Addresses the 
Opening Ceremony of the Preparatory Session of the Economic Development Advisory Conference) 
([cited). See also Lin Chieh-yu, "Chen Urges Part Two of Miracle," IT, Jul23 2001. 
1225 OPROC, Zongtong canjia yazhou Taiwan shanghui lianhe zonghui dijiujie nianhui kaimu dianli 
(President Attends the Opening Ceremony of the Ninth Annual Meeting of Asia-Taiwan Business 
Association) (2002 [cited Mar 18 2004]), available from 
h~://www.president.gov.tw/php-binlprez/shownews.php4. 
1 Ko Shu-ling, "Government Outlines Spending for Weapons," IT, Aug 9 2002. 
1227 OPROC, President Chen s Remarks on the Eve of the Anniversary of the September 11 Attacks 
([cited). 
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Domestically, "democracy, economy and security" promoted political nationalism. 
Internationally, this slogan was a reminder to the regional and global communities of the 
threats from China, a target of soft containment. Moreover, it promotes regional 
support of US-Japan security alliance and bilateral security pacts with the US, adding to 
the expansion of American influence and values in Asia Pacific and even on the global 
stage. Because of Taipei's lobbying efforts the European Parliament overwhelmingly 
passed a resolution calling on Beijing to remove all missiles aimed at Taiwan and 
gradually reduce its stockpile, calling on its member states to support Taiwan's 
participation in the WHO, urging EU Commission for a FfA with Taiwan, and 
demanding European Council of Ministers to invite Taiwan to the Asia-Europe Meeting 
(ASEM).1228 Taipei then launched a "one person, one letter" campaign, urging every 
Taiwanese to write a letter to an international figure or friend to highlight Beijing's 
bellicosity and focus international attention on the missile issue. 
The Emergence of Secessionist Adventurism 
9111 might have slowed the proliferation of strategic symbiosis between the US and 
Taiwan; however, it has not altered the course in the slightest. The Congress has 
relentlessly sought further cooperation with Taiwan; the Bush administration has signed 
many important Taiwan-friendly bills into laws, including PL107-107, PL107-228, 
PL107-314, PL107-10, 107-158, PL108-28 and PL108-235. The progress of strategic 
symbiosis in the seemingly adverse climate of US-PRC anti-terrorism cooperation 
inspired Chen's adventurism, exemplified by the proposition of "one side, one country." 
Despite Washington's strong reaction to the proposition, when the pressure receded, he 
seemed to use it unabashedly. For example, he reaffirmed "one side, one country" 
during a meeting with the media on September 13.1229 During the campaign for 
Taipei's and Kaohsiung's mayoral elections in late 2002, he kept repeating the argument 
of "one side, one country." Washington did not seek further explanation. This marks 
Chen's steps forward toward "pushing the envelope." Even in the face of adversities, 
he makes only limited concessions and abides his time for next step toward the goal. 
1228 Ibid., ([cited). See also 'IT, "Government Hails Europe for Its Support of Taiwan," Sep 6 2002. 
1229 Lin Mei-ling and Lin Wan-yu *f.~~. #W:~. "Bian chongshen liang'an yibian yiguo yao fen 
qingchu (Bian Reiterates That Each Side Is a Country Needs to Be Clear)," UDN, Sep 14 2002. 
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The Referendum and the New Constitution 
Taiwanese Nationalism as an Election Gambit 
The mayoral elections for Taipei and Kaohsiung, scheduled for December 7, 2002 were 
seen a prelude to the 2004 presidential campaign. The ruling performance of the DPP 
had been encumbered with global economic recession, lack of experience, ethnic and 
ideological conflict. The DPP had to find a way for dmwing support. On October 25, 
2002, at a campaign rally for the DPP Taipei City mayoral candidate Li Ymg-yuan ($!!! 
JG), Chen Shui-bian questioned opponent mainlander Ma Ymg-Jeou's loyalty to Taiwan, 
insinuating that Ma's visits to Hong Kong and refusal of Chen's invitation to the 
presidential office amounted to accepting "one country, two systems."1230 Because Ma 
was born in Hong Kong, Chen used the mainlander elite's link with China to imply that 
Ma is not an ethnic Taiwanese but a nostalgic Chinese, who presumably might accept 
Beijing's political arrangement and betmy the interests of Taiwanese. This was DPP's 
conventional wisdom of ethno-nationalism. On November 23, more than 120,000 
farmers and fishermen from all over Taiwan marched through the streets of Taipei to 
protest the failure of the ruling DPP to ease the impact of Taiwan's entry into the WTO 
upon their livelihood.1231 This was the largest street protest in Taiwan's history; even 
more alarming was that farmers and fishermen had been the tmditional supporters of the 
DPP. The DPP was awakened to the danger of losing the presidency in 2004. 
Awakening native supporters' ethno-nationalism became a prime concern for the DPP. 
Beijing's mishandling of such issues as Hong Kong and the SARS pandemic gave Chen 
a decent chance to bring attention to the issue of national identity and link it to 
ethno-nationalism. In December 2002, the government of Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region began a legislative drive to enact Article 23 of the Basic Law, 
which "seeks to eliminate any possibility of Hong Kong being used by any outside force 
to oppose China and foment chaos at home."1232 For many people on Hong Kong, this 
1230 Lin Cbieh-yu and Sandy Huang, "Chen Lashes Out at Ma," IT, Oct 26 2002. 
1231 Tsai Ting-i, "Taipei Sees Biggest Demo Ever," IT, Nov 24 2004. 
1232 Chang Kuo-cheng ~li!tn!G. "What Article 23 Means for Taiwan," IT, Dec 27 2002. 
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move violated Beijing's promise of "no change for fifty years." Hundreds of thousands 
of Hong Kong residents took to the streets in protest. Taipei seized the chance to 
denounce Beijing's recklessness and betmyal of people. The outbreak of SARS in 
spring 2003 and Beijing's incompetent handling of the epidemic again accentuated the 
systematic differences across the Stmit. Therefore, issues of Hong Kong and SARS 
helped the DPP to direct attention to the issue of national identity. Questioning the 
national identity of the pan-blue elites evoked ethno-nationalism and linked 
ethno-nationalism with national identity. To question the national identity of the 
pan-blue elites, the DPP began stressing the alien attributes of the pan-blue elites, of the 
national title and of the obsolete Constitution. 
On August 16,2003, Chen and Lee Teng-hui said that Taiwan would pay a painful price 
if conservative forces regained power.1233 One week later, Lee urged the rectification of 
the nation's title from ROC to Taiwan so that Taiwan could become a "normal country;" 
he urged major constitutional changes to bring it into line with the reality of Taiwan's 
situation. 1234 These ideas were consistent with Chen's position on "Republic of 
Taiwan," "new constitution" and "referendum" in the 1991 "independence plank."1235 
In fact, Chen echoed Lee in late 2004 by declaring that he hoped to oversee significant 
changes that would make Taiwan a ''normal country''1236 and that he was to rename all 
of Taiwan's public agencies within the next two years. 1237 He thus declared on 
September 28, 2003 that a new constitution for Taiwan would be enacted in 2006.1238 
This smacked of secessionist fundamentalism.1239 In this context, critics were right to 
comment that only a new constitution would build Taiwan into a "normal country;"1240 
and that drafting a new constitution indicated an intention to alter the status quo.1241 
Since then, "normal country'' has become a code for the fundamentalist mission that 
strongly inspires an ultimate change of status quo; and "new constitution" and 
"referendum" have become vehicles to accomplish this mission. 
1233 Chang Yon-ping, "Chen, Lee Warn of Conservative Forces' Return," IT, Aug 17 2003. 
1234 Chang Yon-ping, "Change of Name Must Happen: Lee." 
1235 See page 164 of this thesis. 
1236 See page 246 of this thesis. 
1237 See page 24 7 of this thesis. 
1238 Chang Yon-ping and Huang Tai-lin, "President Makes DPP Birthday Pledge." 
1239 For the definition of secessionist fundamentalism. see page 164 of this thesis. 
1240 Lin Chieh-yu and Ko Shu-ling, "Presidential Office, Cabinet Defend President," IT, Oct 1 2003. 
1241 Hsu Yung-ming, "Drafting a Constitution Would Alter Status Quo." 
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In short, when "new constitution" and "referendum" rose to dominate the headlines at 
the end of 2003, the DPP was in fact attacking the central issue of national identity, 
hinting at the alien attributes of the pan-blue elites, evoking ethno-nationalism, and 
taunting Beijing in order to boost native support, as it had in the 1996 and 2000 
presidential elections. In terms of international propaganda, however, "new 
constitution" was said to promote efficiency and "referendum" to consolidate democracy, 
and thereby allay any international misgivings about changing the status quo. 
Converging Positions on the Referendum, New Constitution and Identity 
Secessionism thus ascended to the main theme of the 2004 presidential election. On 
October 25, 2003, the DPP boasted that some 200,000 people had taken to the streets of 
Kaohsiung to support Chen's appeal for a new constitution through a national 
referendum.1242 Chen started a seven-day trip to America in late October to attend a 
ceremony celebrating Panama's Independence Day. On the issue of transit propaganda, 
probably because of conventional wisdom of boosting the DPP's popularity, the Bush 
administration gave Chen an unprecedented two-day transit in New York and Alaska 
respectively. On the evening of October 31, after accepting an international human 
rights award in New York, Chen delivered a 31-minute speech promoting his ideas of 
referendum, new constitution and consolidating Taiwan as a normal, democratic 
country.1243 Many US Congress members went to meet him. Deputy Secretary of 
State Richard Armitage phoned Chen to express his welcome; even Neil Bush, President 
Bush's younger brother, called on Chen at his hotel, which was seen as a top-secret but 
highly symbolic arrangement. At a November 1 banquet on the cruiser New York, Chen 
praised the US as Taiwan's true friend; in response, AIT!Washington Director Shaheen 
said that Bush himself was Taiwan's guardian angel. Chen even bragged about his two 
meetings with Secretary of State Colin Powell in Panama on November 3. While in 
transit in Alaska en route home on November 4, he received a red-carpet welcome and a 
medal of honour from Governor Frank Murk:owski. The DPP lauded Chen's successful 
trip; domestic opinion polls showed that Chen's approval rating had risen, surpassing 
1242 Lin Chieh-yu, "Kaohsiung Gets behind Referendum Bid," IT, Oct 26 2003. 
1243 OPROC, President Chen's Address upon Receiving the Human Iaghts Award by the International 
League for Human Iaghts [internet] (2003 [cited Jun 19 2004]), available from 
http://www.president.gov.tw/php-binlprez/showenews.php4. 
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that of KMT chairman Lien Chan.1244 Five days after Bush had made a resounding call 
to expand democracy around the world in a speech to the National Endowment for 
Democracy, Chen seized the chance to reiterate that a new constitution should be created 
to continue the country's democratic progress and put before the public in a referendum 
on December 10, 2006, International Human Rights Day.1245 
Anxious about the popularity gains of Chen, the pan-blue camp had heated debates over 
the wisdom of shouldering the responsibility of national security and checking the outcry 
for direct civic power, something that had given an unfair advantage to the DPP in past 
years. A reversal of thinking gained ground in the pan-blue camp. They decided to let 
the DPP take the consequence of promoting direct civic power. On November 15, Lien 
Chan proposed the "New Constitution Trilogy'' in an attempt to pre-empt DPP initiatives 
for a new constitution. Declaring that his trilogy was more radical than Chen's 
proposal and that it would be realized two years before Chen's would, Lien announced 
his intention to "propose our new constitution draft next February" for the first stage, 
"amend the current Constitution to add a referendum article" after the election for the 
second stage, and "put our new constitution draft to a referendum at the same time as the 
legislative elections next December" for the final stage.1246 On the central issue of 
national identity, Wang Chin-ping (.:Eiz-¥), native Legislative Speaker and the future 
pan-blue campaign-director, said Lien himself had not denied "each side is a 
country."1247 
Implying US support of the DPP and Chen, AIT/Washington Director Shaheen 
emphatically indicated at a Thanksgiving dinner with the Taiwanese Club in Washington 
DC that Washington understood that Taiwan's requirements for referendum and new 
constitution were meant to advance efficiency but not for independence.1248 On another 
occasion, she urged Taiwan to buy arms from the US to upgrade its C4ISR 
1244 For the detail of the trip see CNA, Xishou tongqing, xinrong zhi lU (Join to Celebrate a Trip of 
Prosperity) [internet] (Central New Agency, 2003 [cited Dec 26 2003]), available from 
h~://www.cna.com.tw/spec/index.php?no=0198. 
124 Chang Yun-ping, "Chen Drafts Timetable on Constitution," IT, Nov 12 2003. 
1246 Lin Chieh-yu and Jimmy Chuang, "Uen Trumpets KMT Constitutional Plan," IT, Nov 16 2003. 
1247 Yang Yu-wen, Lin Ching-yin, and Fan Ling-chia ~)fJ~. **1!D(~. m;~&. "Wang Jinping 
zhuanfang (Interview with Wang Chin-ping)," UDN, Nov 18 2003. 
1248 Chang Tsung-chib ~*9§', "Tsai Yingwen: gongtou zbixian shi xingdong shihou (Tsai Ing-wen: 
Time to Enact a New Constitution through a Ntional Referendum)," UDN, Nov 17 2003. 
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capabilities. 1249 She stressed that the US had never said it "opposes Taiwan 
independence" and what the US said was that it "doesn't support Taiwan independence." 
The implication was that arms deals served as insurance for Chen's drive for 
secessionism. 
Bush's Taiwan Doctrine: Opposition to the Unilateral Change of Status quo 
The Bush administration needed China's help in denuclearising North Korea, 
reconstructing Iraq, stabilising Mghanistan, fighting terrorism, and stemming the 
growing trade deficit. In recent months the US had noticed Taipei's provocative stance 
and Beijing's hardening Ihetoric. Responding to PRC's warning of war if Taipei 
pressed for independence, and to the perilous race for the new constitution between the 
pan-blue and pan-green camps on Taiwan, US State Department Deputy Spokesman 
Adam Ereli bluntly declared on November 19 that the US would "oppose any attempt by 
either side to unilaterally change the situation- or change the status quo in the Taiwan 
Strait."1250 On November 20, Mr. Randy Schriver, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, warned that "if any of [new constitution and 
referendum] efforts touch on Taiwan's status in a way that leads us in that direction 
towards independence, we're not going to be supportive of that." However, he 
repeatedly stated that under Bush's Taiwan policy, that "the United States does not 
support Taiwan independence."1251 
Taking advantage of Bush's non-support of instead of opposition to independence, Chen 
craftily stressed that the essence of his consultative referendum to coincide with the 
presidential election was defensive; one article of the DPP's referendum legislation 
permitted the president to hold a referendum if the country was under attack and its 
sovereignty was subject to change. At this moment, the pan-blue camp reversed its 
check of referendum and new constitution. On November 27 the Legislative Yuan 
passed the referendum law that had been drafted by the pan-blue camp. The pan-blue's 
1249 Chang Tsung-cbih iji*fU, "Xiaxin tan Taiwan anquan zuihao mai quanxian (Shaheen Says Taiwan 
Had Better Buy Comprehensive Insurance for Security)," UDN, Nov 17 2003. 
1250 USDOS, Daily Press Briefing, Adam Ereli, Deputy Spokesman, Washington DC, November 19, 2003 
[internet] (2003 [cited Dec 26 2003]), available from http://www.state.gov/rlpa/prsldpb/2003/26422.htm. 
1251 U.S.-Taiwan-China Issues, Randy Schriver, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs, Foreign Press Center Briefing, [internet] (GlobalSecurity.org, 2003 [cited Dec 26 2003]), 
available from http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmdllibrary/news/taiwan/2003/26534.htm. 
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referendum law concurred with DPP position that the president had the power to hold a 
referendum in the case of a national emergency, but stated that the president could not 
hold a non-binding consultative referendum, a provision that deprived Chen of his 
justification to hold a consultative referendum.1252 However, Chen soon declared to 
hold the referendum as scheduled; in the first consultative defensive referendum, he 
would demand that the PRC renounce the use of force and immediately withdraw all 
ballistic missiles against Taiwan. He hinted ominously that the first referendum would 
be followed by the second and third referenda without specifying what their wording 
would be.1253 
The PRC had asserted that Chen was only using the defensive referendum under the 
pretext of democracy to break Taiwan away from China.1254 The Bush administration 
had to adopt concrete precautions to prevent escalation of tensions. On December 1, 
James Moriarty, Director of Asian Affairs on the NSC, delivered a face-to-face caution 
and a letter from Bush to Chen to warn the latter about his referendum calling for China 
to withdraw ballistic missiles aimed at Taiwan. 1255 On the very same day, State 
Department spokesman Richard Boucher declared, "we oppose any attempt by either 
side to unilaterally change the status quo in the Taiwan Straits ... we would be opposed 
to any referenda [sic] that would change Taiwan's status or move towards 
independence."1256 Still Chen replied that Taiwan referendum was to focus on the 
threat of PRC missiles but not on independence; Chen seemed determined to use the 
''unneeded quarrel" to take on China and help his prospects for re-election.1257 
Washington was tired of Chen's manipulation of the referendum. On December 8, one 
day before meeting new PRC Prime Minister Wen Jiabao ( m_ * W ), the Bush 
administration issued an unusually blunt statement to Taipei, one that was broadly 
1252 UDN, "Guo-Qin ban gongtoufa sandu, zhengyuan bu paichu fuyi (After Third Reading of the 
KMT -PFP Referendum Bill, the Executive Yuan Might Request for Reconsideration)," Nov 28 2003. 
1253 UDN, "Zongtong: 320 gongtou hanwei guojia zhuquan (President: 320 Referendum to Defend 
National Sovereignty)," Nov 30 2003. 
1254 David Stout, "Bush Tells China Leader He Opposes Taiwan's Referendum," NIT, Dec 9 2003. 
1255 David E. Sanger, "U.S. Asks Taiwan to Avoid a Vote Provoking China," NIT, Dec 9 2003. 
1256 USDOS, Daily Press Briefing, Richard Boucher, Spokesman, Washington DC, December 1, 2003 
[internet] (2003 [cited Dec 25 2003]), available from http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2003/26776.htm. 
1257 Keith Bradsher and Joseph Kahn, "Taiwan Referendum to Focus on Missiles, Not Independence," 
NIT, Dec 5 2003; NYT, "Unneeded Quarrel Over Taiwan," Dec 6 2003. 
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interpreted as a warning that Washington opposed any declaration of independence and 
even political discussion or a referendum on the subject.1258 Hours later on December 9, 
Chen dismissed Bush's warning by insisting that the referendum would not centre on 
independence or try to alter the status quo, apparently believing that Bush's recent 
support of democracies around the world placed him in no position to condemn a freely 
held election on Taiwan.1259 Chen repeated that the first referendum would certainly 
lead to a second one, without specifying what its goal would be.1260 
In response, an enraged Bush called the PRC a "partner in diplomacy working to meet 
the dangers of the 21st century." 1261 He told Wen Jiabao that he opposed Chen's 
willingness "to make decisions unilaterally that change the status quo," a clear reference 
to Chen's drive for referendum.1262 Chen remained defiant despite Bush's explicit 
opposition. On December 22, he declared that he would abandon his "Five Noes" 
promise if Beijing stepped up its military threats. 1263 This unexpected addition of 
conditions and caveats to his basic policies substantiated the perceived willingness to 
change the status quo. He then declared on December 31 that the March election was a 
Taiwanese "holy war" against the Chinese Communists. 1264 Consequently, Chen's 
arguments and moves were no longer merely electoral gambits but concrete 
nation-building strategies. This raised considerable concerns. Kenneth Lieberthal 
feared that a new constitution written on Taiwan would acknowledge that the 
government in Taipei does not rule Shanghai or Chongqing but rules Taiwan.1265 Harry 
Harding clearly indicated that the Americans were alert to Chen's intention of using the 
first "opposing-PRC-missile" referendum as a base for revoking his own "Five Noes" 
1258 Sanger, "U.S. Asks Taiwan to Avoid a Vote Provoking China." 
1259 Ibid. 
1260 Kuo Hsien-sheng and Cheng Kuang-lung !¥139C!iili. ~J'G!ll. "Bian: gongtou zouchu diyibu, jiuyou 
dierbu (Bian: The First Referendum Will Certainly Be Followed by a Second One)," UDN, Dec 9 2003. 
1261 USDOS, Bush Calls U.S., China 'Partners in Diplomacy' [internet] (2003 [cited Dec 10 2003]), 
available from http:lnists.state.gov/SCRIPTSIW A-USIAINFO.EXE? AI =ind0312b&L=us-china. 
1262 USDOS, Bush Reaffirms U.S. Commitment to One-China Policy [internet] (2003 [cited Dec 10 2003]), 
available from http:/nists.state.gov/SCRIPTS/W A-USIAINFO.EXE?Al =ind0312b&L=us-china. See 
also Stout, "Bush Tells China Leader He Opposes Taiwan's Referendum." 
1263 Lin Chieh-yu, "Chen Tells China He May Revoke 'Five Noes' Pledge," IT, Dec 23 2003. 
1264 Reuters, "China Condemns Taiwan's President," WP, Jan 12004. 
1265 Kenneth Lieberthal. "Dire Strait: The Risks On Taiwan," WP, Jan 8 2004. 
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and for more radical independence policies in his following referenda.1266 Harding 
pointed out that one of the most dearly-held beliefs of secessionist Taiwanese was that as 
soon as Taiwan declared formal independence, Beijing would strike against Taiwan; the 
US would then be forced to intervene and become embroiled in a war with the PRC. 1267 
Peace Referendum 
Tying Technical Arms Acquisition to Ideological Referendum 
To allay international concern and pressure, Chen moderated his position on January 16 
by adding the peace factor to his "defensive referendum." He made a televised appeal 
that a "peace referendum" was to increase people's awareness of PRC threats and 
maintain the status quo of peace. He announced two questions that would appear on 
the peace referendum on March 20: 
l.The People of Taiwan demand that the Taiwan Strait issue be resolved through peaceful means. 
Should Mainland China refuse to withdraw the missiles it has targeted at Taiwan and to openly 
renounce the use of force against us, would you agree that the Government should acquire more 
advanced anti-missile weapons to strengthen Taiwan's self-defence capabilities? 
2.Would you agree that our Government should engage in negotiation with Mainland China on 
the establishment of a "peace and stability" framework for cross-Strait interactions in order to build 
consensus and for the welfare of the peoples on both sides?1268 
These two questions abandoned the previous demands that the PRC renounce the use of 
force against Taiwan and immediately remove all ballistic missiles aimed at Taiwan; and, 
they had nothing to do with a new constitution symbolizing Taiwan's new status as a 
"normal country." The first questions were designed to appease the Bush 
administration with implication of huge arms acquisitions so as to deliver the first ever 
referendum, which might benefit Chen's bid for re-election and pave the way for future 
referenda. 
Undermining the Unification Ideology of the Pan-Blue Camp 
By linking peace and democracy, the "peace referendum" strengthened nationalism at 
1266 Sun Yang-ming ~mf!lj, "Huafu xuezhe Hehanli: gongtou wenti zai taidu mailuo (Washington 
Scholar Harry Harding: The Referendum Issue in the Context of Taiwan Independence)," UDN, Jan 12 
2004. 
1267 Ibid. 
1268 Keith Bradsher, "Taiwan's Leader Tones Down Referendum Opposed by Beijing," NYT, Jan 17 2004; 
OPROC, President Chen's Televised Statement of the Peace Referendum on March 20 [news release] 
(2004 [cited Jan 19 2004]), available from http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/showenews.php4. 
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home. Annette Lu accused the KMT of Chinese chauvinism and argued that the 2004 
presidential election was a struggle of ''Taiwanese heart against Chinese heart." 1269 
This strategy caused confusion and debates on how to respond to the "peace referendum" 
in the pan-blue camp.1270 On January 26, questioning the legality and necessity of the 
planned referendum, all of the fourteen pan-blue mayors and county commissioners 
urged Chen to reconsider the "illegal and unnecessary" referendum.1271 In a debate 
with Chen on February 21, Lien Chan declared he would not vote for the illegal and 
controversial referendum.1272 Inactivity by not casting vote became a standard measure 
of opposing the referendum. The pan-green camp then launched "Remembering 
February 28 Hand-in-Hand Rally" to rally popular support for referendum. On 
February 28, more than one million people formed a human chain around Taiwan. The 
success nudged Chen's popularity rating higher. Lien in tum appealed to 
neo-Taiwanese-ism for support. 
Softening International Opposition 
All the signals coming from Washington and other places continued to indicate that the 
referendum was highly risky and irresponsible. Although all the evidence clearly 
suggests that Washington did not want the referendum to go ahead, it appeared that the 
US was unable to prevent Taiwan holding its first referendum. American high-level 
officials thus informed the Japanese news media on February 18 that the US could accept 
the referendum in Taiwan as long as it did not involve any attempt to change the status 
quo. The DPP caucus interpreted this as the first joint endorsement by the US and 
Japan for the referendum. In fact, the DPP had made this prediction months earlier. 1273 
This was indirectly corroborated when Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage 
modified his previous remark by adding on March 10 that the necessity of the 
12(:1} Zhongyangshe cf:l:S'cffd:, "Lu Xiulian: daxuan shi Taiwanxin duikang Zhongguoxin (Lu Hsiu-Iien: 
Presidential Election Is a Competition between Taiwanese Heart and Chinese Heart)," UDN, Jan 17 2004. 
1270 Lin Ching-yin #:tiD($:, "320 gongtou, lanjun taidu zai zhuanbian buzai dizhi (The Pan-blue Camp No 
Longer Boycotts the March 20 Referendum)," UDN, Jan 21 2004. 
1271 Huang Tai-lin, "Local Chiefs Rail against Referendum." IT, Jan 27 2004. 
1272 Chang Yun-ping, "Candidates Focus on the Referendum," IT, Feb 22 2004. 
1273 Hsu Ya-ching ~ftJW, "Minjindangtuan: Mei-Ri wei Taiwan gongtou beishu zaozai yiliao (DPP 
Caucus Has Predicted US-Japan Endorsement of Taiwan Referendum as the Final Result Months Earlier)," 
UDN, Feb 20 2004. 
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referendum was for the people of Taiwan to decide.1274 
Strengthening Proxy Balancing 
The fact that both the ruling and the opposition parties on Taiwan were considering a 
new constitution accentuated the security clause of the TRA.1275 The Washington Times 
reported on March 5 that the Pentagon had unofficially agreed to sell Aegis destroyers to 
Taiwan.1276 After all, in the face of rising military threat of the PRC, strengthening 
proxy balancing became a practical consensus between the conservative Pentagon and 
the Taiwanese nationalist government. 
The Fruits of Adventurism 
Overall, the transition from the original referendum to peace referendum provides an 
edifying lesson. Originally, Chen had planned to enact a new constitution through a 
national referendum to promote Taiwan as a "normal country." This was to implement 
1991 "independence plank" to change the status quo, an aspiration of the 
fundamentalists. With Washington's timely aid to his transit diplomacy and the 
promotion of Taiwan identity by the fundamentalist faction, Chen's adventurism 
consolidated Taiwanese nationalism. When facing pressure from Washington, he 
retreated first to "defensive referendum" and then to "peace referendum" but managed to 
secure US permission to hold the first referendum and strengthened proxy balancing. 
Adventurism with limited compromise seemed an effective way to maximize his political 
interests. 
Implications of the 2004 Presidential Election 
Domestic: Converging Ideologies with Tenacious Wounds 
One week before the presidential election, more than one million people joined 
nationwide marches and rallies organized by the pan-blue camp against Chen. The 
1274 Lin Pao-cbing f*Jfl!f, "Armitage tan gongtou ying you Taiwan renminjueding (Armitage: Necessity 
of Referendum is up to the People on Taiwan to Decide)," UDN, Mar 12 2004. 
1275 Harvey Feldman, "More Bowing to Beijing," WP, Jan 17 2004. 
1276 Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough, "Inside the Ring," Washington Times, Mar 5 2004, A05. See also 
Lin Pao-cbing f*Jf .Jt, "Huashengdun sbibao: Mei feizhengshi tongyi shou Tai shendunjian (Washington 
Times: US Unofficially Agrees to Sell Aegis-Class Destroyers to Taiwan)," UDN, Mar 6 2004. 
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event was an obvious move to counter the effect of the stunning turnout of the 
"Remembering February 28 Hand-in-Hand Rally." KMT Chairman Lien Chan and PFP 
Chairman James Soong kissed the earth in Taipei and Taichung respectively to 
demonstrate their love for Taiwan. Lien asserted that the ROC was a sovereign state 
which "we can not, and will not allow to be swallowed, merged or united with" the PRC 
and swore to defend Taiwan's freedom and democracy with blood and life.1Z77 This 
again indicates that the consolidation of Taiwan identity foiCed the members of the 
pro-unification camp to identify their interests with Taiwan; to win support, the pan-blue 
camp had to promote political nationalism, another departure from pro-unification 
ideology. However, this does not mean that the ethnic conflict was over: to boost 
Chen's rating, Lee Teng-hui openly urged Taiwanese to eradicate the alien KMT regime 
and conservatives.1Z78 
In this neck -to-neck campaign, the mysterious attempted assassination episode on the 
afternoon of MaiCh 19 played a key role in the re-election of Chen.1Z79 Some estimated 
the plot resulted in Chen's gain of 120,000 ballots and thus vanquished the presumably 
winning Lien-Soong opposition coalition.1280 Ultimately, Chen-Lu claimed 50.11% of 
the votes, only 0.22% (29,518 votes) higher than the 49.89% claimed by the 
Lien-Soong. 1281 The referendum was invalidated because less than half of the 
electorate cast ballots on the two referenda questions. The election results had two 
domestic implications. Firstly, compared to Chen's rating of 39.3% in 2000, 50.11% was 
a considerable rise in terms of support. The ruling DPP benefited from controlling the 
primary administrative resouiCes; that is, the ruling DPP uses the administrative 
resouiCes to reward its followers and consolidate the network of political support. 
1277 Huang Tai-lin, "Lien, Soong Hold Dramatic Rally," IT, Mar 14 2004; Tsai Hui-ping, Chen Chih-ping, 
and Lin Hsin-hui ~;t\~. ~~zp., f;f\~ "Lien-Song qinwen tudi, fanlan qunzhong feiteng (Pan-Blue 
Supporters Seethed with Excitement when Lien-Soong Kissed the Earch)," UDN, Mar 14 2004. 
1278 Lo Hsiao-ho and Liu Pao-chieh *I H. I!J·~· "Lee Teng-hui gaohu: chedi xiaomie wailai 
zhengquan (Lee Teng-hui: Root out the Alien Regime)," UDN, Mar 14 2004. 
1279 The blue camp suspected that the assassination was directed by Chen and his close protege. See 
Chen Chih-ping ~~zp., "Guomindang ceshi baogao 319 qiangji'an yi you 2 xianchang (KMT's Ballistic 
Testing Report Suggests the 319 Gunshot Case Had 2 Scenes)," UDN, Jul1 2004; Huang Kuo-liang ~m 
~. "Shuai Huamin: 319 qiangji'an buneng paichu zidao ziyan (Shuai Hua-min: 319 Gunshot Case Should 
Not Rule Out the Possibility of a Self-Interest Scheme)," UDEN, Jun 30 2004. 
1280 UDEN, "Qiangji xiaoying xuanpiao xiaozhang 12 wan (Assassination Plot Results in a Flux of 
120,000 Ballots)," Mar 21 2004. 
1281 Xuanju nianduji leibie yilan biao (A Table of Election Years and Categories), ([cited). 
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Chen's re-election was expected to expand the gain-loss gap in bigger Taipei and in the 
other parts of Taiwan within the next four years. Secondly, given the facts that each of 
the rival ideological camps has the support of about half of the voters on Taiwan and that 
the pan-blue camp is phasing out its unification platform, the consolidation of Taiwanese 
nationalism would facilitate more competition and collaboration between the rivals 
toward an ideological convergence. 
International Arena: A Paradoxical Crack in Strategic Symbiosis 
The White House delayed extending its official congratulation until March 26. Even 
then, the congratulatory statement was only issued on-line by the Press Secretary.1282 If 
this was retaliation against Chen's dismissal of Bush's warnings on the referendum issue, 
Chen was unmoved and remained defiant. He declared on March 29 in an interview 
with the Washington Post that his narrow re-election victory was a mandate from voters 
to press ahead with an aggressive agenda to develop Taiwan as an "independent, 
sovereign country'' despite the risk of war with China.1283 Even after China warned that 
a new constitution would sever Taiwan's legal ties with the mainland, and senior Chinese 
military officers declared that China was willing to go to war against Taiwan over the 
issue, even if it means a global boycott of the Olympic Games in 2008,1284 Chen vowed 
in a BBC interview on March 31 to press ahead with plans to put the new constitution to 
a direct referendum, insisting that constitutional reform was "never a timetable for 
independence."1285 His defiant adventurism splits the US-Taiwan symbiotic partnership. 
On the one hand, he worked hand-in-glove with US conservative forces to strengthen 
proxy balancing. On the other hand, he is undoing Taipei's influence operations. 
Ever-Strengthening Proxy Balancing 
Chen's determination for a new constitution even at the cost of war and his firm belief 
that the US would never give up Taiwan pushed proxy balancing to the fore. The 
Pentagon informed Congress on March 30 that it would sell to Taiwan two Ultra-High 
1282 Statement on Taiwan Elections, [internet] (White House, 2004 [cited May 14 2004]), available from 
http://www. whitehouse.gov/news/releasesl2004/03/20040326-6.html. 
128 PhilipP. Pan and David E. Hoffman, "Taiwan's President Maintains Hard Line; Chen Rebukes China 
in Interview," WP, Mar 30 2004. 
1284 Ibid. 
1285 BBC, Chen VoM" Constitutional Reform [internet] (BBC, 2004 [cited May 14 2004]), available from 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/3581407.stm. 
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Frequency long-range Early Warning Radar systems. These radar systems provided 
Taiwan with early warning and detection of ballistic and cruise missiles and aircraft and 
would become a vital component of Taiwan's air and missile defence architecture.1286 
The New York Times reported on April 7 that B-52's were back in Guam after more than 
decade, part of a wide-ranging Pentagon drive to make Guam a "power projection hub" 
on the edge of Asia.1287 When pressed by China to reduce American arms sales to 
Taiwan to lessen the risk of conflict across the Strait, US Vice President Dick Cheney 
rejected it, declaring "We are going to assist Taiwan to acquire the capability to defend 
itself," adding that China had "significantly increased" its own military deployments 
against Taiwan in recent years, 1288 though he said that if Taiwan declares independence, 
the US will not protect it from Chinese aggression.1289 
The House of Representatives passed the National Defence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2005 on May 20, 2004, the same day that Chen delivered his inaugural address. 
Section 1215 of the Act stipulates the exchanges of senior military officer (a general or 
flag officer of the Armed Forces on active duty) and senior official (a civilian official of 
the Department of Defence at the level of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence or 
above) to focus on defending Taiwan against potential submarine and missile attacks by 
the PLA.1290 Although Section1215 was finally dropped in the final version of the 
PL108-375, the legislative history of the bill reaffirmed US conservative forces' intention 
to restore its para-strategic alliance with Taiwan. 
Noting Beijing's concern over the ruling party's secessionism and opposition parties' 
departure from pro-unification ideology, the Pentagon's annual report on China's military 
power to the Congress stated that Beijing was preparing for military contingencies 
despite its leaders' talk of peaceful reunification.1291 The report suggested that Taiwan 
1286 Lin Pao-ching if*Jf]Jt, "Mei shouwo liangtao cbangcheng yujing leida (US Sells to Taiwan Two Sets 
of Long-Range Early Warning Radar)," UDN, Apr 2 2004. See also US DOS, Kelly Says Taiwan 
Relations Act Key to West Pacific Stability (State Department official's April21 Congressional testimony) 
(2004 [cited May 18 2004]), available from http://lists.state.gov/archives/us-china.htm.l. 
1287 NYT, "Looking for Friendly Overseas Base, Pentagon Finds It Already Has One," NIT, Apr 7 2004. 
1288 NYT, "Cheney Presses Beijing on North Korea," NIT, Apr 14 2004. 
1289 Judy Wu, "It's Not Fair," IT, May 8 2004. 
1290 To Authorize Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2005 for Military Activities of tire Department of Defense, 
108th Congress, H.R.4200. It became PL108-375 on October 28, 2004. 
1291 DoD, "FY04 Report to Congress on PRC Military Power," (Washington DC: DoD, 2004), 11-12. 
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might target the Three Gorges Dam as an asymmetric deterrence against China's 
attempted invasion.1292 
On June 10 Chen declared that NT$610.8 billion (US$18.25 billion) arms budget was the 
price for maintaining US-Taiwan defence relationship. 1293 Five days later, the 
bipartisan US-China Economic and Security Review Commission called on the US to 
"conduct a fresh assessment of the one-China policy, given the changing realities in 
China and Taiwan" and the "continued viability" of not recognizing Taiwan as a separate 
country, and reviewed whether the US needs to improve defence support for Taiwan.1294 
In July, the PLA carried out its largest military exercises of the year on Dongshan OI~JlD 
Island, featuring an amphibious mock invasion of Taiwan backed by guided missiles to 
intimidate secessionists. 1295 Meanwhile, US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld 
indicated in Japan that American base on Ryukyu was closely monitoring the Taiwan 
Strait.1296 The Pentagon tested in its Operation Summer Pulse '04 a worldwide and 
simultaneous deployment of its seven aircraft carrier battle groups.1297 The National 
Defence University launched a "Dragon's Thunder" war game on July 12 to specifically 
examine responses to an increasingly likely Chinese military action against Taiwan.1298 
On July 15, Taipei Times, a pro-DPP English-language newspaper, published a 
1292 Ibid., 52-53. 
1293 LoChia-wei BK •. "6108 yijungou, Bian: weixi Tai-Mei fangwei guanxi bixu daijia (Bian: 
NT$610.8 Billion Arms Budget a Necessary Price for Maintaining US-Taiwan Defence Relationship)," 
UDN, Jun 11 2004. 
1294 Bill Gertz, ''Panel Suggests Revisiting U.S. 'One-China' Policy," The Washington Times, Jun 16 2004; 
Charles Snyder, "US Group Suggests 'One China' Rethink," IT, Jun 16 2004. 
1295 IT, "Beijing Plans Massive Military Exercises This Month," Ju15 2004. 
1296 Chen Shih-chang, "Lunsifei: Liuqiu Meijunjidi miqie jianshi Taihai (Rumsfeld: US Base on Ryuk:yu 
Closely Monitors Taiwan Strait)," UDN, Jul 7 2004. 
1297 The goals of the Summer Pulse '04 include "maintaining the ability to respond to crises around the 
globe, enhance regional security and relationships, meet combatant commander requirements including 
forward presence, and demonstrate a commitment to allies and coalition partners." See DoD, Seven 
Carrier Strike Groups Underway for Exercise 'Summer Pulse '04' [internet] (DoD, 2004 [cited Aug 12 
2004]), available from http://www.cffc.navy.mil/dodrelease.htm. 
1298 Jim Wolf, Pentagon War Game Based on China Threat to Taiwan (internet] {Reuters, 2004 [cited 
Aug12 2004]), available from 
http://www.reuters.com/newsArticle.jhtml;jsessionid=ZIBE4HU200VGECRBAEOCFEY?type=domestic 
News&storyiD=5685376. See also Hung Po-chang, "Mei longyin yanxijiaxiang Zhonggong duiTaijunshi 
weixie {US 'Dragon's Thunder' Exercise Simulates PRC Military Threat against Taiwan)," UDEN, Jull6 
2004. 
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sensational story: a front-page report by Beijing-backed Wen Wei Po C3tlii¥&) in Hong 
Kong said PRC military chief Jiang Zemin had vowed to attack Taiwan by 2020 in 
response to Taiwan's independence timetable.1299 In tum, the US planned to deploy 
another aircraft carrier in either Guam or Hawaii to monitor the tensions in the Korean 
peninsula and Taiwan Strait.1300 On July 18, Wen Wei Po accused the US of supporting 
Taiwan's development of strategic WMD, including mid- and long-range guided missiles, 
biological and chemical weapons, depleted uranium bombs, long-range bombers, 
advanced fighters and submarines and of assisting Taiwan to construct a space satellite 
network to maintain surveillance on the southeast coastal provinces of the PRC.1301 
Critics believed the PLA was determined to obtain absolute maritime supremacy over 
500 nautical miles of its coast in the next ten years.1302 From April to November 2004, 
Taiwan engaged in its most ambitious annual military exercise, codenamed "Han Kuang 
(Han Glory) 20," in which Taiwan has for the first time used the US Joint Theatre 
Computer Simulation System. 1303 On December 21, the AIT verified that the US 
government would dispatch active military officers and civilian staff of the Pentagon to 
replace those working in the AIT to provide needed defence assistance. 1304 These 
events indicate the US military was taking definite steps to enhance interoperability for 
future joint US-Taiwan operations against the PLA. 
Vitiated Influence Operations 
Chen's adventurism was cause for concern. It was reported that before the Taiwan 
election, Bush was so infuriated about Chen's deliberate escalation of cross-Strait tension 
1299 Jiang said the period "before or after 2020 is the time to resolve the Taiwan issue." TT, "Jiang 
Promises to Attack Taiwan by 2020," Jull7 2004. 
1300 Chen Shih-cbang, "Xi Taipingyang Mei ni bushu diersao hangkong mujian (US Plans to Deploy 
Second Aircraft Carrier in Western Pacific)," UDN, Jul17 2004. 
1301 Ni Wan-chun, "Wenhuibao: Mei zhu Tai yanzhi huimiexing wuqi (Wen Wei Po: US Assists Taiwan 
to Develop Weapon of Mass Destruction)," UDEN, Jul20 2004. 
1302 Ni Wan-chun, "Zhonggong zizhijian chengjunjin hua sannianduo shijian (It Takes Only a Little over 
Three Years for PRC Indigenous Warships to Join Active Service)," UDEN, Jul21 2004; UDN, 
"Zhonggong qianjian shinian mubiao zhengduo wubaili zhihaiquan (PRC Submarines Aim to Gain 
Maritime Supremacy over 500 Nautical Miles offlts Coast in Ten Years)," Ju130 2004. 
1303 Ting Shu-fan, "Ziwo shixian de Taihai weiji (The Self-Realizing Taiwan Strait Crisis)," UDN, Ju122 
2004. Former Commander-in-Chief of the US Pacific Command Adminral Dennis Blair had headed a 
20-strong military delegation and observed a "Han Kuang 19" in 2003. He observed some of the "Han 
Kuang 20" secessions in 2004. 
1304 Wang Li-chuan, "Meijunzhi renyuan zhuTai, Zhonggong fandui (PRC Opposes the Assignment of 
Active US Military Personnel to Taiwan)." 
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that he referred to Chen as a "son of a bitch." 1305 After the election, Chen's 
adventurism pushed Beijing to harden its policy. On April 15, the Taiwan Affairs 
Office (TAO) of China's State Council asserted that Chen's agenda for a new constitution 
and national referendum was a timetable for independence.1306 This pushed the US to 
clarify its position on status quo. Observing the twenty-fifth Anniversary of the TRA, 
James A. Kelly, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, said 
during a congressional hearing that the term "status quo" was up to the US government 
to define: 
For Beijing, this means no use of force or threat to use force against Taiwan. For Taipei, it 
means exercising prudence in managing all aspects of cross-Strait relations. For both sides, it means 
no statements or actions that would unilaterally alter Taiwan's status.1307 
Kelly reaffirmed that "Our foremost concern is maintaining peace and stability in order 
to advance US interests, spare the region of the dangers of war, safeguard Taiwan's 
democracy, and promote China's constructive integration into the global community as 
well as the spread of personal freedom." 1308 He warned both sides against changing the 
US-defined status quo. To the understanding of John Tkacik, "status quo" means "no 
unification, no independence and no war."1309 AITffaipei Director Douglas H. Paal had 
long been irritated by Chen's defiance of American opposition to the new constitution 
and referendum issues. He specifically warned Taipei not to take Beijing's military 
threat as an empty threat and not to regard the 2008 Olympic Games as a good time for 
declaring Taiwan independence.1310 
The problem is that Taiwanese and Chinese nationalisms continue to feed each other. 
Each side is eager to shift the "status quo" in its own favour. On May 9, China's Prime 
1305 Sun Yang-ming fffim~. "Buxi cengyong yingwen 'sanzijing' maBian (Bush Ever Used 'Son of Bitch' 
to Curse Bian)," UDN, Dec 24 2004. 
1306 Melody Chen, "MAC Blasts Back at China," IT, Apr 15 2004. See also UDN, "Guotaiban: gongtou 
zhixianjiushi taidu shijianbiao (Taiwan Mfairs Office: Referendum and New Constitution Are Timetable 
for Taiwan Independence)," Apr 15 2004. 
1307 James A. Kelly, Overview of U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan- Testimony at a Hearing on Taiwan, House 
International Relations Committee, Apri/21, 2004 (USDOS, 2004 [cited Dec 4 2004]), available from 
h;Jp:l/www.state.gov/p/eaplrlslrm/2004/31649 .htm. 
1 Ibid., ([cited). 
1309 CNA, "US Support Weakening, Confab Told," 4. 
1310 Huang Mei-hui fi~;l{. "Baodaoge: Beijing aoyun bushi Taiwan hushenfu (Douglas Paal Warned 
Taipei Not to Take the 2008 Olympic Games as an Amulet for Declaring Independence)," UDN, May 6 
2004; UDN, "Baodaoge: liang'an 92nian dacheng yiZhong gezi biaoshu (Paal Douglas: Both Sides 
Reached the Agreement of 'One China, Separate Description' in 1992)," May 6 2004. 
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Minister Wen Jiabao declared that he would consider enacting a "Unification Law."1311 
The two main goals of the planned "Unification Law" were the first to counter Chen's 
plan for a new constitution and arrange a timetable for unification, and secondly to 
counter America's TRA.1312 Beijing had apparently entered a new and possibly violent 
phase in its decades-long struggle against Taiwan independence.1313 By contrast, Chen 
declared in his second inaugural address on May 20 to enact a timely, relevant and viable 
new constitution before his term expired in 2008. 1314 Deliberately avoiding any 
mention of his "Five Noes," Chen touched on lightly his promise to continue to "honour 
the promises and principles set forth in my inaugural speech in 2000." 1315 
Fundamentalists were pleased that Chen no longer referred to "Five Noes." 1316 
Taipei continued to call for other democratic countries in Asia-Pacific to join Taiwan to 
counterbalance the military threat posed by the PRC. Chen's address to the Second 
Democratic Pacific Assembly on August 13 again singled out Beijing as the common 
enemy of Asia-Pacific in the name of democracy, peace and economic prosperity. 
However, during a Beijing trip, Australia Foreign Minister Alexander Downer warned 
that Taiwan should not provoke cross-Strait tensions and that Australia was not obligated 
to help the US defend Taiwan, though Australia Prime Minister John Howard later 
corrected the remark.1317 Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong C*~ft) said 
on August 22, "If the [cross-Strait] conflict is provoked by Taiwan, then Singapore 
cannot support Taiwan." He also said that Singapore would not recognize Taiwan if it 
declared independence.1318 On September 24, Singapore Foreign Minister George Yeo 
1311 Chiu Pei-fen fft.~. "Wen Jiabao: renzhen kaolu ding 'tongyifa' (Wen Jiabao: Seriously Consider 
Enacting a Unification Law)," UDN, May 11 2004. 
1312 UDN, "U Jiaquan: tongyifa zhendui taidu, hui tixian shijianbiao (U Jiaquan: Unification Law Aims to 
Counter Independence and Will Embody a Timetable for Unification)," May 17 2004. 
1313 Willy Lam, Beijing Steps up Pressure on Chen [internet] (CNN, 2004 [cited May 25 2004]), available 
from http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/asiapcf/05/18/china. willycolumnl. 
1314 OPROC, President Chen s Inaugural Address 'Paving the Way for a Sustainable Taiwan' [internet] 
(2004 [cited May 21 2004]), available from http://www.president.gov.tw/php-binlprez/showenews.php4. 
1315 Ibid., ([cited). 
1316 Huang Ya-shih, U Shun-te, and Uu Pao-chieh Jim~. *M~. ~JW~. "Dupai manyi: 'sibu yi 
meiyou' tongtong chuju (Secessionists Are Satisfied with No Repetition of 'Five Noes' in the Inauguration 
Speech)," UDN, May 21 2004. 
1317 Joy Su, "Mark Chen Slams 'Unfit' Aussie Minister Downer," IT, Aug 21 2004; Tien Su-i 83,!~·1~. 
"Chen Tangshan pi Ao waizhang shiyan xiang Zhong chaogong (Mark Chen Denounces Australian 
Foreign Minister as Paying Tribute to China for His Indiscreet Remark on Taiwan)," UDN, Aug 21 2004. 
1318 U Ung-i *~· "U Xianlung: Taiwan ruo tiaoqi liang'an chongtu Xing bu zhichi (Singapore PM U 
Xianlung: No Support for Taiwan Iflt Causes Conflict across the Strait)," UDN, Aug 23 2004; Reuters, 
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(~~3(:) told the UN General Assembly that actions by Taiwan's independence groups 
could provoke war with China and "at stake is the stability of the entire Asia-Pacific 
region." In response, Mark Chen, head of Taiwan's MOFA, chastised Singapore on 
September 27 in Hoklo: "Singapore is a country only as big as a piece of snot" and 
"Singapore holds China's lan pa (.@~ifES. testicles) with its hands."1319 
On September 25, in response to an anti-government arms procurement budget protest, 
DPP Premier Yu proposed a "balance of terror" to safeguard Taiwan's security. 1320 
Senior Presidential advisor Koo Kwang-min ($Jl~) placed a full-page advertisement 
in New York 1imes and Washington Post to berate Bush and urge the US to abandon "one 
China" policy.1321 Mark Chen was said to have expressed similar opinions to some 
pro-Taiwan scholars such as Richard Bush and John Tkacik in a conference in 
September. 1322 
The increased dynamics of secessionism justified regional concerns. In an interview in 
Hong Kong on October 25, Secretary of State Colin Powell urged both sides to "look for 
ways of improving dialogue across the Straits and move forward toward that day when 
we will see a peaceful unification." He reaffirmed "one China" by saying that ''Taiwan 
is not independent. It does not enjoy sovereignty as a nation;" 1323 although he 
amended "peaceful unification" into "peaceful resolution" on October 27.1324 The DPP 
government remained defiant. On November 21, Chen Shui-bian declared his hope to 
Singapore PM Sets out Taiwan Stance [internet] (Taiwan Security Research, 2004 [cited Dec 16 2004]), 
available from http:/ ltai wansecurity .org/Reu/2004/Reuters-230804.htm. 
1319 Melody Chen, "Foreign Minister Slams Singapore," IT, Sep 28 2004. In the Taiwanese, or Hoklo 
language, lan pa means .. testicles." If someone holds another's lan pa, he is fawning over that person. 
1320 Ko Shu-ling, "Yu Heralds a 'Balance of Terror'," TT, Sep 26 2004. 
1321 Chang Tsung-chih ~*~· "Gu Kuanmin Niushi Huayou deng quanban guanggao pi Mei yiZhong 
zhengce (Taiwan Presidential Advisor Koo Kwang-ming Put a Full-Page Ad in the NYT and WP Blasting 
US 'One China' Policy)," UDN, Oct 6 2004; Charles Snyder, "US Officials Give Koo Ad Covert Support," 
TT, Oct 10 2004, 1. 
1322 Chang Tsung-chih ~*~· "Mei guanyuan yihuo: guanggao neirong shifou daibiao Bian Iichang? 
(US Official Wonders: Is the Ad Really the Position of Bian?)," UDN, Oct 6 2004. 
1323 USDOS, Interview with Anthony Yuen of Phoenix TV[intemet] (2004 [cited Dec 16 2004]), available 
from http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/37361.htm. 
1324 USDOS,lnterview with Ron lnsana ofCNBC [internet] (2004 [cited Dec 16 2004]), available from 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/37487.htm. 
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bring the constitution into line with the reality so to make Taiwan a "normal country." 1325 
On December 5, he pledged to change the names of all government and diplomatic 
agencies in Taiwan within two years. The declaration and promise proved that Chen's 
"normal country" agenda was identical to Lee's "normal country." The Bush 
administration is not naive enough to fail to appreciate the risks associated with the code 
name "normal country." Deputy Spokesman of State Department Erell made it clear on 
December 7, "changes of terminology ... would appear to unilatemlly change Taiwan's 
status, and for that reason we're not supportive of them."1326 Even so, Chen's MOFA 
was determined to change the names of Taiwan's quasi-embassies abroad. 
Pan-Blue: America's Alternative 
In early 2004, US National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice urged Americans to help 
China in its huge transition to realize the integration of economic freedoms and political 
liberty so that it could become a constructive international player. She reasserted that 
no one should try and change the status quo.1321 However, after Chen's re-election, if 
the pan-green camp dominated the legislature in the 2004 year-end election, Chen's 
adventurism to "push the envelope" could only escalate cross-Strait tensions to the brink 
of war. In contrast, the pan-blue camp has undergone a metamorphosis since the 1980s. 
"New Taiwanese" is the dominant belief of the pan-blue elite; unification is slipping out 
of its platform. In November 2004, the Ministry of Education released a proposed 
Taiwan-centric curriculum for high schools, stating that the ROC is not the legal 
government of Taiwan. 1328 This rekindled the debate over Taiwan's legal status. 
Despite the exchange of fire, the pan-green and pan-blue camps reached a consensus on 
"popular sovereignty." Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Kau Ymg-mao ~~~) 
argued that realistic "popular sovereignty" is an alternative legal structure that could be 
1325 OPROC, Zongtong canjia 'Huang Xinjie xiansheng jinian jiangzuo' (President Attends ~ 
Commemoration Lecture on Mr. Huang Hsin-chieh') [internet] (2004 [cited Nov 22 2004]), available from 
h~://www.president.gov.tw/php-binlprez/shownews.php4. 
132 US DOS, Press Briefing Transcripts - Adam Ereli, Deputy Spokesman, December 6, 2004 [internet] 
(2004 [cited Dec 7 2004]), available from http://www.state.gov/r/palprs/dpb/2004/39460.htm. 
1327 Condoleezza Rice, The National Security Advisor Delivers Remarks at The Mcconnell Center for 
Political Leadership [internet] (White House, 2004 [cited May 6 2004]), available from 
h~://usembassy.state.gov/mumbai/wwwhwashnewsl467.html. 
13 Ko Shu-ling, "The Cabinet Gives Ma a History Lesson," IT, Nov 11 2004; U Shun-te and Fan 
Ung-chia *JIW:f~. m~B. "Zhengyuan yuanhui bian Taiwan diwei, da 'renmin zhuquan' gongshi 
('Popular Sovereignty': Concensus after a Debate over the Legal Status of Taiwan in the Executive Yuan 
Meeting)," UDN, Nov 112004. 
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used to refute the PRC's claim of sovereignty over Taiwan.1329 KMT Vice Chairman 
Ma Ymg-Jeou echoed Kau by suggesting that the building of a consensus on "popular 
sovereignty" would invalidate external challenges to the sovereignty issue.1330 
As the 2004 year-end legislature election approached, American manoeuvres to thwart 
DPP adventurism were underway. US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage said 
on December 10 that Taiwan was probably the largest landmine in US-China relations; 
he warned that the TRA did not require the US to defend Taiwan if it was attacked; and 
said "We all agree that there is but one China, and Taiwan is part of China."1331 This 
constituted a dire warning to the adventurous ruling DPP. On December 11, the 
pan-blue camp won 114 seats in the 225-seat legislature, outnumbering the pan-green's 
101 seats and remaining a majority. An important factor in the pan-blue's victory was a 
suggestion of the AIT. The Arr studied Taiwan's political opinions and told the KMT 
that the DPP had adopted a precise vote-allocation strategy, which sought to maximize 
the number of electees by distributing votes among specific candidates. The Arr 
warned that the pan-blue camp would lose if it did not resort to vote allocation. The 
pan-blue leaders took the advice, enforced vote allocation and won the election.1332 
The US seems to believe that the pan-blue camp can better reconcile Chinese 
nationalism and Taiwanese nationalism to maintain peace across the Strait; supporting 
the originally pro-unification camp has become a viable option for the US to derail 
Chen's radical agenda for name rectification and new constitution. 
Beijing's "Anti-Secession Law': Gain or Loss? 
Beijing was too rigid to appreciate the implications of victory of the pan-blue camp or to 
refine its policy toward Taiwan. On December 17, the PRC National People's Congress 
1329 Li Shun~te and Fan Ling~chia, "Zhengyuan yuanhui bian Taiwan diwei, da 'renmin zhuquan' gongshi 
('Popular Sovereignty': Concensus after a Debate over the Legal Status of Taiwan in the Executive Yuan 
Meeting)." 
1330 Ibid. 
1331 USDOS, Interview With Charlie Rose on PBS [internet] (2004 [cited Dec 22 2004]), available from 
http:l/www.state.gov/sld/rm/39973.btm. 
1332 Huang Fu~chi Jfti:jf;, "Shiwu qianli cbongpiao zhan, Guomintang chongchu lantian (Unprecedented 
Efforts to Draw Votes Resulted in KMT Victory)," UDEN, Dec 12 2004. For more detail about vote 
allocation, see Tsai Ting~i, "December 1 Elections: Fairness, Feasibility of Vote Allocation Stirs up 
Discussion," IT, Nov 19 2001, 3. 
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submitted a draft anti -secession law. 1333 On December 27, Beijing released the 
"Chinese Defence Ministry's White Paper for 2004," characterizing cross-Strait situation 
as "grim" and elevated Taiwan and sovereignty concerns to top priority for China's 
armed forces. As a result, senior Japanese officials, including Foreign Minister 
Nobutaka Machimura and Defence Agency Director General Yoshinori Ono, disclosed 
on February 18, 2005 their plan to assure US Secretary of State Rice and Secretary of 
Defence Rumsfeld that "Japan shares a common concern about the future security of 
Taiwan" in a ''2+2 Ministerial" security talk the following day. 1334 Although there was 
no direct reference to this point during the news conference on February 19, senior 
American and Japanese officials issued a joint declaration of their desire to "encourage 
the peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait" as a "common strategic 
objective."1335 A US official remarked that the Japanese government had finally made a 
public statement of concern about tensions between Taiwan and China. 1336 A 
spokesman for the Japanese Foreign Ministry further asserted that the Taiwan Strait fell 
into the coverage of the US-Japan Security Alliance.1337 Consequently, the US-Japan 
Security Alliance had been expanded to cover the security of Taiwan, despite the denial 
of the US State Department.1338 
After the 2004 year-end legislature election, the US skilfully encouraged James Soong to 
meet Chen Shui-bian. Chen and Soong jointly issued a ten-point conclusion on 
February 24, 2005. The most important points were as follows: Chen returned to his 
"Five Noes;" the constitutional reform would not involve issues of national sovereignty, 
territory, or status quo across the Strait; and any change to the status quo must come with 
1333 Joseph Kahn, "China's Army May Respond if Taiwan Fully Secedes," NIT, Dec 18 2004. 
1334 Joel Brinkley, "Japan Said to Support U.S. on Security of Taiwan," NIT, Feb 19 2005. 
1335 USDOS, Joint Statement of the U.S.-lapan Security Consultative Committee, Richard Boucher, 
Spokesman, February 19, 2005 [internet] (2005 [cited Mar 22 2005]), available from 
http://www.state.gov/rlpa/prs/ps/2005/42490.htm. See also Joel Brinkley, "U.S. and Japan Declare 
Concern Over North Korea," NIT, Feb 20 2005. 
1336 Brinkley, "U.S. and Japan Declare Concern Over North Korea." 
1337 Chang Tsung-chih ~*~· "Riben: Taihai zhengshi naru Mei-Ri anbao fanwei (Japan: Taiwan Strait 
Formally Falls into the Coverage of the US-Japan Security Alliance)," UDEN, Mar 21 2005. See also 
Yang Ching-shun ~$'~, "Taihai anquan Mei-Ri lieru anbao mubiao (US-Japan Security Alliance Lists 
Taiwan Strait Security One oflts Objectives)," UDN, Feb 19 2005. 
1338 USDOS, Daily Press Briefing, Richard Boucher, Spokesman, Washington DC, February 18, 2005 
[internet] (2005 [cited Mar 22 2005]), available from http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2005/42480.htm. 
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the consent of the twenty-three million people of Taiwan. 1339 Chen's mentor, 
secessionist constitutionalist Li Hung-his (~Jim~}, believed that the conclusion was 
intended to placate the US.1340 Indeed, the conclusion could constitute a circuitous 
adventurism by allaying the concern of the US; on the other hand, Soong's move could 
be seen as a US maneuver to contain secessionist fundamentalism. However, people in 
each of the rival camps were very cynical about the result; the fundamentalists accused 
Chen of betraying the ideal of Republic of Taiwan and the pan-blue camp criticized 
Soong for rushing to embrace Chen but neglecting the duty of monitoring the ruling DPP. 
As the two camps exchanged fire with each other and the storm brewed within each 
camp, headstrong Communist leaders introduced and quickly passed the anti-secession 
bill that would effectively pre-authorize military action if Taiwan took concrete steps 
toward formal independence.1341 It drew an instant response from Taipei; in addition to 
the pan-green camp's condemnation, KMT Vice Chairman Ma Ymg-Jeou spearheaded 
thirteen pan-blue mayors and county commissioners to hold a grand international press 
conference on March 14 in protest of Beijing's handling of the sovereignty issue and its 
disrespect of the will of the people on Taiwan.1342 On March 26, hundreds of thousands 
of Taiwanese marched on the streets of Taipei to rally international support to the island 
republic.1343 
From mid-February to late March, Congress introduced five resolutions strongly 
opposing the law; H.CON.RES.98 was passed overwhelmingly by 424-4 on March 
1339 OPROC, Joint Statement of President Chen and Chairman Soong [internet] (2005 [cited Mar 31 
2005]), available from http://www.president.gov.tw/php-binlprez/showenews.php4. See also Huang 
Fu-chi,li Hao-chung, and Wang Cheng-ning JitiJt: · *?.lflf:t • .£IE •. "Bian-Song hui 10 gongshi, bu 
duli, bu tuidong liangguolun (Ten-Point Consensus after Bian-Soong Meeting, Including No Declaration 
of Independence, No Inclusion of the So-Call'State-to-State' Description in the Constitution)," UDEN, Feb 
24 2005. 
1340 Zhongyangshe cp~ffd:. "li Hongxi: Bian-Song 10 gongshi, shuogei Mei ting, dang fan fenlie fa (li 
Hung-hsi: Bian-Soong Ten Consensuses Are Used to Placate the US and Resist the Anti-Secession Law)," 
UDN, Mar 3 2005. 
1341 Kahn, "Beijing Leaders Speak of Force to Keep Taiwan 'Chinese'."; UDN, "Fan fenlie fa quanwen 
(The Full Text of the Anti-Secession Law)." 
1342 Fan ling-chia fi!~B. "Fanlan xianshizhang pi Zhonggong, xiang guoji fasheng (Pan-Blue Mayors 
and County Commissioners Denounce the PRC at an International Press Conference)," UDN, Mar 15 2005; 
Zhongyangshe cp~ffrt. "Kangyi fan fenlie fa, Ma Y'mgjiu zhaokai guoji jizhehui (Ma Ying-jiu Held an 
International Press Conference to Protest the Anti-Secession Law)," UDN, Mar 14 2005. 
1343 Kung ling-chi fL 1.r:m. "27 wan ren ca~ia 326 youxing (270,000 People Participated in the 
Demonstration on March 26)," UDEN, Mar 27 2005. An opinion poll showed that 82.3% Taiwanese 
oppose the anti-secession law; see Lo Chia-wei &Jiflf, "Ba cheng er Taiwan minzhong bu zancheng fan 
fenlie fa (82% of Taiwan People Disapprove the Anti-Secession Legislation)," UDN, Mar 3 2005. 
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16.1344 On March 20, in an NBC interview, Chairman of the JCS General Richard 
Myers reaffirmed Bush's Taiwan doctrine of "no change of the status quo by force by 
either side" and assured to fulfil Bush's decision of "whatever it took to help Taiwan 
defend herself." 1345 When commenting on China's anti-secession law before and 
during the meeting with her Chinese counterparts in Beijing, Secretary of State Rice 
categorically stated on March 19 and 21 that neither Taiwan nor China could resolve the 
cross-Strait problem on its own, 1346 reaffirming the role of the US in defining and 
maintaining status quo of the Taiwan Strait. Moreover, the law prompted the EU's 
March 21 decision to continue the arms embargo to the PRC.1347 The embargo was first 
imposed on China because of concern over human rights in the aftermath of the 1989 
Tiananmen Incident. Although the EU has wanted to lift the embargo in recent years, it 
is the Taiwan issue that justifies America's strong opposition to EU's lifting of arms 
embargo against China, an embargo that hinders China's military modernization. 
The linked events provide another vivid example of US-Taiwan strategic symbiosis. In 
retrospect of the development of such issues as referendum and new constitution, it can 
be argued that on the basis of Taiwanization, the seed dispersion of Taiwanese 
nationalism enraged Chinese nationalists, which in tum triggered regional country's 
misgivings, facilitated the expansion of the US-Japan security alliance, justified the 
expansion of US influence and consolidated Taiwanese nationalism. As Chinese 
nationalism becomes increasingly reactionary, chauvinistic and irredentist, 1348 the 
growing antagonism between Taiwanese nationalism and Chinese nationalism only 
1344 A Concurrent Resolution Expressing the Grave Concern of Congress regarding the Recent Passage of 
the Anti-Secession Law by the National People's Congress of the People :r Republic of China, 1 09th 
Congress, S.CON.RES.21; S.CON.RES.24; Expressing the Grave Concern of Congress regarding the 
Recent Passage of the Anti-Secession Law by the National People's Congress of the People :r Republic of 
China, 109th Congress, H.CON.RES.98; Expressing the Sense of Congress that the United States Should 
Strongly Oppose China's Anti-Secession Legislation with Respect to Taiwan, 109th Congress, 
H.CON.RES.70; Expressing the Sense of Congress that the United States Should Urge the People's 
Republic of China Not to Enact into Law the So-Called 'Anti-Secession' Legislation with Respect to 
Taiwan and Should Reaffirm Its Unwavering Commitment to Taiwan, 109th Congress, H.CON.RES.76. 
1345 NBC, Transcript for March 20: Gen. Richard Myers, David Broder, Ron Brownstein, John Harwood 
and Gwen Ifill [internet] (NBC News, Mar 24, 2005 2005 [cited Mar 31 2005]), available from 
h~://www .msnbc.msn.com/id/7231263/. 
13 USDOS, Interview With Aiko Doden of NHK TV; March 19, 2005 [internet] (2005 [cited Mar 21 
2005]), available from http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/43651.htm; USDOS, Remarks to the Press 
in China- Secretary Condoleezza Rice, China World Hotel, Beijing, China, March 21, 2005 [internet] 
(2005 [cited Mar 21 2005]), available from http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/43678.htm. 
1347 
"China Warrants an Arms Embargo," NIT, Mar 28 2005. 
1348 Chang, Return of the Dragon, 6, 221. 
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ossifies the symbiotic partnership between US Asian policy and Taiwanese nationalism 
and hinders China's rise to regional hegemony and to global superpower. 
Summary 
Since 2000, Washington's belief of US-PRC strategic competition and Taipei's strong 
aspiration for independence together have created a unique symbiotic partnership, which 
consists of proxy balancing for wartime mutual defence cooperation, and peacetime 
influence operations by which Taipei promotes regional comprehensive security, helps 
expand US-Japan security alliance and justifies the continued domination or expansion 
of US influence in Asia Pacific and in global community. This strategic symbiosis runs 
counter to China's rise to regional hegemony and global superpower; the ultimate goal 
can be construed as to make China a constructive member of the world community. 
After 9/11, the US government and pro-Taiwan Congress members continue to maintain 
cross-Strait military balance, promote high-level visit exchanges, advocate Taiwan's 
participation in international organizations, aggrandize US security commitment to 
Taiwan, integrate the island into the TMD system, and promote FfA. The progress of 
the symbiotic partnership along with the prospect of global and domestic economic 
recovery and diplomatic setback prompted Chen Shui -bian to utter "one side, one 
country" and used "democracy, economy and security" to promote a united front against 
China. 9/11 has not changed the course of this strategic symbiosis. 
The "new constitution" and "referendum" were Chen's brainchildren for the 1991 
independence plank. Since late 2003, the DPP has used "new constitution" and 
"referendum" to implicitly link ethno-nationalism with national identity to appeal for 
native support; they finally become vehicles of secessionist fundamentalism to tum 
Taiwan into a "normal country." Despite Bush's opposition to the agenda, Chen used 
adventurism to consolidate the identity of Taiwan, to win 2004 election and to achieve 
the first referendum. The consolidation of Taiwan identity obliged the pan-blue camp 
to identify with Taiwan, promote political nationalism and further deviate from their 
pro-unification ideology. 
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However, Chen's adventurism has caused regional misgivings, and has made Chinese 
nationalism more volatile and undermined the ultimate goal of making China a 
constructive member in global community. His plan for a "normal country" concurs 
with Lee Teng-hui's fundamentalism. The US government seems to use the Taiwanized 
pan-blue camp to contain the secessionist fundamentalism on Taiwan. The AIT 
manoeuvred to help the pan-blue camp win the majority in 2004 legislature election, 
derailing Chen's agenda of rectifying the national title and enacting a new constitution. 
Beijing's rigidity caused miscalculation of the timing and the result of enacting the 
anti-secession law. The law helps the US-Japan Security Alliance to expand to cover 
Taiwan, alienates the pan-blue camp and consolidate Taiwanese nationalism, reassures 
America's military intervention, and prompts the EU to continue its arms embargo to the 
PRC. The increasing antagonism between Taiwanese nationalism and Chinese 
nationalism further consolidates the strategic symbiosis between US Asian policy and 
Taiwanese nationalism and hinders China's rise to regional hegemony and global 
superpower. 
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Chapter 7: CONCLUSION 
Introduction 
This thesis has explored the influence of the US on the evolution of Taiwanese 
nationalism and the role of Taiwanese nationalism in America's Asian policy. It 
attempts to provide a stable and enduring picture of America's Taiwan policy. In 
addition, this thesis has sought to expound American self-interest intention of promoting 
separatism on Taiwan and American containment against China to vindicate the 
misgivings of Chinese nationalism. 
The Formation & Fortification of Strategic Symbiosis 
The main findings of the previous chapters can be summarized as follows: 
After the Qing government ceded Taiwan in 1895, ingrained Chinese nationalism 
prompted the Taiwanese armed and political resistance against Japanese occupation. 
Japan's fifty-year colonial rule planted the seed of Taiwanese nationalism, an inchoate 
Taiwanese consciousness- defined by the Chinese diasporas' passion for irredentism on 
the one hand but inspiring the islanders for an "imagined community" on the other hand. 
Since the early 1940s, America's involvement in Taiwan affairs has been marked by 
hegemonism that had incorporated the values of "self-determination." The KMT's 
misrule since 1945 takeover and the ensuing February 28 Incident caused the 
germination of the seed of Taiwanese nationalism. The successive victories of the CCP 
against the KMT in late 1948 and the imminent prospect of the Communist rule of the 
whole China pushed the US government to secretly develop separatism on Taiwan so as 
to deny the island to the Communists. However, the cause of independence had not 
received strong backing from the Taiwanese community since the beginning. American 
diplomats' first-hand reports repeatedly stressed that Taiwanese independence groups 
were disunited, politically illiterate, disorganized and unreliable; that they had small 
influence but tended to exaggerate the support behind them to force outside action. 
Without America's promotion of Formosan autonomous movement, the KMT could have 
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stifled the germinant, vulnerable Taiwanese nationalism. This underlines that America 
never ruled out Taiwan independence in the name of self-determination to serve US 
national interests. That is, during the initial Cold War era, America encountered 
Taiwanese nationalism and helped its germination to serve US hegemony in East Asia. 
The Korean War marked the inception of a bipolarised Cold War era. The Truman 
administration's resumed separatist intention, including political assertion about the 
undetermined legal status of Taiwan and military neutralization of the Taiwan Strait, 
directly contributed to the emergence of Taiwanese ethno-nationalism. The US further 
used economic aid to promote Taiwanese structuralism and undermine the KMT regime. 
The resulted rapid economic growth from the late 1950s on and accumulative 
socio-economic changes contributed significantly to the native political struggle against 
the ruling mainlander elites in the following decades. American aid also nurtured a 
US-oriented Taiwanese nationalism. By the end of 1960, some US scholars such as 
John K. Fairbank, Robert Scalapino and A. Doak Barnett had shaped a culture-based 
"Taiwan Independence Roadmap;" they believed that the Sino-US cultural conflict, 
cross-Strait cultural differences and intra-island cultural assimilation or Taiwanization 
would perpetuate an independent Taiwan and envisioned that the "Roadmap" would lead 
to Taiwan's self -determination short of full independence. In the context of separatistist 
intention of the US, constructuralism seemed a natural corollary under the authoritarian 
rule of the KMT and the persistent threat from the Communists; democratisation had 
become a common goal of mainlander liberals and Taiwanese nationalists since the late 
1950s. As a result of America's separatist strategies and scholars' independence 
theories, overseas independence groups grew confident that an independent state of 
Taiwan was going to be established in the 1970s. That is, in the bipolarised Cold War 
era, America's underlying separatist approaches helped the construction of independence 
theories and the practical growth of Taiwanese nationalism. 
American confidence in "olle China, One Taiwan" and Tai wanization facilitated 
US-PRC rapprochement. The Three Joint Communique and the TRA inherited the 
essence of separatist intention, and reconciled the need of US-PRC rapprochement and 
the promotion ofTaiwanese nationalism. Under the ostensible "one China" policy, each 
communique on the one hand challenged KMT legitimacy and made Chiang Ching-kuo 
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committed to indigenisation, which facilitated US-expected Taiwanization, eroded "one 
China" policy, substantiated Taiwan's independence, promoted unofficial US-Taiwan 
relations, advanced the economic and political power of the Taiwanese and expanded 
American values and lifestyles on Taiwan. On the other hand, each communique 
galvanized political nationalism, justified opposition movement's appeals for democratic 
reforms, advanced the partnership between some US Congress members sympathetic to 
the cause of Taiwan independence and secessionist Taiwanese in the name of human 
rights and democracy and built up pressure for democratisation and Taiwanization. In 
this context, democratisation was triggered externally by a protracted process of US-PRC 
rapprochement, promoted internally by the nationalist opposition movement and by the 
cumulative socio-economic changes, both of which are legacies of US aid, and pushed 
by the partnership between some US Congress members and Taiwanese nationalists. 
The influx of overseas secessionist political nationalism caused division of national 
identity at home; the committed secessionists further sparked an independent 
nation-building movement and helped the enlightenment of secessionism on the island. 
In short, the cocoon-like "one China" policy in the Sino-US rapprochement era induced a 
metamorphosis of US-Taiwan relations and benefited the pollination of Taiwanese 
secessionism. 
Potential Sino-US confrontation loomed around 1989. The shared perception of the 
threat from Beijing prompted conservatives in Washington and secessionists in Taipei to 
realign their interests for security cooperation. The progress of Tai wanization carried 
huge strategic significance. Lee Teng-hui's Taiwanization aimed to achieve Taiwanese 
domination of Taiwan and break Taiwan away from China. This was identical with the 
US scheme of Taiwanization in the "Taiwan Independence Roadmap." Accordingly, 
the US legalized the primacy of the TRA over the August 17 Communique to advance its 
arms sales to Taiwan in the name of maintaining regional peace and stability; and, in the 
name of supporting democratisation and with the facilitation of Lee's lobbying funds, 
many US Congress members and conservatives established a strategic alliance with Lee, 
which helped dismiss Clinton's faith in "one China," counter Beijing's intimidation and 
assure the advance of Taiwanization. On Taiwan, Lee on the one hand used 
structuralism and cooperated with the DPP ethno-nationalism to push mainlanders aside; 
on the other hand, he proposed constructuralist arguments to remedy aggravated ethnic 
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conflict and ideological cleavage, and imposed a new vision of nation-building. 
Taiwanization was finally accomplished with Chen Shui-bian's victory in 2000 
presidential election. Despite the crises of ethnic conflict and national identity, 
"neo-Taiwanese-ism" has become the political consensus about the future of Taiwan. 
"Neo-Taiwanese-ism" is a natural by-product of Taiwanization;1349 it represents the 
fruition of Taiwanese constructumlism and symbolizes the preliminary accomplishment 
of cultural assimilation. In retrospect, cultural assimilation, or Tai wanization is built 
upon democratisation and was accomplished with the fruition of Taiwanese nationalism 
in the ambience of strategic realignment between the US and Taiwanese nationalist 
power holders. 
Since 2000, Washington's belief in Sino-US strategic competition and the ruling DPP's 
aspiration for independence have together created a unique symbiotic partnership, which 
consists of proxy balancing for wartime putposes and Taipei's influence operations in 
peacetime. In the latter, by dispersing the seeds of Taiwanese nationalism in the 
international community, Taipei seeks to promote regional comprehensive security 
against China, expand the US-Japan security alliance and justify the continued 
domination or expansion of US influence in regional and global community. The 9111 
Incident has not changed the course of strategic symbiosis at all. The DPP used "new 
constitution" and "referendum" to implicitly link ethno-nationalism with national 
identity to draw support for the 2004 presidential election; these two issues have 
significantly strengthened Taiwan identity; they finally become fundamentalists' vehicles 
to alter the status quo of the Taiwan Strait. Chen Shui-bian's re-election reinforces 
bilateral proxy balancing against China; however, his adventurism makes Chinese 
nationalism so volatile that the US government has to use the pan-blue camp to contain 
the secessionist fundamentalism on Taiwan. The consolidation of Taiwan identity 
subjects the pan-blue elite to constructuralism; they are increasingly deviating from their 
pro-unification ideology. Believed to be able to better reconcile the rivalling Chinese 
and Taiwanese nationalisms, the Taiwanized pan-blue camp can be an alternative partner 
for bilateral strategic symbiosis. Beijing's rigidity and manipulation of nationalism 
only result in increased antagonism across the Strait, which assures to consolidate 
1349 Yu, "The Politics of Taiwanisation (ll): The Road to a New Identity," 29. 
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Taiwanese constructuralism, ossify the symbiotic partnership between US Asian policy 
and Taiwanese nationalism and hinders China's rise to regional hegemony and global 
superpower. 
A Historical View of the Past, the Present, and the Future 
America's Asian policies have punctuated the evolution of Taiwanese nationalism. 
During the initial stage of the Cold War, the US encountered germinating Taiwanese 
secessionism and intended to cultivate separatism on Taiwan to deny the island to 
Chinese Communists and serve American hegemony. In the bipolarised Cold War era, 
some American scholars, based on the separatist intention of the US government, forged 
an ethereal and elusive culture-based ''Taiwan Independence Roadmap," which has 
evolved into an enduring and guiding principle of America's Taiwan policy. 
The concept of "cultural conflict" envisioned the epochal confrontation between the US 
and China, which proved a contemporary reality, despite all the diplomatic rhetoric, 
exchanges, and cooperation. America treats Taiwan as an integral part of its 
containment strategy against China, while the latter helps the former continue and 
expand its influence in the international community. In retrospect, and in the simplest 
terms, this strategic symbiosis developed on the basis of Taiwanization, which 
symbolized "cultural assimilation" and rested on democratisation, which highlighted 
"cultural differences" across the Strait and evolved in the context of separatist intention 
of America and resulted from the injection of US political values and economic aid, both 
of which sought to promote democratisation and Taiwanization and thus contributed to 
Taiwanese nationalism. Put another way, although the goals of American 
interventionism on Taiwan since late 1948 were based mainly on preventing the 
expansion of communism in East Asia, Taiwanese nationalism has benefited a lot from 
the underlying separatist intention of the US government. Taiwanese nationalism grew 
with the inspiration of American values and the help of American aid. Those values 
and that aid, along with the dominant majority Taiwanese, enabled the Taiwanese 
nationalists to insist upon democratisation and achieve Taiwanization, ultimately 
resulting in strategic symbiosis. In short, the evolution of Taiwanese nationalism and 
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the antagonism between Taiwanese and Chinese nationalisms both result from Taiwan's 
progress along a different historical trajectory to that of the mainland under the scheme 
and influence of America. 
The ultimate intention of US policy on Taiwan has remained controversial. Andrew 
Nathan aruges that the US is not concerned about whether Taiwan is independent, only 
that the issue is resolved peacefully.1350 However, independence can be either de facto 
or de jure; Nathan's argument does not help clarify America's intention. Added to the 
ambiguity and confusion of the American intention are the contradictory statements by 
the top officials of the Bush administration, even Bush himself. Bush referred to 
Taiwan and China as two "countries" and called Taiwan "Republic of Taiwan" on April4, 
2002.1351 After re-election, Chen Shui-bian's escalating adventurism prompted Colin 
Powell to say on October 25, 2004, "Taiwan is not independent. It does not enjoy 
sovereignty as a nation;"1352 and Richard Armitage to say on December 10, 2004, "We 
all agree that there is but one China, and Taiwan is part of China."1353 However, White 
House spokesman Scott McClellan said on "February 28," 2005, "when it comes to 
China and Taiwan, and our position remains the same. We also continue to encourage 
cross-Strait dialogue between the countries as the best way to resolving some of the 
issues that remain."1354 These high-profile, contradictory remarks that show that the US 
does not simply support Taiwanese nationalism only exacerbate the complexity of the 
issue. 
Indeed, the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue is the focus of the efforts of all major 
powers involved; as long as the result is peaceful, it does not matter whether the outcome 
is unification or independence. However, as John King Fairbank has admonished the 
US since the late 1950s, what Washington confronts is a Beijing regime which has the 
1350 Andrew J. Nathan, "The Effect of Taiwan's Political Reform on Taiwan-Mainland Relations," in 
Political Change in Taiwan, ed. Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992), 
216. 
1351 Agence France-Presse, "Taiwan Gaffe by Bush an Oral Mistake, Says US," SCMP, Apr 8 2002; 
Chang Tsung-cbih ~*~· "Buxi kouwu? Mei guowuyuan: reng cheng Taiwan huo Taiwan renmin (A 
Slip of Tongue by Bush? State Department: Still Use Taiwan or People of Taiwan)," UDN, Apr 7 2002; 
TT, "Editorial: Is the US' Taiwan Policy Changing?" Apr 7 2002, 8. 
1352 See page 246 of this thesis. 
1353 See page 193 of this thesis. 
1354 White House, February 28, 2005 -Press Briefing by Scott McClellan [internet] (White House, 2005 
[cited Mar 31 2005]), available from http://www. whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050228-8.html. 
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formidable combination of Communism and Chinese nationalism; 1355 the epochal 
Sino-America antagonism further highlights Taiwan's strategic importance; 1356 and, 
most importantly, "the fact of Taiwan's independence is our object, not the name." 1357 
Although the whole Taiwan independence movement is not a creation of US policy, in 
the past decades, the US administmtions have on the one hand provided crucial support 
for the Taiwan independence movement by never ruling out independence as an option 
for the island so as to consolidate US hegemony; Washington has, on the other hand, 
repeatedly asserted that it does not support Taiwan independence so as to avoid direct 
conflict with Beijing. Consequently, the status quo of Taiwan Strait- "no unification, 
no independence and no war''1358 - is the crystallization of perpetuating a de facto 
independent Taiwan. 
With the accomplishment of Taiwanization and the realization of the ''Taiwan 
Independence Roadmap," Taiwanese nationalism is now helping American hegemony in 
the epochal Sino-US confrontation. Because the American Seventh Fleet is able to 
patrol the Taiwan Straits and use a Taiwan base when situations require, contemporary 
Taiwan has become a bona fide military and cultural bastion of the US, and the 
westernmost point on America's Western Pacific frontier. A remark by former US 
Secretary of State Colin Powell is most edifying: 
An arms build-up, like those new missiles opposite Taiwan, only deepen tensions, deepen 
suspicion. Whether China chooses peace or coercion to resolve its differences with Taiwan will 
tell us a great deal about the kind of relationship China seeks not only with its neighbors, but with 
us. 
The differences between China and Taiwan are fundamentally political. They cannot be 
solved by military means.1359 
This remark exemplifies the strategic symbiosis between US Asian policy and Taiwanese 
nationalism. As long as the concept of Sino-US "cultural conflict" or the prospect of 
Sino-US confrontation remains true, the symbiotic partnership will perpetuate the de 
facto independence of Taiwan, hinder the rise of China to regional hegemony and thence 
13S5 Fairbank. "China: Time For a Policy," 37. 
1356 Fairbank, China: The People's Middle Kingdom and the U.S.A., 54, 65. 
1357 Ibid., 63. 
1358 CNA, "US Support Weakening, Confab Told," 4. 
1359 USDOS, Remarks at Asia Society Annual Dinner [internet] (2003 [cited Jan 12 2004]), available from 
http-J/www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2002/10983.htm. 
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to global superpower, and help the US consolidate its national interests in the 
Asia-Pacific region or even in the global stage. 
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